## 1NC

### 1NC – Minimalist

#### Their theory of IR is wrong and racist – it relies on Western conceptions of sovereignty, racializes depictions of anarchy absent Western values, and assumes a White, rational neoliberal subject at the core of decision making – this propagates both instability and imperialism.

Hobson, 22 – Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield and is a Fellow of the British Academy. (John M Hobson, “Unmasking the racism of orthodox international relations/international political economy theory,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 53(1), 2-16-2022, doi: 10.1177/09670106211061084)//ILake-MO \*~~problematic language~~ [replaced]

Cycles of racism in orthodox international relations theory

The core point is that racism is a shapeshifter in that its outward expression or modality changes over time while its underlying structure remains the same. Before 1945 both scientific racism and ‘manifest’ cultural racism focused explicitly on race as a core category, while after 1945 race disappears from international relations theory’s gaze and its conceptual repertoire. In particular, 1945 is conventionally viewed as the watershed moment when international relations jettisoned scientific and manifest cultural racism. In this narrative, the West’s ensuing ‘colonial racist guilt syndrome’ prompted the social sciences to ‘make amends’ by replacing the dark old racist Weltanschauung with a bright new non-racist worldview in which the post-1945 international relations discipline came to embrace a value-free, positivistic posture through which the pernicious phenomena of racial hatred and imperialism are thought to have been finally and mercifully exorcized. But the reality saw the creation of a brave new worldview in which explicit racism (scientific and manifest cultural racism) indeed died out in the halls of the academy and were replaced not by ‘non-racist cultural pluralism’ but by subliminal cultural-racist monism that appears on first blush as socially acceptable given that it no longer talks about race and its associated tropes (Hobson, 2012: 185–186, 319–322). Thus, in subliminal cultural racism, Western academics did indeed distance themselves from the old explicit racist tropes but reaffirmed them in whitewashed terms that dare not speak their name.

Thus, ‘white supremacism’ was replaced by the core modus operandi of Western universalism (a.k.a. ‘Western superiority’) and, albeit implicitly, white normality; racial hierarchy alongside the racial standard of civilization were replaced by the proxies of cultural-institutional hierarchy and the Western market standard of civilization; ‘civilization versus barbarism/savagery’ was replaced by ‘tradition versus modernity’ or ‘developed versus undeveloped economies’; ‘barbaric Oriental despotisms’ morphed into the tropes of ‘rogue states’ and the ‘axis of evil’ on the basis that such states would not reciprocate according to the ‘civilized norms’ of (Western) international law and (Western-based) ‘international society’, while ‘savage anarchies’ morphed into ‘failed states’ on the basis that they could not reciprocate. And last, but not least, the old colonial denial of non-Western state sovereignty was replaced by the construct of ‘conditional sovereignty’ in the postcolonial era, while imperial intervention was replaced by (the ‘civilizing mission’ of) US hegemony, intervention by international financial institutions and humanitarian intervention.

Accordingly, orthodox international relations scholars have mistaken the shift from explicit racism to subliminal cultural racism for one that marks the transition from racism to non-racist, value-free ‘scientific positivism’. Critical race theorists view this transition as one in which cultural difference masquerades as tolerant cultural pluralism but that, in reality, is ‘racism in disguise’ (Balibar, 1991; Barker, 1981; Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Henderson, 2013; Hunt, 1987; McCarthy, 2009; Miles, 1993; Omi and Winant, 2014; Perry, 2007; Salter, 2002; Vitalis, 2000, 2015). Thus, speaking of the post-1945 substitution of cultural difference for racial difference, Richard Perry (2007: 216) concludes that ‘the terms may change, perhaps giving the impression that the old [racial] problems have disappeared, when in fact they have merely acquired protective coloration through semantic camouflage’. Or, again, ‘the demise of scientific racism in its evolutionary-biological form did not mean the end of racist thinking in scholarly discourse altogether. A new, post-biological modality of neo-racism is now widespread in social science’ (McCarthy, 2009: 91). This cultural modality has also been termed ‘racism lite’ or ‘colour-blind racism’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2018).

Thus, the evolution of international relations theory has mirrored the generic shifts in the practice of racism in everyday life and in world politics given that the discipline’s racism has been hidden behind a non-racist mask after 1945. Unmasking modern international relations theory reveals its emphasis on cultural difference as a proxy for non-white racial inferiority and white Western superiority. Thus, white international relations theorists often wear a ‘non-racist mask’ in order to make their cultural-racist theories appear socially palatable in the so-called cultural-pluralist postcolonial era. Accordingly, all that has really changed since 1945 is that the old racist Jim Crow laws that international theory originally conceptualized became sublimated or ‘hidden in plain sight’ (Henderson, 2013; Rutazibwa, 2020; Vitalis, 2000), having morphed into the ‘New (subliminal) Jim Crow laws’ of modern analyses of the global economy/interstate system. Uncovering this long-temporal passage that links the past with the present means that the discipline has a fabricated detachment with the racist ghosts of its past (as Bryony Vince put it to me in private conversation). What, then, of the racist double move that modern orthodox international relations theories perform when analysing world politics/global political economy?

Revealing the racist double move of orthodox international relations theory

The giveaway concerning the racist foundations of modern international relations theory lies not simply in what it does say but as much in what it does not. Thus, to postcolonialism’s rhetorical question as to whether racism has played an important role in structuring world politics past and present, the orthodox reply is simply ‘nothing to see here’. This first racist move, which evacuates and whitewashes the presence of racism in world politics past and present, is complemented by the second, in which international relations theory advances a racist analysis of world politics/global political economy but in subliminal cultural language that appears as value-free and ‘racially neutral’. To illustrate this double move, I shall draw on examples from my current research (Hobson and Odijie, forthcoming) and from elsewhere.

The neorealist vision of the Cold War comprises a Western zone of relative peace and stability that ensues from bipolarity or US hegemony or the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). But such ‘peace and stability’ was only rendered possible because of the racist decision by the superpowers to outsource war to the ‘inferior’ and expendable ‘wastelands’ of the Global South, which constituted a safety valve that could prevent direct nuclear conflict from erupting between the USA and the USSR. Thus, ‘it appears that cold war history has a concentric conceptual organization, consisting of a “formal” history of relative peace in the center and “informal” violence in the periphery’ (Kwon, 2010: 155; see also Persaud, 2016). Moreover, ‘in a historical sense – and especially when seen from the South – the Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means. . . For the Third World, the continuum of which the Cold War forms a part did not start in 1945, or even 1917, but in 1878 – with the [Congress] of Berlin that divided Africa between European imperialist powers’ (Westad, 2007: 396). This Western neo-imperialism also takes us back to the future of America’s racist-colonial drive in the 19th and early 20th centuries (see Go, 2011; Hunt, 1987). But all of this necessarily flies under neorealism’s ontological radar scanner given its evacuation of social process through its reification of the structural logic of anarchy that is coupled with the deployment of the Eurocentric/racist method of ‘analytical bifurcation’, wherein racist-imperial processes are bracketed out and silenced in favour of focusing solely on intra-Western white activities (Go, 2016: 89–92, 104–110).

This first move is complemented by neorealism’s second, wherein a subliminal cultural-racist theory is applied to analysing world politics. Notable here is that European empires constituted subsystems hierarchies in which the dominant hyper-sovereign colonial power stood atop of the colonies that were denied sovereignty. But Waltz’s reification of international anarchy is triply problematic, first because this conception replicates the old scientific-racist conception of ‘tropical anarchy’ (Henderson, 2013; Sampson, 2002; compare Lynch, 2019: 277); second, because Waltz sanitizes or evacuates hierarchy from world politics, thereby conjuring Western colonialism and its practices of genocide, the Atlantic slave trade, land appropriation and labour exploitation together with its neo-imperialist successor into thin air (Hobson, 2012: 203–208; Sabaratnam, 2020); and, third, Waltz’s claim that sovereign states are the dominant form of polity under modern anarchy is undermined by the presence of colonial hierarchy before the very recent era of decolonization wherein the only sovereign states that existed were Western. Accordingly, Waltz’s move serves to let Western imperialism off the moral hook, thereby reflecting an ‘epistemology of ignorance’ (Sabaratnam, 2020: 20–21; see also Mills, 2007). Interestingly, we find an evacuation and naturalization of Western empire in the classical realist work of Hans Morgenthau (Hobson, 2012: 188–190; Salter, 2002: 117) and other realists, which leads Nicolas Guilhot (2014) to talk of ‘imperial realism’.

By contrast, Robert Gilpin’s neorealist hegemonic stability theory embraces a normative (direct) imperialism that is dressed up in terms that dare not speak its name (Hobson, 2012: 193–203). Gilpin (1987) differentiates hegemons from empires, where the latter exploit non-Western states while the former help them through the hegemon’s self-sacrificial provision of global public goods. But the paternalist sign of US hierarchical hegemony is that it supposedly uplifts states around the world, with East Asian states singled out as the most egregious and ungrateful free riders that benefit most from hegemonic largesse. Thus, what Gilpin misses is that the conception of uplift reconvenes Britain’s paternalist-imperial civilizing mission of the 19th century, though this elision is inevitable given that he re-visions the British Empire as a benign liberal hegemon. Significantly, Niall Ferguson (2004) effectively reconvenes Gilpin’s argument, though he talks explicitly about the benign liberal imperialism of Britain and America. Moreover, this benign conception that reflects an epistemology of ignorance effectively boils off the coercive side of empire in the subliminal cultural-racist distillation process, thereby providing an apologia for Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

Similar cultural racist logics play out in liberalism (see Hobson, 2012: 216–222, 285–310). While the normative (direct) imperialist posture that is found in John Rawls’s (1999) The Law of Peoples is a very obvious example (Hobson, 2012: 292–295), nevertheless the hard test-case here is that of neoliberal institutionalism. The received wisdom is that neoliberal institutionalism presents a genuinely ‘universal’ picture or flattened ontology of all states learning to cooperate in order to enhance their gains. But it turns out that, in After Hegemony, Keohane (1984) confines this process to Western states (as did Norman Angell before him). Moreover, absent here is a historical-sociological analysis that would reveal the hierarchical-imperial contexts that have driven both Western unity (Sabaratnam, 2020: 25) and the global process by which unequal gains accrue to the West at the expense of the non-West. Paradoxically, constructivists critique neoliberal institutionalism for its rational actor model by asserting that interests are not a priori but are formed through socialization. However, a close reading of Keohane’s book reveals that it is Western norms and identity that socialize Western states into cooperating (Keohane, 1984: 5–7, 43, 182). Accordingly, Keohane not only looks specifically at Western states as the successful actors, but argues that they take specifically Western cultural values such as democracy and liberal capitalism to the table before they enter iterated prisoner’s dilemma games (Keohane, 1984: 182).

One of several (direct) neo-imperialist cues in Keohane’s work emerges from his approval of US hegemonic intervention and intervention by international financial institutions in the Global South as a means of extending complex interdependence across the world. But here the international financial institutions act as paternalist neo-imperial vehicles for the cultural conversion of non-Western states along Western neoliberal capitalist lines via the imposition of neoliberal conditionality and structural adjustment programmes. Moreover, the notorious resentment that these programmes have invoked in many non-Western states, all of which disappears in Keohane’s analysis, takes us back to the future of the ‘unequal treaties’ that emerged under Britain’s informal imperialism in the 19th century, much as the paternalist role of the international financial institutions finds its historical parallel with the League of Nations Mandate System (Anghie, 2005: 245–272). And, finally, Keohane’s approval of Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the 19th and 20th centuries returns us to the problems that I discussed above vis-a-vis hegemonic stability theory (see also Sabaratnam, 2020: 18–19).

A notable example of an indirect imperialist approach is found in the neoliberal theory of globalization, which rehabilitates the classical liberalism of Adam Smith and his aversion to empire (e.g. Friedman, 2000). But there are three subliminal neo-imperialist cues here, the first comprising Friedman’s (2000: 101–111) argument that non-Western states have no choice but to ‘don the golden straitjacket’, which requires them to adopt Western neoliberal-capitalist architectures. Having to become Western means that the theory smuggles informal imperialism in through the backdoor of its Western universalism. Second, by subscribing to the ontological proposition that ‘the world is flat’ (Friedman, 2007), the neoliberal theory of globalization conjures Western imperial/neo-imperial hierarchy and racial capitalism into thin air, thereby naturalizing rather than problematizing these phenomena via the epistemology of white ignorance. And, third, because Friedman focuses on rational individuals whose interests are a priori and whose social identity is irrelevant to individual behaviour, racism and racialized capitalism are whitewashed from the global economy.

Surely constructivism fares much better given its ability to highlight international racial norms? Not only has much of it ignored racism in world politics but the few constructivists who have considered it argue that racism was left behind in world politics after 1945 (Finnemore, 2003; Klotz, 1995), much as imperialism was supposedly outlawed by the UN in 1960. This whitewashing of racism and imperialism from modern world politics not only reflects the illusion that subliminal cultural racism projects but is also a vital move because it allows liberal constructivists to portray Western humanitarian interventionism and liberal peacebuilding/state-building as a non-racist/non-imperial project that saves oppressed non-Western peoples. It is here that we encounter a subliminal cultural-racist paternalism that presents the West as the white saviour of the inferior non-Western societies – thereby rehabilitating the 19th-century conception of the white man’s burden and the civilizing mission – and where the West is (re)presented as the altruistic paternalist father of the non-West (Hobson, 2012: 302–305). Moreover, in this liberal imaginary of ignorance, the notion that peacebuilding/state-building is initiated as a means of eradicating the threat of the deviant non-Western Other disappears from view, as does the legacy of Western empire that created some of the core problems in non-Western states that prompted intervention in the first place (for further postcolonial critiques of liberal constructivism, see Sabaratnam, 2020; Sampson, 2002; Vitalis, 2000).

Liberal constructivism buys into the cultural-racist idea that all progressive actions in the world are initiated by the universal West ‘on behalf of global humanity’. For example, it is the benign West that has single-handedly brought human rights to the world via the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Here international relations’ ‘non-racist mask’ slips conspicuously, given that the Western great powers did their utmost at the United Nations to keep human rights off the global agenda for fear of diluting white supremacy and white normality in world politics and within Western societies. For it was various non-Western delegates at the UN that pursued human rights most fervently while their Western counterparts mobilized the defensive prerogative of sovereign independence to insulate their states from future criticism given that human rights were denied to minorities within their constituent societies, particularly native Americans and black African Americans in the United States. Thus, Western racist motivations and the progressive role of non-Western agency in advancing the cause of human rights in world politics have been airbrushed out of the liberal-constructivist picture. And, in turn, this serves to retain the chimera of the purely progressive non-racist West and the regressive non-West. Equally as egregious is that the role of the West in the denial of human rights to non-Western peoples in the first place is somehow written out of the narrative. Still, much of this is perhaps unavoidable given that liberal-constructivist international relations tends ontologically to divorce power from norms in world politics and epistemologically segregates power from knowledge.

Are orthodox scholars intentionally racist? Racist impact over intention

The case for intentionality is that it is no coincidence that the shift from scientific racism to subliminal cultural racism in orthodox international relations/international political economy theory mirrored the trajectory of racism in everyday life and world politics. My hunch, though, is that international relations theory’s racism is unintentional given that the overwhelming majority of orthodox international relations scholars are most probably non-racist (but not anti-racist) in their private lives. But orthodox international relations scholars have mistaken a critique of their implication in structural racism for an allegation of interpersonal racism. This epistemology of, or move to, innocence links directly to the self-deluded heart of the orthodoxy. For there are all manner of built-in cloaking devices that mask the racism and whiteness of orthodox international relations theories from the eyes of their advocates. International relations’ ‘non-racist mask’ has at least four mystificatory layers.

The first layer (or cloaking device) is that racism in orthodox international relations/international political economy theory is manifested in cultural rather than biological terms, thereby appearing as outwardly non-racist (given the mistaken popular belief that racism is inherently biological). The second layer of mystification is that cultural racism takes on a hidden or subliminal guise (which exorcizes race as an ontological category from world politics), thereby making such racism much harder to detect. Aggregating these two layers together leads white international relations/international political economy scholars to buy into the self-deluded rhetoric that their theories are racist-free. Pertinent here is Blaut’s (1992: 296) characterization of the social sciences since 1950 as ‘so much [subliminal cultural] racism yet so few racists’ (see also Memmi, [1982] 2000: 3).

This mystification is ultimately secured by the third layer of the mask that constitutes the problem of ~~blindness to~~ white privilege. For not being on the end of racism’s pernicious effects means that, unlike non-whites, many white academics tend quite naturally to downplay its existence (see Lake, 2016). An obvious example of this lies with the everyday performance of driving from A to B. For the vast majority of white drivers are able to travel safe in the knowledge that they will not be stopped by the police unless they have been unlucky enough to have been caught breaking the speed limit. By contrast, many black drivers consider themselves lucky if they are not stopped by the police when they have respected the speed limit. Such ~~blindness to~~ [ignorance of] white privilege feeds directly into the unreflexive propensity to deny the presence of whiteness and racism in both the theory and practice of orthodox international relations/international political economy (Peterson, 2021; Sabaratnam, 2020: 5). For the ingeniousness of white privilege is that it renders such privilege invisible. Thus, white people are effectively taught not to notice racism and their role in reproducing it (McIntosh, 2020). Which, in turn, fuels the tendency of the privileged to reject, if not protest vehemently, the accusation of racism in the social sciences – as in the aforementioned spat between Pankaj Mishra and Niall Ferguson (see Mishra, 2011). All of which undermines the prospect of addressing, let alone redressing, the problem at stake.

Thus, while a fifth great debate concerning the Eurocentric racism of orthodox international relations/international political economy is long overdue, unfortunately the chances of it occurring are slim to zero. This is partly because intradisciplinary dialogue between international relations’ orthodox and critical wings has completely broken down (De Carvalho et al., 2011), and partly because a simmering ‘white silence’ of denial is the most likely ‘response’ (see, Ryde, 2019; Saad, 2020). Strikingly, it is now some two decades since Robert Vitalis (2000) wrote his seminal article, but still the tumbleweed of white silence blows deafeningly past my window. However, were an explicit response to be forthcoming, two entwined paradoxes might emerge here, the first being that it would most likely accuse my argument of being angry, hysterical and outlandish, wherein ‘Eurocentrism’ is deemed to be the calm/rational ‘standard of common sense’ – the paradox being that rather than engaging with the substance of my critique, such a response would likely comprise an angry ad hominem attack on the accuser and the journal for publishing such an article. And the second paradox is that while most orthodox scholars abhor ‘cancel culture’, it turns out that engaging in an ad hominem attack serves merely to shut down debate on this vital issue. That is, an ad hominem attack on the accuser is merely another form of cancel culture. Still, both such ‘responses’ would reinforce my argument given that ‘white silence’, ‘white rage’ and ‘white denial’ are manifestations of white privilege (see Ryde, 2019; Saad, 2020: 40–45; Sabaratnam, 2020; Peterson, 2021).

A fourth cloaking device is that pre-1945 orthodox international theory has been put through an ahistorical deracination laundering process to reappear in whitewashed form, fit for consumption in the ‘cultural pluralist’ post-1945 era. And because post-1945 international relations theory is (re)presented as non-racist so the laundering of its pre-1945 predecessor means that international theory in the last three centuries is (re)presented as universally racist-free. In this sleight-of-hand manoeuvre, the racist underpinnings of pre-1945 liberal and realist theories are filtered out or conjured away, leaving only their claims about states or geopolitics or interdependence that are transmogrified into ‘objective universalist’ propositions. In the liberal pantheon, two examples are pertinent. First is Norman Angell, who is (re)presented as a key theorist of liberal interdependence and the peaceful benefits it provides rather than as the paternalist-Eurocentric/cultural racist that he was, given his fundamental belief in international hierarchy and the positive need for the British Empire to promote harmonious global interdependence by acting as the civilizer of the barbaric and savage East (see Hobson, 2012: 40–45). Second is the reconstruction of Woodrow Wilson, who is recast as the founding father of 20th-century progressive liberal internationalism, based as ‘it is’ on anti-imperialism, sovereignty and self-determination for all states rather than on what ‘it was’ – a Lamarckian racist vision comprising a pro-Western imperialist stance and a denial of non-Western state sovereignty that was coupled with strong racial immigration controls and anti-black initiatives at home (see Hobson, 2012: 167–175). Similarly, pre-1945 realists typically mentioned in international relations textbooks include Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder and occasionally Nicholas Spykman, all of whom are (re)presented as geopolitical-realist thinkers that analysed spatial conceptions of world power rather than as Lamarckian scientific racists who advocated Western imperialism to contain the marauding ‘barbaric’ non-Western peril and whose mentor was the scientific-racist thinker Friedrich Ratzel (see Hobson, 2012: 123–130, 156–158).

Critically, this laundering process extends across all aspects of pre-1945 international relations. Thus, it becomes (but should no longer be) a revelation to learn that early international relations was primarily concerned about inter-racial relations; that the claim that international relations emerged formally in 1919 with the noble desire to solve the problem of war elides its earlier origins, which revolved around maintaining white Western global supremacy and racist empire together with the normative study of ‘effective’ colonial administration; that the journal Foreign Affairs was originally called the Journal of Race Development; and that the International Studies Conference at the League of Nations, which set up the subject matter of international relations in the 1930s under the leadership of Alfred Zimmern, grounded its syllabi in normative Western imperialism and racism (see Acharya and Buzan, 2019; Ashworth, 2014; Bell, 2016; De Carvalho et al., 2011; Henderson, 2013; Hobson, 2012; Kristensen, 2021; Long and Schmidt, 2005; Lynch, 2019; Schmidt, 1998; Schmidt and Guilhot, 2019; Thakur and Vale, 2019; Vitalis, 2000, 2005, 2015). That orthodox international relations scholars persist in ignoring these arguments in the face of a now substantial body of literature that has emerged over the last two decades means that this pervading silence can no longer be excused as the product of an innocent ‘historical amnesia’. Rather, this silence points clearly to the white denial of international relations’ racist origins wherein the non-racist mask slips most conspicuously, thereby constituting an actual example of orthodox international relations’ version of cancel culture.

However, except for in the above context, ‘intentionality’ is not the issue that the racist charge hinges upon given that most international relations/international political economy theorists are unintentionally racist. What matters, therefore, is racist impact regardless of intention. And to conclude this article more generally, it would be folly to presume that if only the Eurocentric rather than the racist charge were levied against the orthodox mainstream then ‘all would not be lost’. For the E-word cannot be used as a ‘get out of racist jail free’ card.

#### The alt is De-Mythologization - reject the aff’s racialized discourse in favor of a reimagining of the consequences of white subject-positioning while decentering from white innocence - only a fundamental rethinking dismantles the foundations of Eurocentrism

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[Meera, “Is IR Theory White? Racialized Subject-Positioning in Three Canonical Texts”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies”, March 31st 2020, Vol. 49, Sage Journals, accessed 6/24/22, GDS - LJ]

Given this, what would it mean to re-imagine the study of IR in a way that attempted to overcome epistemologies of immanence, ignorance, and innocence? While it is impossible to do justice here to the wide range of traditions that have alternative starting points, as scholars of IR our priorities should be to (1) ‘de-mythologise’121 and (2) ‘de-centre’ this racialised standpoint. Both require a more sophisticated awareness of epistemological situatedness, a better global-historical education and a wider ethical and political vocabulary and universe. It requires an alertness not just to the intellectual contours of Eurocentrism, but the interlocking moral and epistemological consequences of White subject-positioning. They may be animated by the abolitionist principle that ‘treason to Whiteness is loyalty to humanity’.122 This principle does not build the grounds for a ‘redeemed’ or ‘modified’ Whiteness but totally deconstructs it analytically and ethically.

A ‘de-mythologising’ strategy challenges epistemologies of immanence and ignorance – the specific racialised metahistorical narratives and myths about the exceptional, vanguardist, and progressive character of the ‘West’ and its peoples as a point of departure for building international theory. Alternative accounts are already available to us which emphasise the uneven but interconnected ways in which the modern international system came to be. These look at the contributions of the ‘non-West’ to the rise of the ‘West’,123 the role of transnational networks as drivers of development,124 the enduring role of hierarchies as an organising principle of global order,125 the colonial origins of sovereignty practices126 and the transnational character of political thought.127 There is considerable scope for more historically oriented work which excavates in particular the relation between the ‘colonial’ and the ‘modern.

Another way of ‘de-mythologising’ Whiteness in IR is **to re-think the discipline’s constitutive distinction between ‘war’ and ‘violence’, particularly where the coding of historical events into one or another category have been as a result of racialised categorisations and thinking about whose deaths count, thus enabling an epistemology of ‘innocence’.**128 Withholding the assumption that ‘war’ (meaning wars as recognised by and between Western powers) rather than ‘violence’ should be studied in IR – as in peace studies, for example129 – offers considerable scope for contemplating the rich web of interconnections and entanglements that constitute the international system, and particularly its colonial, imperial and racialised inheritances. It is a particularly productive point of departure for conceiving of questions of consent and sovereignty under radical inequalities of power globally, and potential shared forms of theorising among feminist approaches,130 critical environmentalisms,131 Indigenous political thought,132 and so on. ‘

De-centring’ Whiteness means not only a regional expansion of IR’s gaze but more profoundly a re-locating of its intellectual and ethical centre of gravity away from its stories of ‘immanence’ and ‘innocence’. One way of doing this might be, as Wynter does, to re-centre Blackness as the starting point for the embrace of the ‘human’ in all its multiple potentialities, given that Blackness has been historically overdetermined by experiences and epistemes which locate it at the underside of humanity.133 This radical shaking-up of IR’s epistemological orientations would be particularly productive in dismantling the limits identified here. This could connect them to forms of worldly politics rooted in experiences of diasporic connectivity and suffering, and creativity and solidarity.134 These signal different **sites of sovereignty, rights, borders, and power,135 and open up questions of historical injustice, responsibility, and reparations.** It could conceive of more ‘conventional’ IR theory that began with African presence rather than absence.136 Finally, working with and through Blackness would give an important corrective to debates on the ‘post-human’ which have not always contemplated the racialisation of humanity in depth.137 **The point here is not simply to ‘replace’ White-centredness with Black-centredness as part of historical justice – but through re-positioning to reveal what has been obscured about the organisation of authority, relationality, rights, obligations, materiality, and knowledge.**

Would the kind of IR theory examined here be possible with such starting points? Absolutely. A research programme focused on ‘Great Powers’ would still be possible but be explicitly a study of empires and other polities across time and space. It would have to embrace rather than ignore their internal diversities and forms of interconnectedness – overall, this might lead to an abandonment of the ‘anarchy’ problematique in favour of a more positive historical appreciation of diverse forms of authority and sociality. For a research programme interested in international co-operation, it would have to take a wider understanding of the kinds of co-operation which are possible, the kinds of political purposes that they underpin, and the forms of exclusion, collusion, and expropriation which are likely involved in setting them up. This would make it impossible to study ‘institutions’ or ‘organisations’ among powerful actors in a way which is disembedded from their political foundations. Similarly, for a research programme interested in the emergence of forces of socialisation and collective identification, much more attention would need to be paid to the political context and drivers of particular forms of sociality and the kinds of coercion enabled by productions of Otherness. All such projects would be informed by that spirit of hermeneutic suspicion with which writers not racialised as White have often greeted projections of Western civilisation.

However, it is up to the field as a whole to uphold standards of rigour which make the persistence of racialised ignorance, immanence, and innocence impossible. What has happened over the last several decades has been a continued asymmetry in the practice of our ‘science’, such that the profound epistemological challenges presented for the field in a range of critical writing have been sidelined through practices of training and citation which together reproduce a White subject-position in the discipline. The vast bulk of references to ToIP, AH, and SToIP continue to treat them as authoritative texts. This is an institutional problem more than an epistemological one in many respects and one that is unlikely to be solved in the near future, or at least by this generation. Identifying the logics constitutive of Whiteness in IR theory is a necessary step towards institutional change, but no more than that. In the absence of this change, IR theory will continue to be White.

## 2NC – Blocks/ATs

### Framework – Silencing DA

#### Silencing DA: Traditional IR Teaching silences critical voices in favor of a “norm against noticing” in policymaking - flips their education

**Hendersen, 15**

[Errol. A, “Hidden in Plain Sight - Racism in International Relations Theory”, Race and Racism in International Relations, It’s a Book, edited By University of Warwick, 2015, Routledge, accessed 6/24/22, GDS - LJ]

Another result is that it leaves IR scholars teaching a history of the development of international relations that ignores the salience of colonialism as the centerpiece in the origins of the field. That is, in continuing to teach the fiction that the field emerged following the devastation of World War I, as “idealists” led by Wilson and others such as Lowes Dickinson, Zimmern, Giddings, and Kerr sought to provide the institutional checks on realpolitik that was implicated in the “war to end all wars**”, we belie the reality of the centrality of colonialism, race develop- ment, and white racial supremacy to the development of the academic field of IR. Thus, our narrative creates an academic fiction that hovers outside of its own history.** The presence of this narrative is as much a testament to the white supre- macism that is a centrepiece of the field given that its role is to ensure a “norm against noticing” the centrality of white racism in world politics while simulta- neously “silencing” or making marginal those who would focus on the importance of white racism in the development of the field of IR/world politics, or those who would raise this as a legitimate research focus for the most sensible of reasons: it happens to be true.

### Framework – Knowledge/Scholarship DA

#### you should be skeptical of their evidence – their research model proscribes a violent model that privileges Western research practices. Voting AFF incentivizes the perpetuation of exclusion as a norm and rewards and makes us feel good about psychic violence built upon standards created by hetero-cis-white-men.

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We argue that knowledge cumulation in IR is a fantasy reified by paradigmatic clusters and the mimicry of research standards and practices in the natural sciences (e.g., Elman & Elman, 2001, 2003). The “evidence” of “knowledge cumulation” in IR comes as much from the ritualized practice of research behavior as it does from any “true” or genuine notion of knowledge cumulation. One has “succeeded” in the enterprise of IR by cumulating knowledge, and the work of “successful” scholars is by definition cumulated knowledge. Cumulation of knowledge as a standard of success is a condition of possibility for the desirability of success in the field. That ritualized practice at once is institutionalized as success and institutionalizes the need for research success, reified and reproduced by hiring, tenure, merit raise, and promotion standards.

This ritualization is a signifier that what counts as knowledge in the field, in particular research programs and more generally, is performative (Barad, 2007; Butler, 1990; Weber, 1998)—where standards are set by their utterance and repetition rather than by some external “objective” standards of (narrowly) good science or (more broadly) good research (Baudrillard, 1991; Shepherd, 2008; Williams, 2003). Scholars iterate and reify standards of measurement of knowledge in each piece of scholarship which “succeeds” in the field, and these iterations make it a paradox for scholars to both occupy the methodological, epistemological, and political space that falls outside of inherited standards and succeed. Outside -the -mainstream work’s underrepresentation in the places understood to be publishing “success” is overdetermined, and the correlation between mimicry of traditional scholarship and “success” of critical scholars a given.

We mean “performative” in the sense that Judith Butler uses it (Butler, 1990, 1993), particularly as she talks about it going hand in hand with a Foucauldian notion of disciplining,8 where “performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability—a regularized and constrained repetition of norms” which resonate as “ritualized production” (Butler, 1993, p. 60). This frames performativity as a “specific modality of power as discourse” (Butler, 1993, p. 139) where the politics of the signification and the politics of the sign meet, an act of territoralization, of production, of installation—which does not have to be alone, singular, or unidirectional. Since performatives are their own referent (Butler, 1993, p. 159), they proliferate as manifestations of the power underlying them and interact relatively on the basis of that relative power. In this context, “performances” are actions and events, iterations and reifications, and context-specific, which “bring a subject into being” relationally.9

To escape the recursive, performative loop of “disciplinary success,” we argue that it is important to see the possibility that knowledge cumulation is not, and should not be, a given in IR research. Instead, we argue that the idea itself is an inherited empty signifier with unspoken content which governs the production of what we understand as disciplinary IR. Traditionally, the idea of knowledge cumulation is firmly grounded in a neopositivist understanding of social science, in which the role of theory is to collate observed empirical regularities across cases or what Waltz calls laws (Waltz, 1979). While this interpretation is critiqued in most critical IR, “cumulation,” in that work, becomes a term without clear conceptual content. The paradigmatization of IR theorizing distracts from a particular theory’s internal conditions of possibility by introducing incompatible conditions of possibility drawn from an inherited disciplinary sociology of what knowledge is and how it works. As such, any acknowledgment of the idea of cumulativity from within specific exercises in reflexive IR creates the grounds for necessary failure within those exercises.

The simultaneous rejection of traditional “cumulation” and continued performance of acts of cumulation can be understood by seeing the ways that silence frames cumulation in critical IR. We learn from feminist theorists that the unspoken is as important as if not more important than what is spoken (Charlesworth, 1999; Kronsell, 2006), coming from attention to how IR’s others are omitted, excluded, kept out, and not mentioned (Agathangelou & Ling, 2004; Tickner, 1988). We argue that IR’s silences tell us more about the state of knowledge cumulation in the discipline than looking for standards that tell us what we do know. Accordingly, we ask on principle what any given research program does not take account of and how accounting for those omissions could changes analysis. We focus on both visible omissions (like the concepts that a research program fails to incorporate) and invisible omissions. Invisible omissions are those that are unhearable by a research program— normally left out or ignored by both the researchers that form the core of the research program and their critics (Butler, 2001; Edkins et al., 2012; Hansen, 2000). By “unhearable,” we mean either that the omitted content falls outside of the boundaries set for dialog or is assumed by all stakeholders to be by definition irrelevant (for deeper analyses see MacKinnon, 2006; Spivak, 1988). Unlike its visible omissions—variables that its scholars and their critics have added to, re-operationalized, expanded on, or suggested the inclusion of—invisible omissions are often not treated as omissions at all within particular scholarly boundaries.10

The discipline’s “collective” standards for knowledge production, then, can be understood as constituted by social performances of dominance rather than founded on some given or objective notions of what science should be. Rather than being objective judgments of quality, statements like “this is good science” and “these results are robust” are signs without referents used to discipline (Baudrillard, 1995). The invisible disciplining nature of the performative standards of knowledge cumulation is part of the story of Butler’s understanding of performativity. The other part is attention to who is excluded by claims to knowledge cumulation (generally as well as in specific paradigmatic situations), what is left out, and on what axes. These disciplinary standards (both in the conventional and Foucauldian sense) make invisible their own impossibility and their related necessary failure.

For example, a submission to a traditional IR journal in the United States or Western Europe which makes an interesting argument, but is not in the format of, methodologically acceptable to, inclusive of the same forms of evidence traditionally used in, and good science to that journal’s traditional reviewers is unlikely to succeed in getting published.11 This will generally be justified with reference to the “quality” of the piece, and rarely if ever will questions of sex, race, gender, class, and other axes of exclusion be discussed as producers of the standards that then exclude on “quality” where “quality” has been set up in a way that excludes all performances of scholarship which are not mimicry of a particular Western, liberal model (Paolini, 1999).12 Even editors and reviewers who note the exclusionary effect of these standards will often mourn that and move on, imagining the only possible alternative being lacking standards, and seeing such a lack of standards as more insidious than the exclusionary effects of using certain sets of standards. “Knowledge cumulation” then becomes a set of reified and artificial standards rather than a journey for truth or interest.

The answer to this quagmire is sometimes a liberal politics of inclusion (e.g., Nedal & Nexon, 2018)—how do “we” get more women, more minorities, and more people from underrepresented places in the world to be able to meet the standards of good scholarship in the field? That liberal politics of inclusion, while well-intended, can be read as a (subtle, perhaps accidental) expansion of the violence it (formally) seems to abate. It fails to question the utility of the existing standards of good scholarship and assumes that those currently excluded would be happy to change the form, shape, and/ or nature of their scholarship to fit within the (unquestioned/unquestionable) mold of good scholarship, either loosely or strictly understood. As Puar (2006) argues, liberal “inclusion” to absorb the other within can be as violent as if not more so than exclusion even as it appears progressive. That violence is the reproduction of naturalized, bounded identities when identities are liminal and messy when not policed (e.g., Agathangelou, 2013; Haritaworn et al., 2013; Scott, 2013). The bounded nature of IR inclusion excludes liminality, messiness, and outsideness (e.g., Malksoo, 2012).

Expanding the boundaries of IR to include any given particular excluded work maintains an illusion of stability, hiding what is unstable; it maintains an illusion of certainty, hiding what is in doubt; it maintains an illusion of coherence, hiding the rebellious, the failed, and that which remains outside (e.g., Sjoberg, 2017). Queer theorizing of the liminality involved in unstable sex/gender identities shows that even that which is presumed to be the most primordial (sex identity) is really liminality hiding under supposed definition (e.g., Weber, 2016a). Translated to thinking about inhabitability, this theorizing suggests that the apparent safety of (constituting then occupying) inhabitable space hides liminality and uncertainty, and perhaps danger, under its supposed (empirical and normative) clarity (Haritaworn et al., 2014). Therefore, “all the repressive and reductive strategies of power systems are already present in the internal logic of the sign,” such “that violence is an inevitable byproduct of signification” (Baudrillard, 1981).

In this way, not only do traditional standards of knowledge make invisible their own impossibility, they hide the violence of IR’s denials of failure and continued insistence on traveling failed paths despite the condemnation of failure and the privileging of success. IR’s continued recursive enactment of its settled “standards” despite their obvious failure and exclusiveness makes invisible the raced, classed, and sexed impacts of those standards and their apparent objectivity. Baudrillard’s work provides a path for navigating this disjuncture between signs (IR’s “standards”) and referents (the fantastic notion that “good scholarship” exists objectively) (Baudrillard, 1975). He argues that “only ambivalence, as a rupture of value… sustains a challenge to the legibility, the false transparency of the sign… questions the evidence of the use value of the sign (rational decoding) and of its exchange value (the discourse of communication).” This ambivalence, Baudrillard argues, “brings the political economy of the sign to a standstill; it dissolves the respective definitions of symbol and referent” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 150).

Endorsing the inclusion of nontraditional perspectives, classifying and categorizing them, and assuming inclusion’s possibility may all have violent impacts (for discussions of the violences of inclusion see Haritaworn et al., 2013, 2014; Mbembe, 2019). Moving of the signification “knowledge” from any referent to which it was originally tied makes method and research performances of scholarship, rather than (the illusive) scholarship itself. If “research” is a performance of scholarship, “standards” for research serve to disguise the fantastic nature of knowledge cumulation. As such, there is no space for liminality, uncertainty, change, inadequacy, and failure in structural rather than passing senses. Yet looking beyond the discourse of certainty, those pervade IR. A Baudrillardian ambivalence toward research programs and their truth statements can reveal the recursivity of IR’s standards of knowledge cumulation. This is because condemnation or rejection of any given research program and its truth statements endorses its assumptions about truth, as well as some of its assumptions about what the international arena is and how it works.

As such, the idea that IR knowledge cumulation can be nothing but fantasy is straightforward. If the reification of standards of knowledge cumulation is a signification divorced from a referent, where the recovery of the referent is conceptually and practically impossible, then knowledge cumulation is and will always remain an empty signifier. The only question is how that empty signifier directs and is directed.

We suggest that, in IR, more often than not, knowledge cumulation directs and is directed by discursive seduction. In Baudrillard’s words, seduction is “that which extracts meaning from discourse and detracts it from its truth” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). What makes a discourse of knowledge, of science, and of progress seductive “is its very appearance: the aleatory, meaningless, or ritualistic and meticulous circulation of signs on the surface, its inflections and its nuances. All of this effaces the content value of meaning, and this is seductive” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). Therefore, if there could be an interpretive discourse of knowledge cumulation that reached truth value, that truth value would be selfdefeating, since “the meaning of an interpretive discourse, by contrast, has never seduced anyone.” This is the fundamental contradiction, in Baudrillard’s terms, that makes standards for knowledge cumulation in IR internally impossible. He explains that “every interpretive discourse wants to get beyond appearances; this is its illusion and fraud. But getting beyond appearances is appearance, and is hence subject to the stakes imposed by seduction, and consequently to its own failure as discourse” (Baudrillard, 1991[1979], p. 54). As such, what is left in/of the failed discourse can only be the fantastic, and pretensions to success hollow.

Inhabiting a Failure of a Discipline

The need for success and the denial of failure depend on two things: first, both success and failure existing and being identifiable; and second, presuming a particular normative relationship between success and failure. In IR, as we discussed above, scholars are thought of as successes or failures according to a complicated metric of disciplinary prestige based on publication outlet, “scientific standards,” and perception of the change that they have caused in the discipline. Work is characterized as successful or failed based on whether it contributes to knowledge cumulation. The discipline itself is understood as successful or failed based on the aggregation of those measures. On these terms, the emptiness of disciplinary standards and the impossibility of knowledge cumulation make every piece of scholarship and every scholar in IR a failure and the discipline along with them.13 To us, the identification of success/failure is impossible.

Still, we focus our approach to “disciplinary IR” around questioning the second assumption, that the normative relationship between success and failure is such that success is good and desirable and failure is bad. Failure has been insufficiently explored in disciplinary IR, both in thinking about the disciplinary enterprise and in thinking about the world “out there” which we purport to study.14 Here, we look to theorize the “upside” of the failure of the disciplinary enterprise of IR. It is, after all, failure that Baudrillard called for, in different words—a willingness to drop commitment to and passion for a certain end in the recognition that both that end and its opposite are empty signifiers. Queer theorists have suggested that this sort of failure—failure to live up to expectations which were messy, detached, or a priori untenable—might be worth celebrating (Halberstam, 2011). We build on these two understandings to embrace failure in IR.

Often failure is thought about as either a final end (something has failed), as a stumbling block on a path to success (if at first you do not succeed, try, try again), or as a miscalibration (we thought this was success, but really it is failure instead). With Jack Halberstam, we suggest a normative reinterpretation. Rather than seeing failure as an end point, or as a stopping point on the way to success, it can be seen as itself a politics, “a category levied by the winners against the losers” and “a set of standards that ensure all future radical ventures will be measured as cost-ineffective” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 184). Halberstam uses the example of reproductive success. Inherited wisdom has suggested for a significant amount of time that people should have children—that a heterosexual marriage with biological offspring is the ideal of success in one’s personal life. That could be taken at face value: success (measured in biological offspring to still-married heterosexual, cissexual parents) is to be valued, and failure (measured in some other reproductive result) is to be devalued. Or the very normative value attached to reproductive success is itself a weapon, where associating failure with non-reproduction is a category levied against the losers by the winners. Redefining all reproductive results as successful or changing which reproductive results are measured as successful does not change the weaponized, normalizing character of the concept of success. This is a metaphor for IR’s disciplinary sociology, but it is also directly applicable to IR’s epistemological and methodological engagement with non-heteronormativity

Applied to IR, the normalization of “success” as the thing to which all (researchers) should aspire reifies membership in the categories of “successful” and “failed” and provides the “successful” with a powerful weapon to continue to exclude, put down, and delegitimize the “unsuccessful.” The “winners” are by definition in a normatively superior position compared to the “losers” despite the emptiness of the signification of each category. Understanding individual pieces of work, individual scholars, or research paradigms as failed (a foil to successful) is a categorization wielded by those who have already been classified as successful to achieve and perpetuate the exclusion of those whom they can constitute as inferior. In this way, research success is a category IR’s winners wield against its losers to perpetuate their position as winners, consciously or unconsciously, against a background of a disciplinary IR where the standards for research were created largely by white, heterosexual cis-men and remain largely undisturbed despite the intellectual and representational diversification of IR research and IR scholars.

Failure as a category in IR scholarship serves to “reinscribe and renormalize standards of ‘research success’ which remain unchanged, unchangeable, and regressive” (Halberstam, 2011). The scholarship that makes unconventional claims to knowledge cumulation (or no claim to knowledge cumulation) not only fails but constitutes its researchers as failures—which becomes recursive when “we tend to blame each other or ourselves for the failures of the social structure we inhabit, rather than critiquing the structures… themselves” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 35, citing Kipnes, 2004). In Halberstam’s view, it is the system that privileges success, that is, the problem, and failing within it is an emancipatory possibility which “dismantles the logics of success and failure with which we currently live” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 2).

Realizing the caging nature of the boundaries of disciplinary success, it is possible to think that failure might be perceived as something to celebrate and strive toward rather than something which should inspire shame. Halberstam suggests that “under certain circumstances, failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, and more surprising ways of being in the world” (Halberstam, 2011, pp. 2–3). In Halberstam’s view, it is only when the norms and metrics by which we aspire to success become both politicized and problematized that freedom becomes possible. It is not failing that we as scholars or as people need to learn to do—we fail all the time. As Halberstam notes, failure is endemic in life and work as “to live is to fail, to bungle, to disappoint, and ultimately die,” despite denial, resistance, and constructs of success (Halberstam, 2011, pp. 186–187). Instead of needing to learn to fail, we argue, we need to learn to embrace failure, particularly the collective failure of the enterprise of “disciplinary IR” to achieve or approximate “knowledge cumulation” generally or the aspirations of particular research programs specifically.

### Framework – Epistemology DA

#### The aff’s representations function under “epistemologies of ignorance” that conceal racialized dispossession from mainstream public life

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[Meera, “Is IR Theory White? Racialized Subject-Positioning in Three Canonical Texts”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies”, March 31st 2020, Vol. 49, Sage Journals, accessed 6/24/22, GDS - LJ]

Here, I synthesise strands from CRT and IR for a more systematic conceptual account of Whiteness as a form of subject-positioning that are then used to support an empirical analysis of its manifestations within IR theory. Conceptually, I **posit that White subjectpositioning is centrally characterised within discourse by interlocking epistemologies of ignorance, immanence, and innocence.** These forms of subject-positioning are racialised in that they assume a hierarchy of human significance, signal an identification with a set of White-racialised historical subjects, and a subjective investment in protecting or justifying extant White privilege and supremacy. The concept of ‘epistemologies of ignorance’ as mentioned comes from the work of Mills, who has examined the ways in which liberal American political theory foundationally rests on what he calls the racial contract.44 The racial contract is a tacit agreement among people racialised as White to discount the origins and functioning of White supremacy from discussions about how society is and should be organised. This is achieved through **representations that obscure, exclude or exceptionalise the central role of racialised dispossession, violence, and discrimination in the making of the modern world**.45 Importantly for Mills, these forms of ignorance are not accidental or random but deliberate and necessary for the continued functioning of the present order as a White-dominated polity, because calls for inter-racial justice can be comfortably and systematically ignored in mainstream public life.46 ‘Ignorance’ is therefore central to the reproduction of White supremacy in the United States. This analytic resonates strongly with Krishna’s account of historical ‘amnesia’ in disciplinary IR and Bhambra’s observation about the ignoring of race in methodological Whiteness.

### Framework – Wargames DA

#### Their model weaponizes decision making skills to turn debaters into war planners

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Wargaming’s role as a source of doctrinal innovation, Work argued, should be restored in the new security environment (Work 2015b, 2). Specifically, as one article suggested, the DoD ‘should pursue a joint wargaming initiative designed to generate new concepts around the proposed offset technologies. Wargames serve as a time-tested mechanism for generating new ideas about warfare’ (Norwood and Jensen 2016, 35). In keeping with the 3OS’s agenda of innovation, the role of wargames was to devise and experiment with novel applications for emergent technologies and the US’s broader operational approaches. In a security environment characterized by widespread ambiguity and complexity, wargaming was to facilitate conceptual innovation. In a coauthored article with Paul Selva, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Work laid out the key applications of DoD wargaming:

Wargames provide opportunities to test new ideas and explore the art of the possible. They help us imagine alternative ways of operating and envision new capabilities that might make a difference on future battlefields. When creatively and rigorously applied, wargames help us to think through and begin to resolve complex military challenges, foster the testing of new strategic and operational concepts, stimulate debate, and inform investments in new capabilities. Wargames help strip down a strategic, operational, or tactical problem and reduce its complexity in order to identify the few, important factors that constrain us or an opponent. They provide structured, measured, rigorous – but intellectually liberating – environments to help us explore what works (winning) and what doesn’t (losing) across all dimensions of warfighting. They permit hypotheses to be challenged and theories to be tested during either adjudicated moves or free play settings, thereby allowing current and future leaders to expand the boundaries of warfare theory. And they provide players with the opportunity to make critical mistakes and learn from them – and to perhaps reveal breakthrough strategies and tactics when doing so (Work and Selva 2015).

With this restored faith in the innovative capacities of wargaming, its resurgence began.

In his February memo, Work set out his vision for three time horizons for the new DoDwide wargaming initiative. Led by the Combatant Commands and Services, near-term wargaming (0–5 years into the future) would focus on the execution and improvement of current operations plans, using workshops, red-teaming, table-top exercises, and modelling and simulation for planning, experiments and proto-type development. Mid-term wargaming (5–15 years), led by the Joint Staff, would be dedicated to the development of new capabilities and operational/organizational concepts by incorporating innovative approaches and technologies into force planning. Using workshops, seminar-style wargames, exercises and modelling and simulation, future scenarios would be gamed to explore future US and adversary orders of battle and promote operational innovation. Long-term gaming (beyond 15 years) would assess the operational impacts of technology, explore future challenges, and craft longterm competitive strategies. The Office of Net Assessment was tasked with overseeing this future-focused initiative (Work 2015b, 1–2).

[…Continued...]

The central means by which wargaming intervenes in the human training dimension is through the cultivation of particular kinds of decision-making practices. Indeed, a focus on decision-making is the central distinguishing feature of wargaming, setting it apart from other kinds of models which do not have a ‘human in the loop’. In Perla’s words, ‘a wargame is an exercise in human interaction, and the interplay of human decisions and the simulated outcomes of those decisions’ (1990, 164). He expands elsewhere: wargames ‘are about people making decisions and communicating them in the context of competition or conflict, usually with other people – all the while plagued by uncertainty and complexity. Through these processes, the players live a shared experience and learn from it’ (in Harrigan and Kirschenbaum 2016, 173). The Naval War College’s 'War Gamers’ Handbook' similarly defines wargaming as ‘a tool for exploring decision-making possibilities in an environment with incomplete and imperfect information’ (Burns n.d., 3)

According to its advocates, wargaming works by placing players in a situation in which they are compelled to make decisions (Perla 1990, 203). By slotting participants into a scenario which calls for urgent action, they argue, wargaming provides a safe-to-fail space in which to gain decision-making experience. As Perla recently noted, games work ‘not by asking people to predict how they would react, but by forcing them actually to react, even if that action is within the context of the simulacrum of reality that is the game. A wargame is, in effect, a conflict simulation run on the human brain rather than a computer’ (Pournelle and Deaton 2018, 77). The decisions taken in game are thus a proxy for establishing what steps may need to be taken in a real conflict. As the Army War College’s ‘Strategic Wargaming Series Handbook’ explains, ‘players often discover the need to make unanticipated decisions in order for the game to progress. The rationale associated with decisions reached in the ‘game-world’ may illuminate the need for ‘realworld’ decisions while also informing the decision itself’ (Markley ed. 2015, 2)

The aim, then, is to generate real experience in a synthetic environment in order to become more proficient at making decisions under pressure and managing the consequences of those decisions. This involves an ‘active and absorbing involvement in the challenge of making ‘life and death’ decisions’ (Perla 1990, 8), providing a ‘dress rehearsal’ for crises in which ‘participants feel time and events tightening on them’. This is useful from a training perspective because in a game, ‘as in a crisis, snap judgements – even hunches – drive decisions’ (Allen 1989, 238). What wargaming accomplishes, then, is the development of intuition on the basis of which decisions can be made quickly and accurately. This is necessary because in the foreseeable future,

[d]ecision events will increase in frequency and speed. The “observe, orient, decide, and act” (OODA) loop decision cycle – must be compressed in the short-term to “recognize, decide, act” (RDA). Observation and orientation as discrete actions will be a luxury that the future battlefield will not allow. Superiority will be predicated on further evolving the decision cycle to “predict, decide, and act” (PDA) – with the goal of reducing (or ultimately eliminating) the time to decide – or “predict and act” (PA) – through automation, AI, and IA. (White et al. 2017, 23–4).

As this suggests, the aim of wargaming is to develop specific cognitive skills. As such, it intervenes squarely in the human dimension. As one report put it, ‘[b]eyond fielding a force that simply competes in the physical domains, the Army of 2035 and beyond must be designed to dominate and achieve overmatch in the cognitive domain; for the greatest potential for superiority or supremacy lies here’ (White et al. 2017, 25). What is necessary to make progress in this area, it is claimed, is to understand the conscious and unconscious elements of decision-making processes rehearsed and developed through wargaming. The ultimate goal of these explorations of decision-making seems to be to use individual players in game as nodes which collectively shed light on organizational or institutional decisionmaking. While it is not possible to determine from the actions of a single player in a game what the decisions taken in a real-world conflict would be, it is, it seems, possible to aggregate decision-making data collected in a game to gain a viable picture of real-world group decision-making. As noted above, the aim is to ‘use game results to build models that deepen our understanding of patterns in organizational decision-making’ (Pournelle and Deaton 2018, 19).

The above section has established the wargaming CoP’s claims surrounding the utility of wargaming as a means to intervene in the human training dimension through developing critical thinking, explorations of plural futures, and mapping human decision-making. The following final section argues these interventions amount to an important methodological and epistemological challenge to conventional defence analysis insofar as they echo salient critical/postpositivist critiques of positivist approaches in the social sciences. It concludes that by repurposing these critical tools to impact upon players, wargaming militarizes them.

Post-quantitative defence analysis

Wargaming’s focus on critical thinking, plural futures, and reflexive decision-making amounts to a significant departure from conventional, quantitative OR analysis, signalling instead an inheritance from critical/postpositivist traditions. In his analysis of the IDF’s use of such traditions, Weizman relays Director of the Operational Theory Research Institute, Shimon Naveh’s, account:

We employ critical theory primarily in order to critique the military institution itself – its fixed and heavy conceptual fundaments. . . . Theory is important for us in order to articulate the gap between the existing paradigm and where we want to go. . . . Without theory we could not make sense of different events that happen around us and that would otherwise seem disconnected (in Weizman 2006, 14).

Preferring Deleuze, Tschumi, Debord, and Bataille to Derrida, he continues, in the IDF critical ‘methods are projected in order to conceive of forms of tactical attack in an ‘enemy’ city. Education in the humanities, often believed to be the best lasting weapon with which to combat imperialism, has been adopted as imperialism’s own weapon’ (Weizman 2006, 15). Building on these insights, in this final section I argue that US military wargaming similarly appropriates the means of critical/postpositivist approaches in the service of the conventional ends of defence analysis. By using these methods to impact upon players, it concludes, wargaming contributes to the militarization of them. It develops this account by exploring three key challenges posed by wargaming to OR: the latter’s claims to prediction, objectivity, and rationalism.

### Framework – Institutions DA

#### We will impact turn their attempt to include scholarship that attempts to radically dis-articulate White Being into the fold of anti-black institutions – this feint towards diversity is a tool for getting black and brown folks to perform the labor of White Supremacy so Whites don’t have

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Its [White Being] opened itself to inviting non-normative non-white people into its power, into its violence, even into its administrative forms of leadership, you know, Barack Obama, Jackie Lacey, who until recently was the DA in Los Angeles and helped protect the LAPD’s violence against black people and brown people and so forth, that’s White Being. The major turn the book draws its title from is this concept White Reconstruction, and I want to be really clear, and I think folks will see this when they read the book, White Reconstruction is not just talking about the post 1960s period, its not naming one moment of revival of white supremacy and the ascendancy of White Being, in the broad sense, the way I think about and define White Reconstruction, is as a kind of constantly resurging historically consistent logic of reform and institutional rearticulation that attempts to sustain the ascendancy of white self-making and white world making within a certain kind of humanist futurity, white humanist futurity, whether you call it modernity, whether you call it civilization, manifest destiny, post racial etc. the book thinks through are different periods and different geographies, different cultural political projects, different racial narrative structures that crystallize and enact that logic of reform and rearticulation so the logic of white reconstruction is to institute these protocols of reform and change that disavow racist, sexist, misogynist you know transphobic colonial anti-black other forms of oppressive power while at the same time reproducing and extending those power relations particular gendered anti-blackness and racial colonial violence so both things happen within that reformist logic it’s a kind of move towards sustainability principally of anti-blackness and racial colonial violence so I do focus somewhat on the ongoing half century that has followed the so called civil rights period you know what has followed the downfall of US apartheid but I want to think about it as a historical logic, and the last term I will talk about is this framework conversation this thing that I named multiculturalist white supremacy. Or multicultural white supremacy this is just one of the technologies of white reconstruction I want to get people to think deeply and broadly about how the logics protocols the institutions of normalized anti-black racial colonial violence become promiscuously inclusive under the auspicious of national progress, institutional progress, and sometimes even social justice. I want to think about it as a technology, I want to think about multiculturalist white supremacy as creating a sense or even an ethic of flexibility of inclusivity of diversity of equity of solicitation that incorporates a diversity of subjects meaning black, brown, indigenous people, queer people, women etc it invites these diverse subjects to inhabit the systems and relations of power that end up reproducing the ascendancy of white being and perpetuate anti-blackness and racial colonial power- so I see that as something that people have been differently living in for at least the last 25-30 years, I think it is inseparable from the emergence of kind of official and institutionalized state sanctioned forms of multiculturalism but extends far beyond that and we are absolutely in it right now and we have to be deeply skeptical and suspicious of it - so anyways those are four key terms.

### AT – Extinction First

#### The end of the world has already occurred – its try-or-die for an alternative form of being-in-the-world

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Achille Mbembe’s (2019:7) diagnosis of the present is that “[n]early everywhere the political order is reconstituting itself as a form of organisation for death”. Even liberal democracies, he argues, are increasingly characterised by “separation, hate movements, hostility, and, above all, struggle against an enemy” (Mbembe 2019:42). War, racial hatred, the strengthening of borders and expulsion of enemies, the extreme inequality of contemporary capitalism, and the accelerating violence of runaway climate change produce what he terms an era of necropolitics, which the Covid-19 crisis has merely exacerbated and heightened. He uses the term necropolitics to account for the various ways in which diverse weapons are deployed in the interest of destroying life, and suggests that, “for a large share of humanity, the end of the world has already occurred” (Mbembe 2019:29). This trenchant picture resonates strongly, as we will see below, with the world Okorafor presents in the novel Who Fears Death. Like Okorafor, however, Mbembe does not flinch from this portrayal of a world characterised by violence and death, nor does he abandon all hope of a more convivial politics. Rather, he asks: What do human freedom and vulnerability mean in a necropolitical context? What alternative forms of being-in-the-world are possible? Refusing the binary choice between either violence or freedom, Mbembe (2019:92) suggests that “today’s form of necropower blurs the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom”.

Frantz Fanon (2001, 2008) wrote in the 1950s of the need for a “new humanism” that would set mankind free and restore human dignity, love, and understanding. This concern with the politics and possibilities of a new humanism is central to black feminist traditions of thought, which have done most to explore these questions precisely because the dominant genre of the human—Man—has always been irreducibly raced and gendered. As Sylvia Wynter (2003:313) puts it:

This issue is that of the genre of the human, the issue whose target of abolition is the ongoing collective production of our present ethnoclass mode of being human, Man: above all, its overrepresentation of its well-being as that of the human species as a whole, rather than as it is veridically: that of the Western and westernised (or conversely) global middle classes.

This predominance of a particular conception of human existence, and its constitutive role in carboniferous capitalism, racialised colonialism, patriarchy, and necropower, is why it is necessary to “go about thinking and living enfleshment otherwise so as to usher in different genres of the human” (Weheliye 2014:2; see also Jackson 2020; Mbembe 2019:2). Inspired by Fanon’s (2008:180) call to “introduce invention into existence”, Wynter asks: “How do we be, in Fanonian terms, hybridly human?” (in Wynter and McKittrick 2015:45).

For theorists like Mbembe, Wynter, Weheliye, Jackson, and others, art and the imagination have a crucial role to play. As Wynter argues, humans are a storytelling species: “the human is homo narrans”, at least since African ancestors scratched an intricate symbol on a piece of ochre in Blombos Cave (Wynter and McKittrick 2015:25, 66). Zakiyyah Iman Jackson (2020:1) shows that imaginative work can frequently alter “the meaning and significance of being (human)”. Exploring the work of authors like Toni Morrison, Nalo Hopkinson, Audre Lorde, Wangechi Mutu, and Octavia Butler, Jackson (2020:4) explains how such texts can provoke “unruly yet generative conceptions of being”. Reading and writing novels is itself a form of theorising about the world, and a way of practising new modes of being and freedom (Ashcroft et al. 2002; Gergan et al. 2020; Haraway 2016:12; Weheliye 2014:16).

### AT – IR Reflexive

#### No methodological pluralism – “Self-reflexivity” is a myth – IR’s priors are foundationally racist which makes it unfixable absent radical re-thinking of the alt

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The centrality of race and racism in the foundations of IR and their enduring impact on world affairs towards the end of the millennium contrasts with the relative dearth of mainstream scholarship on the subject in IR. For example, Doty’s (1998, 136) survey of mainstream journals in IR for the period of 1945 –1993 (World Politics, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Review of International Studies) ‘revealed only one article with the word race in the title, four with the term minorities and 13 with the term ethnicity’. Given that at its inception IR focused heavily on issues of race and racism, the marginalization of race and racism in mainstream IR journals (and textbooks) begs the question of what accounts for the apparent disparity? Doty (1998, 145) argues that ‘the dominant understandings of theory and explanation in International Relations’ preclude conceptualizations of ‘complex issues/concepts such as race’ and result in their marginalization or force them ‘into constraining modes of conceptualization and explanation’. For Krishna (2001, 401), the complexity is related less to the issue of racism than to the methodological orientations that often privilege abstract theorizing over historical analyses, which allows IR theorists to whitewash the historical content of global affairs, especially ‘the violence, genocide, and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and the West in the post-Columbian era’. Ignoring the role of racism facilitates this whitewash. He adds that ‘abstraction, usually presented as the desire of the discipline to engage in theory-building rather than in descriptive or historical analysis, is a screen that simultaneously rationalizes and elides the details of these encounters. By encouraging students to display their virtuosity in abstraction the discipline brackets questions of theft of land, violence, and slavery—the three processes that have historically underlain the unequal global order we now find ourselves in’ (Krishna 2001, 401– 402). Further, ‘overattention’ on the part of scholars to issues related to racism in IR ‘is disciplined by professional practices that work as taboo’ and may label such orientations as ‘too historical or descriptive’ and label such students as ‘not adequately theoretical’ and ‘lacking in intellectual rigor’ (Krishna 2001, 402). Moreover, where the impact of race and racism is analysed, insufficient attention is paid to the relevance of struggles related to race and racism to basic conceptions of fundamental issues in world politics such as power, war, freedom or democracy. For example, Persaud (2001, 116) maintains that ‘what needs to be underlined is that the struggle for racial equality has been fundamental to the emergence of democracy as a whole, not just for the colored world’ (2001, 116).

Persaud and Walker (2001, 374) claim that race has not been ignored in IR as much as it ‘has been given the epistemological status of silence’. This silence is linked by Maclean (1981, 110) to ‘invisibility’, which ‘refers to the removal (not necessarily through conscious action) from a field of enquiry, either concrete aspects of social relations, or of certain forms of thought about them’. Vitalis (2000) also acknowledges a ‘norm against noticing’ white racism throughout mainstream IR discourse (also see Depelchin 2005). Each of these processes perpetuates the racist assumptions embedded in the foundations of IR theory where they serve as the ‘priors’ of the main propositions. These assumptions may be exposed by tracing the racist claims that inform IR theory. This approach is different from that undertaken in most studies of racism in IR, which usually focus on one of four approaches: (1) examinations of the impact of non-racial factors on racial outcomes, such as the geographical studies of Linneaus and the physical anthropological works of Blumenbach and Kant, which attempted to determine the extent to which environmental and climatic factors led to the creation of different races;3 (2) examinations of the impact of racial outcomes on non-racial factors, such as studies of the effects of racial stratification on domestic outcomes (for example, development or democracy), or the impact of racial differences on the likelihood of violence within or between states (for example, Deutsch 1970; Shepherd and LeMelle 1970); (3) examinations of the impact of racist practices on the IR of states and non-state actors, such as studies of diplomatic historians on racist practices such as international slavery, imperial conquest, colonialism, genocide, apartheid, occupation, or racial discrimination, among single states, several states, or international organizations (for example, Elkins 2004; Hochschild 1998; Tinker 1977; Vincent 1982; Winant 2001); and (4) examinations of the impact of racist ideology on the IR of states and nonstate actors, such as studies on the impact of racism on foreign policy (for example, Hunt 1987; Lauren 1988; Anderson 2003), imperialism (for example, Rodney 1974), state-making (for example, Cell 1982; Fredrickson 1982; Mamdani 1996; Marx 1998), diasporization (Harris 1982; Walters 1993) or international war (Dower 1986).

While studies utilizing each of these approaches have contributed to our understanding of the role of racism in world politics, they have largely ignored the issue of primary concern to us here: how racism informs the major paradigms of IR theory such as realism and liberalism.4 Racism informs IR theory mainly through its influence on the empirical, ethical and epistemological assumptions that undergird its paradigms. These assumptions operate individually and in combination. For example, racist empirical assumptions bifurcate humanity on the basis of race and determine our view of what/whom we study and how we study it/them—privileging the experiences of ‘superior’ peoples and their societies and institutions. These assumptions also lead us to privilege ethical orientations of the ‘superior’ peoples which justify their privileged status. In such a context, epistemological assumptions that reflect and reinforce the racist dualism are more likely to become ascendant, and ‘knowledge’ that supports the racist dichotomy—both the privileged position of the racial hegemon and the underprivileged position of the racial subaltern—is more likely to be viewed as valid. Such knowledge drawn from the empirical domain becomes legitimized through ethical justifications that ‘naturalize’ the racial hierarchy. In this way, the separate dimensions often reinforce each other.

Whether or not the empirical, ethical and epistemological assumptions operate singly or in combination, it is important to demonstrate the role of these assumptions in IR theory today, especially given that mainstream IR also provides prominent critiques of racism. Ignoring these critiques would misrepresent the degree of racism in the field and disregard the challenge to racist discourse within IR from IR theorists themselves. For example, few IR scholars openly embrace a racist ontology that assumes for whites a higher order of being than for nonwhites.5 Moreover, racist ethical assumptions usually receive the opprobrium they deserve in present IR discourse. Racist epistemological assumptions are largely challenged by the prevalence in IR theory of the view that our ‘knowledge’ of world politics usually requires us to have something approximating evidence to determine the accuracy of rival truth claims. Finally, racist empirical assumptions are checked by the dominant view in IR that our theses should be broadly applicable across states and societies and should be substantiated by crossnational and cross-temporal tests. But the sanguine view of the propensity of IR literature to check racist assumptions, or to generate non-racist theoretical discourse for the field, begs a fuller exploration of how ethical, epistemological and empirical assumptions underlie prominent theses in IR. The main sources of these racist assumptions that inform our present IR discourse are the primary theoretical constructs of most IR theory: the state of nature, the social contract and the conception of anarchy that derives from them.

### AT – Util

#### Everyday violence is a massive impact – you should prioritize it or risk terrible policymaking

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(Elizabeth, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about:¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent.¶ If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning.¶ I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

### AT – No Alt

#### Their argument of “no alternative” is flat out racist and part of the legacy of White IR silencing Black Politics – for example, IR paradigms such as Kimira and Kawaida are under-theorized by the White Academy but explain IR through cultural factors.

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An Afrocentric Paradigm of World Politics

Kimira provides such a framework by drawing, inter alia, on the pan-Africanist theses outlined above and suggesting that the interaction of culture groups (whether within states or between them) plays an important role in international relations. Afrocentric culturalists claim that culture groups pursue self-determination and the alleviation of physical, symbolic, and psychic scarcities within and across the politico-economic units in which they are situated. Contrary to realist views that emphasize political–military factors, idealist views that focus on political–economic factors, or Marxist views that emphasize socio-economic class, culturalists argue that the drive to perpetuate the culture group serves as the basis for the provision of the political and economic superstructure of the society. This is one reason why culture groups persist even as their societies might be transformed economically (e.g. through slave-holding, feudal, capitalist, and/or socialist systems) or politically (e.g. through monarchical, republican, corporatist, and/or liberal democratic systems). Diasporazation brings other culture groups into the fold, modifying the original cultural composition of the society and creating, over time, political, economic, and cultural challenges to the status quo. Eventually, political, economic, and cultural boundaries become incongruent as societies become increasingly heterogeneous.

Witnessing this process over time, one observes that most states, today, are multicultural amalgamations of diverse culture groups rather than actual “nation-states.” Culture groups in these predominantly heterogeneous societies employ strategies of cooperation and conflict in pursuit of self-determination and the alleviation of perceived and real scarcities in their social and physical environments. The process through which diverse cultural groups are brought into the domestic body politic can have repercussions for international conflict and cooperation. That is, the process of nation-building and national mobilization may unleash forces of ethnonationalism or religious intolerance that might increase tensions within and between political units. Competition among cultural groups within such political units as territorial states has implications for international relations, as decision-makers must play to domestic audiences with regard to their foreign policy. For example, one might conjecture that a state’s treatment of a cultural group within its domestic sphere should be associated with its treatment of that group’s cultural cousins abroad. Therefore, one may contend that states that are culturally similar may be less likely to fight each other and may be more likely to cooperate with each other due to the presence of convergent interests borne of cultural affinity. In addition, one might suggest that the cultural composition of a state itself (e.g. its degree of cultural homo- geneity) may be associated with its prospects for international conflict and cooperation. Each of these theses is consistent with kimira’s focus on the role of culture in world politics.

Importantly, kimira binds its focus on culture within an overall theoretical framework that draws on African historical modalities. While space does not allow for the full articulation of the culturalist processes associated with a state’s foreign policy behavior, nevertheless, kimira suggests (1) a different unit of analysis for the study of world politics—culture groups, (2) a different mechanism for change in the global system—diasporazation, and (3) justifications for the unit’s pursuit of change—cultural self-determination and the alleviation of perceived scarcity.

At its core, the Afrocentric culturalist argument suggests a significant relationship between the cultural characteristics of states and their likelihood of interstate conflict, which is in contrast to the major Eurocentric paradigms of world politics, realism and idealism, which largely deny such a relationship.19 Instead, for realists, interstate conflict is dominated by realpolitik factors such as power, while for idealists, factors such as the type of government in a state are assumed to be more salient predictors of international conflict.20 On the other hand, culturalists focus on the cultural composition of a state as a predictor to its foreign policy behavior as a result of the impact of culture groups on their government. Arguably, these processes are accentuated within culturally homo- geneous states where a single culture group dominates the society because in those cases we’d expect the full leverage of the state to be exerted on the conflict exacerbating aspects of a state’s foreign policy (e.g. hyper-nationalism). If individual homogeneous states are prone to conflict then it is plausible that where such states square off against rivals that are likewise homogeneous that the likelihood of interstate conflict is heightened. Previous studies have not focused on the impact of cultural homogeneity on the likelihood of interstate war for pairs of states; therefore, I examine this basic culturalist contention in this study. Since cultural homogeneity itself is primarily a result of nationalist mobilization, then a discussion of the relationship between nationalism and interstate war is in order.

#### IR’s gatekeepers have historically excluded and under-researched Black IR, but, Kimira and Kawaida are examples of potential alts

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In the social sciences, worldviews generate paradigms, which are theoretical frameworks to guide and inform research in a field of study. Just as realism and idealism are Eurocentric paradigms of world politics, kimira—or culturalism—is an Afrocentric paradigm of world politics, which is informed by pan-Africanist perspectives of international relations.4 Its basic thesis is that cultural factors are important correlates of international interactions. This “culturalist” paradigm also synthesizes several pan-Africanist analyses of the processes operative in African–American politics, including Karenga’s “kawaida theory” and Obadele’s “macro-level model,” and generalizes from their African– American modalities to the behavior of states throughout the globe.5 It is useful to briefly review these two theses before discussing the kimira paradigm itself.

The Theoretical Roots of the Afrocentric Paradigm

Karenga’s framework, kawaida, attempts to explicate African–American relations in the US through an examination of the role of culture in black politics. It posits that cultural grounding and focus are ineluctable elements of black liberation and social development, and that national culture is “the self-con- scious, collective thought and practice thru [sic] which a people creates itself, celebrates itself and introduces itself to history and humanity.” 6 Karenga maintains that the imposition of the values and customs of the dominant European– American culture—especially its white supremacist aspects—serves to legitimize the oppression of African–Americans. Further, he insists that European–American cultural imposition denigrates the national (pan-African) culture of African– Americans and results in its replacement with a faddish popular culture that does not serve black interests. Altering Cruse’s thesis of cultural revolution,7 which for him was rooted in the use of popular culture as a change agent, Karenga emphasizes the role of national culture in black liberation.8 Ostensibly, since Afrocentric cultural grounding is at odds with Eurocentric culture, what results is a conflict at the cultural borders of the society which, when heightened, engenders revolution and a basic reorientation of the society. Karenga augurs the development of a black intellectual vanguard that would commit class suicide and subsequently “create an Afro-centric ideology or social theory which negates the ruling race/class ideology and provides the basis for a critical Afro-centric conception of reality and the possibilities and methods of changing it.”9 Armed with this Afrocentric focus, the vanguard would then lead a cultural revolution among African–Americans, which would precede, and make possible, broader political revolution. Within this cultural revolution, he suggests, there is a reafrmation, revitalization, and reclamation of the national culture of black Americans denied by the dominant white supremacist culture.

## Perm

### AT: Perm – Racializing Privilege

#### Racialized Privilege Link: The aff’s assertion of innocence creates racialized discourses of innocence that enforces systematically repressed backlash against social transformation while justifying embedded racism

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[Meera, “Is IR Theory White? Racialized Subject-Positioning in Three Canonical Texts”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies”, March 31st 2020, Vol. 49, Sage Journals, accessed 6/24/22, GDS - LJ]

To the epistemologies of ‘ignorance’ and ‘immanence’, however, we need to add an analytic of ‘innocence’ as characteristic of Whiteness. This is partially subsumed under ‘ignorance’ in the work of Krishna but deserves attention in its own right. Wekker’s work draws attention to the projection of ‘White innocence’ within the Netherlands around racism.51 Epistemologies of innocence seek to emphasise the inadvertent, unintentional, and exceptional character of racist behaviours or practices. These claims to innocence often emerge directly in response to accusations or discussions of racism.52 For Wekker, the trope of innocence is central to White subject-positioning through the profession of good faith and moral respectability. This is because it functions to separate Whiteracialised populations from both histories of colonial and imperial domination and contemporary practices of racialised discrimination.53 Innocence discourse instead locates racism as a matter of exceptional behaviour rooted in personal and conscious forms of discrimination which have mostly been overcome. **This means engagement with racism as a structural phenomenon is systematically repressed,** accompanied by forms of denial, hurt, outrage, and backlash where this is questioned, often evidencing a subjective investment in Whiteness itself.

To go back to the understanding of race as a specific historical transnational social formation or social system,54 we can see that epistemologies of innocence preserve a particular collective mapping of political belonging, responsibility, and justice; one which consistently separates racially privileged peoples from the historical and contemporary production of their privilege or consequences of their actions. There is a contradiction, however, because this deflection of blame for past evils is not complemented by a refusal to take ownership of appropriated land, wealth or property – that is, the material bases of racialised privilege, or of cultural credit for political ideas or historical developments. Discourses of White innocence and good faith instead make possible and manage these contradictions of racialised political governance in society.

### AT: Perm – Starting Points DA

#### Footnoting DA – it’s about starting points – you can’t add black scholarship and stir

Hawthorne and Heitz 18 – \*Chair of the [Black Geographies Specialty Group](https://blackgeographies.org/) of the American Association of Geographers, Assistant Professor of Sociology at UC-Santa Cruz, PhD in Geography at UC Berkeley, MPA at Brown, BA in International Relations and Africana Studies at Brown, \*\* PhD Student in Human Geography, UC Berkeley [Camilla, Kaily, “A seat at the table? Reflections on Black geographies and the limits of dialogue,” 2018, DKP]

It is impossible to engage with the politics of dialogue without first situating ourselves—after all, these are fundamentally questions of power and access. I (Camilla) am a first-generation university student and the first in my immediate family to pursue a graduate degree. As a Black woman geographer, I must continuously reckon with the fact that the university—and the discipline of geography itself—was not made for me. Historically, the university has been a site wherein the subjugation of women and people of color has been articulated and legitimated. Still, I was drawn to human geography because it appeared to be a capacious, interdisciplinary field with productively porous boundaries. In other words, geography seemed to welcome, rather than strictly regulate, theoretical and methodological dialogue between disciplines. But when I began my PhD program, I experienced a distinct sense of alienation as I attempted to do research that seemed marginal to geography (specifically, understanding how Black youth in Italy craft a sense of place that challenges the symbolic and material boundaries of Europeanness and Italianness). I was alarmed that the vocabulary and rich canon shaped by my background in Africana studies (for instance, theories of diaspora, or the works of scholars such as Paul Gilroy and Sylvia Wynter) were not always recognized as ‘formally’ geographical, even though the issues they addressed were fundamentally about space, place, and power. I was similarly alarmed by the fact that, in a discipline whose history is so closely tied to the violent histories of colonialism and racism, race remained a relatively insignificant category in contemporary geography, a ‘superstructural’ embellishment atop the ‘material’, clanking gears of capitalism. The questions that animated my research and the intellectual genealogies I wanted to draw upon, were deeply spatial but seemedillegible to geography. They were, in other words, beyond dialogue.

As a Black woman, I (Kaily) can recall being taught from a very early age not to fight back. When I mouthed off, I was told to sit down and quite literally to shut up. ‘Black’ and ‘girl’ were thrown in my face as insults, justifications for my silence. Insecure in my body, I was also insecure in place, as I constantly moved around the country. Feeling powerless to do much to tangibly or markedly interface with the city streets or Midwestern fields in which I grew up, I found myself drawn to art and photography as some of the few ways I could dialogically assert the power of my body and represent it assuredly in place. Having utilized this embodied knowledge in my thesis research, my advisor proposed that I look into geography programs for my PhD. I found it to be a thrilling and expansive field that had the capacity to engage the language of visual representation and its materialization in structures of race, class, and environment. Like Camilla, my enthusiasm quickly hardened into exasperation when I found that theories of race and gender in geography were limited to one week each in most first-year curricula. I was, and still am, seeking to find the middle ground between the extensive attention Black studies scholars have paid to representations of race, and geographical scholarship on how place is epistemologically formed. It is time that geographers utilized the interdisciplinary nature of their field to widen dialogue formerly limited by structural inequalities.

As Rose-Redwood et al. (2018) rightly argue, certain voices have been systematically excluded from the physical and metaphorical spaces of dialogue within the field of human geography. The marginalization of Black geographic scholarship within the discipline cannot be understood separately from the marginalization of Black scholars at all levels within geography. This means that the academy can itself be a site of violence that regulates who can participate in scholarly dialogue. But, at the same time, we want to argue that the project of Black Geographies is more than simply a project of ‘add Black people and stir’. It is about moving beyond a liberal politics of superficial and provisional inclusion to think seriously about which voices, intellectual genealogies, and traditions of thought are deemed sufficiently canonical or scholarly—and why.

Claims to dialogue within human geography, and the academy writ large, are frequently invoked to obscure a lack of engagement with noncanonical scholarship. Yet we are still convinced that geography has important things to offer our understanding of blackness, and vice versa—that centering blackness can actually tell us important things about space and place, about power and the politics of resistance. The Black Geographies Symposium, for instance, was centered on a shared understanding of blackness as a fundamentally spatial relation, of space as profoundly racialized, and of the history of geography as entangled with racism, colonialism, and enslavement. What would it mean, for instance, if geographers were to read Marx on the factory alongside W.E.B. Du Bois and C.L.R. James on the plantation, or Jamaica Kincaid alongside Doreen Massey on relational understandings of place? A Black geographical scholarly praxis entails a willingness to subvert arborescent models of intellectual lineage in favor of queerings, rhizomes, undercommons (Harney and Moten, 2013), provincializations, or even the Sankofa (Benjamin, 2013). These are, in other words, nonhierarchical and nonlinear modes of study that can attend to the complex geographical itineraries and interconnected struggles that continue to shape our understandings of the relations of capitalism, racism, and sexism that structure the modern world.

Perhaps, then, we should be striving for something more radical than dialogue. Rose-Redwood et al. (2018) point toward the possibilities of dialogue as embodied action; but what if we instead take liberatory knowledges as the point of departure, rather than ‘democratic’ dialogue or abject embodiment? In her keynote presentation at the Black Geographies symposium, Katherine McKittrick suggested that scholarly dialogue necessarily invokes the materiality of humanness in both body and place:

‘The materiality of intellectual inquiry, the ideas we share, the counsel we give each other, is an ongoing referential conversation about Black humanity. [ ...] The materiality of intellectual inquiry, the ideas we share, is a referential conversation that begins from Black humanness’.

## \*\*Links

## Links – Topic

### Link – Cyber Security

#### Cyber warfare is a product of racial capitalisms unconscious – the root cause is violence shaped by inter-capitalist rivalries that make war inevitable and maintains the states monopoly on violence

Dyer-Witherford and Mtviyenko 17 – Nick Dyer-Witheford is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at University of Western Ontario and Svitlana Matviyenko is an Assistant Professor of Critical Media Analysis in the School of Communication [Nick, Svitlana, “Cyber-War and Contemporary Marxism,” 2017, DKP]

Cyber-war could, in theory be part of a contemporary revolutionary war position which might include development militant hacking to sabotage and paralyse corporate operations, recovering the worker power lost by the (cybernetic) diminishment of the power of the mass strike, etc, or disrupting the financial sector. More loosely, as we have already mentioned the last decades of seen some successes in cyber-organizing of occupations, demonstrations and riots, and one could imagine this process intensifying in future crises. However, there are problems in particular to applying cyber-war to revolutionary ends. As Hassan (2013), Dyer-Witheford (2015) and others have argued, there is a misfit between the speed and secrecy of cyber-war practices and the slower and social logic that, in the long term, form radically emancipatory subjects and movements: reliance on cyber-organizing probably account for some of the "up like a rocket, down like a stick" aspect of the 2011 occupations. Moreover, despite hacker romanticism, there is a persisting imbalance of power between state and no-state forces even in the digital realm (Healey 2013), and the new vulnerability of social movements to surveillance cyber-crackdowns seriously jeopardises all sorts of cyber-organizing hacktivism. To assess the future possibilities of revolutionary cyber-war therefore requires an overall assessment of the diverse factors at play in the emergence of cyber-war as a feature of contemporary capitalism, a task to which we now turn.

3. Cyber-War and the capitalist unconscious

Cyber war emerges from and is shaped by the interaction of inter-capitalist rivalries, class war, technological revolutions and both progressive and reactionary social movements, producing an extremely complex diagram. What we might call the horizontal axis of inter-state conflicts, with which many cyber war accounts begin, has to be seen in relation to a vertical axis that pits these same rival states against a seething mass of (often contradictory) digitized resistance movements (many of which are supported or co-opted by inter-state rivalries in various proxy wars), with both horizontal and vertical dynamics arising from, and feeding into, a common origin-point in capitalism's most recent technological revolution. These different vectors interact to create a series of zigzagging, diagonal or swerving alignments whose chaotic tendencies are enhanced by the decentralization, opacity and velocity of networked interaction.

This complex pattern of conflicts can be seen as a manifestation of global capitalism's "unconscious" (Tom sic 2016; Jameson 1991). By this we mean that cyber-war is symptomatic of features of the world-market unacknowledged in the neoliberal discourse of "globalization", namely the profound aggression and destructiveness intrinsic to an order predicated on privatized competition. While neoliberalism of course not only recognises but enthusiastically celebrates competition and its associated "disruptions" and "creative destruction" as a spur to innovation and wealth creation, its official message is that ultimately the "invisible hand" of the market anneals this into the greater good of optimal resource allocation. What is denied is the possibility that this competitive agonistic system might explode into non-creative destruction, and that the ultimate "disruption" is to be found in the horror of war. Cyber-war is a secretive but increasingly present irruption of this possibility, a partially contained yet intensifying expression of the world market's disintegrative tendencies. As aspects of the opaque and undeclared but deeply penetrative refashioning of social subjects by cyber-war we include the following points:

\* Cyber-war is "crepuscular" (Virilio 2002). Cyber-war as neither simply a fabrication of cyber-security experts (Blunden & Cheung 2013; Rid 2013) nor the imminent equivalent of nuclear war, as some of those experts suggest (Clark 2011). It belongs rather neither war nor peace, as form of shadow hostility that is compatible with and cross cuts officially civil relations between states (e.g. US relations with Russia and China) and the outbreak of kinetic conflicts (Syria, Ukraine). It is neither identical to nor separate from either conventional war or peace time signals intelligence operations, but is rather the persistent background noise or "ceiling" (2013) of capital's new cold (and hot) wars, and its endemic class wars.

■ Cyber-war is mystifying. It is well recognized that cyber-war operations pose an "attribution problem" because of the tendency to "obliterate proof" (Filiol 2011) of its perpetrators. Although many of these attribution problems are convincingly solved, sometimes surprisingly quickly (Hansen 2013), they nevertheless invest questions of war and peace, security and risk with a deep murkiness and proliferating anxieties and paranoia.

Cyber-war as marketized (or privatized) war-in which the state's "monopoly of violence" is reinforced and undermined by private actors, hacker armies, corporate "hack-backs", for profit cyber-security firms and consultancies (Harris 2014), so that the "military industrial" complex's of national security states become more and more interfaced with criminal markets and "the dark web", and increasingly dependent by corporate collaborations, which can both enable and constrain state power (for example, the PRISM compliance between the NSA and giant info-corporations followed by "encryption" conflicts between FBI and Apple etc). Cyber-war thus becomes a domain beyond public oversight and democratic control.

Cyber-war is a new way of clandestine mobilization and disciplining of populations. The mass mobilizations of huge armies are thought of as past, but cyber-war offers both states and movements new forms of recruitment, beyond the professional armies, whether by induction into patriotic hacking, Anonymous-style scrip- hacking or jihadist virtual interpellation. By the same token it also sets in motion, through surveillance, a new militarized panopticism, capable of both highly personalized targeting of suspects (Duncan 2014) and the generalized repressive chilling of networks (Deibert 2013).

Cyber-war is increasingly automated, operating by malware implantation, bot -nets, chat bots, the tweaking of algorithmic filter- bubbles, big-data scanning surveillance and the "kill-chains" of drone-warfare (Deibert 2013; Cockburn 2015; Shaw 2016). It thus becomes a machinic capitalist unconscious, a subterranean process in which the participants are made unwittingly or at least unthinkingly complicit by their everyday involvement in a ubiquitously networked social context.

This subterranean militarized digital environment poses contemporary anti-capitalist movements with difficult dilemmas about how, when or if to practice networked organization, whose speed and secrecy offer some powerful advantages, but also confound the slower processes of mundane organization and are intensely vulnerable to surveillance and cyber-crackdowns. Future Marxist revolutionaries, operating under conditions of surveillance and sous veillance, viral information and disinformation, encryption and encryption-breaking, anonymization, verification, authentication, and algorithmic digital war, will have to make constant strategic and tactical decisions about whether to adopt cyber-war techniques. The resort to cyber-war by state actors, their proxies, and their terrorist opponents means that opposition to militarization of the digital is an important arena of organization, mobilizing popular sentiment against the enlarged scope of state and corporate mass surveillance, viral propaganda, covert malware operations, and, more broadly pressing against the aggressive disorders of the world market. Paradoxically, however, as Snowden, Wikileaks and Anonymous have shown, revealing the scope of the destruction, actual and potential, inflicted by global capitalism's new wave of wars and cyber-wars itself requires hacker ingenuity. Therefore the best current revolutionary strategy may be the paradoxical one of (to renew another phrase from the archive of the left) "Krieg dem Krieg", "war on war" (Nation 2009, or in this case, "cyber-war on cyber-war".

### Link – Cyberwar

#### Visions of cyber war are conjured by catastrophic apocalypticism – interpreting benign attacks to construct immanent ‘cyber-doom scenarios’ which justifies imperial expansion in the pursuit of security.

Stevens, 13 – Senior Lecturer in Global Security at King's College London. (Tim Stevens, “Apocalyptic Visions: Cyber War and the Politics of Time,” 4-25-2013, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2256370)//ILake-MO

Anatomy of an Apocalypse

Apocalyptic thinking is inherently eschatological, interpreting history through the prism of finitude: contemporary events are imbued with eschatological meaning and are interpreted as ‘signs’ of impending apocalypse (Robbins and Palmer, 1997: 4-5). The roll-call of signs of cyber war will be familiar: Cuckoo’s Egg, Eligible Receiver, Morris Worm, ILOVEYOU, Code Red, Estonia, Georgia, Conficker, Operation Aurora, Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, and so on. This litany of signs—although internally heterogeneous—imparts metonymic gravitas to cyber war narratives and fulfils a significant mnemonic function in reminding audiences continually of the seriousness of cyber threats. They become ‘signifiers of the no-longer-future-but-reality of cyber-war’ (Cavelty, 2013). Their historical specificity is elided in their construction as discrete events, the frequency of which is always increasing (e.g. Herrera-Flanigan, 2013), and which lead inevitably to cyber war. Prophets who read and pronounce upon these apocalyptic signs—the ‘Cassandras of cyber warfare’ (Rid, 2012: 6)—do not, like their religious counterparts, restrict themselves to specific dates and times upon which terrible events will occur, so need not excuse themselves from incorrect predictions; consequently, they can never be wrong. However, they do have in common talents as ‘masterful bricoleurs, skilfully recasting elements and themes within the constraints of their respective traditions and reconfiguring them to formulate new, meaningful endtimes scenarios’ (Wojcik, 1997: 148). Specific vectors of ‘cyber insecurity’ may change, and timescales expand and contract, but the certainty in apocalypse remains unwavering. ‘Apocalyptic intensity’ is maintained and heightened further by making continued ‘imminent but indeterminate’ predictions, legitimising a constant state of readiness in which adherents ‘feel themselves to be standing poised on the brink of time’ (Bromley, 1997: 36). In fact, it is always ‘only a matter of time’ before a ‘cyber-apocalypse’ occurs (Gable, 2010). This uncertainty is shared with other forms of security, which thrive on a ‘denotative imprecision .... simultaneous appeal to the hard and the vacuous, the precise and the imprecise .... vague generalities about everything and nothing’ (Walker, 1997: 63). This epistemic tension is partially resolved by reading the signs of cyber war as corroboration of a deterministic ‘script’ of the future (Robbins and Palmer, 1997: 5). When events and scenarios converge, the narrative of cyber war gains explanatory power in its own right. In periods of ‘thickened history’ like this, it becomes ever more difficult to comprehend these events—‘to see the wood for the trees’, as it were—and they become part of their own causal structure (Beissinger, 2002: 27). In this case, the impression is that if cyber war is not already occurring, it very soon will be.

The initiation of the apocalypse is frequently reduced to the familiar digital motif of a finger hovering above the button or positioned in readiness for a final, decisive mouse-click or emphatic keystroke: ‘There was a time when war was begun with a sho. Now it can begin with the simple click of a mouse. A silent attack that you may never even know occurred until it all unfolds in front of you’ (Rudd, 2011). During the early Cold War, the image of the US president’s finger poised above a ‘nuclear button’ became the standard symbol of state military power (Strong, 2005: 34) but in an age of cyber war, the power to foment societal chaos is available to all: as UK armed forces minister Nick Harvey warned, ‘the finger hovering over the button could be anyone from a state to a student’ (Hopkins, 2011). The difficulties of representing cyber threats visually (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1165) partially explain the popularity of this imagery but like the nuclear case—for which substantial visual resources were available—there is semantic power in this reduction of immense sociotechnical complexity to a simple manual action (Plotnick, 2012). Like the informational bits mediating the human will to prosecute these actions, the decision to proceed is also binary: on/off, yes or no. We might never know who hit us or why but this single physical act brings the future rushing catastrophically into the present, the moment of ‘cosmic ecstasy’ (Chernus, 1982) in which all apocalyptic predictions are validated.

This suggests apocalypse is also an object of desire, something to be welcomed and, perhaps, brought into being (e.g. Cook, 2004). Apocalypse is not merely the end but also a beginning, a time of both revelation and transformation. An apocalyptic belief in the transformation of the human condition through catastrophe informs the rhetoric of, for instance, the US-led ‘war on terror’ as much as it does the jihadism of those who prompted it (McLaren, 2002; Jackson, 2005: 103-105), even if the utopian ideal of achieving a ‘terror’-free world is as unlikely as Islamist dreams of global caliphate (Gray, 2007). They remain visions no matter how hard one strives to achieve them and are part of a ‘catastrophic’ strand of apocalypticism, pitting good against evil and privileging dystopian and pessimistic views of human nature (Wessinger, 1997). Cyber war scenarios frequently express this catastrophic apocalypticism, yet these eventualities are not entirely unwelcomed. Cyber war as apocalypse is ‘an illumination unveiled precisely at the very moment of the greatest darkness and danger’ (Aho, 1997: 65), a light to dispel the night of political foot-dragging and insufficient cyber security. The catastrophic materialisation of the ‘virtual’ threat is the necessary catalyst through which to achieve this transformation. In this respect, apocalypse operates in its primary sense of ‘revelation’, a ‘singular instant both revealing the meaning of the past and announcing the future’ (Bousquet, 2006: 756), in this case the political errors of the past and the sunlit uplands of a ‘cyber secure’ future.

### Link – Deflection

#### Deflection

Morefield, 19 – Professor of Politics at Whitman College. (Jeanne Morefield, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Isn’t the Problem,” *Boston Review*, 1-8-2019, Available Online: <https://bostonreview.net/articles/jeanne-morefield-tk/)//ILake-MO>

Trump’s willingness to say such things has precipitated an existential crisis in the international relations world. U.S. foreign policy, as an academic discourse and political practice, is built on the delicate foundation of what Robert Vitalis has called the “norm against noticing,” This deflective move has long been the gold standard of international relations; under its rules of play, IR experts act as if the United States has never been an imperial power and that its foreign policy is not, and has never been, intentionally racist. The norm against noticing thus distinguishes between the idea of the United States as a necessary world-historical actor and the reality of how the United States acts.

In that reality, the United States has long been an imperial power with white nationalist aspirations. Given the racialized nature of U.S. imperial expansion, it makes sense that Alexis de Tocqueville predicted, in a chapter entitled “The Three Races of the United States,” that the United States would one day govern “the destinies of half the globe.” In its early days, while still a slave-holding country, the United States asserted its sovereignty through genocide on a continental scale and annexed large portions of northern Mexico. The country went on to overthrow the independent state of Hawaii, occupied the Philippines and Haiti, exerted its regional power throughout Latin America, expanded its international hegemony after World War II, and became what it is today: the world’s foremost military and nuclear power with a $716 billion “defense” budget that exceeds the spending of all other major global powers combined.

“Taking over from the British Empire in the early twentieth-century,” argues James Tully, the United States has used its many military bases located “outside its own borders”—now nearly 800 in over 80 countries— to force open-door economic policies and antidemocratic regimes on states throughout the formerly colonized world. An extremely partial list of sovereign governments that the United States either overthrew or attempted to subvert through military means, assassinations, or election tampering since 1949 includes Syria, Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba, Chile, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Yemen, Australia, Greece, Bolivia, and Angola. Such interventionist policies have contributed substantially to today’s inegalitarian world in which an estimated 783 million people live in profound poverty. In sum, for untold millions of humans in the Global South, the seventy years of worldwide order, security, and prosperity that Ikenberry and Deudney associate with Pax Americana has been anything but ordered, secure, or prosperous.

And yet the norm against noticing prevents foreign policy analysis from even acknowledging—let alone grappling with—the relationship between race and imperialism that has characterized U.S. international relations from the country’s earliest days. This regime of politely un-seeing—of deflecting—connections between U.S. foreign policy, race hierarchy, and colonial administration was clearly not in effect when Foreign Affairs was released under its original name: the Journal of Race Development. This began to change, however, in the 1920s. Among other contributing factors, World War I, the rise of anti-colonial revolutions, and the emergence of liberal internationalism as a popular ideology helped convince foreign policy experts in the United States and Europe to adopt a policy language oriented toward “development” rather than imperialism or racial difference. Mainstream international relations scholarship today remains committed to a narrative in which the discipline itself and U.S. foreign policy has always been and remains race blind, concerned solely with the relationship between sovereign states who cooperate, deter, or compete with one another in a global system in which the United States is simply, like Caesar, the “first citizen” (Ikenberry) or “the luckiest great power in modern history” (Walt). For liberals, this involves a studied erasure of the imperial origins of twentieth-century internationalism in the League of Nations’ Mandate system and the complicity of Woodrow Wilson in preserving, as Adom Getachew puts it, “white supremacy on a global scale.” For realists, it requires both forgetting the anti-Enlightenment origins of postwar realist thought and reinserting the “security dilemma” back into history so that, with the help of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, the world can—as Slavoj Žižek says—“become what it always was.”

International relations experts will acknowledge U.S. violence and overreach when necessary, but routinely read the illiberalism of U.S. foreign policy as an exception that is not at all representative, in Anne Marie Slaughter’s words, of “the idea that is America.” Slaughter, with Ikenberry, can consider bad behavior only briefly and only in the service of insisting that what matters most is not what the United States actually does with its power but what it intends to do. Yes, “imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history,” Ikenberry and Deudney argue, but what matters is that liberalism “has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices.” Indeed, even those public intellectuals such as Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff who, after September 11, called for the United States to embrace its status as an imperial power, framed their arguments in deflective, liberal terms. By contrast, because realists project the security dilemma retroactively into history (while also simultaneously excising imperialism) they can only see the U.S. destabilization of Third World economies, assassinations, and secret bombings as tragic necessities (great powers, claims Mearsheimer, “have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system”) or as the result of liberals’ ill-advised desire to force “our” values on other nations. Both of these deflective strategies reinforce the illusion that we live, in Nikhil Pal Singh’s words, in an “American-centered, racially inclusive world, one organized around formally equal and independent nation states” where some states just happen to have more power than others, and where the alternative—Russian or Chinese hegemony—is too frightening even to contemplate.

That deflection would play such an outsized role in supporting the ideological edifice of international relations today is hardly surprising. Turn-of-the-century British liberals who supported their empire also drew upon a variety of different deflective strategies to reconcile the violence and illiberalism of British imperial expansion with the stated liberal goals of the Empire. Such deflection made it impossible for these thinkers—many of whom would go on to work as some of the first international relations scholars in Britain and help found The Royal Institute of International Affairs—to link the problems of empire with the violence and disruption of imperialism.

Similarly, deflection within international relations today obscures the U.S. role in maintaining the profoundly hierarchical, racist, insecure, deeply unjust reality of the current global order. It also makes it impossible to address how U.S. foreign policy (covert and overt) has contributed to the destabilization of that order by creating the circumstances that give rise to “failed states,” “rogue regimes,” and “sponsors of terrorism.” Moreover, it impedes any theorizing about how the widespread appeal of Trump’s xenophobia at home might, in part, be the product of U.S. foreign policy abroad, the bitter fruit of the War on Terror and its equally violent predecessors. In other words, in the grand tradition of liberal empire, U.S. foreign policy deflection actively disrupts the link between cause and effect that an entire science of international relations was created to explain.

### Link – DPT

#### Democratic peace theory relies on a liberal conception of social contract theory which upon which racial divisions are drawn – perpetual peace is a racist fantasy.

Henderson, 14 – Associate Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University. (Errol A. Henderson, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in international relations theory,” *Race and Racism in International Relations*, Routledge 2014, pg. 19-40)//ILake-MO

Nevertheless, prominent democratic peace advocates such as Ray (1995, 3) insist that Kant provides “an important symbolic as well as substantive source of inspiration for advocates of the democratic peace proposition”. For Doyle (1997, 302), Kant’s thesis “lays a special claim to what world politics is and can be: a state of peace”, and it “claims a special property right in what shapes the politics of Liberal states – liberty and democracy”. Russett (1993, 4) is even more adoring of Kant’s “republican constitutionalism”, which he asserts is “compatible with basic contemporary understandings of democracy”. But Kant’s ethical and political theory is unequivocally racist: it excises whole swathes of humanity from its processes. The republicanism Kant espouses – in contrast to Russett’s claims – is quite a distance from democracy popularly conceived: it is a Herrenvolk democracy for whites that provides for “perpetual peace”. Mills (1997, 72) explains that

the embarrassing fact for the white West (which doubtless explains its concealment) is that their most important moral theorist of the past three hundred years is also the foundational theorist in the modern period of the division between Herrenvolk and Untermenschen, persons and subpersons, upon which Nazi theory would later draw. Modern moral theory and modern racial theory have the same father [emphasis in original].

Mainstream IR theory in general and the democratic peace literature in particular are silent on this aspect of Kant’s writing and its implications for his “perpetual peace”. Similarly, constructivist arguments such as proffered by Wendt ignore this aspect of Kantian thought that should inform their understanding of a “Kantian” state of nature that they insist is orientated toward amicable relations among states and peoples. Even realist counterarguments to the Kantian claims of liberal and constructivist neo-Kantians rarely evoke Kant’s racism as a factor undermining his thesis.

What should be clear is that the social contract theses that underlie prominent conceptions of the global anarchy in which world politics is situated for many realists, idealists/liberals, constructivists, and some Marxists as well, suggest a racist dualism that rests on a fundamental dichotomy with respect to the emergence of society and, thus, the conduct of social affairs for whites, who are constructed as developmentally superior, and blacks, who are constructed as developmentally inferior. Having discussed briefly the racist dualism in prominent conceptions of the state of nature derived from Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, in the next section we discuss how the racism that inheres in the social contract theses became central to the theses of IR theorists who drew on them to devise the paradigms that continue to orientate the field.

### Link – NATO

#### The affirmative recalibrates Global NATO – IR concerns of [security cooperation, great power war, and emerging technologies] elide an interrogation of the blood-soaked network which upholds imperialism.

Campbell, 19 – Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. (Horace B. Campbell, “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis,” *Counter Punch*, 4-9-2019, Available Online: <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/)//ILake-MO>

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran.

Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted.

There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima.

The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO.

#### NATO’s creation was because of Whiteness, and Whiteness also shapes responses to crises like the war in Ukraine.

By Amoz JY Hor, April 12, 2022 (“NATO was founded to protect ‘civilized’ people. That means White.”, Washington Post, Amoz JY Hor is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the George Washington University whose research agenda concerns emotions and racialization in international politics, accessed 6/28/2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/11/nato-ukraine-refugees-whiteness/>) //lrap

The invasion of Ukraine has been horrifying to witness.  
Early on, some observers repeatedly expressed the idea that the invasion of Ukraine is especially horrifying because, as CBS reporter Charlie D’Agata, who was in Kyiv, put it, “This isn’t a place, with all due respect, like Iraq or Afghanistan, that has seen conflict raging for decades. This is a relatively civilized, relatively European — I have to choose those words carefully too — city." (D’Agata later issued an apology.)  
People of color are not surprised. A large body of research finds that Whiteness informs who is deemed deserving of welfare, protectionism, property, security, freedom, humanitarianism and more. NATO’s very inception — too — was birthed through appeals to Whiteness.  
To understand the selective empathy toward Ukraine, here are four historical examples that illustrate how race has always mattered when it comes to NATO and the concept of Western civilization, drawn from a large body of scholarship as well as my own dissertation research.  
1. **NATO was born out of a fear of White slavery**  
American commitments to NATO were born out of the fear that communism would spread in Europe. However, communism was seen to pose a threat not just to “freedom” — but specifically to White freedom, as historian Tyler Stovall and others have shown.  
In the U.S. South, communism was seen as synonymous with desegregation. Looking abroad, arch-segregationist Sen. James Eastland (D-Miss.) in 1947 explained his support for U.S. commitments to Europe:  
… there is more slavery on the earth today than at any previous time in the world’s history … communism is the greatest of all enslavers [because] Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia are the first nations in modern history which have recognized and practiced the doctrine of human slavery as applied to the white race. (Note: Emphasis is the author’s.)  
2. Defending European democracy meant reinforcing colonization elsewhere  
NATO was born as an alliance that protected — and even funded — European colonization. As explicated during the 1948 congressional hearings on the Marshall Plan, the United States believed that Europe’s postwar economic recovery was crucial to resisting communism. Britain, for instance, was to recover through recolonizing Malaya and its strategic resources — rubber and tin. British-controlled Malaya was the second-highest exporter to the United States before Japan’s takeover in World War II. Reestablishing this “triangular trade” was so important that the United States indirectly assisted the suppression of independence movements in colonial Southeast Asia, culminating in the Vietnam War.  
As one senator would explain during the congressional hearings:  
[Y]ou have got Europe … able to maintain herself because of her foreign investments. Those foreign investments are largely gone. … [I]f western Europe and the white race in particular is to carry on, it has got to be done by … extension of the new colonial empire … [to] the nations in Africa. (Note: Emphasis is the author’s)  
3. **Western civilization is code for Whiteness**  
In ways similar to the selective empathy shown toward Ukraine today, early advocates of establishing NATO argued that communism posed a threat to “Western civilization” — a dog whistle for Whiteness.  
“Race” has never been denoted solely by skin color but has always been defined in ways relying on a wide range of physical characteristics such as the shape or size of someone’s nose, eyes or even skull. It has always relied on cultural markers, such as clothing, diet, behavior, origin, ancestral heritage or other cultural traits to mark one group as distinct and inferior or superior from another.  
“Western civilization” is a term that posits liberal ideals as the unique heritage of White people. For example, in 1949, one senator justified the creation of NATO by saying:  
There is not a member of the Senate who does not stem from one of [the North Atlantic] countries. His forebears came from Europe. … We are the result. … [T]his is our hour not to fail civilization. Three hundred million persons … believe in the great common principles which the race has developed and inherited through generation after generation.” (Note: Emphasis is the author’s)  
This was not an isolated sentiment. Fifty years before Samuel Huntington’s book “Clash of Civilizations,” the term “Western civilization” was the title of history courses. The most famous was Arnold Toynbee’s bestseller “A Study of History,” in which he represents “Western Civilization” as the only civilization exclusively made up of the three White “races” — Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean. (By contrast, he states that Black “races” have not contributed to any civilization).  
Because “Western Civilization” was (or is) understood to be exclusively made up White “races,” the term could function as a surrogate term for “Whiteness,” including in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty: “The Parties to this Treaty … are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples.” (Note: Emphasis is the author’s)  
As one senator elaborated in 1949 hearings, this proposal to “defend our so-called western tradition” meant “the culmination of a thousand years [of] the Anglo-Saxon [i.e. White] people.” Unsurprisingly, what makes Ukrainians’ plight so shocking is that “they seem so like us,” so “civilized.”  
4. “Slavs” were considered “not quite White”  
It is not racist to feel outraged about the crisis in Ukraine. War and imperialism are horrifying no matter the victims. Perhaps journalists are well-intentioned in resorting to whatever sources of sympathy they can arouse to help fleeing Ukrainians. Nevertheless, we should resist building solidarity based on something as exclusionary as Whiteness.  
In the United States, Whiteness — initially restricted to Anglo-Saxons — was defined by the constitutional right to not be enslaved. Through the 1800s, non-Anglo-Saxon European immigrants fought against what they called wage slavery in the United States — not on the basis that freedom was a universal right, but on the basis that “only [Blacks] are slaves” and only Chinese labor is “servile.” By becoming “White,” they gained White freedoms. But they also cemented the idea that only Whites are befitting of freedom.  
Slavs — Russians, Ukrainians, Poles and others — were likewise considered “not quite White.” One etymological artifact of this history is that the term “slave” comes from the word “Slav.” Even in 1941, George Kennan — famed grand strategist of the early Cold War — called Russians “a XVII century semi-Asiatic people” who were “backwards” and “servile.” In 2018, the Wall Street Journal similarly characterized the crisis as “Russia’s Turn to Its Asian Past.” The contingency of “Slavs” as “White” was also on display during Brexit.  
However, the solution to injustices faced by Eastern Europeans cannot simply be to extend Whiteness to Ukrainians on the basis that they are “not obviously refugees … from North Africa.” Observers might instead extend solidarity to all who struggle for freedom, not just those “like us.”

#### NATO is the “hub” of a “white-dominated alliance system” created by the United States.

Tilden J. LeMelle, 1972 (“RACE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE”, Journal of Black Studies (accessed via JSTOR), accessed 6/28/2022, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2783780>) //lrap   
\*\*this is a really old card. do not read this unless you’ve got no other options.

RACE AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WHITE-DOMINANT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM   
It is in the above context that one must view the role of race in U.S. foreign policy as it relates to African states as well as to other "nonwhite" states in the world. Racial stratification patterns in the international system have been so established and institutionalized by international white power that, with few exceptions, the function of the non-European peoples of the world is that of subsidizing the life styles of Europeans and supporting continued white domination of the international system at the expense of the "nonwhite." The role of the United States is to provide leadership for that portion of the white world subscribing to what is called democratic capitalism or democratic socialism in its competition with what is called communistic socialism.   
In order to fulfill its role, the United States has set up an elaborate white alliance system which commits millions of people around the world to defend Euro-American interests. Beginning with NATO, which, in its full ramifications, is not a simple alliance of North Atlantic states, since peripherally it includes South Africa and has considered Brazil and Argentina, in the South Atlantic (moreover, at least sixteen African states are geographically North Atlantic states)3 -NATO is a white alliance system par excellence and is the hub of a white-dominated alliance system. Beginning with NATO and including SEATO (U.S., U.K., France, New Zealand, Aus-tralia, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan), CENTO (U.K., Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan), ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.), the Rio Treaty (OAS) and the bilateral treaties of the U.S. with Japan, Korea, Taiwan-all of these are Euro-American-dominated. In Southeast Asia, we find Asians fighting Asians to protect perceived Euro-American interests. What is most interesting is that Euro-Americans have not found it necessary to form multilateral military alliances with black African states-only economic alliances such as the Common Market and Associated African States.   
Could it be that such an alliance would be called upon to hold white supremacist South Africa in check militarily? Or could it be that economic domination of African-controlled states is sufficient to protect white interests on the conti- nent? It is both, since the African commitment to nonalign-ment has not deterred some African states from striking bilateral military agreements with France, the United States, and African states. The fact is that Euro-Americans have become militarily involved in Africa only to protect perceived white interests.

#### White supremacy is inherent to the idea of US hegemony and global leadership.

By Ajamu Baraka, 2019 (“Confronting the U.S./EU/NATO axis of domination”, Green Party US, accessed 6/28/2022, Ajamu Baraka is the national organizer of the Black Alliance for Peace and was the 2016 candidate for vice president on the Green Party ticket, <https://www.gp.org/axis_of_domination>) //lrap  
\*\* could be read as whatever you want, but def has potential to be recut as an alt card

Democrats may hate Trump, but they join in white supremacist solidarity with his aggression against the mostly non-white people of [Venezuela].  
“It is accepted as normal that the U.S. and Europe have the right and, indeed, the responsibility to police the world.”  
The hypocrisy and confusion on the issue of race and white supremacy revealed itself once again in the United States with a governor dressed in blackface and a decision by the Trump administration and supported by the European Union to execute a coup against the democratically elected government of Venezuela.  
And while Virginia Governor Ralph Northam was outed as a racist when photos surfaced from his yearbook as a medical student in the 1980s that depicted him in either blackface or in a KKK outfit, the assumption that the U.S. and European Union had the right to determine the leadership of a nation in the global South escaped the same condemnation as a racist act of white supremacist power.  
The liberal chattering class was quick to condemn this obvious expression of racism and call for Northam’s resignation. But as journalist Greg Palast points out, the attempts by the oligarchy in Venezuela to undermine the government is “at its heart, a furious backlash of the whiter (and wealthier) Venezuelans against their replacement by the larger Mestizo (mixed-race) poor.” Which means that the intervention by the U.S. is an intervention in support of white power.  
Yet liberals who pretended to be outraged by the racism of Northam and had lambasted Trump as a liar and incompetent who colluded with the Russians to influence the U.S. elections, gave their vocal and enthusiastic support for the Trump administration’s illegal intervention.  
“The intervention in Venezuela by the U.S. is an intervention in support of white power.”  
How can this be explained? What lesson must the colonized in the global South and the oppressed peoples and classes trapped in the nations of the North take from this unity of purpose between the neocons and liberal interventionists, the liberal bourgeoisie in the U.S. and Europe and even the general public?  
The answer lies in the Eurocentric, white supremacist cultural discourses that have conditioned the collective consciousness of Westerners. The cultural affliction of Eurocentric, white supremacist ideology that has permeated all forms of cultural and ideological expression. It is not even a point of contention among the academic and non-academic population, both left and right, that “liberal” capitalist Europe represents a significant development in the history of human civilizations, if not the apex of human development.  
This perspective, from Marxism that sees the capitalist phase as a necessary and inevitable stage (albeit with contradictions) to neoliberal globalists, represents a “commonsense” position embedded in all Western social institutions that simultaneously normalizes and invisibilizes behavior informed by the assumptions of white privilege and prerogatives.  
“White supremacist cultural discourses have conditioned the collective consciousness of Westerners.”  
Therefore, why shouldn’t Trump and the Democrats intervene in Venezuela to determine its leadership, especially when the racial element of that action is apparently beyond comprehension?  
For the public in the U.S., Gov. Northam and Donald Trump represent the easy and crude examples of racism that is universally condemned. But the assumption that the white West has the right and responsibility to determine the leadership and way of life of peoples in the global South doesn’t even register as a debatable issue within discourse on white supremacy.  
It is accepted as normal by the corporate media, most of the intelligencia and the public that the U.S. and Europe, without any authorization from any foundational source such as international law or the United Nations Charter, has the right and indeed the responsibility to police the world.  
The lack of debate on this issue and the cavalier attitude that most have in the West to the real possibilities of yet another military engagement with a global South nation that will likely result in the deaths of thousands of human beings reaffirms once again that the value of human life is stratified; the more distant that life is from Europeans – geographically, culturally and ethnically – the less value it has.  
Consequently, the people of the colonized global South fighting for authentic de-colonization and national self-determination along with the nationally oppressed peoples and classes in the North must be equally clear. The European Union Parliament’s decision to recognize the puppet government being imposed on the people of Venezuela is another reminder that there is a common enemy in the U.S./EU/NATO “axis of domination.”  
“The value of human life is stratified; the more distant that life is from Europeans – geographically, culturally and ethnically – the less value it has.”  
The constituent elements of this contemporary axis of domination was established and is sustained as part of what the late Rod Bush referred to as the Pan-European Project – the white supremacist, colonial/capitalist patriarchy – that began with the invasion of the “Americas” by Europe in 1492.  
That invasion provided the material basis for Europe moving from a backwater region of no significance to the various world orders to the predominant powers on the planet for the last 500 years.  
It is important to understand, therefore, that the critique of white supremacy is not limited just to an idealization principle but has a structural reality. This is what differentiates this analysis from the simple rejection of racialism or white supremacy advanced by reform liberals.  
The analytical and theoretical framework employed here centers and grounds the relationship between the institutions and structures of global white supremacy – the IMF, World Bank, WTO, international financial institutions and dollar hegemony, NATO – and the ideological expressions of white supremacy such as the belief in the cultural superiority of Europe, “humanitarian interventions” and the so-called responsibility to protect.  
There can be no confusion – despite the sectoral fights inside the capitalist class that are currently playing out in the intra-class struggle against Trump – that the oligarchy is united when it comes to projecting the dominance of the Pan-European imperialist project in relationship to the global South. The bipartisan support for the imperialist agenda was in full display during the State of the Union speech by Trump when he proudly mentioned U.S. efforts to subvert the Bolivarian process and in the absence of any opposition to this policy by Stacy Abrams (and, by extension, Democrats) during her rebuttal.  
What Must Be the Position of Black Radical Internationalists  
Venezuela is just the latest expression of that bipartisan unity of interests and actions in support of the Pan-European imperialist project now led by the U.S.  
In the case of Venezuela, we know what will happen if a U.S.-led military intervention takes place. It will be a replay of the 1989 invasion of Panama, where U.S forces turned the Black community of El Chorrillo into a “free fire zone,” resulting in the complete destruction of the community and the deaths of over 3,000 Panamanians.  
The people of Venezuela have made a choice. We will not debate the merits of their process, its contradictions or problems. Our responsibility as citizens/captors of empire is to put a brake on the U.S. state’s ability to foist death and destruction on the peoples of the world.  
However, as it is has been stated in other places, it is imperative that the Black working class is separated from this naked imperialist move on Venezuela and all imperialist assaults. African/Black people must be clear on the issue of U.S. and European capitalist/imperialist interventions. The war and militarism being waged against Africans/Black people in the U.S. by the domestic military we call “the police” – embodied by mass incarceration – is part of the global Pan-European axis of domination that is now conspiring against the Bolivarian revolutionary process in Venezuela.  
“The war on Black people in the U.S. is part of the global Pan-European axis of domination that is now conspiring against Venezuela.”  
Opposition to U.S. imperialism cannot be left up to the so-called progressives in the Democrat Party or even the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The CBC has consistently backed the white ruling class agenda of subversion and military intervention, from its support for the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) to its failure to oppose the Department of Defense’s 1033 program, responsible for transferring millions of dollars-worth of military equipment to local police forces that are then deployed against poor working class black and brown communities.  
Representing the “new” Black managerial/administrative/professional petit-bourgeoisie that is now physically and psychologically disconnected from the Black masses, the CBC has completely thrown in its lot with the owners of capital – white power.  
That is why the position of the Black Alliance for Peace should be embraced. BAP says, “not one drop of blood from working class and poor to defend the interests of the capitalist oligarchy.”  
All rational human beings want peace. But there is no peace without justice. Real social justice, which requires radical structural change, cannot be realized without struggle. And **there can be no effective social change** without clearly identifying the enemy—the source of our oppression—and being able to imagine an alternative.  
The revolutionary Black working class is clear and building our forces for the fight that must be waged against the U.S./EU/NATO axis of domination. The only question is, who will be our allies.

### Link – Nuclear War

#### The affirmative’s study of nuclear conflict between sovereign states within an international system relies on epistemological whiteness which obscures the nuclear color line.

van Munster, 21 – International Relations scholar at the Danish Institute for International Studies. (Rens van Munster, “On whiteness in critical security studies: The case of nuclear weapons,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 52(1), 10-26-2021, [doi: 10.1177/09670106211015029)//ILake-MO](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211015029)//ILake-MO)

The nuclear colour line

Although I take issue with the general approach and some of the larger conclusions of Howell and Richter-Montpetit, I find their argument that non-white experiences of (in)security have been theoretically and empirically marginalized productive. In my own research, the idea of epistemological or methodological whiteness has certainly been helpful in addressing a core question: to what extent has nuclear weapons scholarship (too) an in-built whiteness? This line of questioning appears particularly pertinent given that, as Benoit Pelopidas (2016: 326) has noted, nuclear weapons scholarship in security studies is ‘particularly prone’ to ‘forms of self-censorship’ that suppress normativity and serve to reproduce the status quo and restrict our political imagination.6

While recent nuclear weapons scholarship in international relations has sought to recover or develop a more critical perspective on nuclear weapons technology, this body of work continues to occlude questions of colonialism and race. For example, Pelopidas’s suggestion to ground a critical research study in the recognition that all nuclear weapons scholarship is inherently normative given its commitment, in one way or another, to the prevention of nuclear war remains insufficiently attentive to non-white experiences of nuclear violence. It locates nuclear weapons violence in a future that hopefully never happens, yet ignores the multifaceted forms of nuclear violence that happened in the past and that are still ongoing today. Since the production, testing, (threat of) use and stockpiling of nuclear weapons are all deeply entangled with the violent histories of imperialism and colonialism, much of these past and present forms of nuclear violence disproportionally affect (former) colonial and non-white populations. A genuinely critical study of nuclear weapons must also include a focus on their imperial foundations and racial dimensions, including how the nuclearization of international politics has shaped non-white experiences of (in)security. To ignore the ‘nuclear colour line’, its history and fallout, severely limits our understanding of the violent effects of nuclear weapons and the human costs associated with a security policy based on deterrence. It is also at odds with the most recent developments in anti-nuclear discourse, most notably the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Here, the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons is argued not just in the context of warfare, but also in relation to the contaminating and destructive activities that occur across the entire nuclear fuel cycle (from uranium mining to radioactive waste disposal).

Recent developments in black and African American studies offer one avenue through which to decentre whiteness in nuclear weapons scholarship and attune critical security studies to the racialized realities of nuclear weapons. A substantial literature on black internationalism and the anti-nuclear struggle has existed for a long time, but this scholarship has remained outside critical security studies – an occlusion that admittedly also characterizes my own work on progressive anti-nuclear intellectuals during the Cold War (Van Munster and Sylvest, 2016).7 Vincent Intondi’s (2015) African Americans Against the Bomb, in particular, offers a fruitful starting point on which to base such an intellectual conversation.8 Intondi shows that African Americans viewed nuclear weapons from the perspective of colonialism and black liberation globally, a perspective that fundamentally challenges the dominant view in international relations that the pursuit of nuclear weapons can be understood as the horizontal competition between sovereign states under conditions of anarchy. African Americans pointed out that the development of nuclear capabilities critically relied on the continuation of an unfree (neo)colonial system of rule, including uranium mining in the Congo and the appropriation of overseas territories as designated test sites.

The foregrounding of race also cuts through the distinction between the domestic and the international, inside and outside, upon which much nuclear weapons scholarship in security studies is predicated. African American intellectuals and activists such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Bayard Rustin and Martin Luther King strongly resisted the claim that nuclear weapons were a matter of international politics only and consciously linked the colonial system in which these weapons were rooted to their own struggle for freedom and civil rights. African American critiques of nuclear weapons decentre white experiences and crucially link nuclear weapons to structural forms of violence, including racism and colonialism, that are embedded within the larger social and political structures of domestic and international society. Their uptake in critical security studies would broaden the intellectual ancestry of nuclear weapons scholarship, while offering inspiration to the current movement, spearheaded by non-Western states, to ban the bomb.

Advances in the nuclear humanities and environmental humanities have generally also been more attentive to (post)colonial and non-white experiences with nuclear weapons. In focusing on communities affected by uranium mining, nuclear testing and waste disposal, these, too, fundamentally challenge the view that nuclear weapons violence lies in an abstract future (Hecht, 2012; Kuletz, 1998; Stawkowski, 2016). For example, the focus on communities affected by nuclear testing offers much-needed nuance to the persistent myth that nuclear weapons have never been used since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a belief that continues to inform both formal theories of strategy and post-structuralist critique. For example, Jacques Derrida (1984: 23) maintained as late as 1984 that the ‘fabulously textual’ phenomenon of nuclear weapons first and foremost depends ‘upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding’. The emphasis on nuclear weapons as discursive entities with symbolic power in a game of signalling contrasts sharply with non-white experiences with this technology and serves to conceal the real violence nuclear tests enacted upon indigenous communities and their lands. Such communities had no stake in the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons, yet are the ones affected most by their development. Indeed, nuclear powers detonated scores of bombs on colonial or dependent territories, including Algeria, French Polynesia, the aboriginal Australian territories of Maralinga, Emu Field and Monte Bello Island, and the Marshall Islands. In short, when it comes to nuclear weapons, tests are not just tests: they are experiments that reflect deeply racial and geographic hierarchies of worth (Barker and Johnston, 2008; Immerwahr, 2019).

The study of such hierarchies also complicates the dominant perspective of nuclear weapons violence as highly spectacular and world-ending. Whereas the danger of a nuclear war that results in the immediate death of millions of people across the planet remains a real risk, the ongoing continuous suffering of communities exposed to nuclear testing (as well as other nuclear activities) draws attention to the more intricate, less spectacular and less visible ways in which nuclear weapons perform their everyday violence.9 For these communities, the original violence of the explosion has long since mutated into what Rob Nixon (2011: 2) has referred to as ‘slow violence’, ‘a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all’. The extent to which ‘slow violence’ is the right term to capture such events is a matter of debate, but one of its advantages is that it enables a discussion of nuclear violence that temporally as well as spatially reaches beyond the moment of detonation. Leaking radioactive waste, irradiated landscapes and contamination continue to shape the postcolonial realities of those that have been forcefully removed from their lands or suffer from radiation-related illnesses. Gradual deaths, radiation sickness, biological mutations, geographical displacement and intergenerational trauma must all be included among the central human experiences of what it means to live, die and survive in the nuclear age.

### Link – Ukraine

#### Ukraine is a link, not uniqueness – the 1AC’s narrative of inter-imperialist conflict is complicit in upholding a civilizational order which hyper-values whiteness and dehumanizes racialized others.

Baraka, 22 – Editor and contributing columnist for the Black Agenda Report and contributing columnist for Counterpunch. (Ajamu Baraka, “A new consensus on Whiteness?” *Black Agenda Report*, 3-21-2022, Available Online: https://blackagendareport.com/ukraine-new-consensus-whiteness)//ILake-MO

However, in this short essay I want to address something even more insidious and dangerous than the general propaganda efforts to generate support for the war against Russia, and that is: in the process of building support for war, the white supremacist, ultranationalist, and neo-Nazi elements in Ukrainian society and in the state were downplayed, if not ignored.

That whitewashing, coupled with the inordinate attention given to the war, with the inevitable sympathy for the white victims of this war–a war motivated by the desire of Ukrainians to join Europe, to “defend Europeanness,” and European “civilization”–revealed a contradiction that has always been present at the heart of the emergence of what became Europe. That contradiction was the hyper-valuation of white lives, of “whiteness,” in relationship to the racialized “others,” a contradiction that I refer to as the “white lives matter more movement.”

This whitewashing of Ukraine is particularly dangerous because it is occurring at a historical moment of deep crisis for the global capitalist order, producing proto-fascist movements across Europe that are becoming more visible and bolder. As I said in previous writings on this subject, U.S. authorities and the U.S. and Western European press understood that Ukraine had an active problem with white supremacist ultranationalists and literal neo-Nazis. Nevertheless, in order to engender support for Ukraine and to set the stage for the performance of a lifetime by Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s actor president, Ukraine had to be recreated, minus the ultranationalist influence and Nazis.

Herein lies the danger for non-Europeans.

The coup in 2014 saw for the first time since the second world-war, literal neo-Nazis serving in the government of a European state. Moreover, even though the ultranationalists and neo-Nazis did not have a commanding electoral base, their non-state presence controlling the streets of major cities and towns across Ukraine was significant. They were notorious for their attacks on LGBTQ populations, anarchists, non-Europeans, and Roma peoples. Their violent opposition to communists and communism and socialism of any sort was officially amplified with repressive legislation that outlawed and repressed most left political tendencies.

Beginning in 2014, white supremacists from throughout the European world traveled to Ukraine, with over four thousand “volunteers” traveling to Ukraine recently to fight in response to Zelensky’s call to help fight the Russians. It did not matter to Zelensky or the European nations supplying weapons and paying the salaries of these “volunteers” that most of them were self-identified white supremacists.

Again, we do not need to make the case of the presence of these forces in Ukraine. That has already been done, here, here, and here. The political issue is that the sanitizing of the right-wing Ukrainian state has strengthened the far-right not only in Ukraine but globally. The whitewashing by liberals and the liberal/left in the U.S. that transformed these elements into “moderate” Nazis is having the effect of legitimizing their proto-fascist racialized politics, a politics that is emerging across the white world. There is a reason Marine LePen has a chance to defeat Emmanuel Macron, even after he moved further to the right after being elected.

#### The 1AC’s efforts to cooperate with NATO upholds a racialized organization of European countries built on colonialism and the guarding of white supremacy

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[Amoz JY, “NATO Was Founded to Protect ‘Civilized’ People. That Means White.”, The Washington Post, April 12, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/11/nato-ukraine-refugees-whiteness/>, accessed 6/28/2022, GDS - LJ]

The invasion of Ukraine has been horrifying to witness.

Early on, [some](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/28/ukraine-coverage-media-racist-biases/?itid=lk_inline_manual_4) observers [repeatedly](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/western-media-coverage-ukraine-russia-invasion-criticism) [expressed](https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/news/charlie-dagata-cbs-apology-ukraine-iraq-b2024265.html) [the idea](https://twitter.com/saratu/status/1497700938269835269) that the invasion of Ukraine is especially horrifying because, as CBS reporter Charlie D’Agata, who was in Kyiv, put it, “This isn’t a place, with all due respect, like Iraq or Afghanistan, that has seen conflict raging for decades. This is a relatively civilized, relatively European — I have to choose those words carefully too — city." (D’Agata later issued [an apology](https://www.thewrap.com/cbs-charlie-dagata-backlash-ukraine-civilized/).)

People of color are not surprised. A large body of research finds that Whiteness informs who is deemed [deserving](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/race-and-the-undeserving-poor/9781788210386) [of](https://nyupress.org/9780814736708/the-politics-of-disgust/) [welfare](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1468-4446.12317), [protectionism](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/16/americans-views-of-trade-arent-just-about-economics-theyre-also-about-race/?itid=lk_inline_manual_6), [property](https://harvardlawreview.org/1993/06/whiteness-as-property/), [security](https://muse.jhu.edu/book/68329#:~:text=In%20The%20Purpose%20of%20Intervention,the%20ways%20they%20have%20intervened.), [freedom,](https://www.amazon.com/Racial-Contract-Charles-W-Mills/dp/0801484634) [humanitarianism](https://muse.jhu.edu/book/68329#:~:text=In%20The%20Purpose%20of%20Intervention,the%20ways%20they%20have%20intervened.) and more. [NATO’s very inception](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/why-is-there-no-nato-in-asia-collective-identity-regionalism-and-the-origins-of-multilateralism/B8BE13AF44D732DD9E749E7AE9A861EB) — too — **was birthed through appeals to Whiteness.**

To understand the selective empathy toward Ukraine, here are four historical examples that illustrate how race has always mattered when it comes to NATO and the concept of Western civilization, drawn from a large body of scholarship as well as my own dissertation research.

1. NATO was born out of a fear of White slavery

American commitments to NATO were born out of the fear that [communism](https://www.vub.be/sites/vub/files/nieuws/users/bcoppiet/118risse.pdf) would spread in Europe. **However, communism was seen to pose a threat not just to “freedom” — but specifically to**[**White freedom**](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691179469/white-freedom)**, as historian Tyler Stovall and others have shown.**

In the U.S. South, [communism](https://lsupress.org/books/detail/black-struggle-red-scare/) was seen as synonymous with [desegregation](https://uncpress.org/book/9781469613871/defending-white-democracy/). Looking abroad, arch-segregationist Sen. James Eastland (D-Miss.) in 1947 [explained](https://www.congress.gov/bound-congressional-record/1947/04/11/senate-section) his support for U.S. commitments to Europe:

… there is more slavery on the earth today than at any previous time in the world’s history … communism is the greatest of all enslavers [because] Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia are the first nations in modern history which have recognized and practiced the doctrine of human slavery as applied to the white race. (Note: Emphasis is the author’s.)

[Calling Ukrainian refugees more 'civilized' than Syrians requires willful amnesia](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/22/calling-ukrainian-refugees-more-civilized-than-syrians-requires-willful-amnesia/?itid=lk_interstitial_manual_15)

**2. Defending European democracy meant reinforcing colonization elsewhere**

NATO was born as an alliance that protected — and even funded — European colonization. As explicated during the 1948 congressional hearings on the Marshall Plan, the United States believed that Europe’s postwar economic recovery was crucial to resisting communism. Britain, for instance, was to recover through recolonizing Malaya and its strategic resources — rubber and tin. British-controlled Malaya was the second-highest exporter to the United States before Japan’s takeover in World War II. Reestablishing this “triangular trade” was so important that the United States [indirectly assisted](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24914471?seq=1) the suppression of independence movements in colonial Southeast Asia, [culminating in the Vietnam War](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801419584/the-path-to-vietnam/).

As one senator would explain during the congressional hearings:

[Y]ou have got Europe … able to maintain herself because of her foreign investments. Those foreign investments are largely gone. … [I]f western Europe and the white race in particular is to carry on, it has got to be done by … extension of the new colonial empire … [to] the nations in Africa. (Note: Emphasis is the author’s)

3. Western civilization is code for Whiteness

In ways similar to the selective empathy shown toward Ukraine today, early advocates of establishing NATO argued that [communism posed a threat to “Western civilization”](https://www.press.umich.edu/155781/civilizing_the_enemy) — a dog whistle for Whiteness.

“Race” has never been denoted solely by skin color but has always been defined in ways relying on [a](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/racism-and-nationalism/B41832A63712E513B3B5F3C09B8DEEF5) [wide](https://www.mediaed.org/transcripts/Stuart-Hall-Race-the-Floating-Signifier-Transcript.pdf) [range](https://www.versobooks.com/books/4019-racecra) of physical characteristics such as the shape or size of someone’s nose, eyes or even skull. It has always relied on cultural markers, such as [clothing](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1468796812448022), [diet](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/drawing-the-global-colour-line/6086724C986974CCE003AC628986E36F), [behavior](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-southeast-asian-studies/article/abs/myth-of-the-lazy-native-a-study-of-the-image-of-the-malays-filipinos-and-javanese-from-the-16th-to-the-20th-century-and-its-function-in-the-ideology-of-colonial-capitalism-by-syed-hussein-alatas-frank-cass-colondon-1977-pp-267-bibliography-abbreviations-index-hardcover-950/55872C0382367C351D07460A5826161B), [origin](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1070289X.2018.1543831), [ancestral heritage](https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-intimacies-of-four-continents) or other [cultural traits](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Race_and_Racialization/yitBhzsd9OIC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=balibar+neo+racism&pg=PA83&printsec=frontcover) to mark one group as distinct and [inferior or superior](https://monoskop.org/images/a/a5/Fanon_Frantz_Black_Skin_White_Masks_1986.pdf) from another.

[**“Western civilization”**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/09/western-civilisation-appiah-reith-lecture)**is a term that posits liberal ideals as the unique heritage of White people. For example, in 1949, one senator**[**justified**](https://www.congress.gov/bound-congressional-record/1949/07/07/senate-section)**the creation of NATO by saying:**

There is not a member of the Senate who does not stem from one of [the North Atlantic] countries. His forebears came from Europe. … We are the result. … [T]his is our hour not to fail civilization. Three hundred million persons … believe in the great common principles which the race has developed and inherited through generation after generation.” (Note: Emphasis is the author’s)

This was not an isolated sentiment. Fifty years before Samuel Huntington’s book “Clash of Civilizations,” the term “Western civilization” was the title of [history](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320950722_'Western'_and_'White_Civilization'_White_Nationalism_and_Eurocentrism_at_the_Crossroads) [courses](https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article/105/3/770/23403?login=true). The most famous was Arnold Toynbee’s bestseller “[A Study of History](https://nyupress.org/9780853459613/inventing-western-civilization/),” in which he represents “Western Civilization” as the only civilization exclusively made up of the three White “races” — Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean. (By contrast, he states that Black “races” have not contributed to any civilization).

Because “Western Civilization” was (or is) understood to be exclusively made up White “races,” the term could function as a surrogate term for “Whiteness,” including in [the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/history_pdf/20161122_E1-founding-treaty-original-treaty_NN-en.pdf): “The Parties to this Treaty … are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples.” (Note: Emphasis is the author’s)

As one senator [elaborated in 1949 hearings](https://www.congress.gov/bound-congressional-record/1949/07/11/senate-section), this proposal to “defend our so-called western tradition” meant “the culmination of a thousand years [of] the Anglo-Saxon [i.e. White] people.” Unsurprisingly, what makes Ukrainians’ plight so shocking is that [“they seem so like us,” so “civilized.”](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/civilised-european-look-like-us-racist-coverage-ukraine)

[Check out all TMC's Russia-Ukraine analysis at our new topic guide: Russia and its neighbors](https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vRffYVd_7Hjbhe7ilAA-ku-sk24GujiOK0cusFkQno9iX0PQCMQoeG5Duzpwn2hZvWQGpGX0CrdYPTX/pub)

4. “Slavs” were considered “not quite White”

It is not racist to feel outraged about the crisis in Ukraine. War and imperialism are horrifying no matter the victims. Perhaps journalists are well-intentioned in resorting to whatever sources of sympathy they can arouse to help fleeing Ukrainians. **Nevertheless, we should resist building**[**solidarity**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/15/dont-forget-ukraine-refugee-crisis/?itid=lk_inline_manual_36)[**based**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/15/dont-forget-ukraine-refugee-crisis/?itid=lk_inline_manual_36)[**on**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/anti-black-racism-is-upending-easy-narratives-about-historic-exodus-ukraine/?itid=lk_inline_manual_36)[**something**](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/more-racism-at-ukrainian-borders)**as exclusionary as Whiteness.**

[In the United States](https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-abolition-of-white-democracy), Whiteness — initially restricted to Anglo-Saxons — was defined by the constitutional right to not be enslaved. [Through the 1800s](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674951914), non-Anglo-Saxon European immigrants fought against what they called wage slavery in the United States — not on the basis that freedom was a universal right, but on the basis that [“only [Blacks] are slaves”](https://www.versobooks.com/books/255-the-wages-of-whiteness) and [only Chinese labor is “servile](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/drawing-the-global-colour-line/6086724C986974CCE003AC628986E36F).” By [becoming](https://www.routledge.com/Racial-Formation-in-the-United-States/Omi-Winant/p/book/9780415520317) [“White,”](https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393339741) they gained White freedoms. But they also cemented the idea that only Whites are befitting of freedom.

Slavs — Russians, Ukrainians, Poles and others — were likewise considered “not quite White.” One etymological artifact of this history is that the term “slave” [comes](https://nyupress.org/9780814798935/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-caucasian-race/) [from](https://uncpress.org/book/9781469663722/black-marxism-revised-and-updated-third-edition/) the word “[Slav](https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=slave).” Even in 1941, [George Kennan](https://findingaids.princeton.edu/catalog/MC076_c03088) — famed grand strategist of the early Cold War — called Russians “a XVII century semi-Asiatic people” who were “backwards” and “servile.” In 2018, [the Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-turn-to-its-asian-past-1530889247) similarly characterized the crisis as “Russia’s Turn to Its Asian Past.” The [contingency](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211024408) of “Slavs” as “White” was also [on display](https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/09/29/post-brexit-hate-crimes-against-poles-are-an-expression-of-long-standing-prejudices-and-contestation-over-white-identity-in-the-uk/) during [Brexit](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1451308).

However, the solution to injustices faced by Eastern Europeans cannot simply be to extend Whiteness to Ukrainians on the basis [that](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/26/us/politics/ukraine-europe-refugees.html) [they](https://www.npr.org/2022/03/03/1084201542/ukraine-refugees-racism) [are](https://www.reuters.com/world/arab-refugees-see-double-standards-europes-embrace-ukrainians-2022-03-02/) [“not obviously refugees … from North Africa.”](https://www.npr.org/2022/02/28/1083423348/europe-welcomes-ukrainian-refugees-but-others-less-so) Observers [might](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/22/calling-ukrainian-refugees-more-civilized-than-syrians-requires-willful-amnesia/?itid=lk_inline_manual_41) [instead](https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.1057/s41312-021-00115-z?sharing_token=KsE1emJiM5NdoZ0F1v3d1VxOt48VBPO10Uv7D6sAgHv8NH7AjxddMsBm-iiBO8EoeOHkKwwnd5eZEy28z0sX6b3UFpR0ylqrwg0TfVUSTZiV0jYJIK-Zet68JkmEzFNLf1sjCM6QRO_4WReBGl0lm18eQKGjFvY76xjChxmUzrI%3D) [extend](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41268-017-0112-2) [solidarity](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/26/world/middleeast/refugees-ukraine-middle-east.html) [to](https://www.sds-1960s.org/WhiteBlindspot.pdf) [all](https://theconversation.com/not-in-the-past-colonialism-is-rooted-in-the-present-157395) who [struggle](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/05/famine-afghanistan-joe-biden-reparations) for freedom, [not](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/how-the-ukraine-crisis-reveals-our-racial-empathy-gap-1.6380344) [just](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/05/ukraine-african-refugees-racism/?itid=lk_inline_manual_41) [those](https://www.vox.com/22962300/ukraine-russia-refugee-racism) [“like us.”](https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/tv/story/2022-03-02/ukraine-russia-war-racism-media-middle-east)

#### Cooperation with NATO justifies white supremacist racist notions of pro-European peace while enforcing forced amnesia of targeted violence against countries in the global south - the impact is slow violence and war- Libya, Afghanistan, Syria prove

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[Margaret, “Does Ukraine Expose White Supremacist Foreign Policy?”, LA Progressive, March 4th, 2022, <https://www.laprogressive.com/progressive-issues/white-supremacist-foreign-policy>, accessed 6/28/22, GDS - LJ]

“White supremacy is at the heart of US war propaganda. The exhortation to "stand with Ukraine" is no exception to this rule.”

[CBS](https://twitter.com/Jairo_I_Funez/status/1497625911033667588?s=20&t=j8--6150_hIDfaLzEOxNlQ) followed suit, "This isn't a place, with all due respect, like Iraq or Afghanistan who has seen conflict rage for decades. This is a relatively civilized, relatively European - I have to choose those words carefully - city where you wouldn't expect that or hope that it was going to happen."

T**he narrative that only white people deserve peace and security is all the more shameful because the global south suffers from war and privation as a direct result of US/NATO actions.** **It is NATO that destroyed the nation of Libya, NATO which attempted to do the same in Syria, NATO that occupied Afghanistan,** NATO which wages war across [African countries](https://www.blackagendareport.com/nato-and-africa-relationship-colonial-violence-and-structural-white-supremacy) with US, French and British troops deployed across the continent. The white world causes suffering and then says that the people of the global south are “uncivilized” with no rights that need to be respected.

A Watson Institute of Brown University [study](https://watson.brown.edu/research/2020/Post-9/11DisplacementStudy) showed that more than 37 million people in North Africa, Western and Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa have been displaced by the US and its allies since 2001. The humanitarian disasters begun years ago are ongoing, as refugees use the Mediterranean and even the US border with Mexico as points of escape. After experiencing wars of aggression these nations are then subjected to punishment as the United States steals Afghanistan’s assets and keeps Syria under the thumb of Caesar Sanctions. These thefts cause more suffering and even death as nations are robbed of the ability to care for their people. Who is civilized and who is not?

Ukraine has been pushed to the forefront of American thought in order to defend the imperialist foreign policy which led to the current conflict with Russia. If the blue eyed nation is suffering it is because of US and NATO arrogance and aggression. Ukraine’s current situation is a direct result of the 2014 coup engineered by the US and its EU partners. An elected president was dispatched and a civil war began that has killed some 14,000 people. Ukraine is a US colony with a puppet government now under military attack. Ukrainians are themselves refugees as they flee to neighboring Poland, Romania, Slovakia and other countries. It is the supposedly advanced, democratic, and supposedly civilized who have created their problems.

Yet once again bare faced racism is evident. African migrants and students in Ukraine were prohibited from boarding trains and buses that could take them to safety. A group of [Jamaican students](https://twitter.com/JamaicaGleaner/status/1497947605254430725?s=20&t=j8--6150_hIDfaLzEOxNlQ) was forced to walk 20 kilometers when they were forced off of a bus enroute to Poland. Africans and Jamaicans live and study all over the world because the US and Europe underdevelop their nations through a variety of means. Yet Ukrainians and Poles didn’t see people in need of help. They determined that the non-blondes were not deserving of assistance.

Ironically, it is the white supremacist underpinnings of US/NATO foreign policy which has created all of Ukraine’s suffering. The need to dominate, to “contain” Russia and its ally China is not playing out the way they had hoped but the Ukrainians be damned. The MinskII agreement which was unanimously approved in the United Nations Security Council was a roadmap to peace. Ukraine should be a neutral nation but that is the exact opposite of what its lords and masters in Washington want. The good faith negotiations that could resolve the crisis are a non-starter because NATO is a very dishonest broker.

#### US Security cooperation with NATO and other European institutions sustains a Pan-European Project to uphold an axis of capitalist domination to suppress non-white culture in favor of 21st century colonization

**Doonan, 19**

[David, “Confronting the U.S./EU/NATO Axis of Domination”, Green Party US, February 15, 2019, <https://www.gp.org/axis_of_domination>, accessed 6/28/22, GDS - LJ]

The intervention in Venezuela by the U.S. is an intervention in support of white power.”

How can this be explained? What lesson must the colonized in the global South and the oppressed peoples and classes trapped in the nations of the North take from this unity of purpose between the neocons and liberal interventionists, the liberal bourgeoisie in the U.S. and Europe and even the general public?

The answer lies in the Eurocentric, white supremacist cultural discourses that have conditioned the collective consciousness of Westerners. **The cultural affliction of Eurocentric, white supremacist ideology that has permeated all forms of cultural and ideological expression**. It is not even a point of contention among the academic and non-academic population, both left and right, that “liberal” capitalist Europe represents a significant development in the history of human civilizations, if not the apex of human development.

This perspective, from Marxism that sees the capitalist phase as a necessary and inevitable stage (albeit with contradictions) to neoliberal globalists, represents a “commonsense” position embedded in all Western social institutions that simultaneously normalizes and invisibilizes behavior informed by the assumptions of white privilege and prerogatives.

“White supremacist cultural discourses have conditioned the collective consciousness of Westerners.”

Therefore, why shouldn’t Trump and the Democrats intervene in Venezuela to determine its leadership, especially when the racial element of that action is apparently beyond comprehension?

For the public in the U.S., Gov. Northam and Donald Trump represent the easy and crude examples of racism that is universally condemned. But the assumption that the white West has the right and responsibility to determine the leadership and way of life of peoples in the global South doesn’t even register as a debatable issue within discourse on white supremacy.

It is accepted as normal by the corporate media, most of the intelligencia and the public that the U.S. and Europe, without any authorization from any foundational source such as international law or the United Nations Charter, has the right and indeed the responsibility to police the world.

The lack of debate on this issue and the cavalier attitude that most have in the West to the real possibilities of yet another military engagement with a global South nation that will likely result in the deaths of thousands of human beings reaffirms once again that the value of human life is stratified; the more distant that life is from Europeans – geographically, culturally and ethnically – the less value it has.

Consequently, the people of the colonized global South fighting for authentic de-colonization and national self-determination along with the nationally oppressed peoples and classes in the North must be equally clear. The European Union Parliament’s decision to recognize the puppet government being imposed on the people of Venezuela is another reminder that there is a common enemy in the U.S./EU/NATO “axis of domination.”

**“The value of human life is stratified; the more distant that life is from Europeans – geographically, culturally and ethnically – the less value it has.”**

The constituent elements of this contemporary axis of domination was established and is sustained as part of what the late Rod Bush referred to as the Pan-European Project – the white supremacist, colonial/capitalist patriarchy – that began with the invasion of the “Americas” by Europe in 1492.

That invasion provided the material basis for Europe moving from a backwater region of no significance to the various world orders to the predominant powers on the planet for the last 500 years.

It is important to understand, therefore, that the critique of white supremacy is not limited just to an idealization principle but has a structural reality. This is what differentiates this analysis from the simple rejection of racialism or white supremacy advanced by reform liberals.

The analytical and theoretical framework employed here centers and grounds the relationship between the institutions and structures of global white supremacy – the IMF, World Bank, WTO, international financial institutions and dollar hegemony, NATO – and the ideological expressions of white supremacy such as the belief in the cultural superiority of Europe, [“humanitarian interventions”](https://blackagendareport.com/content/humanitarian-intervention-human-rights-gift-keeps-giving-us-imperialism) and the so-called [responsibility to protect.](https://blackagendareport.com/content/syria-and-sham-)

#### Silencing DA: The aff’s citing of the Russian Ukraine war supports a European centered conception of pan-European peace that papers over global south countries affected by NATO

**Dabashi,** Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, **22**

[Hamid, Russia-Ukraine war: Are We Really Surprised by The Racist Media Coverage?”, Middle East Eye, March 15th, 2022, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/russia-ukraine-war-racist-media-coverage-surprised>, accessed 6/28/22, GS - LJ]

Also in Middle East Eye, [Peter Oborne points to](https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/russia-ukraine-war-media-bias-west-blatant-racism) the “blatant racism of the West” as it rushes to aid Ukraine against a foreign invader, while failing to prioritise mercy missions to countries such as Yemen, Gaza and Syria. In Al Jazeera, [Patrick Gathara](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/1/covering-ukraine-a-mean-streak-of-racist-exceptionalism) highlights the “racist exceptionalism” on display amid the Russia-Ukraine war, while a piece by [Andrew Mitrovica sarcastically notes](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/8/some-lives-are-more-valuable-than-others) that “some lives are more valuable than others - according to Western media’s coverage of the Ukraine war”.

The list goes on. People are disgusted and fed up with the baldfaced vulgarity of pundits, reporters, editorial boards and politicians alike. Articles calling attention to this hypocrisy receive thousands of likes and retweets. But should we really be so aghast to see European and American journalists and politicians being who and what they are - constitutionally racist to the bone?

Let me put it bluntly: I am not surprised to see that US and European pundits and politicians are racist hypocrites. Of course they are. I am just surprised by the reactions of critical thinkers of my own ranks and convictions. Why are they surprised, aghast, plaintive? Why, in short, are they disappointed? Did they expect differently, and if so, why?

Personally, I have never been surprised [to see images of Israelis](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/world/middleeast/israelis-watch-bombs-drop-on-gaza-from-front-row-seats.html) picnicking on a hill, drinking champagne or sipping cappuccino, as they watch their army butcher Palestinians in [Gaza](https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/gaza-under-attack). I have always known that many do not even see Arabs as human beings.

Has it not become abundantly clear by now that the idea of journalistic objectivity, neutrality and fairness is a bad joke? When we write articles pointing out such vulgar hypocrisies, to whom are we really talking and trying to convince? What is the point of this repeated preaching to the choir?

European ideals

A whole generation of “postcolonial thinkers” from South Asia and Africa have made their academic careers out of being disappointed at Europeans for creating what they believe to be “universal” ideals and concepts, and yet not applying them to people they have brutalised and conquered. Yet such principles and ideals were never universal. They were always European, Christian, white supremacist, xenophobic, homophobic, [antisemitic](https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/antisemitism) and [Islamophobic](https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/islamophobia).

Seeing other races and cultures as subhuman is written deeply into celebrated European philosophies. Enlightenment thinker [Immanuel Kant once wrote](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/2/28/blackface-white-mask-racism-as-psychosis) about a Black carpenter: “It might be that there was something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered; but in short, this fellow was very black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.”

Indeed, many European philosophers thought non-Europeans were subhuman - as do millions of Europeans and Americans who are philosophically beholden to them. But my concern is not with them; it is with those who seem so utterly disappointed that Europeans do not live by their own standards. I believe they do.

I don’t think Americans and Europeans are being hypocritical about Ukraine at all. In fact, they are being very consistent in their racist, white supremacism. How many times and in how many places must we see this before it finally sinks in?

**We must stop thinking European “values” are universal. We must learn and understand that they are exclusively European, and for Europeans alone.**

That recognition does not compromise our ability to have a humane reaction to ugly or uplifting realities around us. I am severely critical of the Russian thuggery in Ukraine, and I fully support Ukrainians defending their homeland, as I do Afghans, Iraqis, Yemenis or Palestinians**. But this is not out of any false assumption of the universality of European humanism. I** am not partaking in western “values” when I express such reactions. I do so strictly as a Shia Muslim and as an Iranian - and entirely based on my own moral, political, cultural and civilisational convictions.

The very name “Europe” is an icon of racism and white supremacy. Yes, there is a civilisation to that name, too; but as philosopher [Walter Benjamin said](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/2004/05/16/walter-benjamins-brilliant/de7262db-4a2d-4540-a694-961f23e56347/): “There is no document of civilisation which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.” **Europeans are the beneficiaries of their own civilisation, and people around the globe are at the mercy of their barbarism.**

### Link – Prototype Warfare [OCOs]

#### [OCOs] are part and parcel to a shift toward prototype warfare driven by an experimental rationality which immunizes warfare from failure and justifies interventions and endless wars.

Hoijtink, 22 – Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Amsterdam. (Marijn Hoijtink, “‘Prototype warfare’: Innovation, optimisation, and the experimental way of warfare,” *European Journal of International Security*, 5-17-2022, doi: 10.1017/eis.2022.12)//ILake-MO

Prototype warfare, as described by Shanahan, centres on an overarching imperative of military innovation set against the backdrop of an increasingly fierce technological competition on the global stage.10 At its core, prototype warfare represents a shift in how Western militaries develop and acquire technology and weaponry. It promotes moving away from a focus on the mass production of high-end weapons to the development, rapid fielding, and testing of prototypes in specific operational environments, ‘where units can fail early and fail small, to scale fast and learn fast’.11 As formulated by the UK army as part of its own strategic conceptualisation of prototype warfare, prototype warfare this way involves more than the modification of existing acquisition processes.12 It represents a broader ‘mindset’ or ‘new approach’ to military activity, which ‘seeks to mimic the pace and intensity of wartime transformation by prioritizing experimentation and adaption’ and encourage warfighters ‘to take calculated risks with a higher than normal tolerance for failure, enabling them to learn, succeed and exploit catalytic ideas that deliver asymmetric advantage’.13

Tracing recent conceptions of ‘prototype warfare’ across Western military discourse and practice, my objective in this article is to map the contours of a new regime of warfare, which is emerging against the background of an overarching imperative of military innovation and speculative understanding of the potential role of ‘AI’ in warfare. Broadly defined, regimes of warfare are constellations of discourses, practices, interactions, technologies, and rationalities that constitute and organise war in a specific and (largely) shared way. As argued by Antoine Bousquet, historically, such shared ways of thinking about and organising the conduct of war have strongly been informed by an overarching scientific rationality.14 What Bousquet defines as ‘the scientific way of warfare’ refers to this systematic and extensive deployment of scientific ideas ‘to inform thinking about the very nature of combat and the forms of military organization best suited to prevail in it’.15 As the regimes that Bousquet identifies are connected to the prevalence of a specific set of scientific ideas and technologies in a given period, this means that they are historically variable and always subject to change.

My argument in this article is that prototype warfare represents such a shift and is reflective of a broader transformation, or new regime of warfare. Specifically, I argue that the concept of prototype warfare captures the emergence of a profoundly experimental way of warfare, which is driven by an overarching experimental rationality,16 and largely conducted ‘by-experiment’.17 While warfare has always been underpinned by experimental activity, what is particular in the current context is how experimentation spans across an increasingly wide range of military practices, into the actual (or simulated) battlefield, and across novel military-corporate assemblages. What explains this spatialisation of experimental practice and its ubiquity in contemporary warfare is a particular, highly speculative, understanding of experimentation that is increasingly detached from a more narrow interpretation of experimentation as a scientific practice of replication and controlled testing and that embraces uncertainty and failure as a productive force. As Michelle Murphy writes, this kind of experimentation legitimises continued intervention and is largely self-perpetuating, hailing ‘life as composed of composed of potential, of chances, of possibilities for becoming, of manipulable relations that can be triggered and altered, if only the right protocol and technique can be employed’.18

As I will argue, this speculative understanding of experimentation in the context of war has serious political implications. Driven by this kind of experimental rationality, the experimental way of warfare is largely immune to failure, or uninterested in the costs or aftermath of the experiments being deployed. Any result represents valuable data gained, and so failures only serve to advance further experimentation. This way, the experimental way of warfare is largely insulated from critique, as militaries can always point to lessons learned or to the future potential of the ‘next’ experiment. As part of this development, war and conflict become reconfigured mainly as an opportunity to experiment. Our wars become endless and everywhere, not because of the (discursive representation of) the enemy, but because of the broader experimental infrastructure that is created and that needs to be maintained.

## Links – Theory

### L – IR – Anarchy

#### IR’s foundational assumptions of “anarchy” and “power” are racist.

Henderson, 14 – Associate Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University. (Errol A. Henderson, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in international relations theory,” *Race and Racism in International Relations*, Routledge 2014, pg. 19-40)//ILake-MO

Anarchy and world politics: the tropical roots of IR theory

A racist conceptualisation of anarchy became the centerpiece of the major paradigms of world politics: realism and liberalism/idealism, and their recent offshoot, constructivism. Today, realism is the dominant paradigm in world politics; or, specifically, neorealism, which rests on Waltz’s revision of the traditional realism of Schuman and Morgenthau. Neorealism asserts that the international system is anarchic and that states are the dominant actors. The anarchic structure of the system mandates a self-help orientation among the states because without an authority above them, individual states must ensure their own security. In such a system, security is the basic objective of states and power is essential to achieving state aims and resisting those of others. Realists argue that states seek to maximise their power to ensure their security; but, the security dilemma ensures that, ironically, each state’s pursuit of its own security leads ultimately to its greater insecurity. Balance of power practices become essential in this conflict-laden global system in which power – especially military power – is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts of interest. Liberalism (or idealism) – the paradigmatic counterpoise of realism – is similarly grounded in a preoccupation with anarchy. Idealists accept the view that the global system is anarchic and that anarchy could lead to security dilemmas, balance of power politics, and interstate war, but unlike realists, they do not accept that these are the inevitable outcomes of international interactions. Grounded in the Enlightenment belief in the perfectibility of the individual, they transferred their view of domestic politics to the international realm and argued that conflict and wars were largely a result of “bad” institutions such as autocratic regimes, and that by democratising regimes, facilitating international commerce, and encouraging international institutions then international cooperation would ensue. In this view, states are not destined to predation borne of anarchy, the persistent pursuit of power and the security dilemma, as realists maintain. Instead, the spread of democracy, liberal international trade policies, and international law would allow states to overcome the security dilemma and cooperate with each other. Foreign policy is assumed to reflect domestic policy such that states that are peaceful domestically (e.g. democracies) are more likely to be peaceful abroad and those that are more violent domestically (e.g. autocracies) are more likely to be violent abroad.

One of the key idealists of the twentieth century, who is also viewed as one of the progenitors of the field of IR, was Woodrow Wilson (Ray 1995, 7). But the view that Wilson – especially Wilson of the post-World War I period – established IR is more received wisdom than actual fact, obfuscating less salutary but more significant factors leading to the field’s emergence. As noted above, at its birth, IR was concerned with issues of anarchy and power; however, this anarchy was largely assumed to inhere in the “primitive” polities of the “inferior” races – primarily in the tropical domains of what we would now consider the “third world”. At the same time, the relevant power was that wielded by the “civilised” white race through their “modern” states. The mechanism of “efficient” and “rational” colonial administration, many early IR theorists maintained, could ensure that “anarchy” did not spread to the “modern” world and lead to violence among the major (white) powers. So the concerns among realists and idealists with anarchy are grounded in a racist discourse that is concerned with the obligations of superior peoples to impose order on the anarchic domains of inferior peoples in order to prevent the chaos presumed to be endemic in the latter from spilling over into the former’s territories or self-proclaimed spheres of interest. Similarly, the realist and idealist concern with power was grounded in a racist discourse concerned largely with the power of whites to control the tropics, subjugate its people, steal its resources, and superimpose themselves through colonial administration. Therefore, the roots of realism – the dominant paradigm in world politics, are grounded in a rationalisation for the construction of a hierarchical racial order to be imposed upon the anarchy allegedly arising from the “tropics”, which begs for rational colonial administration from whites. It is little more than an intellectual justification for colonialism and imperialism in the guise of the “white man’s burden”. Also, the roots of idealism are found less in idealised versions of classical liberal precepts regarding the perfectibility of humanity, the primacy of “God-given” individual rights, and the spread of democracy, free trade, and the rule of law, than with the imposition of a white racist order on indigenous peoples throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Given the imperative for “progress” and “development” and the view that the unspoiled lands were not being sufficiently exploited by the indigenous peoples, realists and idealists agreed that the incentive for imperialist conquest could lead to conflict among whites; therefore, a rational distribution of territory and its appropriate administration by colonial agencies was necessary. Realists and idealists disagreed on the implications of the global system for the interaction of white peoples and their states and political institutions, but often they accepted or justified the subjugation of non-whites by whites. In this way they found congruence in their policy recommendations for the domestic and international spheres at least in this regard: they supported white racial domination through racial discrimination of non-white minorities at home and white imperialism through racial domination of non-white polities abroad. Nowhere were these racist policies more evident than in Africa – and in the treatment of the racial minorities of the African diaspora in Western Europe and the Americas.

While realism and idealism converge on a white supremacist logic that has been evident since the establishment of the field of IR, I maintain that this racism was not only present at the creation of the field but continues to inform the major paradigms, primarily – though not uniquely – through their conceptions of anarchy. For example, Sampson (2002, 429) argues that “the discourse of international politics employs a particular conception of anarchy – tropical anarchy – that portrays the international system as ‘primitive’”. This “tropical anarchy”, the social contract theorists assumed, was the primeval condition of non-white peoples, which Kidd (1898), among many others, rationalised as a basis for Western colonialism. The anarchical world – the state of nature – was the preserve of non-Europeans, primitive peoples. Sampson views anarchy as a “trope” more than a “natural state of affairs”; but he is clear that, “while scholars may define anarchy variously, the primitive images that anarchy evokes remain constant”. Not only are the paradigmatic roots of IR theory saturated by the racist stream of tropical anarchy, Sampson is even more explicit that “the foundation upon which much of the discipline rests is not anarchy but rather an image of primitive society popularised by British social anthropologists during the 1930s and 1940s” (Sampson 2002, 429). For example, Sampson argues that Waltz’s thesis on system structure derives from the obsolete, anarchic, and in many ways racist conceptualisation of African primitive society of anthropologist S. F. Nadel. Sampson (2002, 444) does not argue that Waltz’s definition of system structure – so crucial to his rendering of “structural realism –borrows from Nadel, “but the structure Waltz employs is Nadel’s” (emphasis in original). Waltz analogises Nadel’s view of the structure of African primitive societies to the global structure in which international politics takes place. He adds that Waltz “derived all three components of his theory of international politics (ordering principles, functional differentiation, and the distribution of material capabilities) form a theory of primitive society published by Nadel in 1957” (Sampson 2002, 430); and he documents Waltz’s allusions to Nadel in his Theory of International Politics as well as in prior and subsequent works.

### L – IR – Theory

#### The contemporary role of IR paradigms are built on white supremacist agendas to rationalize black primitivism through western saviorism while silencing discussions of embedded violence

**Hendersen, 15**

[Errol. A, “Hidden in Plain Sight - Racism in International Relations Theory”, Race and Racism in International Relations, It’s a Book, edited By University of Warwick, 2015, Routledge, accessed 6/24/22, GDS - LJ]

Thus, it is not difficult to trace the historical and contemporary role and impact of racism in IR theory. Racism has not only informed the paradigms of world politics, **it was fundamental to the conceptualisation of its key theoretical touchstone: anarchy. The social contract theorists rooted their conceptualisations of the state of nature in a broader “racial contract” that dichotomised humanity racially and established a white supremacist hierarchy in their foundational conceptions of society**. Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century IR theorists built on this racist dualism as they constructed their conception of a global anarchy and the role of “civilised” whites to provide, maintain, and ensure order within it by a system of international power relations among whites – or at minimum, dominated by whites, and a system of colonial subjugation for non-whites – or those nonwhites who failed to successfully resist their domination militarily. The impact and role of racism is manifest through the major paradigms operative today – realism, neorealism, liberalism/idealism, and constructivism – mainly through their continued reliance on a racist conception of anarchy; in the case of neorealism through its grounding in African primitivism, while for Marxism, its reliance on and “normalising” of a Eurocentric teleology of economic development for the world.

To be sure, the dualism at the broad theoretical level of paradigms underscores, guides, and informs the more specific dichotomies at the level of theories, models, and theses that are derived from these paradigms – especially those that are applied to Africa’s political processes, and those of other regions as well. In the case of African international relations, they both contextualise and rationalise a black African primitivism juxtaposed to a white Western progressivism**, a black African peculiaristic savagery and a white Western universalist humanity,** resulting in an enduring African tribal/ethnic warfare frame of reference contrasted to an evolved Western democratic peace; in each case a static ossified ahistorical permanence contrasted to a dynamic evolving transcendence. One result is that one must endure what are considered to be “meaningful” or “appropriate” or even “incisive” or “cutting-edge” discussions of Africa’s domestic and international politics that have as their point of departure loose and often obtuse references to “hearts of darkness”, “greed versus grievance”, “tribal warfare”, “warlordism”, “frontiersmen”, or a litany of other metaphors that would not pass the editor’s desk at most top-tier academic journals as legitimate contexts through which to observe and examine contemporary armed conflicts in the Western world7. Notably, rarely do those same journals publish work on the historical and enduring racism embedded in the major paradigms of world politics or discuss the implications of such a condition if it were shown to obtain.

In fact, the “norm against noticing” white racism is so intense that it engenders a “silencing” of those who would raise it; or it ensures against publication in main- stream outlets for such work except that it provides appropriate euphemisms for the atrocities associated with white racism – especially against blacks – or the requisite “balance” to emphasise the role of non-whites in their own subjugation – **as if white supremacism and the imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and internal colonialism that it employed against Africans, Asians, and Native Amer- icans are somehow the responsibility of groups other than the whites who created it, maintained it, and continue to profit from it**. Thus, the racist dualism in world politics creates, in turn, a dual quandary for IR scholars and many Africanists seeking to publish in Western journals – and many non-Western ones, too – wherein white racist expectations of the appropriateness of certain lines of inquiry often limits the discourse of African politics to hollow phraseology and meaningless metaphors, **while they simultaneously check informed challenges to historical and contemporary expressions, practices, and institutions of white racism in academia by ensuring that such racism is rarely confronted in the major publications in IR/world politics in clear and direct terms.**

### L – IR – Realism

#### The affirmative’s realist conceptions of international relations perpetuate an anarchist pursuit of power grounded in notions of conquest and the rationalization of the white man’s burden

**Hendersen, 15**

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One of the key idealists of the twentieth century, who is also viewed as one of the progenitors of the field of IR, was Woodrow Wilson (Ray 1995, 7). But the view that Wilson – especially Wilson of the post-World War I period – established IR is more received wisdom than actual fact, obfuscating less salutary but more significant factors leading to the field’s emergence. As noted above, at its birth, IR was concerned with issues of anarchy and power; however, this anarchy was largely assumed to inhere in the “primitive” polities of the “inferior” races – primarily in the tropical domains of what we would now consider the “third world”. At the same time, the relevant power was that wielded by the “civilised” white race through their “modern” states. The mechanism of “efficient” and “rational” colonial administration, many early IR theorists maintained, could ensure that “anarchy” did not spread to the “modern” world and lead to violence among the major (white) powers**. So the concerns among realists and idealists with anarchy are grounded in a racist discourse that is concerned with the obligations of superior peoples to impose order on the anarchic domains of inferior peoples in order to prevent the chaos presumed to be endemic in the latter from spilling over into the former’s territories or self-proclaimed spheres of interest.** Similarly, **the realist and idealist concern with power was grounded in a racist discourse concerned largely with the power of whites to control the tropics, subjugate its people, steal its resources, and superimpose themselves through colonial administration.** Therefore, the roots of realism – the dominant paradigm in world politics, are grounded in a rationalisation for the construction of a hierarchical racial order to be imposed upon the anarchy allegedly arising from the “tropics”, which begs for rational colonial administration from whites. It is little more than an intellectual justification for colonialism and imperialism in the guise of the “white man’s burden”. Also, the roots of idealism are found less in idealised versions of classical liberal precepts regarding the per- fectibility of humanity, the primacy of “God-given” individual rights, and the spread of democracy, free trade, and the rule of law, than with the imposition of a white racist order on indigenous peoples throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Given the imperative for “progress” and “development” and the view that the unspoiled lands were not being sufficiently exploited by the indigenous peoples, realists and idealists agreed that the incentive for imperialist conquest could lead to conflict among whites; therefore, a rational distribution of territory and its appro- priate administration by colonial agencies was necessary. Realists and idealists disagreed on the implications of the global system for the interaction of white peoples and their states and political institutions, but often they accepted or justi- fied the subjugation of non-whites by whites. In this way they found congruence in their policy recommendations for the domestic and international spheres at least in this regard: they supported white racial domination through racial discrimination of non-white minorities at home and white imperialism through racial domination of non-white polities abroad. Nowhere were these racist policies more evident than in Africa – and in the treatment of the racial minorities of the African diaspora in Western Europe and the Americas.

#### [Liberalism/Realism] enforces methodological purity which brackets out the theories and realities of the Global South – prefer alternative models of IR premised on connectedness and empathy.

Harper-Shipman & Gordon, 20 – \*T.D. Harper-Shipman is Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at Davidson. \*\*Lewis R. Gordon is Professor of Philosophy and Department Chair at University of Connecticut, PhD in Philosophy at Yale, founder of the Center for Afro-Jewish Studies (T.D. Harper-Shipman and Lewis R. Gordon, “Race and Ethics in International Relations,” *The Routledge Handbook to Rethinking Ethics in International Relations*, Routledge)//ILake-MO

Through a systematic positing of rationalism and parsimonious models, conventional IR elides the possibility of including the lived realities of black, brown, and red peoples in the Global South as valid forms of evidence and critical perspectives. To the extent that these voices can be quantified in an undifferentiated manner, they do not figure legitimately into the existing disciplinary paradigm. Without intentionally incorporating race into the framework, scholars are unable to explain phenomena such as the Global North’s continued imperial domination through globalization or the racialized political economy of contemporary forms of slavery such as sex-trafficking and forced domestic servitude in the United States (Crawford 2002; Georgis and Lugosi 2014; J.A. Gordon 2019). Alternative methodologies that may allow for a more ethical incorporation of race into IR include the world-travelling goal of achieving ‘a space of mutual understanding using the tool of empathy, which is the ability to enter the spirit of a different experience and find it in an echo of some part of oneself ’ (Sylvester 2017, 182; see also Anzaldúa 1987; Sylvester 1995). There is also poisie, an epistemological framework for offering a critique of and reconstructing IR in a fashion that is void of colonial, capitalist-patriarchy (see Agathangelou and Ling 2004). Grovogui (2001) proposes reverse ethnography as a methodology available to the formerly colonized for assessing the colonizers’ ontological dispositions for what they are and not what the colonizers say they are. Exposing the limitations in this line of thinking in IR knowledge production demonstrates the provincial nature of the predominantly white approach to International Relations, which contradicts the current positivist paradigm that calls for universal theorizing. Finally, though not exclusively, ethics demands connectedness and its concomitant obligation to others. This involves being in-relation-with-others instead of being separate. Models of IR premised on purity would require the elimination of relations with others (read as forms of contamination), whereas those premised on being-in-relations leads to a form of structural, ongoing mixture and transformation, which Jane Anna Gordon (2014) describes as ‘creolizing theory’. As the white supremacist origins of IR oppose such a model, overcoming that history requires acknowledging a different model of coexistence on our planet.

### L – IR – Constructivism

#### Constructivist understandings postulates that it is the burden of ‘culturally evolved’ western states to elevate primitive states from their lower condition - upholding a racist framework of the white democracy through neo-colonialism

**Hendersen, 15**

[Errol. A, “Hidden in Plain Sight - Racism in International Relations Theory”, Race and Racism in International Relations, It’s a Book, edited By University of Warwick, 2015, Routledge, accessed 6/24/22, GDS - LJ]

For social constructivists the convergence with Waltz’s system structure is even more apparent. The differentiation that Waltz fails to observe in world politics is captured in Wendt’s distinction between Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian inter- national systems. Wendt views the essential relationships among sovereigns in a Hobbesian anarchy as one of enemies, while in a Lockean anarchy it is one of rivals, and lastly, in a Kantian anarchy it is one of friends. His most culturally evolved system, the Kantian, is one shared primarily by the Western powers, while others exist within Lockean and Hobbesian contexts. **This meant that only the Western states could be entrusted to transfer to the third world the requisites for a higher level of social evolution to elevate them out of their lower condition.6 Therefore, “the ‘burden” of structural transformation, the responsibility of ‘teaching’ the rest of the world how to evolve, falls squarely on the shoulders of great powers. Less powerful states have little or no hope of transforming the international system on their own**” (Waltz 1979, 449). Sampson characterises Wendt’s “social theory of international relations” as “remarkably un-international”. He states that while Wendt chastises Waltz’s study for lacking a reference to “role” in its index, Sampson counters that “discounting Montezuma and the Aztecs, one might say the same of Wendt’s social theory for the entire ‘Third World’” (Sampson 2002, 448–9). He adds that

Wendt’s text is largely an attempt to explain how Europe and the United States pulled themselves out of ‘nature’s realm’. It tells us how NATO and Europe evolved into complex social kinds through a process dubbed ‘cultural selection’. There is no mention of non-Western social kinds. It is not even clear whether African or Asian states could ‘evolve’ without the help of bigger, more powerful benefactors.

(Sampson 2002, 449)

Sampson notes that counter to the title of Wendt’s most popular article, “anarchy is only what some states make of it”. In fact it is as constrained by the logic of tropical anarchy as is Waltz’s; only that where Waltz rationalises the stasis of the status quo equilibrium (i.e. the balance of power, or, by analogy, the maintenance of Western power in the colonies), Wendt rationalises the transformation of the status quo within limits governed by the status quo powers (i.e. Kantian social evolution, or, by analogy, the establishment of colonial administration in the colonies as a function of the “white man’s burden” or mission civilatrice). He concludes that, by arguing that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’**, Wendt suggests that powerful, civilised states have the capacity to lift weaker, primitive states out of the heart of darkness and into the light of democratic peace. Thus super- powers like the United States should shoulder the global burden of civilising international society.** This reverses Waltz’s conclusions. Waltz seeks system maintenance and equilibrium. Wendt seeks transformation. Waltz privileges power over progress. Wendt suggests the opposite.

(Sampson 2002, 450)

Waltz’s framework resurrects anthropology’s misrepresentation of African political systems of the 1950s and Wendt reproduces anthropological debates of the 1930s and 1940s (Sampson 2002, 451). Both paradigms converge on a notion of tropical anarchy, which reinforces a racist dualism in world politics that is manifest, in turn, in prominent theses that derive from these paradigms.

## Alternatives

### Alt – Decolonize IR

#### The alternative is to decolonize IR as a method of deep theorizing that refuses the racist scholarship that underpins the 1AC

Adamson, 20 – Professor of International Relations at SOAS, University of London. (Flora B. Adamson, “Pushing the Boundaries: Can We “Decolonize” Security Studies?” *Journal of Global Security Studies*, Volume 5(1), January 2020, doi: [10.1093/jogss/ogz057](https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz057))//ILake-MO

Applying a Decolonial Lens to Security Studies

Decolonial theory has gained traction in the humanities and is slowly entering the social sciences, including IR theory (Chakrabarty 2000; Jones 2006; Mignolo 2012; Rao 2013; Capan 2017; Weiner 2018). The very language of decolonization suggests a more substantive critique of dynamics of inclusion and exclusion and how they operate in the study of global security. Indeed, postcolonial and decolonial approaches to IR form a type of “deep theorizing” that exists on a par with realism or liberalism (Berenskoetter 2018). A decolonial lens on the field begins with the observation that entrenched and deeply rooted social and political hierarchies based on exclusionary practices shape both geopolitics and the production of knowledge, with particular attention to global hierarchies of race, as well as imperial and colonial histories (including settler colonialism in North America and elsewhere). These hierarchies have both shaped and coexist with the formal structures of international relations (such as states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations) and constitute an additional layer of power relations and forms of exclusion that often remain invisible in mainstream approaches to security.

For example, the erasure of race from IR occurred in the post-1945 period when there was a switch from a study of global race relations, colonialism, empire, and “civilizations,” to a focus on “states” (Vitalis 2015). What W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) referred to as the “global color line” disappeared as an object of analysis in IR, with race being almost invisible as a salient factor in security studies (Doty 1993; Jones 2008; Nisancioglu 2019). A more trenchant critique would argue that security studies suffers from the problem of “methodological whiteness” (Bhambra 2017). This means that, not only is race made invisible, but also the security effects of race—such as racialized violence and the legacies of colonial histories—are not defined as “security issues” (Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019). With few exceptions, IR and security scholars have not engaged with global issues of policing, criminal justice, incarceration, or movements such as Black Lives Matter.2 A focus on the state and the attachment to nationalism as a primary identity (see also Hendrix, this issue) draws attention away from other cross-cutting identities and solidarities, such as transnational solidarity movements based on race or religion, including movements such as black internationalism (Daulatzai 2012; Munro 2017; Blain 2018).

In addition to the erasure of race, contemporary security studies has focused more on the projection of power by powerful actors than its effects on the less powerful. Security studies is still a US-dominated discipline, and decision-making in Washington DC is its primary reference point. English language journals are filled with policy-relevant articles geared to the maximization of US power, not how other states and non-state actors can best contain or resist US power (Adamson 2016, 21). Classic security studies’ case studies, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, are seen through the lens of actors in Washington rather than Washington's adversaries or targets (Laffey and Weldes 2008). Topics such as humanitarian intervention are approached more often from the intervener's perspective than that of those in the state targeted for intervention (Sabaratnam 2017). Security studies has largely marginalized perspectives on world events that derive from a Global South position (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Acharya 2014). For example, studies of World War II regularly ignore their racial and colonial dimensions, including the roles played by black troops in the United States and colonial troops in Britain (Krebs 2006; Barkawi 2016, 2017). Security studies scholarship on the global war on terrorism has focused more on strategies that policymakers could take to prevent terrorism than the impact of those strategies on vulnerable communities or the experiences of those caught up in the global counterterrorism infrastructure (Khalili 2013).

### Alt – Radical IR

#### The alternative is radical IR – a method of pessimism that allows us to create an alternative

By Dillon Stone Tatum, 2021 (“Toward a Radical IR: Transformation, Praxis, and Critique in a (Neo)Liberal World Order”, International Studies Review, accessed 6/27/2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab043>) //lrap \*\*can also be re-cut as a perm card

This article set out to accomplish three things. First, it has demonstrated that the field of IR theory has largely neglected the potential contributions of radicalism as a way of orienting some of our theoretical practices. This is as much a critique of mainstream IR theory with its status-quo orientation as well as a critique of critical IR. Second, I have drawn a sketch of what a radical IR would look like in terms of its focus, its positionality in relation to political action, and a rethinking of critical methods—moving from a method of critical genealogy to a method of destruction. Third, the article has shown the promises and virtues of a radical IR by briefly discussing the debates about liberal world order and showing the possible interventions of radicalism in IR's engagement with such debates.  
While the method of a radical IR asks us for pessimism, and an amount of “destructive suspicion,” a turn to radical IR should not force us to abandon hope and affirmative attempts to reimagine world politics. The dual importance of “uprooting” old conceptions and the “rooting” of new imaginings of world politics should remain at the forefront of any turn to radicalism. **It is precisely because alternatives are possible that pessimism is possible**. As David Chandler (2019, 188) writes of affirmation and the Anthropocene: “If no alternatives are possible, even in the imagination, then pessimism is no longer possible.” In short, radicalism should bring us hope and represent an affirmative alternative to the contemporary world order.  
What a radical IR asks for above all else is a revolution in thinking: in a restructuring of scholars’ relationship with our subject matter and our methods. Would we be willing to call anything less than that “radical?”

### Alt – Reactionary Internationalism

#### The alternative is to analyze reactionary international politics

By Joseph MacKay and Christopher David LaRoche, 2018 (“Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory?”, International Studies Quarterly, accessed 6/26/2022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx083>) //lrap

Reaction, we have argued, is almost completely absent from contemporary international-relations theory. However, we can find fragmentary traces of reaction in the field's history and an extensive presence in the history of political thought. Reactionary beliefs and dispositions play a significant role in modern international political practice. This raises the question: why is there now no reactionary international theory? Here, we can only offer some conjectures. We suspect that its absence is linked to the field's putatively ameliorative orientation—that is, the way the field often locates its roots in liberal idealism and the decidedly nonreactionary challenge posed by realists. Such a narrative, and particularly the part played by liberalism, suggests notions of “the good” in world politics incompatible with reactionary ideas.58  
This narrative renders past international-relations reactionaries invisible by obscuring connections between canonical international-relations schools and reactionary ideas. Early realists are read as emphasizing the permanent limits of political change. Early geopolitical reactionaries have, until recently, been read out of the discipline entirely. Liberal linkages to empire were elided as embarrassing. Later critical theorists rejected liberals and realists alike as unreflexive and presentist—as too focused on the status quo and blind to the possibilities of emancipatory politics. However, they did so in the name of “a critique of domination” that would explore means of resistance available to “those systematically or casually subjected to sustained forms of suffering, denigration, and/or exclusion” (Weber 2014, 532).59 Such criticisms may reject reaction generally but do little to distinguish it from the joint liberal-realist project of international-relations theory as such.  
Why then does reaction matter? The practice of reactionary international politics appears more widespread at present than at any time in the post-war period. At the time of writing, far-right parties are active—though not quite ascendant—across Europe; the politics of reaction appears increasingly normalized (Cole 2005; Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz 2012). British voters, led by activists chiefly from the right, narrowly chose to leave the European Union. This “Brexit” was partially motivated by “cultural backlash” (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 29–31) or racially tinged (Rajan-Rankin 2017, 2) nostalgia. The stated positions of the new American president, who campaigned on a promise to “Make America Great Again,” often upend the traditional party system and deride liberal international order (Patrick 2017). The so-called Islamic State has declared a Caliphate, putatively modeled on a premodern Islamic world order (Ahmad 2017, 12). Elsewhere in the West, individual reactionary radicals like Kaczynski and Breivik no longer seem isolated, as evidenced by the rise of the alt-right and its self-styled ideologues, such as Richard Spencer (Wood 2017). Once-solid bulwarks between the mainstream right and extremists no longer seem secure.60 Reactionary politics are on the march and are reshaping the world political future. However concerning this may be, though, the account above reminds us these circumstances are not new: reaction is a recurring feature of international politics.61  
If we are correct, then the contemporary discipline, scrupulously forgetful of its reactionary past, is shorn of intellectual history that might clarify present circumstances. A field that ignores reaction as such may be blind to reactionary political practice. This blindness in turn weakens the responses scholars can offer. Indeed, contemporary reaction might have been anticipated. A quarter century ago, in framing his otherwise ultra-liberal “end of history” thesis, Francis Fukuyama noted a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed:  
Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come. Even though I recognize its inevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings for the civilization that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again. (Fukuyama 1989, 18)  
That nostalgia now appears present in force in world politics.62 In the years ahead, a central task for international-relations theory will be to take reaction seriously, as both an intellectual tradition and a form of practical politics. Scholars whose political preferences are liberal or radical, or who embrace a realist skepticism of both projects, may find little to dislike in their field's implicit antireactionary moral orientation. We do not advocate a reactionary alternative. We aim instead to consider the analytical and political implications of having neglected reaction as such. A field that does not understand it in theory is ill equipped to understand and confront it in practice.

### Alt – Transnational Black Geographies

#### The alternative is to endorse a Transnational Black Geography that refuses to endorse cooperation with NATO – the aff participates in an anti-black regime of bordering that operates to fracture liberatory coalitions and maintain your complicity in White Supremacy

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When it becomes difficult to state the obvious, to name violence, to see what is right in front of our eyes – despite attempts to keep it from view, to get us to avert our gaze – when every utterance, every representation circulates in an economy structured by censorship, this is a crisis of representation. But who is this “we” who has an obligation to watch what has systematically been hidden from view? What is crucial is that this “we” is not a naturalised collectivity already given to us by state power. Thus, how we constitute this “we”, which Ariella Azoulay has termed the “citizenry of photography” (Azoulay, 2008), is a political question converging with that with which Hawthorne concludes her lecture. How do we resist the totalisation of representations in times of crisis against and beyond the bordering of our subjectivities by states and capital? This collective subject, who has the responsibility to watch (Azoulay, 2008) and listen to photographs (Campt, 2017) is, perhaps, the collective subject Hawthorne evokes at the end of her lecture: created out of “shared political visions, intertwined histories of struggles and resistance, and nonlinear diasporic entanglements”, seeking to “disrupt state systems of categorisation” (Hawthorne, 2021). The “citizenry of photography”, as I understand it, is crosscut by and seeks to refuse the violence of national citizenship, as well as its privileges. Some of us experience this racist, gendered border violence directly, on our bodies; others, benefiting from privileges of racialised citizenship, move through borders (and in bordered societies) with ease and do not experience their violence. All of us are viewing (when we should be watching) photographs: alone, together. Azoulay (2008) makes a distinction between looking at and watching photographs, noting, “[p]hotographs don't speak for themselves. Alone, they do not decipher a thing. Identifying what is seen doesn't excuse the spectator from “watching” the photograph, rather than looking at it, and from caring for its sense” (Azoulay, 2008:25). Rather than looking at photographs through the ossifying gazes we inherit and reproduce, we must disrupt normative frames of meaning by taking responsibility for the ongoing injustices they represent.

Anti-Blackness suffuses the normative gazes that states attempt to naturalise through their control of borders, including the borders that structure vision. Globally and in European societies in particular, anti-Blackness is a deep structure of racial capitalism, which is institutionalised in migration policies and fully internalised in ordinary perception. Dionne Brand has powerfully articulated how the abduction and forced migration of enslaved Africans through the Door of No Return in transatlantic slavery “transformed us into bodies emptied of being, bodies emptied of self-interpretation, into which new interpretations could be placed” (Brand, 2001:93). What is crucial, both for acts of perceiving representations and for acts of collectively generating representations – in social movements against borders, in a fundamentally anti-Black world – is that we neither reproduce the divisions border regimes depend upon (including the racial categories of white supremacy) nor fallaciously pretend these divisions are not material or real. Both are representational risks with which no-border movements tarry, as they seek to effect coalitions and relations of horizontal solidarity among people whom the nation-state system, racial capitalism, and heteropatriarchy consign to differential fates. What does this mean for no-border movements? I believe it underscores the importance of interrogating racism and sexism and homophobia and transphobia – and, more generally, a taken-for-granted heteronormativity universalising the colonial/modern binary gender system – as these articulate capital and state power. Moreover, no-border movements have the potential to constitute a “we” that, in its utopian moments, prefigures collective liberation and, in its pragmatic moments, confronts the epistemic oppression that “speaking for” people on the move entails. To quote the Black Mediterranean Collective's crucial insight: “This ontology of `spoken for' subjects reproduces a strong, forensic epistemology that simultaneously displaces the point of view of the living, and replaces the memorialisation of the death” (BMC, 2021:12).

Struggles against borders in the European context often trace their lineages to anti-fascist, anti-capitalist, anarchist, and anti-authoritarian movements but less often to anti-colonial and anti-racist movements. In this connection, it feels important to point out that the “neo-fascism in contemporary Mediterranean migration politics” (BMC, 2021:11) has many guises across what is conventionally understood as the political spectrum; like white supremacy and heteropatriarchal ideologies, it is not exclusively the currency of self-declared fascists, the extreme right, ethnonationalists, or neo-Nazis. Perhaps white European citizens can less easily recognise fascism in the technocratic discourses of neoliberal Europe than in the explicitly racist, anti-Black, anti-Muslim, anti-Roma, and anti-Semitic (and simultaneously homophobic, transphobic, and misogynistic) discourses of “sovereign `strongmen' who have arisen in this epoch of crisis capitalism” (BMC, 2021:11). For all its hand-wringing and expressions of “concern” for the rise of “illiberal”, “draconian”, and “authoritarian” politics within Europe, the EU funds and orchestrates a veritable race war at the borders of Europe, together with a range of national governments which avow various political allegiances and orientations, including commitments to liberal democracy (which are incompatible with conventional understandings of “fascism”).

Whilst people on the move are violently attacked, tortured, and killed, migration scholars seem to have difficulty naming this a race war. The EU has constituted a dedicated military force charged with overseeing and coordinating national militaries, coastguards, and border police in their bordering projects, namely Frontex, which seeks over the next 5 years to increase nearly 10-fold the number of people it employs (from 1400 currently, in 2022, to 10 000 by 2027). Civil society search-and-rescue operations, human rights monitoring, and investigative journalists in the Mediterranean report on the violent collusion between national coastguards and border police (on all sides of the sea and land borders), Frontex, and NATO, as well as paramilitary border hunters. Yet this violence is still overwhelmingly understood as an exception to the “rule of law”. The massive encampment and incarceration projects based on racialised citizenship are naturalised in research decrying “reception conditions” but not the very existence of camps, detention centres, and borders themselves. Migration scholars tend to reproduce the self-representations of EU and other European democracies, even as they critique aspects of the migration regime. For instance, the dubious division between so-called “economic migrants” and “refugees”, ascriptions of “vulnerability”, or carceral discourses around “trafficking” are uncritically reproduced as racialised/gendered background assumptions even in critical migration studies. For instance, what goes unquestioned in studies of migration management infrastructure, such as the hotspot mechanism instituted in Italy and Greece in 2016, is that asylum processes have the goal of offering “protection”, rather than expediting deportation on newly proliferating grounds. These notions, lifted from EU policy documents in myriad studies, lend academic legitimacy to the manufactured hellscape of hotspots, such as the infamous Moria camp (and its successor Moria 2.0, on the firing range at Kara Tepe) on Lesvos. An analysis of anti-Black racism and coloniality in European migration studies would allow reflection on the anti-Blackness and coloniality not only of migration regimes but, also, of the axioms of migration studies itself. As the Black Mediterranean Collective argues, the field lacks “a systematic analysis of racism and anti-Blackness as integral to the dynamics of trans-Mediterranean migration, exclusion, and differential incorporation” (BMC, 2021:15).

Contemporary anti-Black racism has been formed by processes of long historical duration that are defined by and define mobility and place. Thus, the aim, as I understand it, of Black Mediterranean Geographies in the current conjuncture is not simply to intersect “Blackness” with “people on the move” or to recognise or acknowledge that institutionalised hostility and border violence against people on the move draws on repertoires of anti-Black racism. The theoretical paradigm that Hawthorne proposes in her lecture goes deeper to challenge how anti-Blackness suffuses foundational categories of thought: body, space, and race. In their introduction to their germinal edited collection, Black Geographies and the Politics of Place, Katherine McKittrick and Clyde Woods identify three dilemmas in thinking about space and race that constitute what they term “bio-geographic determinism”, a way of thinking or imagining that makes Black geographies unknowable: first, geographic determinism, the construction of “black bodies inherently occupying black spaces”; second, the reduction of Black geographies to flesh, “the body as the only relevant black geographic scale”; and third, the abstraction or de-mattering of Black geographies to devices of imagination, “metaphoric/creative spaces, which are not represented as concrete, everyday, or lived” (McKittrick and Woods, 2007:7). The consequence of these habits of thought wrought by white supremacy is that “race, or blackness, is not understood as socially produced and shifting but is instead conceptualised as transhistorical, essentially corporeal, or allegorical or symbolic” (McKittrick and Woods, 2007:7). By what violent conceptual and perceptual acts, then, does Blackness get equated with the particular and with “nuance” (Harris, 1990) whilst simultaneously being constructed as fungible (Spillers, 2003; Hartman, 1997) – mired in place and yet perpetually out of place (Mohanram, 1999) – whilst whiteness is constructed, simultaneously, as universal, mobile, and yet an exclusive property, defined by the right to exclude (Harris, 1993)?

Hawthorne's lecture points to a much-needed critique of migration studies as reproducing anti-Black racism through its failure to confront anti-Black racism at the heart of the global regime of borders but, also, in extractivist migration circuits of “differential inclusion” (Sharma, 2006), such as the exploitation of African agricultural workers to harvest Italian tomatoes, some of which are exported to their countries of origin, like Ghana (Auvellain and Liberti, 2014). Hawthorne points out that although “the majority of the people arriving to Italy via the central Mediterranean route were Black immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (and, in many cases, with direct (post)colonial ties to Italy)”, anti-Black racism has not figured in European migration studies and public discourses as “an essential part of the story” of the so-called refugee crisis post-2015 (Hawthorne, 2021). At the same time, Hawthorne notes that “there was often an unsettling tendency to uncritically impose the geographies of the Middle Passage upon what was happening in the Mediterranean” (Hawthorne, 2021), for instance by “juxtapos[ing] the famous diagram of the slave ship Brookes … with aerial shots of migrant boats in the vast blue of the Mediterranean. What work do these visual comparisons do, and what analyses do they elide?” (Hawthorne, 2021). As someone who was urged by an editor to make this comparison in an article on photographic representations of the refugee crisis, I appreciate Hawthorne's urging us to think about the limitation of “visual comparisons”. I am not sure if “comparison” best describes the intentional act of perception of a representation (an act of looking that is sedimented by relations of power), which itself reproduces other representations. What I mean is that the relationship between a photograph and a woodcut print from the eighteenth century has already been forged in and through the visual economies of anti-Blackness before any comparative claim between the two is made. What is significant here is that both the photograph and the woodcut, though using dehumanising strategies of representation, become the visual anchor for calls, respectively, for the abolition of slavery and for open borders. The pamphlet Description of a Slave Ship, published in 1789 by the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, included a print of “Plan of an African Ship's Lower Deck with Negroes in the Proportion of Only One to a Ton”, which was “the most famous, widely-reproduced, and widely-adapted image representing slave conditions on the middle passage ever made” (Wood, 1997:212; see SEAST, 1789). The photograph I believe Hawthorne is referring to in her lecture is entitled “Rescue Operation”, taken by Massimo Sestini from a helicopter, which reproduces the framing, point of view, and arguably the cultural agenda of anti-slavery visuals, arguably illustrating Marcus Wood's “central premise … that the task of explaining why the middle passage was represented the way it was bears not only on the past but also on the present” (Wood, 1997:212). Sestini's “Rescue Operation” depicts people on the move, predominantly Black people, on a boat 25 km from the Libyan coast, prior to being intercepted by an Italian navy ship in Operation Mare Nostrum in 2014 (see World Press Photo, 2015). This photograph was shot from a helicopter, locating the spectator above the subjects of the photograph. This point of view reproduces and normalises a military perception of humans as “targets”, whether of guns or cameras. It puts the viewer of the photograph – presumptively the citizen – in the position of authority, surveilling the seas, whilst locating the subjects of the photograph in a subordinate position, subject to state control, surveillance, visibility, or extinguishment. The refugees in the crowded boat photographed by Sestini were identified through Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN), a military–humanitarian operation of the Italian government, which deployed sea vessels, helicopters, and aircraft to monitor and control “migration flows” in the Mediterranean Sea in the aftermath of the Lampedusa shipwrecks. OMN was replaced by Frontex's Operation Triton in 2014 and Eurosur – the EU's sea and land surveillance system using drones. What perhaps echoes in “comparative” viewing of the two images (encouraged by the framing of the photograph by the photographer) is the objectification of the people rendered as anonymous bodies, as Wood argues, “an abolitionist cultural agenda which dictated that slaves were to be visualised in a manner that emphasised their total passivity and their status as helpless victims” (Wood, 1997:212). The comparison between these two images, then, as inopportune and problematic as it may be for myriad other reasons, tells us something about how people on the move – in particular when they are Black Africans – are objectified by the various racialised gazes to which they are subject: the military–humanitarian gaze, the gaze of photographers, and the gaze of “empathetic” or “hostile” viewers of photographs of the refugee crisis, all of which embody white supremacy.

Hawthorne points out the limitations in attempts to make sense of the Mediterranean refugee crisis as a sedimentation of histories of anti-Black racism focussed on geographies of the Middle Passage and plantation slavery whilst being equally critical of the “geographical sleight of hand” through which “slavery [is constructed as] something that happened `out there' in the Americas” (Hawthorne, 2021). White European efforts abound to airbrush slavery from the history of European empires, both in their colonies and in their metropoles, to excise from the historical record their participation in slavery and plunder. Indeed, these ahistorical and ageographic disavowals bolster a “post-racial” (Boulila, 2020) or “non-racist” view of contemporary European societies (Lentin, 2018), by locating racism “elsewhere” in time and place. Hawthorne critiques analytic moves to superimpose the Black Atlantic on the Black Mediterranean. She surveys influential Black feminist theories which demonstrate how the plantation and the Middle Passage have been key to producing “modern ontological systems of categorisation and hierarchisation that continue to determine value and access to full `humanness'” (Hawthorne, 2021) and the “ungendering of Black flesh” (Hawthorne:9). At the same time, Hawthorne offers a nuanced critique of comparative approaches that elide the specificity of the historical emergence of the Black Mediterranean by assuming that analyses in Black studies developed of the “plantation-based racial chattel slavery” and its afterlives “can be stretched” to other geographies, such as those that materialised in Africa or Europe or between Africa and Europe. The Black Mediterranean cannot function either as the prehistory to European conquest, transatlantic slavery, and the Black Atlantic or as the contemporary analogue of these historically and geographically determinate processes.

I want to argue that we can no longer approach the Black Mediterranean as a (now defunct) precondition for a racial capitalist order centred on the North Atlantic. Nor is it sufficient to approach the dynamics of the contemporary Mediterranean as merely derivative of Black Atlantic afterlives of slavery. Instead, it is urgent to study the ongoing reproductions of the Black Mediterranean in the present, along with all of its ongoing, nonlinear articulations with the Black Atlantic (as well as the Black Pacific and the Black Indian Ocean).

(Hawthorne, 2021)

In this connection, Hawthorne poses some crucial questions about how plantation slavery may be conceptualised transnationally, neither “reducing its relevance to a matter of bio-genealogical kinship [n]or … rendering it little more than a vague metaphor for anti-Blackness in general” (Hawthorne, 2021). This is connected to Hawthorne's deeper, germane critique of provincialising versus universalising moves in Black geographic scholarship and in vernacular geographies of anti-Black racism. She observes that “the field of Black Studies is more institutionally established in the United States than it is in Europe, which has shaped the economies of knowledge production about the Black diaspora that some Black European scholars have come to controversially term “African American hegemony” (Hawthorne, 2021). (Incidentally, similar claims are made by European scholars about African American feminists' “hegemony” in intersectionality studies. The ascription of “hegemony” to scholars who are internally colonised within North American white settler states and marginalised within Anglo-American academies is, to put it mildly, jarring in both instances.) Whilst rejecting diffusionism, Hawthorne's lecture prompts deeper reflection on how ideas and activist practices circulate, “touch down” (Browne and Nash, 2019–2020), and get taken up across geographies.

In this connection, her discussion of the transnational Black Lives Matter movement is illuminating. Suggesting “we shift our focus to understand Black Lives Matter itself as a diasporic resource that is shared back and forth across different diasporic sites – and specifically, in this case, across the Black Atlantic and the Black Mediterranean”, Hawthorne seeks to displace framings of “Black Lives Matter going global”, which have the tendency to “elide the work Black Italian organisers had been undertaking for over a decade – movement work that sometimes, but not always, was explicitly connected to Black American mobilisations” (Hawthorne, 2021). Especially in light of the European Parliament's resolution that “Black Lives Matter” in 2020, whereby parliamentarians denounced racism and discrimination, no-border activists retorted to nonperformative (Ahmed, 2006) European institutional and corporate statements that “Black Lives Matter also in the Med”. In light of this, I would question Hawthorne's empirical claim that “[t]he language of abolition has not yet been taken up as a framework for action in these Black Lives Matter mobilizations” (2020). Calls for the abolition of Frontex, which Hawthorne cites as evidence of an emergent abolitionist consciousness (Hawthorne, 2021), continue decades-long anti-detention and anti-prison struggles in the context of border abolitionist (no-border) movements. The broader point, however, is that through such comparisons (which, elsewhere in her article, she rejects), little space is left for an explicitly internationalist orientation in abolition struggles, which rejects the bordering of social movement imaginaries to nationalised geographies. This is not just a question of “borrowing” or “circulating” terms and concepts but rather of forming internationalist coalitions of struggle against the normative bordering of the world and of our communities of concern. Internationalism discerns both the specificities of local struggle – often waged by diasporic communities – and their interconnection against globalised regimes of rule.

Continents are racial concepts. Through logics of anti-Blackness embodied in colonial processes of long duration, the Mediterranean is rendered representationally non-Black in the European imaginary and materially anti-Black in European migration politics. What is suppressed by European anti-Blackness is that Mediterranean geographies are, and have always been, “multiracial”, not in virtue of recent, postcolonial migration but long before the institution of the postcolonial nation-state system that seeks to control mobility through the imposition of borders to expunge Blackness from Europe – or to enclose Blackness within exploitative regimes of labour migration and asylum. Hawthorne's lecture prompts reflection on what is metaphor, what is analogy, and what is catachresis in representing the Black Mediterranean. I began this brief commentary by quoting part of Emtithal Mahmoud's poem, “Bird Watching on Lesvos Island” (Mahmoud, 2016). Mahmoud makes powerful use of a metaphor, to speak back to power, as she tries to make sense of incomprehensible loss, devastation, and survival against an Aegean horizon. Yet, when analogies substitute for geographic or historical analysis, they occlude more than they reveal. As intersectionality suggests, analogies tend to do violence to both terms in the analogy: both that which is positioned as already known and that which we seek to know through the act of comparative juxtaposition. Confronting the horizon over an aqueous cemetery; a violent border; and a space of transhistorical, transgeographic Black survival and resistance, Hawthorne's “Black Mediterranean Geographies” refuses the violence of so many bordered gazes.

## Auxiliary/Satellite

### Link – China

#### Techno-Orientalism

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Yellow Peril and Techno-Orientalism

The term yellow peril emerged in the late nineteenth century in response to Japan’s arrival to the geopolitical stage as a formidable military and industrial contender to the Western powers of Europe and the United States.9 The concept was further elaborated and given a tangible racial form through Sax Rohmer’s series of novels and films that provided the early content for the social imaginary of “yellow peril” along with its personification in the character of Dr. Fu Manchu, the iconic supervillain archetype of the Asian “evil criminal genius,” and his cast of minions.10 Strikingly, Dr. Fu Manchu’s characterization as evil, criminal, and genius continues to inform the racial trope of the Asian scientist spy; and more recently, we may add to the list the bioengineer, the CFO, the international graduate student, to name just a few. Moreover, the notion of the non-differentiable “yellow” masses continues to function as a homogenizing and dehumanizing device of Asian racialization, which makes possible the transference of Sinophobia to Asian xenophobia.

In its inherent attempt to construct a racial other, “yellow peril” is more a projection of Western fear than a representation of an Asian object/subject, and in this sense, it may be better understood as a repository of racial affect that can animate a myriad of representational figures, images, and discourses, depending on context. Indeed, the images and discourses of yellow peril have surfaced multiple times throughout the twentieth century, capturing a multitude of ever-shifting perceived threats that range from the danger of military intrusion (i.e., Japanese Americans during WWII), economic competition (i.e., Chinese laborers in the late nineteenth century, Japan in the 1980s), Asian moral and cultural depravity (i.e., non-Christian heathens, Chinese prostitutes, opium smokers), to biological inferiority (i.e., effeminacy, disease carriers). As Colleen Lye observes, “the incipient ‘yellow peril’ refers to a particular combinatory kind of anticolonial [and anti-West] nationalism, in which the union of Japanese technological advance and Chinese numerical mass confronts Western civilization with a potentially unbeatable force.”11 Arguably, the yellow peril of today represents heightened Western anxieties around China’s combined forces of population size, global economic growth, and rapid technological-scientific innovation—all of which emerge from a political system that is considered ideologically oppositional to ours. The current context, we suggest, is best understood through the lens of techno-Orientalism.

When the idea of techno-Orientalism first appeared in David Morley and Kevin Robins’s analysis of why Japan occupied such a threatening position in Western imagination in the late 1980s, techno-Orientalism offered a framework to make sense of the technologically imbued racist stereotypes of Japan/the Japanese that were emerging within the context of Western fears and anxieties around Japan’s ascendancy as a technological global power. They proposed that if technological advancement has been crucial to Western civilizational progress, then Japan’s technological superiority over the West also signals a critical challenge to Western hegemony, including its cultural authority to control representations of the West and its “others.” They claimed that the shifting balance in global power—the West’s loss of technological preeminence—has induced an identity crisis in the West. In response, techno-Orientalism, in which “[idioms of technology] become structured into the discourse of Orientalism,” is produced in large part to discipline Japan and its rise to techno-economic power.12 The United States, for instance, externalized its anxiety into xenophobic projections of Japan as a “culture that is cold, impersonal, and machine-like” in which its people are “sub-human” and “unfeeling aliens.”13 Techno-Orientalism, born from the “Japan Panic,” was effectively consolidated through and around political-economic concerns that frame Japanese and, by extension, Asian techno-capitalist progress as dangerous and dystopian.

Analogous to Japan’s position in the late 1980s, China currently figures into the techno-Orientalist imaginary as a powerful competitor in mass production, a global financial giant, and an aggressive investor in technological, infrastructural, and scientific developments. At the same time, the increasing purchasing power of China provokes American fear of a future global market that is economically driven by Chinese consumptive desires and practices. It is this duality—the domination of both production and consumption across different sectors of the techno-capitalist global economy—that undergirds American anxieties of a sinicized future.16

Further amplifying these anxieties around Chinese techno-economic domination is our imagination of China/the Chinese as the ultimate yellow peril, whose state ideology is oppositional to that of the United States and whose unmatched population size combined with its economic expansion and technological advancements may actually pose a real challenge to U.S. global hegemony. We turn now to examine how the ideology of yellow peril is manifesting in the current context of techno-Orientalism, beginning first with an analysis of the racial trope of “Chinese as contagion” and its connection to anti-Asian aggression.

#### Applying orientalist tropes to foreign policy has causes violent attacks on Asians

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In the early weeks of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States, President Trump put out many mixed messages, but he remained consistent with one—that China was to blame for the spread of the virus. Repeatedly, he insisted on calling the novel coronavirus “the Chinese virus,” despite mounting public criticism against the racialization of the deadly pathogen. Many noted the inflammatory nature of this anti-Asian rhetoric. During this same period, reports ranging from verbal abuse to intimidation to physical assault against people of Asian descent documented the sudden rise of anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States and globally. According to Human Rights Watch, an Asian woman in Brooklyn, New York, suffered a racially motivated acid attack, and in Texas, a Burmese American man and his two children were stabbed by a man who claimed he thought the family was “Chinese and infecting people with the coronavirus.”1 The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council in the United States reported over one thousand cases of anti-Asian incidents in a two-week period in March 2020.2 Outside the United States, a Singaporean student in the United Kingdom was violently kicked and punched by an angry group of men after they uttered, “we don’t want your coronavirus in our country” (my emphasis).3 In Australia, a survey taken by the community group Asian Australian Alliance recorded a total of 178 reports of anti-Asian incidents in two weeks, ranging from racial slurs to physical assault.4 Though President Trump has dropped the “Chinese virus” for “kung flu” and tweeted on March 23 that “It is very important that we totally protect our Asian American community . . . the spreading of the virus is NOT their fault,” it seems that Sinophobia and racial violence against Asian Americans have been unleashed.

Make no mistake, as long as President Trump continues to take a confrontational stance, using the rhetoric of blame against China with the intention to punish it with new sanctions, tariffs, and even the cancellation of U.S. debt obligations,5 the racial aggressions against Asian Americans will continue to rise, if not intensify. By now, it is widely accepted that the novel coronavirus emerged first in Wuhan, and scientists believe that the zoonotic disease might have jumped from animals to humans at Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, a wet market where vegetables, seafood, meat, and a small number of exotic wildlife were sold. Despite this, on April 30, President Trump casually offered a new theory, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted: that COVID had originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which houses a biosafety level-4 lab, and that the virus might have “leaked” from that lab. The implicit suggestion is that China had either intentionally bioengineered the novel coronavirus to cause massive destruction, thereby attributing malice, or carelessly leaked the virus due to scientific negligence, thereby attributing incompetence. In either case, these kinds of unsubstantiated speculations work to further stoke anger and disdain against the Chinese state. More disturbingly, they traffic in the idea of China as a biotechnology threat, resonating with pre-existing filmic representations of futuristic dystopian worlds.

The immediate and unqualified responses from the scientific community reveal the danger of these potentially incendiary speculations. Responding swiftly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a press release the morning of April 30 stating that “The Intelligence Community . . . concurs with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified . . . ” (my emphasis).6 Within days, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, Dr. Anthony Fauci, attested that the virus “could not have been artificially or deliberately manipulated.”7 These assertions sought to extinguish any attribution of malice to the Chinese state. Even with firm contestation, however, the very invocation of the idea of biotechnology warfare has tapped into and perhaps even fueled our existing techno-Orientalist anxieties.

As the COVID pandemic story transpires in real time, engulfing the entire global community, taking unexpected twists and turns, making divergences and transgressions, we have become increasingly aware that the layers of entanglements cannot be easily parsed out, nor will we know anytime soon how and when the story will end. We offer a query into how we might assess and make sense of the intensifying Sinophobia and xenophobia in this current context. To do so, we must resist the temptation to confine our analysis to the narrow parameters of the pandemic. Rather, we insist on examining the rise of anti-Asian aggression within the concomitant vectors of the pandemic, the escalation of the U.S.-China trade war, and the growing concerns about cyber- and techno-security. Here we assert that the ideology of yellow peril set within a techno-Orientalist imaginary is powerfully animating the racial form and racial affect mediating the multiple terrains of public health, technology, global trade, and national security. While it is tempting to treat this historical conjuncture as extraordinary, it is crucial that we situate the current unfolding within the long history of Asian racialization, one that indexes the abiding tension between the political impetus to define national belonging and the shifting economic imperatives of the nation-state.8

The Contemporary Racial Repertoire of the “China/Chinese” Threat

The outbreak of the pandemic could not have had worse timing (as if it could be timed), but timing is critically important here. Its emergence amid the ongoing intensive trade war between the United States and China is significant in that the prevailing tensions between the two countries and the discourses of Chinese unfair trade competition, scientific espionage, and technological surveillance frame the reception of the pandemic. One may argue that President Trump’s insistence on blaming China for the spread of the deadly virus is yet another tactic in his administration’s sustained attempt to quell China’s economic power at the same time that it provides a foil to distract from—and a scapegoat to blame for—the economic and public health crisis in which we find ourselves.

At this particular juncture, we unfortunately have been inundated with media coverage of a plethora of accusations and actions launched against China and Chinese Americans. Within the past two years, we have witnessed the implementation of trade sanctions and tariffs against China, the removal of prominent Chinese American scientists from research institutions, and the severing of nationwide economic transactions with certain China-based telecommunications corporations, with Huawei Technologies Company being the most notable. All these have been advanced in the name of national security. The discursive formation and the representational devices that have been used to justify these state directives play a critical role in constructing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as culprit and as America’s enemy number one. These constructions, some of which will be examined in this essay, are layered upon one another, each building and elaborating on the last, and each invoking and simultaneously inciting a different set of anxieties that lie within the broader repertoire of China/ Chinese as threat. Indeed, the inundation of media about China makes it difficult, if not impossible, to decipher truth from falsehood, myth from reality, rhetoric from evidence. Our task here is not to weigh the truth-value of these representations but to treat them as ongoing contests embedded in power and to draw out their material effects. It is worth noting that while the explicit target of U.S. state aggression has been the mainland Chinese state or the PRC, the actual effects are much more wide-ranging and extend into everyday aggressions against all those who present as East Asian American.

In our examination of the variegated representations of China/Chinese, we suggest that the longstanding ideology of “yellow peril” remains not just pertinent, but extremely forceful in constructing a multifaceted repertoire of Chinese state threat and, by extension, of Chinese/Asian American threat. What is particular about this recent iteration of yellow peril is its configuration through the lens of techno-Orientalism, a framework that is primarily used to examine the explicitly fictional genres of novels, videogames, and films but that we now assert as being actively deployed in this current historical conjuncture.

### Link – Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning itself is violent - Invoking extinction to justify emergency governance is a tool for securing White Futurity.

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II Governing through emergency

A range of work in geography and allied fields has traced the work emergency does in the advent and (re)production of existing and new forms, practices and relations of power. Stimulated by the ‘war on terror’, research has shown how contemporary liberal order is secured by governing through the logics of Emergency with a capital E (Adey, 2016; Amin, 2013; Agamben, 2007; Anderson, 2015; Aradau, 2015; Cooper, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Grove, 2013; Graham, 2011; Massumi, 2009). On the one hand, events or situations which are designated as emergencies are governed in ways that are designed to contain and curtail classes of events, and people that are designated as threats to an existing order. Governing through emergencies primarily hinges on draining an event of its eventfulness, by reducing its potentiality to disrupt, end, or overturn. On the other hand, liberal order governs through emergency in the sense that claims to an emergency – sometimes strategic declarations that an emergency has happened, is happening or will happen – can justify actions that (re)order bodies and relations for pre-existing reasons. Within this broad emphasis on ‘governing through emergency’, two main lines of research have developed.

First, a line of research concerned with emergency as exception has unpacked the work that the ‘state of emergency’ as juridical-political category and instrument does in the (re)making and (re)ordering of spaces and bodies (Neal, 2006; Coleman, 2007; Braun and McCarthy, 2005). Here the emphasis is less on the materialities and affects of the event designated as an emergency, and more on what is enabled through the act of formal declaration and the acts that follow. Building on Agamben’s (1998) neo-Schmittian engagement with sovereignty and the exception, research has disclosed the intensely uneven geographies of exclusion that are founded through the ‘state of emergency’, and the myriad ways in which people suffer and are damaged in the name of emergency. This emphasis on the ‘state of emergency’ reflects the fact that emergency declarations and subsequent actions often reveal the relation between democratic life and its authoritarian others as fractured and fragmented (Ophir 2007). In a ‘state of emergency’ visible impacts and effects of power manifest in and through bodies, typically framed in terms of the production of ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998). Research into racial violence following Hurricane Katrina (Braun and McCarthy, 2005) and the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Mullings et al., 2010), for instance, shows how action in a state of emergency draws on and reproduces black disaster victims as disposable lives (Giroux, 2006) while pursuing a goal of sustaining the existing socio-ecological order.

A second strand of work troubles this emphasis on the ‘state of emergency’ by approaching emergency as one technique of liberal rule amongst others. Governing through emergencies happens through innumerable mundane techniques designed to enable either the continuation or swift return of the non-emergency everyday. These techniques include exercises (Anderson and Adey, 2012; Schoch-Spana, 2004; O’Grady, 2016), shelters (Fredricksen, 2014), scenarios (De Goede, 2008; De Goede and Randalls, 2009), and participatory activities (Grove, 2014a). This research examines: the problem that situations designated as emergencies pose for governance; efforts to grasp such situations and render them actionable as emergencies; and how the practical operation of particular techniques of governance change what an event is and might become (De Goede and Randalls, 2009; Lakoff and Collier, 2008; Lentzos and Rose, 2009). Governing through emergencies is shown to involve a set of disparate, partially connected activities that happen through spatially distributed networks of anticipation including: forms of preparedness, preemption and precaution action (Amoore, 2013; De Goede and Randalls, 2009; Cooper, 2008; Lakoff, 2007; Massumi, 2009)); detectiondiagnosis (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2016); and response and recovery (Anderson, 2015). Rather than a juridico-legal category confined to the spaces and topologies of the exception, governing through emergencies appears here as simultaneously ordinary and extraordinary, materializing in scenes and situations of emergency, before returning to the background life of otherwise unexceptional spaces (see, for example, Barker, 2012; Hu, 2018).

Despite important differences, work on emergency-as-exception and emergency-as technique emphasize how emergency as a juridical-political category, set of governmental techniques, and atmosphere functions to sustain liberal rule. Following MacIntyre’s (1989: 345) assertion that liberalism’s teleological goal is ‘no more and no less than the continued sustenance of liberal and social order’, emergency is at once an occasion in which liberal rule is placed in question and (re)consolidated. Governing through emergency promises to bring events to an end by attempting to (re)produce recognizable cyclical or linear sequences of, for example, order-growth-development, disruption stabilization-recovery, or disruption-adaptation transformation. The goal is to drain an event of its eventfulness, making it into a recognized, completed happening and bringing the potentiality that the term emergency gestures towards to an end. This foreclosure of potentiality is by no means always a problem; as Povinelli (2011) reminds us, the burden of becoming-otherwise is often unevenly distributed. But it becomes a problem as it is harnessed to the goal of perpetuating liberal order, and emergency and disaster management are transformed into forms of ‘institutionalized anti-action’ designed to ‘ward off unexpected novelty’ and ‘block contingency rather than exploit its opportunity’ (Hu, 2018: 103).

Work on ‘governing through emergencies’ offers and rests on a critique of how governing through emergency ends, forecloses or redirects potentiality and thus (re)produces harmful or damaging conditions in the name of securing existing order. While it has mainly focused on liberal democracies in the Global North (exceptions including Hu, 2018, and Grove, 2013, 2014a, 2014b), we take four key points from this literature. First, ‘governing through emergencies’ orientates inquiry to how and with what consequences events or situations are claimed and thereafter related to as ‘emergencies’: claims of emergency demand action from those who govern, and it is important to attend to how subsequent in-action generates its own harms. Second, how certain events and situations become more perceptible and actionable than others is an important line of inquiry. Activist, public and artist claims of emergency often go unheard, ignored, or are dismissed by the state and other apparatuses through which emergencies are governed. Third, how everyday lives are partly composed through the techniques, objects, institutions and practices of governing through emergency requires exploration. Emergency techniques, objects and so on are encountered and become palpable with the atmospheres and moods that give everyday lives a particular feel.

Finally, work on ‘governing through emergencies’ reminds us that the relation between emergency and the everyday is at stake in emergency governance. Everyday habits, practices, and events may be governed as a source of potential or proto emergencies, with governing happening as dispersed phenomena across multiple sites and scenes in addition to visible, punctual scenes of emergency. This final point importantly connects to longstanding questions on what counts as a time-space of emergency when the line between exceptional and everyday becomes blurred. Walter Benjamin’s (1968: 257) observation that ‘the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule’ has shaped anthropologists’ and geographers’ studies of banal forms of violence throughout the Global South (e.g. Taussig, 1992; Scheper-Hughes, 1992; Das, 2007; Rose, 2014). More recently, geographers and other critical theorists have turned to concepts including ‘slow violence’ (Nixon, 2011) and ‘slow death’ (Berlant, 2011) to examine how racially and economically uneven processes of environment (in)justice fold harm, suffering, risk and premature death into the fabric of everyday life, particularly among poor and marginalized communities. Taken together, this and other research highlights that emergency is not only a dry juridical category, but signals a form of life structured through biopolitical techniques and mechanisms of racialization that delimit what lives can and should be exposed to banal forms of exceptional violence. The next section explores the multiple time-spaces of this form of Anderson et al. 5 life – what we are calling here racializing emergency.

III Racializing emergency

One of the more influential literatures in geography on everyday violence comes from work on environmental racism. Drawing variously on, inter alia, black geographies, political ecology, and feminist geography, this body of research reflects Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s (2007: 28) definition of racism as the ‘state sanctioned and/or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death’. In contrast to interpretations of racism as subjective prejudices, Gilmore’s approach directs attention towards structurally-produced forms of violence that have created and sustained capitalist political ecological order and continue to do so in the present day. Illustrating this approach, Katherine McKittrick (2013) demonstrates how colonialism operated through a geographic language of racial condemnation that created both difference and value in colonial economies: the figure of the black slave that embodied the possibility of violence without limits. Here, blackness is less an indicator of phenotypic difference than a political, juridical and philosophical category that constructed certain spaces as unlivable and marked those inhabiting these areas as less-than-human. This racialized designation formed the material and discursive foundations for the emergence of the uniquely European experience of finitude. The temporal experience of the future as an open-ended domain of progressive change, growth and betterment, amenable to human intervention and calculated improvement (Dillon, 1996), emerged literally on the backs of enslaved peoples from the African continent designated as ‘black’, whose forced labor and premature death in plantation economies created previously unimaginable sources of wealth and prosperity for European slave traders and slave owners (Thomas, 2016; Smith and Vasudevan, 2017).

These ‘racialized imaginative geographies of the uninhabitable’ (McKittrick, 2013: 7) continue to shape the present. McKittrick (2013: 7) stresses that:

in our present moment, some live in the unlivable, and to live in the unlivable condemns the geographies of marginalized to death over and over again. Life, then, is extracted from particular regions, transforming some places into inhuman rather than human geographies.

Geographic work on environmental (in)justice has unpacked how this ‘geographic management of blackness’ plays out in contemporary liberal societies. For example, Pulido’s (2000) seminal study of environmental racism in Los Angeles demonstrates how the urban landscape has been shaped by historical trajectories of white residents’ movement away from both polluted industrial areas and minority neighborhoods. Whiteness – and white privilege – is produced in this relational movement away from spaces and communities marked as ‘black’ and thus subject to greater levels of hazardous material exposure. The exposure of black bodies to harmful contaminants, and their resulting poor health and premature death, operates not only through direct and intentional means, but also through more insidious and banal practices that produce the toxic environments these bodies inhabit (Bullard, 2000; Tse, 2007; Mohai and Saha, 2015).

This literature has increasingly drawn on Rob Nixon’s (2009, 2011) concept of slow violence and Achille Mbembe’s (2003) concept of ‘necropolitics’ to unpack how power differentials unevenly distribute risk and harm in late modern capitalist societies. Nixon deploys slow violence to think through the subtle transformations in the spatial and temporal organization of violence under conditions of what Ulrich Beck refers to as ‘reflexive modernization’. Beck foregrounds how the institutions that structured modern societies throughout much of the 20th century, such as the territorially-bounded nation-state, full employment, and the maledominated nuclear family, have increasingly become destabilized in recent decades (Beck et al., 2003). While these institutions formerly provided the (white, male) modern individual with a sense of security and stability, their gradual erosion creates qualitatively new experiences of insecurity. Reading spectacular catastrophes such as the 1983 Bhopal chemical explosion and 1986 Chernobyl meltdown against the grain, he argues that the violence of these events is not confined to the immediate time-space of the event itself. Rather, the effects slowly reverberate across affected spaces and populations, gradually producing mutations, diseases, and debilitating injuries that erode vital capacities. But these drawn-out, attritional after-effects fail to receive the media attention and public concern these disasters initially received. Instead, they produce new subjectivities striving to survive in and through risky, inhospitable landscapes. Thus, while some adherents to Beck’s risk society thesis maintain that late-modern societies can be characterized by the democratization of catastrophic risk (see Bougen, 2003), Nixon demonstrates how the slow violence of advanced modernity is not evenly distributed across the population.

Environmental racism scholars have begun to articulate Nixon’s arguments alongside Mbembe’s (2001, 2003) sense of necropolitics to understand how this uneven geography of slow violence is shaped by racializing assemblages, or various legal and extra-legal techniques that produce differences within the population and expose some segments to premature death (Pulido, 2017; Davies, 2018). In short, Mbembe offers necropolitics as a corrective to Agamben’s formulation of bare life and sovereignty. For Mbembe, the colony, rather than the camp, is the paradigmatic scene where exceptional violence – the sovereign decision on the state of exception that brings the figures of both the sovereign and bare life into being – is contingent on banal practices that sustain colonial rule. Necropolitics names those techniques and practices that produce death-spaces inhabited by colonized subjects whose lives carry no juridical or theological value. Thus, for some researchers, slow violence signals ‘a form of late-modern necropolitics, where communities are exposed to the power of death-in-life’ (Davies, 2018: 1540). For example, Thom Davies’ research into the lived experience of toxic environments in the US’s so-called ‘Cancer Alley’ is rooted in a recognition that:

just as Mbembe’s colonialized bodies were kept in a state of gradual injury through processes of imperial domination, Nixon’s interpretation of slow violence shows how the uneven spread of globalization and pollution also keeps marginalized groups in situations and spaces of wounded subjugation. (Davies, 2018: 1540)

Similarly, Randi Gressgard’s (2019) innovative approach to urban resilience juxtaposes research on the necropolitics of colonialism with urban splintering to understand how practices of urban securitization are situated in antiblack racism and settler colonialism. These engagements with necropolitics draw out how contemporary forms of rule enact a subtle form of death-politics: the production of necropolitical geographies that render some places deathworlds whose slow forms of violence do not elicit shock or emergency response.

However, Jared Sexton (2010) cautions against Mbembe’s tendency to blur qualitatively distinct forms of racialized violence. In Sexton’s reading, Mbembe effaces the distinction between contingent violence that maintains colonial rule and the structural violence of slavery. He argues that by positioning slavery as one instance of a general phenomenon of modern terror, Mbembe loses track of

the singular commodification of human existence (not simply its [instrumentalized] labor power) Anderson et al. 7 under racial slavery, that structure of gratuitous violence in which a body is rendered as flesh to be accumulated and exchanged. (Sexton, 2010: 38)

Flesh is key to Sexton’s insistence that the experience of blackness is irreducible to that of other paradigmatic figures of modern deathpolitics in Agamben and Mbembe’s thought, such as the colonized subject or the refugee. Flesh is not biological; it materializes through racializing assemblages that inscribe racialized imaginaries onto human physiology (Weheliye, 2014). It thus offers an alternative to both the representational understandings of race and the abstract, ontological understandings of bare life that undergird Mbembe and Agamben’s readings of death-politics. It highlights the contextually- specific social formations – such as the New World plantation society – that, for African and indigenous peoples, are scenes of actual rather than potential mutilation, dismemberment and exile. For Sexton (2010), the social death that results from this ‘theft of the body’ (Spillers, 1987) distinguishes slavery’s structural violence from the colony’s contingent violence: the terror-formation Mbembe attributes to colonialism is already institutionalized in the structure of chattel slavery that denies the black subject kinship ties and mandates total submission of the enslaved before all whites.

While these arguments on racialized violence appear somewhat removed from work on governing Emergencies, they point to the racialized foundations of modern biopolitics that both Agambenian- and Foucauldian-inflected work bypass. If, as we saw above, the contextually specific transformation of persons into mere ‘flesh’ precedes any biopolitical division of the population into decontextualized categories of bare life (zoe) and valued life (bios), then the bios – the valued life in need of security and development – always carries with it the antihumanist negation of black flesh as its historical condition of possibility. Saidiya Hartman’s (1997) influential genealogy of freedom in the pre- and post-Civil War US offers an alternative account of how biology and politics intertwine. As she details, the definition of the slave’s legal status also established the scope of rights and liberties of the freed. This system of rights, liberties and privileges in white supremacist societies gave rise to particular experiences of daily life for white subjects that shaped normative expectations for how ‘valued life’ as such should unfold. Thus, post-emancipation and post-war legal struggles to eradicate discrimination revolved around the question of how to delimit black ‘freedom’ in a white supremacist society that continued to be structured around the exclusive privileges and value of whiteness. Biology – in the form of blood – became the means for managing life through the Jim Crow-era ‘separate but equal’ doctrine. The subject’s bloodline determined their capacity to claim the rights and privileges of whiteness, and determined the capacity of the state and other white subjects to legally deny those privileges to subjects marked as black. Thus, the expectations and comforts of whiteness were secured by white subjects through the continued classification of racialized subjects and the definition of the limits of their freedom.

Hartman’s analysis thus shows how the valued life that modern biopolitics takes as its object is an effect of racializing assemblages that extend the violence and deprivations of slavery into the present day. The possibility for specifying and managing various forms of collective life through techniques of emergency governance are thus founded on a ‘corporeal politics spanning the divide between slavery and freedom’ (Hartman, 1997: 9) that makes possible the experience of the future as openended and in need of securing through denying the possibility of this future to black spaces and subjects.

This argument offers an important corrective to work on governing Emergencies and slow violence by revealing that modern biopolitics carries within it multiple temporal registers that 8 Progress in Human Geography XX(X) express uneven and shifting economies of harm, suffering and insecurity within liberal societies. The anticipatory and open-ended temporality of the liberal subject is constitutively conjoined with at least two additional temporalities. First, the durative temporality of slow violence is not confined to contemporary late-modern societies, but defines the black experience of modernity since its inception in racialized slavery. The temporality of blackness as social death is not growth and development, but an incalculable, endured time with no interval or break. This ‘stalled present’ of ‘arrested movement’ (Scott, 2014: 6) offers no promise of transformation, betterment or improvement, only the exhaustion that comes from striving to endure unlivable worlds. As Sexton (2010: 64) emphasizes, ‘to be black in an antiblack world ... is to be inundated and under assault at every turn, pushed into an endlessly kinetic movement; which is to say subjected to an open and absolute vulnerability.’

This persistent ‘open and absolute vulnerability’ encompasses and exceeds both slow violence and necropolitics. But at the same time, we do not read blackness as an absolute, ontological category – following McKittrick (2016), we do not reduce black lives to death. Instead, Weheliye’s (2014) attention to racializing assemblages directs attention to the way the structural violence of racial capitalism hinges on topologically pliant and contextually specific configurations of different racializing techniques whose precise arrangement conditions the specific content of blackness as such. In this sense, the slow violence of late-modern societies is thus a topologically recalibrated form of the exposure to harm, suffering and premature death that has structured blackness since the slave plantation. As McKittrick (2013: 4) emphasizes, the plantation ‘uncovers a logic that emerges in the present and folds over to repeat itself anew throughout black lives’. This repetition of plantation violence – the recurrent demand for black social death as the possibility for liberal freedom – signals a second alternative temporality of modernity: the simultaneity of past, present and future that collapses open-ended futurity into a stalled present of enduring the violence of social death (Thomas, 2016). Christina Sharpe (2016) characterizes this simultaneity in terms of living in the wake of slavery. As a metaphor, wake signals an ongoing disturbance that folds the past into the present. Sharpe emphasizes that

living in the wake on a global level means living the disastrous time and effects of continued marked migrations, Mediterranean and Caribbean disasters, trans-American and African migration, structural adjustment imposed by the International Monetary Fund that continues imperalisms/colonialisms, and more. (Sharpe, 2016: 15)

Taken together, stalled time and disastrous time allow us to rethink the biopolitics of emergency governance in a way that situates liberalism’s anticipatory temporalities in relation to its constitutive racialized temporalities of duration and simultaneity. The life that emergency governance takes as its object carries with it multiple temporalities: the open-ended futurity of the white liberal subject and the repetitive and durative temporalities of black and indigenous subjects enduring the wake of slavery and genocide that denies these subjects the possibility of a future (Smith and Vasudevan, 2017). In this light, the biopolitics of emergency governance revolves around the uneven re/distribution of these distinct temporalities of modernity throughout the population. In clear distinction from all-encompassing visions of emergency and violence found in some Agambenian- and Foucauldian-inspired research, this reframing of biopolitics encourages us to look beyond the foreclosure of potentiality that works on governing through emergency details, and instead attend to expressions of actually-existing difference in the present that emerge out of and against contextually-specific racializing assemblages. The challenge here is to practice what Anderson et al. 9 we might call racializing emergency: racializing emergency involves situating emergency claims in particular socio-spatial contexts to examine how they contest the distribution of anticipatory, repetitive and durative temporalities and the forms of harm and suffering that are exercised through these uneven spatiotemporal geographies.

Explicitly recognizing the racializing assemblages that structure liberal biopolitics foregrounds the centrality of blackness to the modern category of emergency, and thus points to the need for critical analyses of emergency governance to take on board the coexistence of anticipatory, repetitive and durative temporalities. This decentering move radically opens up the relation between power and life that has been a central concern of research on governing Emergencies. As our review outlined above, geographers commonly read this relation in terms of governmental apparatuses that attempt to strategically control individual and collective life processes (a power over life) and an ontologically prior constitutive power of collective life. But this vision of a pluripotent life capable of generating new becomings must be radically expanded in light of the multiplicity of unevenly distributed temporalities that structure liberal order. In particular, analysis needs to account for a prior political economy of racialization that produces this uneven distribution in the first place. This opens the question of the threshold between different forms of modern life that are differentially governed through emergency logics and techniques. Importantly, this is not an ontological threshold that ultimately resolves into a clear Agambenian distinction between a valued life of the polis (bios) and the expendable life of homo sacer (zoe). Rather, this is a mutable and mobile threshold that is continually re/produced and challenged through the contextually-specific interplay of force relations, techniques, knowledges and strategies that differentially inscribes racial categories onto specific bodies, which are then open to being governed in some ways rather than others (Baldwin, 2012). In short, governing through emergency hinges on a prior politics of racialization that renders some lives governable through liberal techniques of emergency rule, and others not.

As Hartman (1997) patiently details, this politics of racialization allows some (white) subjects to claim protections from the state (or, we could add, any institution that governs) on the basis of an expected future of growth, security and development, and withholds the possibility of this claim from other (black/Indigenous) subjects (see also Povinelli, 2011). Racializing emergency allows us to approach Emergency as one sphere among others of liberal rule in which subjects may advance these claims. Emergency claims draw on and reiterate the racialized distribution of temporalities that structures liberal life. In doing so, racializing emergency opens a space of indeterminacy between emergency and life foreclosed by accounts of Emergency governance that equate liberal life with a purely anticipatory temporality. To rethink the spatio-temporal structure of liberal life thus also demands that we rethink the spatio-temporal structure of emergency as one terrain of liberal biopolitics. In the penultimate section, we articulate the concept of slow emergency to think through emergency governance in relation to a racialized understanding of emergency.

# AFF Answers

### 2AC – Plan Consequences Key

**Debate should be centered on the consequences of the plan—comparing opportunity costs is best for clash and argument refinement, which is a prerequisite to making critique and activism portable.**

**Fairclough and Fairclough, 18**—emeritus Professor of Linguistics at Lancaster University AND School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Central Lancashire (Norman and Isabela, “A procedural approach to ethical critique in CDA,” Critical Discourse Studies Volume 15, 2018 - Issue 2, 169-185) [CDA=critical discourse analysis]

The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 30-34), but we are using it here in a general sense: for the view that an **adequate framework for ethical evaluation** and **critique must include the comparison** and **evaluation of different arguments for different lines of action** in a process of deliberation. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus. Nevertheless, deliberation can **contribute to the quality of ethical critique** by ensuring that a **wide range of arguments are considered** in making decisions, that all alternatives are **taken into account** and **thoroughly criticized**, and that people have to (at least) **moderate their own partialities** in evaluating a range of arguments collectively. To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses of action which they led to. The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have discussed this in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 96-97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. CDA and practical argumentation CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is **oriented to action**, including political discourse, but also managerial, organisational and other forms of discourse. The **primary activity** in such discourse is **practical argumentation**, argumentation over action, over **what is to be done** (e.g. **what policies should be adopted**). Practical argumentation should accordingly be the **primary analytical focus** in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This **does not exclude other** familiar **forms of analysis** (such as **analysing representations**) but subsumes them. The point of representing (or ‘framing’) an issue in a particular way is to **create particular** public **attitudes** and **opinions**, and thus **legitimize** or **facilitate a particular course of action**. Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, critique of discourse is a normal part of all discourse. It is a **normal part of everyday practical argumentation**: people **find reasons in favour** and **against proposals for action**, they **consider alternatives**, **adopt them** or **discard them**, and so on. A course of action **worthy of being adopted** is **one that has withstood criticism**. Agents may decide to discard proposals either because they are **likely to be instrumentally inadequate** iun relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, or because they find them **ethically problematic**, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels: as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the critique that CDA itself is open to. There are therefore three main places where ethical values come into the picture: what values are arguers (e.g. politicians) arguing from? what are the values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the arguments of those arguers? what are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)? CDA is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It can itself be viewed as a **form of practical argumentation** (Fairclough 2013), open to the **same critical questions** that it directs at the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address ethical evaluations that are critical of their work. Moreover, the ethical judgement which is part of the normative critique carried out in CDA **does not come out of thin air**, but is built upon elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse. And CDA needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality, such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough 2003). We have argued that the **primary focus** of critical analysis in CDA should be **practical argumentation** and **deliberation** (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This was based upon a claim about the character of political discourse, which we saw as primarily concerned with the question of **what is to be done**. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which **(alternative) proposals are being tested**. The **framework** for critical analysis of **practical argumentation** and **deliberation** which we have developed since 2012 provides CDA with an **effective way of evaluating** and **critiquing discourse** from an **ethical point of view**. One of its strengths is that it allows **different approaches** to thinking about ethical questions (deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics) to be combined within an **ethical deliberative procedure for achieving impartiality**. In a more recent version of this framework (Fairclough, I. 2016, 2018), deliberation is modelled as a critical procedure designed to **filter out** those **practical conclusions** (and corresponding decisions) that **would not pass the test of critical questioning**. Two distinct argument schemes are involved in deliberative activity types: an argument from goals, circumstances and meansgoal relations, and an argument from (negative or positive) consequences. Proposals are **tentatively supported** by **practical arguments from goals**, and are **tested in the light of their potential consequences**, via **practical arguments from consequence**. Goals are generated by various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can also be obligations, rights and duties. Critical questioning seeks to **expose potential negative consequences** of proposals and thus evaluate them in terms of their **acceptability** or **reasonableness**: if the consequences are **on balance unacceptable** for those affected, then it would be **more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action**. Unacceptable consequences are **critical objections** which can **conclusively rebut a proposal**. Where two or more proposals survive critical testing, one may be **chosen as the better proposal** on nonarbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact). In our view, the **most significant perspective** in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a **consequentialist** one (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, Fairclough, I. 2016). The term ‘consequence’ is however used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is **likely to result in a situation** that is illegal or **unjust**, then the proposal can be **evaluated as unacceptable** from both a **consequentialist ethics** and a **deontological ethical position**. Our framework can therefore **accommodate** deontological **ethical issues** within a broader **consequentialist perspective**. By inquiring into the motives of action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective.

### 2AC – Scenario Planning

#### IR Scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases and incorporate complementary theories while making research policy-relevant

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Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.

The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

#### Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures.

Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.¶ Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.¶ This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.¶ What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?¶ Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.¶ The Art of Scenario Analysis¶ We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.¶ While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.¶ Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).¶ Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present.¶ Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry¶ The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.¶ Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8¶ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools.¶ In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas.¶ The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance.¶ The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### Threat scenario-analysis is good.

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This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios. In his classic work on scenario and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study. This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs. Scenarios in the Discipline What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur: During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region. This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many **dimensions of political science** theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may improve the study of IR. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.

### 2AC – Extinction First

#### The aff outweighs – extinction is the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely

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Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universa**l**, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### Extinction outweighs.

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In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of *intergenerational equity* according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them *nothing*. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is *a global public good*. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an *intergenerational* public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is *temporal* free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the *availability heuristic*, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

### 2AC – Fiat Good

#### Fiat is good -- foreign policy simulations teach students how allies and adversaries respond to U.S. policy -- fosters ideological reflexivity, accurate policy prediction, and argumentative agency.

**Esberg and Sagan ’12** [Jane and Scott; 2012; Special assistant to the Director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation; Professor of Political Science and Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; *The Nonproliferation Review*, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” p. 95-96]

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict. The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works. Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork. More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice. These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux. Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur. Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others. Acts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.

### 2AC – Debating Nuclear Risk Good

#### Debating nuclear risk is good.

**Bernstein ’18** [Aron; September 21st; Emeritus Professor of Physics at MIT; The Bulletin, “Reducing the risk of nuclear war begins in the classroom,” https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/reducing-the-risk-of-nuclear-war-begins-in-the-classroom/]

The need for education on nuclear weapons. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the students of today have less lived experience to draw on than older generations. Today’s typical college student was born after the end of the Cold War and has no memory of a time when most Americans were deeply afraid of nuclear war (excluding, to an extent, the fiery exchange of threats between President Trump and Kim Jong-un last year). Perhaps as a result, these students also have very limited knowledge about nuclear weapons. The majority do not have a strong understanding of what nuclear weapons are, their destructive power, or their role in the international order, and even fewer have a sense of how many nuclear weapons exist. They are not aware of the $1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program, in which the majority of costs come from modernizing and improving delivery systems rather than performing the technically necessary maintenance of the nuclear warheads. History education on the Cold War often addresses the US-Soviet arms race of that time, but nuclear weapons issues in other regions—such as the tense situation between India and Pakistan—are rarely ever mentioned. The distant, but persistent, possibility of an unintentional nuclear launch due to unauthorized access, technical failure, or a cyberattack on warning systems, is also overlooked, as is general information about which states possess nuclear weapons today.

In short, students in the United States (and likely elsewhere) typically graduate from high school having received almost no information on nuclear weapons. It is generally assumed that today’s American public simply doesn’t care about the **complicated** and somewhat **abstract** issues of nuclear weapons and deterrence because they rarely affect people’s lives directly. However, an alternative explanation exists: The American public doesn’t know enough about nuclear weapons to have much political opinion on them, but if they had more knowledge, that could change. If so, educating students on nuclear weapons on a large scale could have the long-term effect of creating an American public that is politically engaged on the nuclear issue and motivated to hold its elected leaders accountable for implementing nuclear policy that reduces the risk of nuclear war.

For some students, education on nuclear issues may have an impact beyond just putting nuclear weapons on their radar (pun intended). Today’s students are the next politicians, scientists, and journalists, and some of them will inevitably be tasked with addressing the nuclear issue in their careers. For these students, early exposure to the issues of nuclear weapons in an educational context could be useful preparation for grappling with those issues professionally. Indeed, for some students, learning about nuclear weapons could have a decisive impact on their career trajectory and inspire them to dedicate themselves to solving these problems.

## IR Theory

### Realism

#### Impact Turn - Realism is True and Accurate - COVID 19 Proves Security Dilemma amidst zero-sum competitions for international aid

**Basrur** Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and **Kiliem** Nanyang Technological University, **21,**

[Rajesh and Frederick, “COVID - 19 and International Cooperation: IR Pradigms at Odds”, Nataional Library of Medicine, November 9th, 21, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/>, accessed 6/27/22, GDS - LJ]

Even in the world’s most integrated supranational organization, the European Union (EU), member states readily violate otherwise sacrosanct principles of cooperation, and realists would not be surprised by how quickly lofty European ideals and norms made way for national self-help once the Covid-19 crisis hit the continent. The outbreak was followed by immediate violation of many existing EU regulations: competition law, fiscal discipline, and freedom of movement. As countries closed their borders, EU capitals went into full nationalist gear (Guardian [2020a](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR32)). Without any EU-consultation process, a number of EU countries immediately closed their borders and decreed export bans. When Italy, one of the worst affected countries in the world, asked fellow EU members for emergency relief with critical medical supplies, for several weeks it was met with precisely what realism would expect: its neighbors violated the EU’s single-market spirit by decreeing export bans on pharmaceutical equipment (Braw [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR5); Reuters [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR25)).

Dismayed by the lack of European solidarity, Rome was happy to accept support from China, which, though itself badly affected, sent medical equipment and experts immediately. Far from being altruistic, however, Beijing aims to rewrite the Covid-19 narrative. It does not want to be seen as the point-of-origin of the Covid-19 virus and views the pandemic as an opportunity to come out ahead of the United States in a zero-sum competition for global primacy. In Italy and elsewhere, China’s “mask diplomacy” is a noteworthy public relations coup (Kliem and Chong [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR16)). Beijing wants to be recognized globally as a responsible provider of public health goods in the absence of US leadership, and thereby, progress towards its ultimate objective of comprehensive power accumulation relative to Washington.

Indeed, the US has not only been absent in terms of leadership, but has also actively engaged in nationalistic self-help at the expense of others. President Donald Trump of the United States, Europe’s closest non-EU ally and partner, tried to lure CureVac, a German firm that was developing a promising Covid-19 vaccine technology, to relocate its Covid-19 research and development division to the US and to guarantee exclusive American access to the firm’s products (Die Welt [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR11)). Similarly, Trump sought to block the sale of masks to Canada by a US-based firm (MacCharles and Ballingall [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR17)), though a compromise was arrived at later. The US (like other countries, e.g. Japan) has also sought to restructure global supply chains in order to bypass dependence on China (Pamuk and Shalal [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR22)), which—if it succeeds—will be a radical and long-term change.

**Realists also point out that international institutions do not enable states to concentrate on greater long-term gains for everyone. Instead, international anarchy forces states to treat international organizations and institutions essentially like the international system itself: as an arena for zero-sum competition.** Indeed, as realism predicts, the World Health Organization (WHO) has become highly politicized. For example, **because of the PRC’s refusal to accept Taiwan as a diplomatically independent, sovereign nation state, the WHO disregards Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19 as well as related research and development results.** Allegedly bowing to pressure from Beijing, the WHO does not recognize Taiwan and refuses to include Taipei’s very successful pandemic management strategies in its reports on global research efforts (Financial Times [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR14)). This also supports the neoclassical realists’ argument about domestic factors. It shows how domestic ideology shapes foreign policy decisions in China and hinders international cooperation.

If a severe transboundary global crisis cannot spur international cooperation, then what can? Realism reminds us that, because of the trust deficit systemically inherent in an international system characterized by anarchy, states hesitate to forgo their first instinct for self-help and zero-sum games, even amidst a common global challenge.

#### Realism comes first—even if their theories come first, we win realism frames all underlying structures.

Bertucci et al. 18 [Bertucci, Mariano E, et al. Constructivism Reconsidered Past, Present, and Future. Ann Arbor University Of Michigan Press, 2018, pp. 223–229. Senior Lecturer in International Security at the Strategy and Security Institute, Department of Politics, University of Exeter \ kaylan]

The previous section documented how social variables might be taken as having the potential to transform international politics. This section now turns to an explanation of why it is so hard to fulfill such seeming transformational promise. Running throughout is the argument that while playing a particular social role or expressing a particular cultural identity are certainly state interests, they are necessarily **subordinate to political survival** (as a sovereign entity with control over its own foreign policy), “**physiological” security** (the safety from death and harm of the state’s population), **and economic prosperity** (a baseline level of which is necessary to ensure physiological security). Put simply, if a state and its population do not exist, it cannot achieve anything else—such as fulfilling a social role or **expressing a cultural identity**—either.36 And since survival, security, and prosperity all have a material base—as Wendt recognizes via his “rump materialism” (he simply does not think the material base yields determinate outcomes)—so too must **states necessarily put the defense of such interests ahead of social role fulfillment** if they want to be in a position to play any sort of role in future.37 That is not to suggest that states do not sometimes—or, indeed, often—make ideationally driven foreign policy choices that are detrimental to their other interests. It is simply a description of states’ incentive structure, which much of the time they end up following. It is necessary at this point to defend the notion that there is, in fact, a material base independent of the social world and that characteristics of that material base can yield causal outcomes. After all, military technology does not descend as manna from heaven, but rather is created via human agency in response to perceived threats, and thus it necessarily contains a dose of military culture and broader social identity from the outset. The same goes for the overall share of national economic resources allocated to defense, and indeed, money itself is a socially constructed store of value, albeit one premised upon underlying materially underpinned wealth.38 Any assessment of strategic priorities is necessarily filtered through the strategic-cultural lens of the institution(s) doing the assessing; asking one’s navy for an analysis of the relative merits of sea denial versus power projection, for example, necessarily delivers an answer infused with that navy’s historical trajectory, its sense of its role in the nation and the world, its internal politics, and so forth. The broader question of whether the sea—like other geographical features—constitutes a strategic barrier or a highway similarly requires cultural interpretation. Even technologies with such seemingly self-evident destructive power as nuclear weapons are not self-evidently “good” or “bad,” either morally or strategically, absent social interpretation. One might see them as “bad” because of the potential humanitarian consequences of their use (or because of the constraints they impose on conventional military options), or “good” because of the casualties in conventional war they prevent (and deterrence that they enable at low relative cost). Their political meaning is thus socially constructed, even if the physiological effects on human bodies of their detonation have only one possible outcome. If military technology and resources require a social component to be both developed and meaningfully deployed, then Wendt’s contention that there is indeed a “rump” material base but that it is simply indeterminate—in the absence of a friend/enemy distinction—as a cause of international outcomes becomes alluring.39 Crucially, however, **each of these social choices involves a decisive material effect that is not open to interpretation.** It may be debatable whether nuclear weapons are “good” or “bad,” but the effect that one will have on the city and its population of frail, carbon-based human animals over which it detonates represents a single, determinate outcome—and **a state facing another state armed with them must therefore make certain necessary calculations based around that capability**.40 In the same vein, while the strategic threat/opportunity constituted by geographical features, such as the oceanic moats enjoyed by the United States and United Kingdom, may be a matter of interpretation, the underlying **material factor** —humans’ inability to cross water without spending resources on capital (ships) that could otherwise have been spent on further ground forces— yields certain necessary outcomes. Indeed, the very foundation of relations between major powers after 1945—secure second-strike nuclear deterrence and its disincentivization of conventional aggression41—**rests on a physical “fact**”: the relative impenetrability of water to the electro-magnetic spectrum and the associated survivability that it provides to ballistic missile submarines. The same goes for the decision over what share of national economic resources to allocate to defense. Choosing a proportion may indeed be a socially and ideationally informed political choice, but the underlying size of the resource pools—and the military potentiality that they underpin— rests on the total size of the state’s capital stock (both human and physical), which is not a matter of social interpretation. And while military technology is indeed developed in response to human agency, it is done so from within the technical bounds of the feasible. Such rebuttals apply more widely: while the balance of power, including resources and technology, is indeed necessarily interpreted through states’ social lenses, it nonetheless conditions the bounds of the possible even in the absence of social content. And when those possibilities include hostile use, certain behaviors are necessitated by prudent states seeking survival for their populations. Realists should indeed be castigated if they infer predictions solely from the balance of currently existing military hardware—a thin and intellectually impoverished understanding of relative power—and critics are correct to point out that a large stock of materiel is not the same as being able to compel another to do that which they would not otherwise have done, in line with the behavioral output understanding of power commonly associated with Dahl (as distinct from the input understanding).42 But viewing total state power in terms of overall assets, defined as the state’s total stock of physical,43 financial,44 and human capital,45 **does a better job** of first encompassing all the relevant resources—equipment, stores of value, human bodies and brains—**and, second, providing an effective measurable proxy for the underlying causes of behavioral power** (given that the latter can only be observed ex post, and is therefore not an effective predictor of outcomes). None of this is to deny that there is a social element to the construction of all these power resources, or indeed that the “material” itself involves a large dose of social input, and this chapter is therefore not attempting to “settle” the debate over the precise nature of the relationship. It is simply to point out, rather, that states’ power resources and their effects are not wholly socially constructed and that the nonsocial element produces certain effects. Turning to specific arguments over states’ pursuit of status, the notion that achieving a particular elevated status and thus fulfilling a certain international-social role might be a goal of states is relatively uncontentious.46 For instance, one insightful recent constructivist work on Britain’s pursuit of international status suggests at the outset that states’ social roles are not the same as their interests, ambitions, values, or capabilities.47 Yet the same work later asserts that social role actually produces national interests, thus implying that states cannot in fact have interests besides those constituted by identity.48 Such conceptual tensions are symptomatic of a theoretical dilemma: the more minimal former assertion is the harder to refute, yet the more ambitious latter claim is necessary if constructivists are to escape the realist retort that fulfilling a social role is merely an interest of states—and a subordinate one to materially underpinned survival at that—rather than the interest. Escaping this retort is in turn necessary if constructivists are to be able to claim that anarchy is indeed what states make of it socially, since transforming the prevailing culture of anarchy would require states to lower their guard against each other—and thus accept higher risk to their survival, at least **while the hoped-for transformation was taking place**—in pursuit of an international- social value. The less contentious point—that playing a particular social role is one of multiple interests—opens the way to conceding that the most fundamental state interests remain “political” survival (of state territory and institutions), “biological” security (of the citizenry’s bodies), and preserving some baseline level of economic prosperity, since **a state that cannot survive cannot achieve anything else**. But if that is the case, then from these materially underpinned vital interests follows a need to be capable of defending them against potential foes—and that, if it comes to it, **means accomplishing certain military missions**.49 Such military capability is necessarily underpinned by material resources, even as it also has a socially constructed dimension. Such capability can be provided independently (internal balancing), via allies (external balancing), or through some combination of the two—prudent strategy, including eschewing avoidable confrontation and aligning with the preferences of powerful allies, is a key aspect of state success50—but either way, it rests on some friendly actor’s underlying resources. And reliance on external balancing brings its own dangers, as recently experienced by European NATO, when one’s allies turn coercive.51 In short, such an analysis—while conceding that social role and status are important to states, all else held equal, and that such concerns sometimes drive them to act in imprudent ways—nonetheless suggests that hedging against abandonment, coercion, or outright destruction via balance-of- power positioning is likely to remain pervasive. This is not to say that there will not be variation in the extent and severity of such competition. All manner of ideational variables might exacerbate or reduce tensions, as discussed above, and even in the absence of such social forces, overt, intensive competition may yield self-destructive outcomes if it increases another side’s insecurity and causes them to adopt a more offensively capable strategic posture in response.52 The point, rather, is simply that conflict will never be a wholly absent possibility and that that reality must condition states’ calculations—often to the point of some level of defensive hedging, if the state has the resources and technology to make that feasible —**even in times of broadly cooperative relations**. A similar retort can be made against the claims that threat perception and military doctrine are both so fundamentally skewed by culture that they may be commonly and wholly disconnected from balance-of-power concerns, and which subsequently allow for an end to military balancing, mutual threat, and security competition. While this short chapter is clearly not the place for an extensive review, the success of many states— particularly resource-rich ones—in aping military technological and professional best practice would seem to suggest that much of the time states are able to achieve what Gray, borrowing from marketing theory, dubs “good enough” **force postures in the face of strategic uncertainty.**53 Similarly, when states do “die” in the face of foreign aggression—a rare occurrence in post-1945 international politics—**it is more often as a consequence of their relative military weakness** and geographical vulnerability than as a consequence of a failure to perceive a looming threat.54 Indeed, a key contribution of the neoclassical realist research program has been to demonstrate that while domestic-political variables may filter strategic behavior in multifarious and often nefarious ways, there are still underlying balance-of-power structural pressures at the international-systemic level that states usually respond to, even if they do so belatedly or imperfectly.55 In short, while Waltzian “socialization” toward accurately perceiving threats and formulating effective military doctrine may frequently be hindered—and sometimes terminally compromised—by cultural factors, as a description of the workings of the international system as a whole (as he intended his theory to be), realist predictions of enduring concern and possible competition over the distribution of material power are **not undermined** by this recognition.56 Tellingly, despite their strong ideational commitments toward democracy promotion and human rights enforcement under the banner of upholding international order, Western states have recently had the reprioritization of balancing against increasingly capable rivals forced upon them by developments in the balance of power, whether that be China’s rise in Asia for the United States or Russia’s (partial) resurgence in Europe for the rest of NATO.57 Finally, even national identity and the nationalism it engenders—the ideational “master variable” underpinning the nation-state system—is itself forged by the interaction of political group identity and the survival imperative under structural anarchy. To paraphrase Tilly, **war makes the state, and the state makes war.**58 Modern nation-states may have originated as political groups of individually weak human beings with some shared identity connection, but their choice to form states as protective war machines capable of generating the military power necessary to defend against similar political units, and the subsequent mutual reinforcement of national identity and state strength, **is very much consistent with realism’s predictions** of the consequences of international structural anarchy. Indeed, as noted earlier, Mearsheimer uses these grounds to argue that nationalism and realism are mutually supportive theories.59 In the post–Cold War world, moreover, mutually threatening political groups’ need to generate the military power necessary for security under anarchy—the security dilemma, in short—helps to explain the explosion of ferocious ethnonationalist and sectarian conflict within and between the new states emerging from the collapse of previously multiethnic communist federations, secular Middle Eastern autocracies, and so forth.60 Such conflict has in turn forged the identity of the states and state-like entities emerging from it. In short, while it is certainly not impossible for national identities to shift, as noted above, the process of their generation nonetheless suggests that they are endogenous to—rather than readily capable of exogenously shifting to transform—international systemic security competition and balance-of- power positioning, that they are as much a dependent variable as an independent variable

### 2AC – Realism/Perm

#### Perm do both – IR is reflexive, constantly changing and can be re-appropriated

Abraham, 17—Johns Hopkins University (Kavi Joseph, “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” International Political Sociology (2017) 11, 221–238, dml)

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. A third response, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this failing does not delegitimize other realist insights. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better. The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements. Thinking from the Present By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a counter-imperial machine, to cultivate a shared spirituality that can gather diverse and divergent constituencies to confront dangerous practices. In my estimation, countering an imperial machine that operates in complex ways and at complex sites requires a political strategy as unwieldy and diffuse, linking constituencies that we may otherwise dismiss. That a tradition of realism regularly circulates through halls of power across the globe should be reason not to reject righteously but rather to leverage its authorized status. We can talk about imperialism, knowledge production, and race here, while they can talk about anarchy, power, and self-interest there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that reverberate among us. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” this argument involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward new research agendas and new forms of critique that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention. Needless to say, drawing together realist and postcolonial thought, as this essay has done, can be met with analytical skepticism and political hostility. A mode of argumentation that refuses comparisons of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists strikes a note of analytical evasion. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, the argument anticipates strong political reservations: why align the project of postcolonial theory with realism, an unethical tradition of militarism and realpolitik? To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, reducing “realists” to a coherent body of thought not only obscures the complexity of their thinking (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) but reproduces the narrative of transhistorical unity that some realists use to authorize unethical policy programs in the first place. More critically, however, in embodying an unproductive ahistoricism, it poses conventional realist categories of anarchy, selfinterest, and military power as the political problem to confront whereas the present historical context demands attunement to how some of these drives (militarism, national interest) connect with discrete problems of liberalism and imperial practices. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that countering imperial formations may benefit from resonances established not just among postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but contemporary realists who identify links between liberalism and imperialism (Walt 2013). Indeed, if realism as a policy program defending the national interest is entangled with current militaristic and imperial interventions, we should push the premise of this statement, that difference should be defended, in anti-imperial and prudential directions. Doing so may allow new openings to emerge in the present sense of closure, new strategies to think and defend alternative politics. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.

### Liberalism

#### Economic Liberalism Key - Interdependance through economic incentives ensures cooperation and democracy to preserve international peace - COVID + numerous pandemics prove

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[Rajesh and Frederick, “COVID - 19 and International Cooperation: IR Pradigms at Odds”, Nataional Library of Medicine, November 9th, 21, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/>, accessed 6/27/22, GDS - LJ]

When the fates of states are bound together, liberals claim, they must cooperate or pay a very high price. The global economy, for instance, is a complex network of trade, finance and manufacturing that places a premium on cooperation. From this perspective, states must cooperate to stem pandemics that flow seamlessly across the world and impose high costs on all societies. They must share knowledge and material resources to counter a scourge that harms them all. They certainly do so, for example, in US-led efforts to ensure the reliable availability of equipment to combat pandemics (Tribune [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR34)). But they do not cooperate consistently. The United States has sought to corner scarce medical supplies (Bradley [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR4)), European states have failed to coordinate policy (The Guardian [2020a](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR32)), and China and the United States are squabbling over responsibility (Shi and Wu [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR29)). In short, the pattern is much as in another arena of contest between interdependent states: the as yet unfinished “trade war.”

Why? Interdependence does not automatically produce cooperation. It is only when the breakdown of interdependence raises the prospect of serious catastrophe that states cooperate. When nuclear-armed states are on the verge of war, for instance, they engage in tacit cooperation by practicing extreme caution and often seek explicit accommodation through talks, as was the case in Cold War crises. Even so, they continue to compete through arms racing, alliance building and occasional brinkmanship. Comparatively low levels of interdependence amidst the Covid-19 outbreak are unlikely to generate high levels of cooperation as the threat to national survival is limited.

The onset of pandemics has certainly produced unprecedented cooperation among epistemic communities, such as virologists, in a transnationalized world. Scientists from many countries have worked together to manage the threat of a viral outbreak ever since the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002. The appearance of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012 quickly led to the activation of a scientific network that has been dubbed the “SARS club” (Butler [2012](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR6)). More broadly, the onset of MERS spurred global research, producing as many as 883 scientific papers in 92 countries between 2012 and 2015 (Zyoud [2016](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR37)). Likewise, as the New York Times has noted, the Covid-19 outbreak has galvanized unparalleled cooperative research in which scientists have bypassed standard protocols and competitive secrecy to engage in shared efforts (Apuzzo and Kirkpatrick [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR1)). But, not for the first time, politics has trumped cooperation. The possibility of a quantum leap in global scientific collaboration has been stymied by the China-US spat, which has reduced the prospects of shared funding and finance to fight the virus. The US, for instance, stopped funding of a critical coronavirus-related training program for Chinese and other scientists even before the current outbreak. National priorities have overridden collective action, which is entirely in accord with realist expectations (Baumgaertner and Rainey [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR3)).

The same malaise afflicts international institutions, which liberals see as fostering high levels of cooperation. The Group of 7 major economies (G7) failed to organize a summit meeting in March 2020, while a subsequent meeting of their foreign ministers came up with no more than an anodyne statement seeking to foster research cooperation and do “whatever is necessary” to counter the economic fallout of the crisis even as they disagreed on whether China was to blame for the onset of the crisis (Schult [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR28)). The G20 did not do much better. It did support debt relief for poor countries, but its announced $5 trillion injection into the global economy was in fact no more than the sum of moneys already committed by its individual members for themselves (Chodor [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR7)). The institution at the center of the crisis, the WHO, has been acknowledged as critical to the information flow relating to the crisis. But the WHO has also been dogged by controversy for announcing the onset of the pandemic late (on 11 March, by which time it had already spread to 113 countries) and for apparently deferring to China in doing so (Basrur [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR2)). Such failings have brought much criticism and calls for its reform (South China Morning Post [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR31)).

#### Absent the U.S, power vacuums through competing security interests cause Russian heg [retag lol]

Erkan 22 [Erkan, Mariya. “A Neoclassical Realist Perspective on Russian Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Putin Era.” International Relations and International Law Journal, vol. 97, no. 1, Mar. 2022, 10.26577/irilj.2022.v97.i1.07. Accessed 28 June 2022. <creds, PhD candidate lols> \ kaylan]

Considering Eastern Mediterranean as a regional subsystem, one can see that it reflects the global arena presenting its mini projection but adding some regional actors. This is explained 67 Mariya Erkan by the interdependence of global and regional fluctuations as mutually influencing components of one whole, that is, the regional subsystem is a part of the global international system. Indeed, the Eastern Mediterranean is part of the Mediterranean region, which is adjacent to Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, which can be considered as separate subsystems, and which also provides the opportunity to enter the World Ocean. Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is opposed to the active actions of the United States and its Western allies in the face of the European Union in the region. Moreover, the last decade has been marked by the increasing activity of both regional (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey) and global actors (China). The discovered reserves of energy resources in recent years are of strategic importance and can affect the distribution of power both in the region and undermine Russia’s position in the international arena. Therefore, controlling its extraction and transportation in the region allows Moscow to keep dominant position in the supply of energy resources to Europe. Another important aspect of Russian interest in the region is security. Before considering these factors, it is worth paying special attention to the structural modifiers that play a role in shaping Russian foreign policy towards Eastern Mediterranean. Russia’s geographic location relative to the Eastern Mediterranean region has predetermined its policy for centuries. The vast territory of Russia has no access to warm seas, which naturally impeded its trade and economic development, as a result of which Russia has historically sought to find a way to the shores of warm seas expanding its defensive territory to the south. The events of the Arab Spring provided an opportunity to strengthen Russian position in the region, which culminated in Russia’s engagement into the Syrian Civil War. Providing significant military and diplomatic support to the Assad regime, Russia got under its control the naval base in Tartus, the strategic port of Latakia and the Khmeimim air base in Syria, which allow Moscow to project its influence and power not only in the Middle East, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Two of these military bases, namely a naval base in Tartus and an air base in Khmeimim ensure Russia’s presence in the region in the extended time frame for 49 years (long-term) starting from 2017 (Legucka, 2020: 2). This region is a “south key” to open the “door” to the World Ocean and project Russian power globally. Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean, which is located at the intersection of the Middle East, Europe and North Africa and provides access to the World Ocean, is an important communications and transmission route, thereby, representing a strategically significant region for Russia in terms of projecting its influence and power. Another structural modifier that affects the way actors interact and behave towards each other is the offense-defense balance in military technologies, which intensifies the security dilemma in the relevant region. Russia got access to naval and air facilities in Syria that has expanded its operational capabilities throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as beyond. Thus, for example, a naval base in Tartus has the potential to accommodate eleven warships. As Russia’s case shows, its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean are largely built on the perception of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union and NATO, and their immediate proximity to the borders of Russia, thereby exacerbating the feeling of a “besieged fortress” (Delanoë, 2014:24). Thus, Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is primarily conditioned by its national security requirements. Nevertheless, the consistent development of the European Union in the process of enlargement has institutionally complicated its foreign policy decision making, which impeded the European Council “to reach a clear consensus on the EU’s policy in Syria, Libya, or Turkey” (Pierini, 2020: 104). Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2020 has created uncertainty and further **distracted** the European Union from the Eastern Mediterranean affairs (Pierini, 2020: 104). Furthermore, there has been a relative weakening of the US role in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, which **led to a power vacuum** (Dalay, 2021: I). This, in its turn, **contributed to the opening of a window of opportunity for other actors**, and, as a consequence, led to Moscow’s decisive actions in this region. As noted by Dario Cristiani, Russia’s approach is “exploiting strategic vacuums,” (Cristiani, 2020: 2) which is recently being traced in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to claim that Washington is completely leaving the Eastern Mediterranean, reorienting itself to the Asia-Pacific region. As the former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted, the ratio of American naval power between the Pacific and the Atlantic would change by 60/40, in contrast to the previous 50/50 (Perlez, 2012). Despite this shift, the Eastern Mediterranean remains a strategically important region for the United States, allowing it to project its power. This 68 A neoclassical realist perspective on Russian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Putin era region is a kind of ‘springboard’ for exerting US influence in a number of directions, mainly in Africa and deep into Eurasia, reaching Central Asia, which is of interest to Washington in the geo-political confrontation with China above all (Nopens, 2013: 3-4). These were external systemic incentives, which influenced Russia to tailor its foreign policy in accordance with the circumstances designed by the international system. Russian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is also closely linked to its Middle Eastern policy, as its posture in the Eastern Mediterranean is intended to preserve its gains in Syria. Thus, Russia’s policy in the region is dictated by a defensive position and a simultaneous desire to assert itself as a great power within the international system, a power, which is **capable to transform the existing rules of the world order**. However, there is another point of view. Some researchers believe that the main driver for Russia’s activity in the region is not its desire to establish itself as a great power due to the lack of the necessary means for this, but the pragmatic task of ensuring the security of its southern flank in the event of a possible conflict with NATO (Rumer, 2021: 1). As it was mentioned above, the Arab Spring and subsequent events in Libya and Syria provided Russia with opportunities to expand its participation in the region. Representing itself as a great power and being at the same time an external actor in the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia took its place in the complex equilibrium of interests of external and regional actors. It has managed to forge relations with all the key regional powers. The power structure of the Eastern Mediterranean is characterized by the involvement of major powers (China, European Union, Russia and the United States), regional powers with direct access to the Mediterranean (Israel and Turkey), and Middle Eastern regional powers (Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia). In addition, there is a de facto divided Cyprus that is facing off against Turkish pressure. In their dispute over energy resources, Russia also plays an important role, influencing the balance of power. Kremlin seizes every opportunity to exert its influence on any crisis situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which would make it possible to freeze competitive projects for the extraction of energy resources and their transportation to Europe continuing to keep a dominant position in the supply of energy resources. Indeed, the destabilized situation in the Eastern Mediterranean causes concern in the ranks of the EU and NATO, thereby distracting them directly from Russia itself. For example, Russia has offered its mediation services between Cyprus and Greece with Turkey on the maritime delimitation and division of Eastern Mediterranean energy resources accordingly, which could potentially expand its influence on the southern borders of the EU and NATO taking in consideration their indispensable geopolitical significance for Western allies’ positioning in the region. In addition, by doing so, it would displace Germany, which is the preferred intermediary in this dispute (Madeira, 2020). Another leverage of Russia’s influence on the extraction and supply of energy resources is its striving to participate in regional energy projects. For example, in 2017, a 30% stake in the Egyptian Zohr gas field, which is the largest gas field in the Mediterranean Sea, was acquired by the Russian state-owned company Rosneft (Rosneft Information Division, 2017). Besides that, other Russian companies got energy contracts in Libya and Syria (Legucka, 2020: 2). Russia used its military position in the Eastern Mediterranean to strike at ISIS positions in Syria, thereby demonstrating its power and establishing itself once again as a great power in the transforming international system. The United States acted similarly during the Gulf Wars, striking Iraq with long-range missiles deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, Russia is leaning more towards internal balancing, rearming its forces and emulating the successful security behavior and the military practice of its rival. Vladimir Putin, expressing his sympathy to the foreign policy of Imperial Russia, is guided by Alexander III principle that “Russia has only two allies - its army and its navy.” The Domestic Level: Variables Constraining Foreign Policy The difference between neoclassical realism and earlier versions of realism is its taking into account a number of domestic factors that affect the likelihood and form of the state’s response to certain international systemic imperatives. Type III neoclassical realist theory considers four categories of intervening variables, namely leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations and domestic institutions (Ripsman, 2016: 58-59). It is apparent that the figure of Vladimir Putin in power plays an important role in the activation of Moscow on its southern flank. This is especially true in contrast to the foreign policy course pursued by the previous President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, when Russia withdrew from a number of regions, including 69 Mariya Erkan the Eastern Mediterranean, and focused its attention mainly on the western direction. Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin stepped up its efforts to return from abandoned regions and develop new ties and directions. As mentioned earlier, from the very beginning of his tenure in power, he declared the need to strengthen Russia’s military presence in the Mediterranean. His assertive foreign policy in the region serves as a justification of its imperial nature for the Russian society, as well as provides access to profitable agreements, including energy and military sectors, for his close teammates (i.e. Gennady Timchenko and Yevgeny Prigozhin) (Legucka, 2020: 1). As is known, one of the continuities of the Soviet period in the shaping of modern Russian foreign policy is its ‘over-centralization’ and the role of personal ties within the circle of political elites (Chernyshev, 2014: 19). The place of the Eastern Mediterranean in Russian strategic culture is mainly seen as a part of the larger Mediterranean region, which is adjacent to Europe. Therefore, Russian Eastern Mediterranean policy is inextricably linked with Moscow’s foreign policy towards Europe. However, the events taking place in the Middle East over the past decade have given even more weight to the Eastern Mediterranean in the foreign policy of many states, including Russia. Back in 1996, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, the famous Arabist Yevgeny Primakov, noted the importance of this region for Russia as providing direct access to the strategically important region of the Middle East (Delanoë, 2014: 28). At that time, the degree of significance was determined by the instability of the southern borders of Russia itself. Today, the threat comes directly from the Middle East region and threatens to revive the separatist and extremist sentiments of the so-called “soft underbelly” of Russia. This term was used by Primakov to designate Russian southern flank (Kreutz, 2007: 11). What is more, the so-called concept of the “Greater Mediterranean” in Russia’s strategy towards the region, reflected in the Memorandum on Russian Policy in the Mediterranean of 1995 (Memorandum o politike Rossii v Sredizemnomor’ye , 1995), implies partnership relations between the countries of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which shows its strategic importance as one of the parts (subsystem) of a single whole (international system). As for the perception of the need for Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is due to the fact that Russian elites, like Russian society as a whole, perceive the idea of Russia’s greatness and do not agree only on defining its role as a regional power (Lukyanov, 2016: 34). Thus, Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean **meets its national interests in ensuring economic interests**, primarily in the energy sector, and **security**. The weak economic and political situation is certainly a limiting factor. The budget allocated for the military maintenance of Russian troops and foreign military bases could be distributed to solve domestic socio- economic problems, and this causes discontent in society. However, the perception of systemic incentives through the prism of the leader, as well as the established strategic culture, make their own adjustments to Moscow’s foreign policy decisions. Conclusion **Russian foreign policy** in the Eastern Mediterranean **has become assertive** in the Putin era. This is due to Russia’s geopolitical, economic and military interests both in the region itself and in other regions adjacent to it. A number of systemic factors, such as American declining role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, regional rivalries, disputes over maritime delimitation and energy resources, inconsistent Western policy, and the outbreak of military conflicts open up opportunities for Russia to strengthen its position in the region and exercise its influence. Together with systemic factors (independent variable), domestic factors (intervening variables) such as leader image and strategic culture play an important role in how the Kremlin processes and responds to systemic pressures. For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has been consistently expanding the scope of cooperation with remote regions and deepening it in various areas, from trade and economic to military issues. Moscow perceives the Eastern Mediterranean as its southern flank and strategically important region located at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and providing access to the open ocean. Russia’s strategy in the region is aimed at ensuring security and preventing the spread of influence of other actors in the international system. It maintains the balance of power in the region

### Heg good

#### US hegemony actually benefits smaller states

Zachary Selden, ND (Reviewing *America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation* by Carla Norrlof, UChicago Press Journals, accessed 6/28/2022, [https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1017/S0022381611000211#](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1017/S0022381611000211)) //lrap

\*\* this would be a good book to read if you foresee having to go for this argument! unfortunately i did not have the time so maybe later lol

In America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation, Carla Norrlof argues that the American hegemony is likely to endure because of the United States’ dominance in three areas: currency, trade and security. It is a highly relevant work given the current degree of speculation about the decline of the United States and the rise of China. Norrlof, however, explicitly avoids any normative implications regarding American hegemony and focuses on how those three factors interact to produce an enduring hegemonic position for the United States as well as disproportionate gains relative to the gains to smaller states. In this regard, the author challenges one of the basic propositions of hegemonic stability theory.  
Norrlof bases her theory on **the interlocking aspects** of the dollar’s primacy, the commercial power of the United States and its military predominance. The dollar’s status as the key currency grants the United States material gains as well as policy flexibility. At the same time, its massive commercial role helps to insulate it from the effects of long-term trade deficits and pushes the costs of adjustment across the international financial system. American military predominance cements those gains by protecting American commercial interests, protecting a widespread range of allies with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, and acting as a guarantor of the United States’ role as a safe haven for investment.  
Norrlof’s argument in some ways boils down to one of size; the United States’ economy is so large that its deficits help rather than hinder the maintenance of its hegemonic status. Smaller states need the hegemon to absorb goods and capital and the negative effects of large deficits that would affect smaller states do not apply to same degree to the hegemon. American hegemony is thus neither altruistic nor exploitative; it benefits smaller states but also generates disproportionately large benefits for the United States. With this point, Norrlof takes on one of the basic propositions of hegemonic stability theory which is that the hegemon provides public goods at a cost to itself that smaller states enjoy as free riders. Norrlof makes a convincing case that in fact the hegemon can derive disproportionate gains by threatening to exclude some states by offering “club” goods rather than public goods.  
It is natural that some speculation about how American hegemony could end would be a part of a work of this nature. Norrlof’s argues that American hegemony is relatively stable because another state or group of states would have to be willing and able to challenge the existing order, which means forgoing the security and economic benefits they currently enjoy. She identifies two possible challengers: East Asia and the European Union. Norrlof devotes a fair amount of consideration to the possibility of the Euro becoming a replacement for the dollar, but this seems already somewhat dated given the Greek debt crisis and its effects on the common currency. Although talk of the Euro’s demise is probably greatly overstated, there is certainly little chance that it will become a replacement for the dollar in the foreseeable future. This book was obviously in press before Athens’ fiscal situation became clear so this is not a criticism of the work, but it is worth noting that Norrlof’s main candidate for a challenger to American financial hegemony appears to have taken a significant step backwards. This only strengthens the author’s basic conclusion regarding the endurance of American hegemony.  
One area that could use additional consideration in a work of this nature is the potential for the sudden collapse of American hegemony. The U.S. Treasury’s gross borrowing has been running as high as $1.9 trillion a year to finance a $1.5 trillion federal deficit. It is difficult to imagine that the federal government can continue to borrow more than 40% of its annual budget into the indefinite future without significant consequences. If U.S. debt levels combined with a lack of growth and rapidly rising entitlement spending leads to a collapse in investor confidence, there could be a sudden and dramatic fall in the value of the dollar and, in turn, the ability of the United States to act as the dominant importer. This would inevitably lead to a dramatic scaling back of American defense commitments and the subsequent decline of the ability of the United States to act as the guarantor of the security of allies or as the safe haven for investment. In other words, it may not take a challenger to American hegemony to bring it to an end; the United States may do so on its own.  
Overall, however, this is a notable work that builds a strong case that American hegemony is likely to endure for the foreseeable future. The tone is refreshingly dispassionate and, for a relatively short work, it marshals an impressive amount of empirical evidence to support the author’s contentions. It is likely to fuel debates both on a practical and theoretical level as to the nature of hegemony in the current international environment.

#### NATO is flexible, meaning that it can easily be adapted and changed to fit the current purposes

Mike Sweeney, January 6, 2020 (“What Is NATO Good For?”, The Strategy Bridge, accessed 6/28/2022, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/6/what-is-nato-good-for>) //lrap

What is NATO good for? This is a question that gets asked a lot these days, and there is an increasing tendency among many to mimic 1960s rocker Edwin Starr and shout, “Nothing!” Indeed, the run-up to the alliance’s 70th anniversary was accompanied by an outpouring of doubts about NATO’s future and usefulness. At War on the Rocks, the alliance was said to be both endangering American lives and overflowing with strategic liabilities as a result of expansion.[1] The Wall Street Journal asserted that the alliance was effectively deceased.[2] Writing in The National Review, Douglas MacGregor found “dead” insufficient, instead declaring NATO to be a zombie, while Gil Barndollar merely called for the alliance to retire at 70.[3] MIT’s Barry Posen beat everyone to the punch with his OpEd in The New York Times in March calling for a major reassessment of America’s role in the alliance.[4]  
Of course, NATO’s obituary has been written many times before. In the opening to Why NATO Endures, quietly one of the best books on the alliance, Wallace J. Thies wryly notes that Henry Kissinger owns the unique distinction of having declared the alliance to be in serious peril in each of the first six decades of NATO’s existence.[5] For the time being, better policies on how NATO is used should be the focus, rather than scrapping it altogether or withdrawing U.S. support. Key to this will be working to enhance strategic stability between the alliance and Russia.   
DE-MYSTIFYING THE PAST  
To some extent, NATO is a victim of its own myth-making. Support for the alliance is often couched in somber testaments to the wisdom of the founders and odes to the selfless nobility of collective defense. The reality is quite different.  
Interestingly, the main strategic rationale for NATO that emerges in the pages of Thies’ book is as a complement to the Marshall Plan: just as funds from that initiative would allow the Europeans to rebuild their economies, NATO would remove the burden from the European allies of having to devote scarce money to their militaries. It would also provide psychological reinforcement to nations still traumatized by the Second World War, living in Stalin’s long shadow. Once the West European economies had stabilized and rebounded, they could—in theory—take on a greater share of their defense and the United States could recede.[6]   
Thus, in the late 1940s, many U.S. officials didn’t expect to base American troops in Europe indefinitely.[7] Nor did they necessarily expect them to have to fight. While the Soviets might attempt mischief within their own sphere of influence—as seen in the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of West Berlin—their ability and willingness to go beyond that was considered limited by key thinkers such as George Kennan, who believed the Soviet military and people too spent from the Second World War to threaten Western Europe.[8] Moreover, Stalin was seen as distinct from Hitler in terms of his willingness to pursue risk. While the Soviet leader might try to capitalize on existing chaos and weakness, he wasn’t disposed to the outright aggression that characterized the Nazi regime.[9]   
But in a prescient prelude to the defensibility issues surrounding the admission of the Baltic states, not a great deal of thought was given to how Western Europe would actually be defended when the alliance was formed—at least in terms of conventional forces. Of course, in April 1949, America still had a nuclear monopoly.  
The Soviet detonation of its own atomic device in August 1949 changed the U.S. calculus somewhat, but it was events around the world a year later that truly focused America’s mind on what it had signed up for in NATO. The conventional defeats suffered by the U.S. military in the opening stage of the Korean War ,  as much as any development, led to a realistic discussion of what collective defense would really look like in Europe—almost eighteen months after the alliance’s inception.[10] It was only then that planners on both sides of the Atlantic began to take seriously the practical questions of defensibility and to set up integrated military structures—such as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE—to coordinate those efforts.[11] Subsequently, NATO’s role as an institution and U.S. force deployments in Europe would both take on permanence.   
The ad hoc nature of this process is the point worth underscoring. NATO was not formed by strategic gods implementing their divine wisdom; it was the result of hardworking government officials and political leaders doing their best to deal with the security challenges of the day using the means at their disposal. That is all the alliance has ever been, and we exalt its past at the risk of its future.  
NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT, NOT A THEOLOGY   
Understanding that NATO outlasted its original purpose—to allow the Europeans to focus on rebuilding their economies in tandem with the Marshall Plan—well before the end of the Cold War illustrates that the alliance has always been an adaptable instrument. It is true that some twentieth-century luminaries such as Kennan and Dwight Eisenhower didn’t foresee NATO evolving into a permanent fixture in European security at its inception.[12] But should that have stopped the alliance from becoming an effective military bulwark against the Soviets as the Cold War developed and demands on the alliance evolved?   
Just as it adapted and changed throughout its early history, NATO’s purpose now can be whatever is required. This doesn’t mean that NATO should do everything—or be everywhere. The past thirty years have shown that there are some things the alliance does better than others and also that there are questionable benefits to unending expansion of its membership. President George W. Bush’s support for Georgian and Ukrainian membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit is the most prominent example of this and likely contributed to both the August War in Georgia and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.[13]  
But here, too, perspective is needed. Because the alliance should consider ending expansion doesn’t mean previous rounds were inherently mistakes. Enlargement permanently settled the Polish Question—which provided grist for a century and a half of European wars—and also has on balance contributed to stability between Russia and the Baltic states. Likewise, being realistic about the failure of the Libya intervention doesn’t mean the 1995 operation to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was also a mistake. The 1999 Kosovo intervention probably falls somewhere in the middle.[14]   
NATO frankly does its best work when no one hears about it. Its strength lies in the day-to-day military cooperation it fosters and the general sense of deterrence and stability it promotes. These contributions are neither as dramatic as facing off against the Red Army at the height of the Cold War, nor as controversial as the Libyan intervention, but they would be glaring in their absence.   
Why arbitrarily remove the structure that provides that stability—both with Russia and also among NATO’s many disparate members? Withdrawing NATO protection from the Baltic states or the smaller Balkan members, for example, will not preclude the possibility of their becoming involved in a war with Russia or Serbia; just the opposite, it could make it more likely. Once such a conflict begins, is it certain the United States will not be entangled or affected even if it is no longer actively participating in NATO?   
Again, it is worth reiterating that NATO is an instrument. Many of the alliance’s opponents may actually be opposed to the way the United States and its partners have employed force since the end of the Cold War—especially in the case of operations falling under the rubric of regime change. The argument, implicit in Posen’s OpEd, for example, is that NATO needs to be taken away from reckless U.S. policymakers to prevent them from future adventures.   
This argument is backwards. Yes, the consequences of three decades of continuous military operations should be examined. But increasing national restraint and making better strategic decisions seems like a smarter path than summarily scrapping an effective, tested tool that could play an essential role in a wiser foreign policy.  
STABILIZING THE PRESENT  
NATO’s advocates are also prone to hyperbole, but one word that is not an overstatement is irreplaceable. It would be difficult—if not impossible—to recreate NATO or something like it from scratch. Still, even irreplaceable doesn’t imply permanence if the alliance’s value cannot readily be established and sold to the populations of its constituent members, especially Americans.   
…SHARED HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OR EVEN SIMPLE NOSTALGIA WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE ALLIANCE THROUGH THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.  
Demography is not on the alliance’s side. Should NATO survive to celebrate its centennial, the generation being born at that time will be as far removed from the end of the Second World War as someone born in 1969 was from the conclusion of the American Civil War. Even the September 11th attacks—and NATO’s ensuing invocation of Article 5—will be a half century in the past. In short, shared historical experience or even simple nostalgia will not be enough to sustain the alliance through the twenty-first century. NATO needs to show that it is not just relevant, but crucial to continued security in Europe and, to be blunt, the broader interests of its essential member, the United States.  
The most effective way of doing that is reinforcing the image of NATO as a vehicle for stability, something which has been recently diminished. There are legitimate arguments to be made that NATO now endangers American security by having antagonized Russia through enlargement and increased the likelihood of confrontation, possibly a nuclear one, rather than decreasing it.[15] That relations between America and Russia—and overall stability in Eastern Europe—might be far worse without the alliance is also true, but is a difficult sell in trying to promote the alliance’s relevance. NATO needs to be an active participant in visibly promoting stability, beyond the important day-to-day but low-key role it plays in this regard.   
Some potential steps are obvious, the most high profile of which would be a public declaration on closing the alliance to further expansion after the current candidacy of North Macedonia is vetted. To be clear, such a move need not be taken in a vacuum. In general, NATO must engage with Russia and some sort of quid pro quo shouldn’t be ruled out on ending further expansion of the alliance. Cessation of Moscow’s support for separatist activities in Transnistria and the Donbass certainly should be on the table as should guarantees from Russia that Belarus and Ukraine would be free to pursue their own independent relationships with the West, perhaps to someday include the possibility of membership in the European Union if either state wants it.[16]   
Even the taboo question of recognizing Russian annexation of Crimea shouldn’t be off limits, though again strong concessions and actions by Russia to promote security in Central and Eastern Europe must be exacted in return. There exists a real danger that, in time, the annexation of Crimea will more-or-less be accepted by the international community, producing a de facto recognition of Russian adventurism. Would it not be better to address the question head-on and elicit a price from Moscow—ideally one that benefits overall regional stability?   
All of this might well be too much to ask. But by pursuing negotiations along these lines, it would at least have the effect of engaging Russia in a strategic dialogue—one that could eventually yield results while also serving as an outlet for regional stress before it metastasizes into genuine crises. Such a dialogue would also publicly bolster the image of NATO as a force working to diffuse tension—both in Central and Eastern Europe and between Russia and the United States more broadly—rather than being an aggravating factor in those relationships.   
A more workmanlike complement to this higher-level discussion could be to resuscitate serious arms control discussions between Russia and NATO. Unfortunately, the most obvious candidate for attention—the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty—is probably a non-starter at this point and also an issue that has extended out of NATO’s purview given American concerns over Chinese intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Pacific. But discussion on conventional force deployments is something that the alliance could lead on, perhaps mimicking the useful negotiations that took place in the late 1980s, ultimately resulting in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.[17] NATO could either attempt such talks directly or channel them through a third-party organization, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). While new efforts to improve transparency and, possibly, impose limits on force deployments need not be an exact replica of the CFE process, or even lead to a formal treaty, they could be a further step both in burnishing the alliance’s public role as a stabilizing entity and yet another means of engaging Russia in a dialogue that, in itself, could contribute to a reduction in tensions.  
A first step to consider in this regard, might be talks between NATO and Russia on reducing—or even halting—major exercises in close proximity to one another’s territory. As one informed observer has noted, military exercises are an important part of “the larger geopolitical discourse.”[18] Effectively, the conduct of exercises—and their timing and locale—is a language unto itself. A negotiated moratorium on large-scale maneuvers, like NATO’s Saber Strike and Russia’s Zapad exercises, could be one way for NATO and Russia to say hello to one another again.   
SEEING RUSSIA CLEARLY  
In all of these efforts, it is important for NATO to see Russia as it is and not as it was. To be clear, there is no question that Russia meddles in the affairs of its neighbors; its annexation of Crimea and support to the Donbass insurgency speak plainly to this. But Russia, like any power, is bound by the limits of its capabilities and they are not infinite.   
Russian economic resources are, at best, those of a middle power. In 2018, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranked eleventh after the likes of Canada; price-adjusted GDP is slightly more impressive at sixth overall globally, but still leaves Russia trailing Germany, India, Japan, the United States, and China.[19] Russia has chosen to expend these limited resources on an at least half a dozen neo-imperial projects in Abkhazia, Chechnya, Crimea, the Donbass, Transnistria, and South Ossetia. There is also Russia’s open-ended military commitment in Syria. Each of these adventures costs money, limiting Moscow’s ability to placate its population through social programs. That Vladimir Putin’s popularity took perhaps its worst hit after he was forced to raise the retirement age speaks to the long-term risks inherent in supporting what are essentially six mini-client states.[20]   
Militarily, Russia has steadily rebuilt itself since the nadir of the early 1990s. In particular, Russia took pains to learn from its shaky performance during the 2008 war with Georgia and implement needed reforms.[21] That said, Russia of today is nowhere near the menace that the Red Army once was believed to be. And while it would be wrong to say that funds aren’t available for Russian military modernization, planned investments reflect modest improvements rather than transformative capabilities.[22]  
NATO’s strategic depth has also radically changed since the Cold War, through both the inclusion of Poland and the territory of East Germany. Russian forces must now also traverse either Belarus or Ukraine before even touching the edge of NATO’s main territory. There is, obviously, the important exception of the Baltic states which will be examined later. For all the understandable concern over Russian aggression in the wake of the Crimean annexation, it is essential to remember that the overall military situation and balance of forces has improved remarkably for NATO in the past thirty years.  
Russia’s overall conventional threat to NATO is thus extremely limited. Would Russia have the wherewithal to occupy Belarus and Ukraine and then still successfully invade Poland, let alone to enter German territory? It seems extremely unlikely. Forcibly placating Belarus and/or Ukraine alone might stretch Russian capabilities to their limits and there still is the question of economically supporting a prolonged occupation of those territories.   
…WHEN DEALING WITH RUSSIA, NATO CAN AFFORD TO BE BOTH PATIENT AND PERHAPS EVEN GENEROUS…  
In sum, when dealing with Russia, NATO can afford to be both patient and perhaps even generous; after all, the alliance won the Cold War and maintains a much stronger strategic position in its aftermath. This doesn’t mean that Russia still can’t be dangerous, but its diminished capabilities limit the damage it can do conventionally. Russia can and does intimidate its immediate neighbors and—especially in the case of Ukraine—actively undermines their security. But if NATO wants this to stop and is unwilling to use military force to end the incursions in Crimea and the Donbass, the only alternative is some kind of negotiated settlement. That means NATO has to talk to Russia—despite its bad behavior—just as it once spoke to the Soviets, in spite of their own serious transgressions.   
MUST NATO NUKE?  
There are, of course, two obvious caveats to the preceding discussion about Russia’s capacity to inflict damage on NATO. The first is that Russia does pose a very real threat to the territory of the Baltic states, inarguably the portion of alliance territory most susceptible to conventional attack. Second, Russia retains the ability to devastate all NATO territory, in both Europe and North America, through its strategic forces. The intersection of these two issues—Baltic vulnerability and the potency of the Russian nuclear arsenal—remains at the heart of many arguments by NATO detractors in America: that the alliance could entangle the United States in an unnecessary war in northeast Europe, one that would likely escalate to a suicidal strategic exchange.  
Two corrections are needed to this argument. The first is that Russian dominance in a war for the Baltics is not absolutely assured. To a large degree this has become the popularly accepted view following RAND’s 2016 wargame series that established Russia could overrun the Baltic states in as little as 60 hours.[23] This does not discount these exercises wholesale; no doubt, they were an important contribution to the debate on the viability of NATO’s security guarantee to the Baltics and helped to focus thinking on defensibility in northeast Europe. But it was a single set of exercises conducted by one organization and one set of analysts, respected though they might be. Would it not be useful to replicate conflict scenarios with other planners and analysts who might bring a different set of assumptions to the gaming table?   
Perhaps the results would be exactly the same, but it is worth asking if Russia’s ability to seize the Baltics is being overestimated—or at least the speed with which they would do so—and the price Russia might pay to achieve its objectives. There are a host of variables that come into play including the actions of other regional actors—such as Belarus—that are often taken for granted.[24] The scope of such games should also be extended to the essential question of what it would cost Russia to operate a prolonged occupation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, both militarily and economically. Additional assessments and a broader lens to examine the second- and third-order consequences of Russian actions might yield a different perspective on how easy it would be for Russia to take the Baltic states.  
The second, and perhaps even more important, correction that needs to be made is challenging the assumption that NATO must resort to nuclear use if it is unable to win conventionally. This is simply unrealistic in the current setting and it is essentially a mental hangover from Cold War-era policies. Nuclear escalation after conventional loss was a by-product of the perceived conventional weakness of NATO during the Cold War vis-à-vis Warsaw Pact forces. It should not somehow, three decades after the conflict’s end, be seen as the current de facto response.   
Yes, it would be difficult and painful to alliance cohesion and reliability—to say nothing of the Baltic states themselves—if Russia won a conventional conflict in northeast Europe. But the idea that preventing that eventuality must lead NATO to use nuclear weapons is discordant, at best, with the current strategic environment. Moving away from any discussion of a nuclear response in a Baltic conflict would be an essential step toward reducing the criticism that NATO endangers American security more than helping it.   
Moreover, removing the possibility of a nuclear response in a Baltic contingency would not inherently mean that the alliance was surrendering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; there remain viable strategies for deterring Russia with conventional forces, as seen in the success of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups.[25] Even if Baltic territory were lost in a war with Russia tactical nuclear forces are unlikely to save it—not least because they would possibly be employed on said territory. Win or lose, nuclear forces should thus have no role in NATO’s response to aggression against the Baltics and the alliance needs to consider declaring that policy publicly.   
Taking this argument a step further, would it boost regional security—to say nothing of NATO’s image as a force for stability—if the alliance finally relinquished its remaining tactical nuclear weapons? A definitive answer is beyond the scope of this paper, but it demands more attention than it has received.[26] What is the scenario where tactical nuclear weapons are somehow deployed to stem a conventional attack without leading to dangerous escalation? How, for example, could they be used in a Baltic conflict without sparking a strategic exchange with Russia and/or decimating large portions of the territory NATO is supposed to be defending? And if there is no reasonable applicability for these weapons in a Baltic conflict, why keep them at all?  
There has been an understandable and necessary debate over the question of what was and was not promised to Soviet and then-Russian leaders regarding NATO enlargement at the end of the Cold War.[27] This is an important subject that needs to be examined, but the discussion over what happened and its subsequent impact on relations between Russia and the West have, to a degree, obscured another equally prominent move at the end of the Cold War. In September 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the field all of its tactical nuclear weapons, except for a small force of B61 gravity bombs left in NATO Europe.[28] Bringing those weapons home now— along with a public declaration on a cessation of further expansion of the alliance’s membership—would do much to reset NATO’s image as a force for stability. It would undercut many of the arguments that the alliance is ultimately a liability for broader American security interests.   
To reiterate, NATO is an instrument, one that has shown it can be adapted to different tasks and goals as the strategic setting changes. Those adaptations have not always been swift or graceful, yet the alliance’s endurance speaks to the fact that it eventually does meet its members’ needs. If NATO can reassert itself in the current environment as **an engine of stability** and not just a provider of military security it has a much stronger chance of persevering, even as its origins in the aftermath of World War II and the early years of the Cold War recede further into history

### Securitization Good

#### Turn—the alt leads to war—only the affs securitized structures to address revisionism solves.

Goddard 22 [Goddard, Stacie. “How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia.” Heinonline.org, May 2022, heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora101&div=56&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals. Accessed 27 June 2022. Stacie E. Goddard is an American political scientist. She is the Mildred Lane Kemper Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Goddard is known for her research on international order, grand strategy, and global power politics \ kaylan]

The Outsiders How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia Stacie Goddard In late February, as Russian forces moved into Ukraine, Vladimir Putin declared that his offensive was aimed not just at bringing Russia's neighbor to heel but also at repudiating the U.S.-led liberal international order. "Where the West comes to establish its own order," the Russian president railed, "the result is bloody, unhealed wounds, ulcers of international terrorism and extremism." Moscow would now seek to roll back the expanding order as "a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a people." Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine is only the most recent act in a years-long effort to overturn the existing status quo, one that has featured cyber- attacks, assassinations, a war against Georgia, meddling in U.S. elections, military involvement in Syria, and the annexation of Crimea. As Putin's troops neared Kyiv, many observers kept an eye on China, the other authoritarian power busy rejecting the U.S.-led order. Over the last decade, Beijing has contested territorial norms in the South China Sea and built new international economic institutions. 28 FOREIGN AFFAIRS as the Asian Infrastructure Invest- ment Bank, to compete with Western- dominated ones, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Beijing and Moscow seem to have joined forces in their effort to undermine the order. Just weeks before Russia's invasion, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin promised to place "no limits" on the two countries' cooperation as they seek to redefine norms of democracy, push back against universal definitions of human rights, and secure their "core interests." It was not supposed to be like this. After the Cold War, the United States relied on a strategy of luring into the order would-be revisionist powers-that is, countries that have both the means and the motivation to challenge the status quo. U.S. leaders argued that by cooperating with China and Russia and incorporating them into international institutions, they could curb those countries' ambitions and perhaps even push them onto a path of progressive liberalization. Both countries joined economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization; security institu- tions, such as the nuclear nonprolifera- tion regime; and even human rights treaties, such as the International Cov- enant on Civil and Political Rights. As U.S. President Bill Clinton's 2000 National Security Strategy argued, although the United States must be "mindful of threats to peace," it should seize "on the desire of both countries to participate in the global economy and global institutions, insisting that both accept the obligations as well as the benefits of integration." What went wrong? Some blame poor U.S. leadership. After four years of the Trump administration, the argument Stacie Goddard runs, liberal institutions were left rudderless, providing an opening for revisionist powers. The Biden adminis- tration's chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan confirmed that the United States was weakened and in retreat. Others, by contrast, contend that the strategy was futile from the start. According to this view, it was hopelessly optimistic to expect that China and Russia would embrace liberal values and accept the idea that the United States should maintain its position at the top of the international order. Both of these views are problematic. There is very little Washington could have done to stave off challenges to the liberal order. Historically, integration into international institutions has not restrained countries hoping to challenge the status quo. To the contrary, it has enhanced their ability to mobilize allies, secure leverage over their trading partners, and gain legitimacy for their normative visions. It is not simply that international institutions were unlikely to check China's and Russia's revision- ism; their membership in fact assisted their efforts to transform world politics. On the other hand, it is a mistake to dismiss institutional integration as a complete failure. If judged by the high ambitions set by U.S. **policymakers**, who thought that incorporating expansionist powers into international institutions would temper their ambitions, then it **has not** lived up to its promise. But judged by a more reasonable standard, it has succeeded: although institutional integration can't prevent revisionism, it can shape the strategies revisionists use. Although Russia's invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that **countries bent on expansionism will charge ahead regard- less,** on the whole, **international institu- tions can channel this aggression** **so** that **it doesn't devolve into bloodshed.** Rather than giving up on institutions, then, Western policymakers should adopt a **realistic approach** to them. While they may not lead to completely harmonious relations, they can be **a potent tool for preventing war**. A strategy of institutional realpolitik would also recognize that for all their coordination, China and Russia are very different types of revisionists. China's assaults have been less violent but in many ways more consequential; where Moscow has relied on strategies of disruption and violence, Beijing has preferred to exert influence through growing networks and its position within international institutions. That is why the one-size-fits-all strategy of the past fell short-and why a new approach is called for. To that end, the United States needs to see international institutions not as a way to transform the funda- mental nature of its rivals **but as places that can become better forums for communicating preferences**, resolving disputes, and **establishing clear redlines**. That, not lofty plans to change China and Russia or a wholesale abandonment of institutions, should help keep the revisionists in check.

#### Future and past wars are not a reflection of securitization, yet a demonstration of how the affs systems prevented bloodshed and structured coordination

Goddard 22 [Goddard, Stacie. “How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia.” Heinonline.org, May 2022, heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora101&div=56&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals. Accessed 27 June 2022. Stacie E. Goddard is an American political scientist. She is the Mildred Lane Kemper Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Goddard is known for her research on international order, grand strategy, and global power politics \ kaylan]

By the mid-1990s, China had emerged as one of the world's fastest-growing economies. In a 1999 speech, Clinton outlined the challenge of a rising China for American foreign policy, noting that "if it chooses to do so, China could .. . pour much more of its wealth into military might and into traditional great-power geopolitics." In contrast to China, post-Soviet Russia was a declining power, so there was little concern that the country would emerge as a global competitor to the United States. Still, Russia had the potential to become a serious revisionist. Many feared the rise of a Russian nationalist right, one that would reestablish authori- tarian government at home and attempt to reassert Russian imperial dominance over the former Soviet states. U.S. officials turned to multilateral institutions to deal with these incipient threats. These policymakers believed that membership in liberal institutions would make China and Russia more liberal themselves and thus less inclined to buck the existing international order. Clinton's top goal was to help Russia become a consolidated democracy, one firmly embedded in Western institu- tions. As for China, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained the United States' position in 1997: "It is our hope that the trend toward greater economic and social integration of China will have a liberalizing effect on political and human rights practices"-although she also acknowledged that "given the nature of China's government, that progress will be gradual, at best, and is by no means inevitable." Although recent critics of institu- tional integration have focused on the failure of international institutions to liberalize China and Russia, this wasn't the only-or even the primary-way integration was supposed to prevent revisionism. Even if the two countries remained illiberal at home, admitting them into existing institutions was supposed to encourage good behavior abroad. Free trade and foreign direct investment would make them rich. Participation in international institutions would grant them status and prestige. And if such carrots were not enough to make China and Russia play by the rules, institutional membership would also pro- vide the United States and its allies with sticks they could use to increase the costs of revisionism. The more Beijing and Moscow came to depend on interna- tional institutions for their wealth, power, and influence, the easier it would be to punish them if they decided to break the rules. Integrating them into global financial markets, for example, would not only help unlock economic growth; it could also make the two countries more vulnerable to sanctions. Finally, institutions were supposed to bind China and Russia more closely to the status quo. When countries join international institutions, their wealth and power become tied to these organi- zations in ways that are hard to change down the road. This was the logic behind incorporating Germany into Western May/June 2022 31 Stacie Goddard security institutions, such as NATO, after World War II. And it was the premise of France's decision to rope Germany into the French economy through the Euro- pean Coal and Steel Community: in doing so, France ensured that it would retain a voice in German affairs and that any attempt by Germany to increase its power would be channeled through institutional pathways. THE RETURN OF REVISIONISM At first, **integration seemed to work.** The speed and extent of China's entry into international institutions, especially economic ones, during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations were nothing short of astonishing. Throughout the Chinese leader Mao Zedong's rule, the country remained isolated from international institutions, even after joining the UN, where it had inherited Taiwan's seat in 1971. After its opening in 1979, China was still slow to join interna- tional organizations. But by 2000, it had become a member of over 50 of them. It signed both the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In 2001, China entered the wTO with the Clinton administra- tion's enthusiastic support, and despite vocal protest from American protection- ists on both the left and the right. Russia faced a rockier road to integra- tion. Urged on by U.S. economists, Russian President Boris Yeltsin launched a 13-month plan of "shock therapy," designed to rapidly privatize the Russian economy. Instead of economic growth, Russia's economy saw its GDP fall by almost half, and poverty increased from two percent to 40 percent of the popula- tion. Former Soviet elites took advantage of their position to monopolize owner- ship over newly privatized petroleum and gas resources. Talks of bringing Russia into the European security order stalled in 1994, when the United States abandoned its plans for the so-called Partnership for Peace, which would have brought eastern European states and Russia into a security umbrella frame- work, and chose instead to expand the NATO alliance into eastern Europe. By the end of the decade, however, Russia seemed to be turning a corner. The country's new president, Vladimir Putin, was no democrat, but he appeared to be introducing legal and economic reforms that could liberalize the country in the long run. To support economic privatization, the United States per- suaded the G-7 countries to pledge $28 billion of collective aid for Russia. In 1998, Russia joined the newly created G-8. In 2012, Russia's accession to the wTO concluded after 18 years of negotia- tions. The 9/11 attacks brought the United States and Russia closer, and the two cooperated on counterterrorism and arms control initiatives. At first, the optimism of those who favored institutional integration seemed warranted. At the turn of the millen- nium, both China and Russia appeared eager to act as "responsible stakeholders," as Robert Zoellick put it in 2005, when he served as U.S. deputy secretary of state. Soon, however, concerning signs emerged. By 2009, some political scien- tists began pointing to China's "artificial- island-building spree" and saber rattling in the South China Sea as harbingers of territorial expansion. In 2013, China launched both the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive program investing in infrastructure projects in the 32 developing world. China's leaders claimed that these initiatives comple- mented existing institutions and filled gaps in the current economic order. Many in Washington, however, sus- pected that China was seeking to con- struct an alternative economic order devoid of liberal values. Meanwhile, in 2008, Russia launched its first violent attempt to redraw the borders of the post-Cold War world when its troops invaded two breakaway territories in Georgia. It went further in 2014, invading eastern Ukraine and annexing the Crimean Peninsula. In. 2015, against vocal Western opposition, the Russian military intervened in the Syrian civil war to buttress President Bashar al-Assad's fragile regime, provid- ing critical-and often indiscriminate- air support for Syrian government forces, which with this assistance began to retake contested territory. At the time, advocates of institutional integration dismissed these revisionist moves as insignificant and unsustainable. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry, for example, insisted in these pages in 2014 that despite these transgressions, "Russia and, especially, China are deeply integrated into the world economy and its governing institutions." At most they were "spoilers," he concluded: "They do not have the interests-let alone the ideas, capacities, or allies-to lead them to upend existing global rules and institutions." Policymakers in Washing- ton echoed these confident assessments. In a 2014 speech at West Point, President Barack Obama recognized that "Russia's aggression toward former Soviet states unnerves capitals in Europe, while China's economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors." But he expressed optimism that international institutions would continue to "reduce the need for unilateral American action and increase restraint among other nations." In hindsight, it is easy to see that this confidence was misplaced. A **better understanding of the intersection of international institutions and great- power revisionism might have tempered such expectations.** Historically, the **constraining** **effects** **of** **international** **institutions** **on** **revisionism** have been **inconsistent** at best. Even when revi- sionist states were brought into the institutional order, they were **still able to pursue their** **aims**. When Prussia launched a war in 1864 that would set the stage for German unification, it was considered a core member of the Concert of Europe, the order estab- lished after the Napoleonic Wars to help keep the peace. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, it was a member in good standing of the League of Nations and the so-called Washing- ton system, which maintained limits on great-power shipbuilding. Both Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were mem- bers of the League of Nations when they began their efforts to conquer Europe. In short, history gave the lie to the theory that institutional integration alone could restrain revisionism. NOT ALL REVISIONISTS Given the mixed record of institutional integration, it is **tempting** **to** **dismiss** **Washington's** **embrace** of this approach as not only futile but also naive. Indeed, this is precisely what the harshest critics of U.S. grand strategy are saying. Bringing China into international institutions, the political scientist John Mearsheimer wrote in these pages in 34 Io REIGN AFFAIRS The Outsiders 2021, "may have been the worst strategic blunder any country has made in recent history: there is no comparable example of a great power actively fostering the rise of a peer competitor." But **such criticism overlooks the fact that international institutions change how revisionists choose to disrupt the international** **order**. Institutions may not have eliminated revisionist ambitions, but they have shaped the way China and Russia have pursued their aims. Even with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its past military action in Crimea and Chechnya, the country has embraced force **much less** than similar states in history; current events are so shocking in part because they have become so rare, a testament at least to some extent to the effects of integration. Witness how, in the past, a common way to change the status quo was to mount an aggressive attack. Napoleon's France conquered wide swaths of Europe as it sought to obliterate the last vestiges of the eighteenth-century dynastic order. When imperial Japanese leaders decided to break clean of the League of Nations and the Washington system, they relied on brute force to expand their influence and wrest economic resources, first in China and then in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, both France's and Japan's revisionist campaigns brought nothing but disaster for their leaders. With this historical antecedent, it is easy to see why institutionalists of the 1990s be- lieved revisionism was unlikely. Regard- less of their ambitions, countries will often decide to content themselves with the existing international order. The costs of major-power wars were stagger- ing in previous centuries; they would be catastrophic in the present day. But revisionists do not always need to use force to upend the status quo. In fact, the most transformative revisionists engage in rules-based revolutions. These revisionists start out looking like reform- ers, working within existing institutions to achieve their aims. Over time, how- ever, their "salami slicing" of existing rules and norms can **create significant weaknesses** in international institutions that undermine the broader institutional order. When Russia sought to expand its influence in the Ottoman Empire after the Greek Revolution of 1821, it used the forums established by the Concert of Europe to push its allies to recognize Russian rights in Ottoman territories. By using available diplomatic resources, Russia slowly fragmented the boundaries of the existing territorial order until it shattered them in the Crimean War, in the mid-nineteenth century. Prussia provides another example of this approach, with even more trans- formative results. From 1864 to 1871, it unified the German states under its rule at little cost and with limited use of force. German unification not only upended European boundaries; it also laid the groundwork for the Industrial Revolution in Germany, which would vault the country into the top tier of great powers by the end of the cen- tury. Ideologically, Prussia mobilized new forces of German nationalism, ripping apart the conservative founda- tions of European institutions. Yet Prussia achieved this revolution without sacrificing its position as a core member of European security and economic institutions. In this way, the country undermined the foundations of the European order from both within and without. May/June 2022 35 Stacie Goddard To challenge existing institutions, other revisionists created alternative institutional systems to establish their own spheres of influence and attract new supporters to their cause. In the years following World War II, especially after the United States launched the Marshall Plan in 1948, the Soviet Union withdrew from various Western institu- tions. Joseph Stalin hoped to increase Soviet power not by overtly challenging Western alliances but through political purges in eastern European states. When Moscow would challenge institu- tions, it would do so either covertly or in areas geographically outside the core of the dominant order. Looking at the varied historical record of revisionism, three things stand out.

### 2AC – AT - IR Racist

#### IR isn't anti-black -- it's a minimalist theory to explain the occurrence of interstate war -- purity in scholastic exercises have zero concrete solvency.

Wæver & Buzan **’**20 [Ole and Barry; May 15th; Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen; Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics; KU, “Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit,” Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit; GR]

Racism is a powerful, malignant force in world politics, and our discipline, IR, has deeply problematic entanglements with it. It is a serious matter both to come intellectually to grips with this and to find the most effective strategies to act on it. We worry that more serious problems and possibilities are marginalised by an ultimately very inward-looking and scholastic exercise where a particular definition of racism and a specific theoretical perspective makes it possible to deem the vast majority of scholarship in IR ‘racist’, ‘methodologically white’ and ‘antiblack’- every work that does not explicitly follow one exact version of anti-racist scholarship. Especially, the role played in H&RM’s argumentation by our sins of omission does ultimately seem to rest on the premise that only their distinct form of scholarship can be redeemed, because even post-colonial scholarship and critiques of euro-centrism are not enough; you are a racist if you do not follow exactly this particular route. It is not important whether your scholarship actually supports or hinders anti-racist analysis or political engagement; it is all about who you cite and what declarations you make. Here, a theory is not judged by what can be done with it, but by the question whether self-appointed anti-racists can find supposedly problematic sentences somewhere in its key texts. In this section, we will first point out that the H&RM article is a personal attack on us for racism, despite their reassurances about the opposite. Then, we discuss what an analysis of structural racism (systems of power) could amount to, given that they claim to do one but utterly fail to do so, resorting instead to a pretend examination of the foundations of ST. Next, we discuss what could be methodological guidelines for actually proving whether or not a theory like ST is racist.

H&RM’s usage of the term racism for all scholarship that does not foreground race as the primary theme, means that 99% of IR will be ‘racist’. There will be no room for any other scholarship (unless you will live with the moniker of being racist). Not only does this seem very unproductive in terms of disciplinary conversations, not to talk of diversity and pluralism, it also means that it becomes very hard to use the category of ‘racism’ for critical purposes for those cases where it actually is at stake in a sense closer to what the rest of the discipline, and indeed the public discourse, means by it. It has been watered down by the fact that everyone but those in critical whiteness studies have been deemed racist, one by one, where we just happened to get the special honour of being among the first. H&RM might protest that this is not their plan, but we fail to see how this can be avoided when the logic they apply is that the term racist can be based primarily on sins of omission in the sense of a theory being focused around other categories.

As documented above, they claim numerous times that ST ‘occludes’ or ‘refuses’ various dynamics relating to race that they find important, but they never offer any basis for concluding that the theory makes it harder to see these things, only that it does not as such zoom in on them. This does not have to do with a choice particularly regarding race but the structure and nature of the theory as a general analytical apparatus that can be applied to all instances where actors try to securitize or desecuritize something, and the user is free then to include race more or less in this analysis, just as the theory is not deciding how important nationalism is or gender51, but it enables the analysis of the way different categories and distinctions become politically mobilised in security struggles.

H&RM will probably argue that if you do not mention race in these contexts, you ‘hide’ it. Three answers: 1) no, there is a difference between not mentioning and hiding, it takes a step more of the critic to show that the theory prevents something from being articulated or that it uses abstractions that stand in the way of articulating race; that certainly is the case for some theories, so it is a legitimate avenue of critique, but they haven’t shown this, 2) the theory is intentionally (as we have explained numerous times) minimalist in having a clear conceptual core and then not putting all kinds of factors like the role of media or populism into the theory -- not because we haven’t noticed these factors but because they belong in applications, and the theory exactly allows you to study these phenomena, 3) we are very explicit that one of the advantages of a minimalist theory is the ability to combine it with other theories especially general theories about the nature and structures of society; one should not build out ST to become a general theory of society or international relations, better in any specific usage of the theory combine it with the theories one finds productive for the particular research project. (Wæver 2011, 2015) The latter point has come up in replies to the ‘sociological’ version of ST (Balzacq), which has more of a tendency to add all relevant factors to the theory, while the classical Copenhagen version is tight and invites combination with theories that complement it, which could exactly be theories of race and racism. Our ultimate concern here is: how do we actually get to study racism in world politics in a practically and politically helpful way?

When developing our own framework, ST, we took care to make sure it could do critical work in concrete analyses, in our view on racism as well, and H&RM fail to show that this is not the case. In addition, we have then on a more mundane, human level engaged ourselves in various ways to foster non-Western scholarship and theories in IR (Tickner & Wæver 2009; Acharya & Buzan 2010, 2019). One has for instance co-founded a book-series with the aim to identify “alternatives for thinking about the ‘international’ that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West” and “provincializing the West” (quoting from the Routledge homepage of the book series); the other has amongst many other things re-written this history of the IR discipline to show both that it has ignored non-Western contributions and that the Western part of it is indebted to ‘scientific racism’ (Buzan & Lawson 2015; Acharya and Buzan 2019). Closer to ST, the project in Buzan & Wæver 2003 was to a large extent to challenge the euro-centrism enshrined in dominant conceptions of polarity and of the relationship between global and regional, to enable theories to be more attentive to actual security dynamics in ‘most of the world’.

Surely, all of these efforts can be critically assessed as to what has been helpful and what hasn’t. But we find it strange that H&RM choose to ignore completely the possibility of assessing the ability of ST to form the basis for helpful analyses of racism. They neither look at those analyses that have actually been done, nor do they show systematically why it would be impossible to do so. On the contrary, they limit themselves to highly abstract and indirect attributions of racism to the theory as such through various unconvincing routes. From this they deduce (without any discussion) that ST can’t inform studies of racism (and when it has actually done it, they presumably are able to magically make those publications go away) (see section 6 below).

H&RM offer no explanation as to how their type of analysis helps in combating racism. It is unclear if it is a kind of ground clearing operation to be followed up by new and better theories after getting us out of the way. Or whether they believe that we are so much a part of the oppressive structures that attacking us is in itself liberating. Or -- as we will consider below in more detail -- the whole exercise is more about making universities more inclusive and hospitable to students and scholars of colour. Closely linked to the latter option, their rationale could be that the attack is meant more as a kind of ‘happening’ drawing attention to the question of race. Especially in the latter case, it would be intentional that the article plays ambiguously with making a very personal attack while pretending not to.

#### IR scholarship regarding the liberal order is not irredeemably racist

Gideon Rose 16, editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2016, “Review of, ‘White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations,’” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2016-02-16/white-world-order-black-power-politics-birth-american

In this interesting and important yet flawed book, Vitalis seeks to bridge the “vast gulf divid[ing] international relations from Africana studies,” bringing the “racism [of the discipline of international relations] to light.” Conventional narratives of the field’s history, he argues, trace it to the rise of realism and national security concerns in the years around World War II, adding a few historical thinkers, such as Thucydides, to claim a timeless intellectual pedigree. But this ignores both the extensive mainstream scholarship of the first decades of the twentieth century that dealt with colonialism and racial issues and the pioneering work of African American writers in what he calls “the Howard School.” Consigning both to the memory hole, he says, paints a distorted picture of the discipline’s origins and nature, obscuring the role that international relations scholarship has played in the construction and perpetuation of white Western dominance. These are major claims, and some of them hold up better than others. Vitalis is correct to shine a spotlight on the forgotten academic work of the first third of the twentieth century and offers a timely reminder of just how prevalent racialized thinking was and how central a role imperialism—as opposed to straightforward great-power relations—played in global affairs. Back then, for example, “policy relevance” in political science often meant figuring out how to train good colonial administrators. Vitalis also provides a service by telling the story of scholars such as Alain Locke, Ralph Bunche, and Rayford Logan, enriching readers’ understanding of midcentury intellectual debates over U.S. foreign policy and tracing how racism operated inside various professional institutions. Vitalis is less convincing, however, in casting his analysis as an indictment of the postwar discipline of international relations, let alone its contemporary incarnation. To get there, one has to share his politics. Vitalis sees a project of U.S. imperial domination playing out over the course of the past century, with the “subjection” continuing today, “through new-old policies of intervention, tutelage, and targeted killings in new-old zones of anarchy and civilization deficit.” Given such a reading of U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that he believes “the history of ideas, institutions, and practices [in the field] has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions”—or that he sees today’s mainstream international relations scholars as handmaidens of an evil national security state and as the direct descendants of their racist predecessors of a century ago. Scorning the notion that the postwar liberal international order represents anything particularly new or admirable, Vitalis scores a few points in noting how long it took for some earlier social and racial hierarchies, both international and domestic, to erode. But he refuses to accept the fact that they have indeed eroded. One is left wanting more analysis of how and why the attitudes and patterns of domination Vitalis describes gave way over time, and how the midcentury theorists and practitioners of the liberal international order understood and handled the paradoxes of its halting and inconsistent implementation.

#### There is no monolithic IR – the field is reflexive and effective – its track record of prediction proves. AND, sweeping criticisms of a fragmented field of research don’t answer the specificity of our studies.

Dan Reiter 15. Professor of Political Science at Emory University. “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools.” War on the Rocks. 8-27-2015. <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s. But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether: Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants. This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective. A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome. Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets. Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians? Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings. Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies. Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations. Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions. Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

### 2AC – Eurocentric

#### IR’s not intrinsically Eurocentric – they need to indict our specific studies, or their vague theoretical cards just don’t apply

Audrey Alejandro 19, Assistant Professor at the Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Western Dominance in International Relations?”, Routledge Publishing, forthcoming

Since the 1970s, a ‘critical’ movement has been developing in the humanities and social sciences denouncing the existence of ‘Western dominance’ over the worldwide production and circulation of knowledge. However, thirty years after the emergence of this promising agenda in International Relations (IR), this discipline has not experienced a major shift. This volume offers a counter-intuitive and original contribution to the understanding of the global circulation of knowledge. In contrast to the literature, it argues that the internationalisation of social sciences in the designated ‘Global South’ is not conditioned by the existence of a presumably ‘Western dominance’. Indeed, although discriminative practices such as Eurocentrism and gatekeeping exist, their existence does not lead to a unipolar structuration of IR internationalisation around ‘the West’. Based on these empirical results, this book reflexively questions the role of critique in the (re)production of the social and political order. Paradoxically, the anti-Eurocentric critical discourses reproduce the very Eurocentrism they criticise. This book offers methodological support to address this paradox by demonstrating how one can use discourse analysis and reflexivity to produce innovative results and decentre oneself from the vision of the world one has been socialised into.

#### IR scholarship is not American-centric – it’s a complex field with people from backgrounds all over the world

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It is often said that the international relations (IR) scholarly community is too American-centric and needs to broaden its horizons. I disagree. In the mid-1970s, Stanley Hoffmann called IR an “American social science.” That label was appropriate then, and it is still appropriate today especially with regard to the all important ideas and theories that dominate discourse in our discipline. This situation is not likely to change significantly anytime soon and for entirely legitimate and defensible reasons. To be clear, the issue here is not about the makeup of the IR scholarly community as there is an abundance of scholars from outside the borders of the United States who study world politics. It is clear from just perusing the program for the International Studies Association’s annual conference that IR scholars live in a global village. This diversity—which is all for the good—is likely to grow with time as increasing numbers of young people from around the world go to college and study IR. In short, American scholars do not have great influence because of their numbers. Nor do Americans dominate the field because the subjects that concern them are privileged over the interests of scholars from other countries. In fact, the issues that concern IR students are the same almost everywhere. Nuclear proliferation, democracy promotion, and economic interdependence—to pick just three topics among many—hardly concern the United States alone or even just the great powers. Virtually every country cares about those subjects and countless others, although they might approach them in different ways. North Korea and the United States, for example, might think differently about the virtues of nuclear proliferation, but both care greatly about the issue. It is in the realm of methods, and especially theory, where US scholars dominate the study of IR. The analytical frameworks and causal stories that researchers from other countries employ in their work are associated in large part with American academia. For instance, the key names associated with the three most important bodies of IR theory—constructivism, liberalism, and realism—are closely tied to scholars at American universities. And the few influential IR theorists who do not teach at US universities are mostly British or are at least associated with British schools. Thus, one could argue that it is really Anglo-Saxon scholars who dominate the IR discourse. The importance of theory for studying international politics cannot be underestimated as there is no way we can make sense of the infinitely complicated world around us without theories. The fact that the United States is home to the world’s leading theorists is what allows its IR community to control the commanding heights of the field. The dominance of American-based scholars is reinforced by the fact that they have developed a rich variety of theories that are very useful for comprehending the politics of the international system. This means, however, there is not a lot of room for new theories or even major twists on existing theories. To be sure, this is not to say that there is no room for new theories, especially when it comes to middle-range theories. Plus, there is always room to refine existing theories. Still, there are limited opportunities in 2015 for scholars outside the United States—as well inside it—to develop wholly new theories. If this were 1945, the situation would be markedly different. The extent to which American theories cast a giant shadow over the IR field is reflected in how undergraduate and graduate students outside of the United States talk and think about international politics. Wherever I speak abroad— regardless of the subject—the comments and questions from students are virtually the same ones I get when I talk on American campuses. Indeed, students inside and outside of the United States seem to read the same articles and books and for the most part employ the same concepts and arguments. I might add that as a realist, I feel intellectually more at home in Beijing than Washington because Chinese scholars and policymakers tend to be more sympathetic to realism than their American counterparts. So, when I speak in China— where there is a deep fascination with American IR theories—I sometimes start my talks by saying, “It is good to be back among my people.” And I do not speak one word of Chinese, although I do speak the same language as my Chinese interlocutors when we talk about the basic realities of international politics. American dominance in IR is reinforced by the fact that many talented undergraduates from around the world come to the United States for graduate training, where they are taught that the theories and methods that dominate the intellectual landscape on American campuses are essential tools for being a first-rate scholar. Most of them go on to have successful careers—often not only in the United States but also in other countries—where they purvey the ideas they learned in graduate school. One sometimes hears the argument that there is a hegemonic discourse in IR and that the Americans who control it actively work to suppress new ideas generated by outsiders. In other words, there would be a richer and more diverse menu of IR theories were it not for American gatekeepers policing the discourse. This claim is wrong and easy to refute. For starters, just ask yourself: where are the ideas that are being suppressed? Where is the evidence that American academics have prevented others from pushing forward new ideas about international politics? In fact, there is none. And please remember that we live in the age of the Internet, where it is almost impossible to stop new ideas—particularly good ones—from reaching a wide audience. Beside, the scholarly world places a high premium on creating innovative arguments, especially if they challenge conventional wisdoms and even if they make prominent scholars angry. Finally, the American IR community is international and liberal at its core, which makes it hard to believe serious scholars in that world would be interested in protecting a hegemonic discourse, much less be capable of organizing to achieve that end. Even if a few scholars played politics and attempted to marginalize a novel idea they disliked, other scholars would intervene to promote and engage with it, particularly if it shed new light on an important problem. One might argue that focusing on culture, as an explanatory variable, would allow non-Americans to offer new theories and broaden horizons within IR. For example, a number of scholars and public intellectuals have claimed that China has a Confucian culture, which they maintain has had a profound influence on its past foreign policy and will continue to do so in the future. For example, this is a key element in Henry Kissinger’s 2011 book On China, and it is clearly a legitimate argument. But cultural arguments of this sort have been swishing around in American academia for decades. During the Cold War, for instance, more than a few American scholars maintained that there was a Soviet strategic culture that mattered greatly for explaining Moscow’s behavior. All this is to say that cultural arguments do not offer a new way of broadening our intellectual vista in IR. American dominance of the IR discourse is likely to diminish somewhat in the decades ahead as scholars from other countries become increasingly engaged in trying to develop new theories and refine existing ones. After all, Americans do not have a special aptitude for doing theory, and the United States has not always ruled the theoretical roost. Britain and Germany dominated intellectual discourse in IR before World War II, and US preeminence did not emerge until after 1945. Moreover, when Americans got seriously involved in IR scholarship, their theories bore a remarkable resemblance to those developed in Europe. Just think of the profound influence of Immanuel Kant and Hans Morgenthau—both Germans— on IR theory in the United States. What this tells us is that those non-American IR scholars who become leading theorists at some future point will stand on the shoulders of American academics, much the way America’s leading lights have stood on the shoulders of their European predecessors. This is the way scholarship advances.

### 2AC – Nation State Good

#### Analysis through nation-states and security is good.

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6. The two faces of security – and of peace Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested political authority. Often it is enacted through violent power, rebranded as legitimate force. Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But although security is a deeply disputed idea, it is also a highly necessary one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, as a frame for policy and as a moral narrative. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as essential to the preservation of peace. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency to slide from global, to national, to citizen and to human security and back again, without enough serious reflection on how they interconnect and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong. The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with eachother. On the one hand, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily transforming the conditions giving rise to this violence or attending to the quality of the subsequent peace. In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative nonstate or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most acute. For in practice it protects socially embedded power, established property relations and social privilege – and reinforces global, national and local inequalities. On the other hand, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to social peace and protection from violence, abuses of rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. It connects to the idea of ‘positive peace’, including transformations in the social conditions giving rise to violence and deepening the relationships between states and their citizens. The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people fall back upon their social identities – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to respond to insecurity and violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these identities are written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed to establish hierarchies of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘Security in the vernacular’ paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by those who challenge the deeply rooted legacies of insecurity, exclusion and injustice. Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or a region or locality is considered to be secure. Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they should be. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of social order, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both affairs of governance and vital concerns for everyone who lives under the leaky umbrella of political authority. Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law, and effective and accountable security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects conditions of the security of people. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but also because of the need for constant vigilance to ensure that those charged with delivering security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to protect.

## AT – Links

### AT: L – China

#### Empirically disproven.

Tenzin Dorjee 21. Senior researcher at Tibet Action Institute and a PhD candidate in the political science department at Columbia University. "Opinion: Anti-China is not anti-Asian". Washington Post. 4-6-2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/06/anti-china-is-not-anti-asian/

However, some commentators are arguing that the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s criticism of the Chinese government is to blame for the domestic problem of anti-Asian violence. This specious claim, which China’s state-run media quickly exploited, has been most prominently advanced in the mainstream Western media by distinguished novelist Viet Thanh Nguyen and political scientist Janelle Wong, who claim that “bipartisan political rhetoric about Asia” and successive administrations’ “critical takes” on China fuel anti-Asian violence. This narrative, which weaponizes Asian American vulnerability to shield Beijing from international criticism, is as dangerous as it is fraudulent.

First of all, let’s be clear that there is no bipartisan political rhetoric targeting Asia, a continent of nearly 50 nations. Conflating Asia with China is the geopolitical equivalent of assuming all Asians are Chinese, precisely the kind of racial lumping that the writers themselves sensibly caution against.

To be sure, criticism of the Chinese government by policymakers in Washington has escalated in recent years. But the overwhelming volume of the rhetoric targeting Beijing has been prompted not by abstract geopolitical competition but by tangible grievances, including China’s genocide in Xinjiang, intensifying repression in Tibet, dismantling of democracy in Hong Kong and sweeping crackdown on Chinese civil society. Some of Beijing’s harshest critics are Asian Americans. Uyghur refugees, Hong Kong democrats, Chinese dissidents and Tibetan exiles such as myself, whose communities back home reel under Beijing’s boot, are urging Congress to censure China for its crimes. Asking lawmakers of conscience to hold their tongue on Beijing’s genocide to supposedly prevent racial violence here is to set up a false trade-off between Asian American safety and Uyghur lives, both of which should be treated as nonnegotiable.

Moreover, there is no research-based evidence that American lawmakers’ legitimate criticism of Beijing has a causal effect on violence against Asians. In fact, Washington’s political rhetoric has been rising steadily over the past half decade, during which Beijing built the Uyghur internment camps, demolished Hong Kong’s democracy and chipped away at the liberal international order. Anti-Asian attacks remained rare during this whole period, soaring only when the pandemic hit. If China had contained covid-19 within its borders, or if the United States had succeeded in keeping it out, no amount of congressional criticism against Beijing would have made us afraid to ride the subway at night.

market reforms, the Chinese people experienced the fastest increase so far in their standard of living.

#### No mutual exclusivity---the perm solves because we can criticize the Chinese government AND combat racism.

Josh Rogin 21. Columnist covering foreign policy and national security. George Washington University, BA in International Affairs 2001; Sophia University, Tokyo "Opinion: The United States must confront the Chinese Communist Party and racism at the same time". Washington Post. 3-25-2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-united-states-must-confront-the-chinese-communist-party-and-racism-at-the-same-time/2021/03/25/63fe8308-8d9c-11eb-9423-04079921c915\_story.html

The United States must compete with China and confront the Chinese government on a range of issues while simultaneously combating the rise of anti-Asian racism at home. These two missions are not at odds with each other, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would have you believe. In fact, they must go hand in hand. In Alaska last weekend, Chinese government leaders sought to stoke our country’s racial divisions, accusing the United States of having “slaughtered” African Americans, to deflect criticism over Beijing’s mass atrocities against its Uyghur Muslim population. Meanwhile, CCP propaganda outlets have been using the killing last week in the Atlanta area of eight innocent people (six of them Asian) to cast aspersions on those who are condemning the Chinese government’s atrocities. Beijing’s goal is to conflate and confuse two related but distinct issues: challenging the Chinese government and the need to fight racism in the United States. But their gambit amounts to presenting a false choice between doing one or the other. “It is part of a broader strategy that the Chinese Communist Party is enacting to undermine our democracy,” Rep. Stephanie Murphy (D-Fla.) told me in an interview. “So when you see them creating that false equivalency . . . it is their way to sow discord in our society, because they understand when we are not united, we are weaker in leading the world in confronting their bad behavior.” Murphy, a former Pentagon official who came to the United States as a child refugee from Vietnam, said that the use of racist language by former president Donald Trump and other GOP officials plays into the CCP’s hands. Yet at the same she emphasized that U.S. leaders have to be able to speak honestly and critically about the CCP’s negative behaviors, including its mishandling of the covid-19 pandemic. The rise of racism against Asian Americans not only hurts the United States’ ability to deal with China, but also it harms efforts to make common cause with our regional allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. Those governments’ ability to join the United States in confronting China is hurt when members of their diaspora communities are mistreated in the United States. “We have to be able to make a very clear distinction that our adversary and competitor is the Chinese Communist Party, not the Chinese people, and certainly not the Asian Americans who live here and who have contributed so much to this country,” Murphy said. “When we attack Americans of Asian descent, we attack ourselves.” Some American commentators argue that the effort to confront the Chinese government’s behavior has fueled the staggering rise in hate and violence directed at Asians and Asian Americans in the United States. It’s certainly true that Trump’s racist rhetoric regarding the coronavirus fueled hate and conflated the two issues, tragically. And U.S. government efforts to confront CCP influence operations in our country have at times unfairly targeted people of Chinese origins. Such targeting of Asians and Asian Americans makes us weaker at home and abroad. We must learn from, not repeat, examples from history when U.S. foreign policy negatively affected American minorities, including the mass internment of U.S. citizens and noncitizens of Japanese descent during World War II and the mistreatment of Arab and Muslim Americans after 9/11. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), the son of Indian immigrants, told me that the United States has to out-compete China without replicating the paradigms of the Cold War. But, he said, we must also stand up to the authoritarian and repressive model the Chinese government is putting forward without ceding our moral authority. “That has to be the balance, enhance America’s strategic interest but clearly reject provocative rhetoric that’s intended to play to a base,” he said. “There’s a way to frame our moral position as a liberal democracy . . . without coming off as demonizing an entire civilization in a way that hurts Chinese or Chinese Americans.” Khanna and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) have co-sponsored a bill, the Endless Frontier Act, to revamp the National Science Foundation to try to out-compete China through technological innovation. Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Sen. Todd C. Young (R-Ind.) are cooperating on companion legislation in the Senate. These efforts will be a major test of whether bipartisan cooperation on the China challenge is possible. It’s not the drive to confront China that is fueling hate and racism against Asians in America. Political opportunists are abusing that effort by fueling bigotry to score political points. This makes a unified strategy to confront the Chinese government only more difficult to achieve. In fact, addressing racism at home is crucial to winning the competition with China in the long run. “We have to be aggressive in our policies and working with our allies to combat the violations the Chinese are making, but at the same time, we can hold the CCP accountable without scapegoating Asian Americans,” Murphy said. “And we have a responsibility to do that.”

### AT: L – NATO

#### Securitizing via NATO good—only deterrence through our systems avoids extinction

Goddard 22 [ Goddard, Stacie. “How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia.” Heinonline.org, May 2022, heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora101&div=6&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals. Accessed 27 June 2022. Stacie E. Goddard is an American political scientist. She is the Mildred Lane Kemper Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Goddard is known for her research on international order, grand strategy, and global power politics \ kaylan]

First, it is not simply that interna- tional institutions fail to restrain revi- sionists. In fact, membership in interna- tional institutions can give countries resources with which to challenge the status quo. Second, how a revisionist decides to challenge those institutions depends on how it is positioned within them. Only revisionists that are mem- bers in good standing can use the strat- egy of working within institutions to advance their ambitions. Finally, con- trary to the conventional wisdom, violent revisionism is not the norm in interna- tional politics. Indeed, when revisionists unleash military attacks, it is often a last resort. Only when imperial Japan failed to achieve its expansionist aims within existing institutions did it turn to military force. Military aggression is a sign not of strength but of weakness. LASHING OUT Russia, of course, has taken the path of military aggression in its war against Ukraine. That brutal attack against democratization and liberalism has demonstrated how-despite their recent declaration of unity-China and Russia are in very different institutional posi- tions and are therefore pursuing distinct revisionist strategies. Putin's Russia may be disruptive in the short term, but it is **ultimately too weak** to build an alterna- tive institutional order. Although Russia has sought access to liberal international institutions, the country was always a bit player within them. **As a result, it could not rely on the existing order to negoti- ate its demands.** Nor does Russia have many resources outside the U.S.-led institutions that make up the dominant liberal order that would allow it to exit the system. For all the talk about Russia building its own sphere of influence, the country has been outflanked by NATO and the European Union in eastern Europe, and China is competing with it for influence in Central Asia. Lacking the resources to effectively challenge the existing order or build its own, Russia has resorted to disruption and violence. It launches violent military actions against its neighbors and uses political interference, propaganda, and economic coercion-for example, funding right-wing populist parties in Austria and France, banning agricultural imports from the Eu, and threatening gas cutoffs-to sow division in Western polities and drive wedges between NATO allies. Far from signaling some grand scheme, **Russia's violence is best viewed as a strategy of last resort.** China is different. The good news is that Beijing has little need to use vio- lence, because its participation in the international order has strengthened its ability to challenge the status quo 36 without resorting to force. The resources provided by membership in institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the wTO, and the UN Security Council have allowed China to expand its global footprint, even though they **also constrain Beijing's ambitions.** For supporters of the liberal order, however, the bad news is that China has member- ship in institutions both inside and outside that order, and it is precisely this type of position that allows states to pursue transformative revisionism. The growing alarm about China's and Russia's revisionism has amplified calls for the United States to abandon its institutionalist strategy and instead embrace traditional realpolitik. The goal is no longer integration; it is **deterrence**: the United States must ensure that its military and alliances **are strong enough to dissuade China and Russia from using force** to achieve their aims. This was the stated approach of the Trump adminis- tration. Its 2017 National Security Strategy argued that while the United States would still "seek areas of coopera- tion with competitors," its primary aim would be to "deter and if necessary, defeat aggression against U.S. interests and increase the likelihood of managing competitions without violent conflict." **But turning away from institutional engagement with revisionist powers would be a mistake**. Although military instruments remain important, the United States already holds a sizable advantage in military power over all its rivals, and any increased investment would matter only on the margins. And given that no major power today wants to engage in a large-scale conventional or nuclear war, it is doubtful that military power would be the weapon of choice in direct international political rivalries. Revisionists will continue to use force, but only in places where they believe the United States and its allies are unlikely to directly counter their vio- lence. Washington was unable to deter Russia's invasion of Ukraine, **but** it remains improbable that Putin will directly attack a NATO member. Even in Taiwan, Beijing is not liable to turn to force if it can avoid it. **There is no reason to risk escalation** with the United States and its Asian allies if economic and diplomatic instruments are just as likely to secure Chinese aims. BETTER INSIDE THE TENT Instead of abandoning institutional integration in favor of saber rattling, Washington needs to make better use of institutions to exert its influence and limit that of its rivals. Even the most hardened proponents of realpolitik concede that institutional cooperation is **necessary** **to deal with existential threats** such as climate change, nuclear prolifera- tion, and pandemic disease. Ensuring that all the great powers remain firmly inte- grated in institutions that address these collective dangers-such as the Paris climate accord and the Nuclear Nonpro- liferation Treaty-should be the goal. Beyond this, **the United States needs to embrace a strategy of institu- tional realpolitik.** To begin with, it should abandon the idea that the purpose of international institutions is to eliminate revisionism or expand liberal global governance. Rather, international institutions are a tool to manage power politics. The most straightforward and significant aim should be to channel revisionist ambitions toward institutional forums May/June 2022 37 Stacie Goddard and away from more violent and destructive behavior. International institutions could be designed not to stop competition through power politics but to direct it and make it more predictable by providing chan- nels of communication, forums for negotiation, and clear rules about what counts as appropriate behavior. In Ukraine, this may seem like too little, too late. But at some point, the war will be over, and it is important to consider what will come next. This is not to advocate another "reset" or a substan- tive partnership with Russia, which must not be permitted to subjugate its neigh- bors. The goal, instead, should be to redirect a hostile relationship back into more predictable forums-of the kind that stabilized U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Some might decry this as tantamount to appeasement. To be clear, the United States and its allies including those of Ukraine. The United States should support similar institutions to modify China's actions in the South China Sea. At a minimum, Washington should ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to give it more legitimacy in pushing back against illegal Chinese behavior. The United States should also try to outflank its rivals by thinking strategi- cally about where revisionists could mobilize support for an alternative and more illiberal international order in the future. This is particularly important in the coming long contest with China, in which Washington, so far, seems to be largely on the defensive. AUKUS, the trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom; the G-7; and the Five Eyes partnership with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are all designed to shore up the United States' security relationships. But Washington remains strangely reluctant to engage in offensive institution build- ing. Biden has yet to reverse his prede- cessor's decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, whose succes- sor institution, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, established a free-trade zone stretching from Vietnam to Australia and encompassing around 40 percent of global GDP. The United States is also excluded from the Regional Comprehen- sive Economic Partnership, a regional free-trade pact that is likely to build stronger ties between China and South- east Asian countries. Finding a way to interact with these new institutions is critical if Washington wishes to bind itself to its allies and partners in mean- ingful, credible, and durable ways. Moreover, China has significantly expanded its footprint in areas that the United States has treated as peripheral. Although originally Chinese officials portrayed the infrastructure projects of the BRI as a complement to the liberal economic order, Beijing has since begun to frame them as steps in building an alternative order, or a "community of common destiny." Reforming interna- tional economic institutions to make them more attentive to the needs of aid-recipient countries could help outflank the BRI, which has experienced its own difficulties. For example, the United States could use its own existing institutions-the Millennium Challenge Corporation or the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation-to invest in infrastructure that would 38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS buttress the efforts of the new African Continental Free Trade Area and stymie China's influence. KEEP THEM CLOSE Such reforms would not represent a return to the order building of the 1990s. The United States has neither the power nor the will to go back to that approach. Indeed, institutional realpolitik should involve selective retrenchment. Wash- ington should be willing to identify places where it overextended at the height of U.S. primacy. It may make sense to pull back from the globally oriented, hyper-legalized institutional structure of the wTO, which has ben- efited countries that are not playing by its rules, such as China. Washington should also be willing to let its regional allies and partners take the lead in institution building. Strong regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the EU, are critical to halting revisionist projects, even if they sometimes act against the United States' interests. The next era of great-power competi- tion is already here, but this is not the time to be ramping up military confron- tations and shutting down or pulling away from international institutions. U.S. policymakers should reject the false dichotomy that suggests that Washing- ton must choose between realpolitik and institution building. Seeking to reinvigo- rate international alliances and institu- tions is not evidence of a lack of imagi- nation or a naive faith in multilateralism. Rather, it is a tried-and-true way to play the game of great-power politics.Z' "Nguyen Ba Thanh wonders if death by old age is civilisation's destiny." - Philosophy Now "A gripping reflection of the murky future of Homo Sapiens." - Kirkus Reviews If all else-your body and memories, stars, the entire universe itself-has an inevitable life cycle, is population aging on Earth the final stage of such a life cycle for technological civilizations? A stirring fusion of sociology and philosophy, The Demogra-Fate Hypothesis envisions the demographic future of our primate species through a unique lens- both sobering and wryly entertaining. Ebook and paperback are available on Amazon 39

### AT: L – Nukes

#### Nuclear war turns the K.

Thompson, 18 – Chicago-based creative writer. (Nicole Akoukou Thompson, "Why I will not allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed", *RaceBaitr*, 4-6-2018, https://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/#)//ILake-MO

I couldn’t spare empathy for a white woman whose biggest fear was something that hadn’t happened yet and might not. Meanwhile, my most significant fears were in motion: women and men dying in cells after being wrongly imprisoned, choked out for peddling cigarettes, or shot to death during ‘routine’ traffic stops. I twitch when my partner is late, worried that a cantankerous cop has brutalized or shot him because he wouldn’t prostrate himself.

As a woman of color, I am aware of the multiple types of violence that threaten me currently—not theoretically. Street harassment, excessively affecting me as a Black woman, has blindsided me since I was eleven. A premature body meant being catcalled before I’d discussed the birds and the bees. It meant being followed, whistled at, or groped. As an adult, while navigating through neighborhoods with extinguished street lights, I noticed the correlation between women’s safety and street lighting—as well as the fact that Black and brown neighborhoods were never as brightly lit as those with a more significant white population.

I move quickly through those unlit spaces, never comforted by the inevitable whirl of red and blue sirens. In fact, it’s always been the contrary. Ever so often, cops approach me in their vehicle’s encouraging me to “Hurry along,” “Stay on the sidewalk,” or “Have a good night.” My spine stiffening, I never believed they endorsed my safety. Instead, I worried that I’d be accused of an unnamed accusation, corned by a cop who preys on Black women, or worse.

A majority of my 50-minute bus ride from the southside of Chicago to the north to join these women for the birthday celebration was spent reading articles about citywide shootings. I began with a Chicago Tribute piece titled “33 people shot, seven fatally, in 13 hours,” then toppled into a barrage of RIP posts on Facebook and ended with angry posts about police brutality on Tumblr. You might guess, by the time I arrived to dinner I wasn’t in the mood for the “I can’t believe we’re all going to die because Trump is an idiot” shit.

I shook my head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, I departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just some white shit.”

Sadly, that thought would not last long.

I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black people have lived under the specter of having our existence erased on a white man’s whim since we stepped onto the shore at Jamestown Landing.” However, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: nuclear strike would disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals.

North Korea won’t target the plain sight racists of Portland, Oregon, the violently microaggressive liberals of the rural Northwest, or the white-hooded klansmen of Diamondhead, Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike densely populated urban areas, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. These locations stand-out as targets for a nuclear strike because they are densely populated U.S. population centers. Attacking the heart of the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me that the most populous cities in the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more plainly put: Black populations.

This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart. The practice of preparing for a nuclear holocaust sometimes feels comical, particularly when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country.

Blackness is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We are stuck by rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard.

The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.”

In light of this homecoming, we now flirt with a new, larger fear of a Black genocide. America has always worked towards Black eradication through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality, but nuclear war on American soil would be swift. And for this reason I’ve grown tired of whiteness being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false.

“The Day After,” the iconic, highest-rated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the devastation from the attack is completely white-washed, leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas.

Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and brown folks would outpace that number, due to placement and poverty. That number would be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle Black and brown communities and would mark us for generations. It’s for that reason that we have to do more to foster disaster preparedness among Black people where we can. Black people deserve the space to explore nuclear unease, even if we have competing threats, anxieties, and worries.

### AT: L – Cyber

#### Cyber Threats are real and the root cause is lack of security - Cyber Espionage, Crime, and attacks inflict trillions of dollars in damage - securitization key to deter

**McGraw,** PhD and Chief Technology Officer of Cigital, and author of Software Security along with ten other software security books, **13**

[Gary, “Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 1, pg. 109-119, February 6, 2013, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013>, accessed 6/27/22, GDS - LJ]

The inevitable slide towards cyber war is accelerated by the systemic vulnerability of modern systems. Technical security vulnerabilities and exploits are the common root of cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber crime. Distinguishing cyber war from other sorts of cyber attack is thus an important first step in any treatment of the problem. Cyber war is over-hyped, especially in the United States, but **it is also a very real phenomenon**. The potential for cyber conflict is growing in tandem with our dependence on vulnerable technology.

Stuxnet provides a prime example of a cyber weapon, not only because of its impact but because of the relative simplicity of its attack payload. The problem is that Stuxnet ‘hype’ exaggerated the capabilities required to create an effective cyber weapon. Consequently, non-technical policymakers may assume that relatively unsophisticated actors will not be able to participate in offensive cyber war. That is wrong. **Modern systems are so riddled with security vulnerabilities that conducting a spectacular attack is relatively easy.** On the average day there are thousands of exploitable vulnerabilities not yet made public or patched. These so-called ‘0day’ vulnerabilities are exploited by attackers around the world.[1](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013) The only way to address the security problem and slow the accelerating slide into cyber war is to build security into our systems when they are created. Software security is a relatively new discipline that takes on the challenge of building security in, and has seen real success among multinational corporations. In general, software-security progress is more advanced among private corporations (including multinational banks and independent software vendors) than in the public sector, which lags years behind.

The conceptual conflation of cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber crime into a three-headed cyber Cerberus perpetuates fear, uncertainty and doubt. This has made the already gaping policy vacuum on cyber security more obvious than ever before.

Of the three major cyber security concerns in the public eye, cyber crime is far more pervasive than cyber war or espionage. And yet it is the least commonly discussed among policymakers. Cyber crime is already commonplace and is growing: 285 million digital records were breached in 2008 and 2011 boasted the second-highest data loss total since 2004.[2](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013)

**Though economic calculations vary widely and are difficult to make, cyber crime and data loss have been estimated to cost the global economy at least $1.0 trillion dollars annually**.[3](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013) Even if this estimate is an order of magnitude too high, cyber crime is still an important problem that needs addressing. Just as consumers flock to the Internet, so do criminals. Why did Willie Sutton, the notorious Depression-era gangster, rob banks? As he famously (and perhaps apocryphally) put it: ‘That's where the money is.’ Criminals flock to the Internet for the same reason.

Cyber espionage is another prominent problem that captivates the imagination, and is much more common than cyber war. The highly distributed, massively interconnected nature of modern information systems makes keeping secrets difficult. It is easier than ever before to transfer, store and hide information, while more information than ever before is stored and manipulated on networked machines. A pen drive the size of a little finger can store more information than the super computers of a decade ago.

Cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber crime all share the same root cause: our dependence on insecure networked computer systems. The bad news about this dependency is that cyber war appears to be dominating the conversation among policy-makers even though cyber crime is the largest and most pervasive problem. When pundits and policymakers focus only on cyber war, the most threats emanating from cyber crime and espionage are relegated to the background. Interestingly, building systems properly from a security perspective will address the cyber crime and espionage problems just as effectively as it will address cyber war. By building security into our systems in the first place we can lessen the possibility of cyber war, take a bite out of cyber crime, and deter cyber espionage all at the same time.

#### Malware threats are often underestimated - effective payloads of Stux-Esque cyberattacks are unsophisticated and easily built

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[Gary, “Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 1, pg. 109-119, February 6, 2013, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013>, accessed 6/27/22, GDS - LJ]

To bring this all home, imagine the timer controlling the spin velocity of a centrifuge working incorrectly. Centrifuge systems require careful balance and exacting technical control when used to enrich uranium. Stuxnet sabotaged this control, resulting in the destruction or disabling of thousands of centrifuge units. Though the delivery mechanism for Stuxnet involved a number of previously unknown 0day vulnerabilities, stolen crypto credentials, and other arcana, ***the action part of the payload itself was not very technically sophisticated*.** DLL interpositioning of the type explained above was well known in 1997. It is easy to carry out, and is so elementary that it is ineffective as an attack against today's online gaming systems.[20](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013) Put another way, most modern control systems are so poorly designed from a security perspective that they are vulnerable to attacks devised over 15 years ago.

Why is cyber war therefore inevitable? Because effective payloads of the Stuxnet variety are easily built. It **does not take nation-state resources to create an effective cyber war payload.** Unless and until we eradicate systemic security vulnerabilities in the systems we depend on, they will continue to be attacked. The relative ease with which an attack can be made levels the cyber playing field, allowing even cyber activists to do real and permanent damage.

#### Even if our threats are inflated, that’s good, securitizing them is the best way to build trust and avoid extinction—otherwise, governmental collapse

Schneider 22 [Schneider, Jacquelyn. “A World without Trust: The Insidious Cyberthreat.” Heinonline.org, June 2022, heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora101&id=24&collection=journals&index=. Accessed 27 June 2022. Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Her research focuses on the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cybersecurity, unmanned technologies, and Northeast Asia. \ kaylan]

When sounding the alarm over cyberthreats, policymakers and analysts have typically employed a vocabulary of conflict and catastrophe. As early as 2001, James Adams, a co-founder of the cybersecu- rity firm iDefense, warned in these pages that cyberspace was "a new inter- national battlefield," where future military campaigns would be won or lost. In subsequent years, U.S. defense officials warned of a "cyber-Pearl Harbor," in the words of then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, and a "cyber 9/11," according to then Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano. In 2015, James Clapper, then the director of national intelligence, said the United States must prepare for a "cyber Arma- geddon" but acknowledged it was not the most likely scenario. In response to the threat, officials argued that cyberspace should be understood as a "domain" of conflict, with "key terrain" that the United States needed to take or defend. The 20 years since Adams's warning have revealed that **cyberthreats and cyberattacks are hugely consequential**- but not in the way most predictions suggested. Spying and theft in cyber- JACQUELYN SCHNEIDER is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. 22 FOREIGN AFFAIRS space have garnered peta-, exa-, even zettabytes of sensitive and proprietary data. Cyber-enabled information opera- tions have **threatened elections** and incited mass social movements. Cyberat- tacks on businesses have cost hundreds of **billions** of dollars. But while the cyberthreat is real and growing, expecta- tions that cyberattacks would create large-scale physical effects akin to those caused by surprise bombings on U.S. soil, or that they would hurtle states into violent conflict, or even that what happened in the domain of cyberspace would define who won or lost on the battlefield haven't been borne out. In trying to analogize the cyberthreat to the world of physical warfare, policymakers missed the far more insidious danger that cyber-operations pose: how they erode the trust people place in markets, governments, and even **national power**. Correctly **diagnosing the threat is essential**, in part because it shapes how states invest in cybersecurity. Focusing on single, potentially catastrophic events, and thinking mostly about the possible physical effects of cyberattacks, unduly prioritizes capabilities that will protect against "the big one": large-scale re- sponses to disastrous cyberattacks, offensive measures that produce physical violence, or punishments only for the kinds of attacks that cross a strategic threshold. Such capabilities and responses are mostly ineffective at protecting against the way cyberattacks undermine the trust that undergirds modern economies, societies, governments, and militaries. If trust is what's at stake-and it has already been deeply eroded-then the steps states must take to survive and operate in this new world are different. The solution to a "cyber-Pearl Harbor" t AN- 410 , .r , 40 Jacquelyn Schneider is to do everything possible to ensure it doesn't happen, but the way to retain trust in a digital world despite the inevitability of cyberattacks is to build resilience and thereby promote confi- dence in today's systems of commerce, governance, military power, and interna- tional cooperation. States can develop this resilience by restoring links be- tween humans and within networks, by strategically distributing analog systems where needed, and by investing in processes that allow for manual and human intervention. The key to success in cyberspace over the long term is not finding a way to defeat all cyberattacks but learning how to survive despite the disruption and destruction they cause. The United States has not so far experienced a "cyber 9/11," and a cyber- attack that causes immediate cata- strophic physical effects isn't likely in the future, either. But Americans' trust in their government, their institutions, and even their fellow citizens is declin- ing rapidly-weakening the very foun- dations of society. Cyberattacks prey on these weak points, sowing distrust in information, creating confusion and anxiety, and exacerbating hatred and misinformation. As people's digital dependencies grow and the links among technologies, people, and institutions become more tenuous, this cyberthreat to trust will only **become more existen- tial**. It is this creeping dystopian future that policymakers should worry about- and **do everything possible to avert**. THE TIES THAT BIND Trust, defined as "the firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something," plays a central role in economies, societies, and the international system. It allows individu- als, organizations, and states to delegate tasks or responsibilities, thereby freeing up time and resources to accomplish other jobs, or to cooperate instead of acting alone. It is the glue that allows complex relationships to survive-per- mitting markets to become more com- plex, governance to extend over a broader population or set of issues, and states to trade, cooperate, and exist within more complicated alliance relationships. "Extensions of trust ... enable coordina- tion of actions over large domains of space and time, which in turn permits the benefits of more complex, differentiated, and diverse societies," explains the political scientist Mark Warren. Those extensions of trust have played an essential role in human progress across all dimensions. Primitive, iso- lated, and autocratic societies function with what sociologists call "particular- ized trust"-a trust of only known others. Modern and interconnected states require what's called "generalized trust," which extends beyond known circles and allows actors to delegate trust relationships to individuals, organizations, and processes with whom the truster is not intimately familiar. Particularized trust leads to allegiance within small groups, distrust of others, and wariness of unfamiliar processes or institutions; generalized trust enables complicated market interactions, com- munity involvement, and trade and cooperation among states. The modern market, for example, could not exist without the trust that allows for the delegation of responsibil- ity to another entity. People trust that currencies have value, that banks can secure and safeguard assets, and that 24 FOREIGN AFFAIRS A World Without Trust 1ous in the form of checks, credit cards, or loans will be fulfilled. When individu- als and entities have trust in a financial system, wages, profits, and employment increase. Trust in laws about property rights facilitates trade and economic prosperity. The digital economy makes this generalized trust even more impor- tant. No longer do people deposit gold in a bank vault. Instead, modern econo- mies consist of complicated sets of digital transactions in which users must trust not only that banks are securing and safeguarding their assets but also that the digital medium-a series of ones and zeros linked together in code- translates to an actual value that can be used to buy goods and services. Trust is a basic ingredient of social capital-the shared norms and intercon- nected networks that, as the political scientist Robert Putnam has famously argued, lead to more peaceful and prosperous communities. The general- ized trust at the heart of social capital allows voters to delegate responsibility to proxies and institutions to represent their interests. Voters must trust that a repre- sentative will promote their interests, that votes will be logged and counted properly, and that the institutions that write and uphold laws will do so fairly. Finally, trust is at the heart of how states generate national power and, ultimately, how they interact within the international system. It allows civilian heads of state to delegate command of armed forces to military leaders and enables those military leaders to execute decentralized control of lower- level military operations and tactics. States characterized by civil-military distrust are less likely to win wars, partly because of how trust affects a regime's willingness to give control to lower levels of military units in war- fare. For example, the political scientist Caitlin Talmadge notes how Saddam Hussein's efforts to coup-proof his military through the frequent cycling of officers through assignments, the restriction of foreign travel and train- ing, and perverse regime loyalty pro- motion incentives handicapped the otherwise well-equipped Iraqi military. Trust also enables militaries to experi- ment and train with new technologies, making them more likely to innovate and develop revolutionary advance- ments in military power. Trust also dictates the stability of the international system. States rely on it to build trade and arms control agreements and, most important, to feel confident that other states will not launch a surprise attack or invasion. It enables international cooperation and thwarts arms races by creating the conditions to share information-thus defeating the suboptimal outcome of a prisoner's dilemma, wherein states choose conflict because they are unable to share the information required for cooperation. The Russian proverb "Doveryai, no proveryai"-"Trust, but verify"-has guided arms control negotiations and agreements since the Cold War. In short, the world today is more dependent on trust than ever before. This is, in large part, because of the way information and digital technologies have proliferated across modern economies, societies, governments, and militaries, their virtual nature amplifying the role that trust plays in daily activities. This occurs in a few ways. First, the rise of automation and autonomous technolo- gies-whether in traffic systems, finan- January/February 2022 25 Jacquelyn Schneider cial markets, health care, or military weapons-necessitates a delegation of trust whereby the user is trusting that the machine can accomplish a task safely and appropriately. Second, digital informa- tion requires the user to trust that data are stored in the right place, that their values are what the user believes them to be, and that the data won't be manipu- lated. Additionally, digital social media platforms create new trust dynamics around identity, privacy, and validity. How do you trust the creators of infor- mation or that your social interactions are with an actual person? How do you trust that the information you provide others will be kept private? These are relatively complex relationships with trust, all the result of users' dependence on digital technologies and information in the modern world. SUSPICION SPREADS All the trust that is needed to carry out these online interactions and exchanges creates an enormous target. In the most dramatic way, cyber-operations generate distrust in how or whether a system operates. For instance, an exploit, which is a cyberattack that takes advantage of a security flaw in a computer system, can hack and control a pacemaker, causing distrust on the part of the patient using the device. Or a micro- chip backdoor can allow bad actors to access smart weapons, sowing distrust about who is in control of those weap- ons. Cyber-operations can lead to distrust in the integrity of data or the algorithms that make sense of data. Are voter logs accurate? Is that artificial- intelligence-enabled strategic warning system showing a real missile launch, or is it **a blip** in the computer code? Additionally, operating in a digital world can produce distrust in owner- ship or control of information: Are your photos private? Is your company's intellectual property secure? **Did government secrets about nuclear weapons make it into an adversary's hands**? Finally, cyber-operations create distrust by manipulating social net- works and relationships and ultimately deteriorating social capital. Online personas, bots, and disinformation campaigns all complicate whether individuals can trust both information and one another. All these cyberthreats have implications that can erode the **foundations** on which markets, socie- ties, governments, and the international system were built. The digitally dependent economy is particularly vulnerable to degradations of trust. As the modern market has become more interconnected online, cyberthreats have grown more sophisticated and ubiquitous. Yearly estimates of the total economic cost of cyberattacks range from hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars. But it isn't the financial cost of these attacks alone that threatens the modern economy. Instead, it is how these **persistent attacks create distrust in the integrity** of the system as a whole. Nowhere was this more evident than in the public's response to the ransom- ware attack on the American oil pro- vider Colonial Pipeline. In May 2021, a criminal gang known as DarkSide shut down the pipeline, which provides about 45 percent of the fuel to the East Coast of the United States, and demanded a ransom, which the company ultimately paid. Despite the limited impact of the attack on the company's ability to provide oil to its customers, people 26 FOREIGN AFFAIRS A World Without Trust panicked and flocked to gas stations with oil tanks and plastic bags to stock up on gas, leading to an artificial shortage at the pump. This kind of distrust, and the chaos it causes, threatens the founda- tions not just of the digital economy but also **of the entire economy**. The inability to safeguard intellectual property from cybertheft is similarly consequential. The practice of stealing intellectual property or trade secrets by hacking into a company's network and taking sensitive data has become a lucrative criminal enterprise-one that states including China and North Korea use to catch up with the United States and other countries that have the most innovative technology. North Korea famously hacked the pharmaceutical company Pfizer in an attempt to steal its covID-19 vaccine technology, and Chinese exfiltrations of U.S. defense industrial base research has led to copycat technological advances in aircraft and missile development. The more extensive and sophisticated such attacks become, the less companies can trust that their investments in research and development will lead to profit-ul- timately destroying knowledge-based economies. And nowhere are the threats to trust more existential than in online banking. If users no longer trust that their digital data and their money can be safeguarded, then the entire compli- cated modern financial system could collapse. Perversely, the turn toward cryptocurrencies, most of which are not backed by government guarantees, makes trust in the value of digital information all the more critical. Societies and governments are also vulnerable to attacks on trust. Schools, courts, and municipal governments have all become ransomware targets- whereby systems are taken offline or rendered useless until the victim pays up. In the cross hairs are virtual class- rooms, access to judicial records, and local emergency services. And while the immediate impact of these attacks can temporarily degrade some governance and social functions, the greater danger is that over the long term, a lack of faith in the integrity of data stored by gov- ernments-whether marriage records, birth certificates, criminal records, or property divisions-can erode trust in the basic functions of a society. Democ- racy's reliance on information and social capital to build trust in institutions has proved remarkably vulnerable to cyber- enabled information operations. State- sponsored campaigns that provoke questions about the integrity of gover- nance data (such as vote tallies) or that fracture communities into small groups of particularized trust give rise to the kind of forces that foment civil unrest and threaten democracy. Cyber-operations can also **jeopardize military power**, by attacking trust in modern weapons. With the rise of digital capabilities, starting with the **microprocessor**, states began to rely on smart weapons, networked sensors, and autonomous platforms for their militar- ies. As those militaries became more digitally capable, they also became susceptible to cyber-operations that threatened the reliability and functional- ity of these smart weapons systems. Whereas a previous focus on cyber- threats fixated on how cyber-operations could act like a bomb**, the true danger occurs when cyberattacks make it difficult to trust that actual bombs will work as expected**. As militaries move January/February 2022 27 Jacquelyn Schneider farther away from the battlefield through remote operations and com- manders delegate responsibility to autonomous systems, this trust becomes all the more important. Can militaries have faith that cyberattacks on autono- mous systems will not render them ineffective or, worse, cause fratricide or kill civilians? Furthermore, for highly networked militaries (such as that of the United States), lessons taken from the early information age led to doctrines, campaigns, and weapons that rely on complex distributions of information. Absent trust in information or the means by which it is being disseminated, militaries will be stymied-awaiting new orders, unsure of how to proceed. Together, these factors threaten the fragile systems of trust that facilitate peace and stability within the interna- tional system. They make trade less likely, arms control more difficult, and states more uncertain about one anoth- er's intentions. The introduction of cybertools for spying, attacks, and theft has only exacerbated the effects of distrust. **Offensive cyber-capabilities** are difficult to monitor, and the **lack of norms about the appropriate uses of cyber-operations makes it difficult for states to trust that others will use restraint.** Are Russian hackers exploring U.S. power networks to launch an imminent cyberattack, or are they merely probing for vulnerabilities, with no future plans to use them? **Are U.S. "defend forward" cyber-operations truly to prevent attacks on U.S. networks or instead a guise to justify offensive cyberattacks on Chinese or Russian command-and-control systems**? Mean- while, the use of mercenaries, interme- diaries, and gray-zone operations in cyberspace makes attribution and determining intent harder, further threatening trust and cooperation in the international system. For example, Israeli spyware aiding Saudi govern- ment efforts to repress dissent, off-duty Chinese military hacktivists, criminal organizations the Russian state allows but does not officially sponsor-all make it difficult to establish a clear chain of attribution for an intentional state action. Such intermediaries also threaten the usefulness of official agreements among states about what is appropriate behavior in cyberspace. LIVING WITH FAILURE To date, U.S. solutions to dangers in cyberspace have focused on the cyber- space part of the question-deterring, defending against, and defeating cyber- threats as they attack their targets. But these cyber-focused strategies have struggled and even failed: cyberattacks are on the rise, the efficacy of deterrence is questionable, and offensive ap- proaches cannot stem the tide of small- scale attacks that threaten the world's modern, digital foundations. Massive exploits-such as the recent hacks of SolarWinds' network management software and Microsoft Exchange Server's email software-are less a failure of U.S. cyberdefenses than a symptom of how the targeted systems were conceived and constructed in the first place. The goal should be not to stop all cyber-intrusions but to build systems that are able to withstand incoming attacks. This is not a new lesson. When cannons and gunpowder debuted in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, cities struggled to survive the onslaught of the new 28 FOREIGN AFFAIRS A World Without Trust firepower. So states adapted their fortifications-dug ditches, built bas- tions, organized cavaliers, constructed extensive polygonal edifices-all with the idea of creating cities that could survive a siege, not stop the cannon fire from ever occurring. The best fortifica- tions were designed to enable active defense, wearing the attackers down until a counterattack could defeat the forces remaining outside the city. The fortification analogy invites an alternative cyberstrategy in which the focus is on the system itself-whether that's a smart weapon, an electric grid, or the mind of an American voter. How does one build systems that can con- tinue to operate in a world of degraded trust? Here, network theory-the study of how networks succeed, fail, and survive-offers guidance. Studies on network robustness find that the strongest networks are those with a high density of small nodes and mul- tiple pathways between nodes. Highly resilient networks can withstand the removal of multiple nodes and linkages without decomposing, whereas less resilient, centralized networks, with few pathways and sparser nodes, have a much lower critical threshold for degradation and failure. If economies, societies, governments, and the interna- tional system are going to survive serious erosions of trust, they will need more bonds and links, fewer dependen- cies on central nodes, and new ways to reconstitute network components even as they are under attack. Together, these qualities will lead to generalized trust in the integrity of the systems. How can states build such networks? First, at the technical level, networks and data structures that undergird the economy, critical infrastructure, and military power must prioritize resil- ience. This requires decentralized and dense networks, hybrid cloud struc- tures, redundant applications, and backup processes. It implies planning and training for network failure so that individuals can adapt and continue to provide services even in the midst of an offensive cyber-campaign. It means relying on physical backups for the most important data (such as votes) and manual options for operating systems when digital capabilities are unavail- able. For some highly sensitive systems (for instance, nuclear command and control), it may be that analog options, even when less efficient, produce remarkable resilience. Users need to trust that digital capabilities and net- works have been designed to gracefully degrade, as opposed to catastrophically fail: the distinction between binary trust (that is, trusting the system will work perfectly or not trusting the system at all) and a continuum of trust (trusting the system to function at some percentage between zero and 100 percent) should drive the design of digital capabilities and networks. These design choices will not only increase users' trust but also decrease the incen- tives for criminal and state-based actors to launch cyberattacks. Making critical infrastructure and military power more resilient to cyber- attacks would have positive effects on international stability. More resilient infrastructure and populations are less susceptible to systemic and long-lasting effects from cyberattacks because they can bounce back quickly. This resilience, in turn, decreases the incentives for states to preemptively strike an adver- January/February 2022 29 Jacquelyn Schneider sary online, since they would question the efficacy of their cyberattacks and their ability to coerce the target popula- tion. Faced with a difficult, costly, and potentially ineffective attack, aggressors are less likely to see the benefits of chancing the cyberattack in the first place. Furthermore, states that focus on building resilience and perseverance in their digitally enabled military forces are less likely to double down on first-strike or offensive operations, such as long-range missile strikes or cam- paigns of preemption. The security dilemma-when states that would otherwise not go to war with each other find themselves in conflict because they are uncertain about each other's inten- tions-suggests that when states focus more on defense than offense, they are **less likely to spiral into conflicts** caused by distrust and uncertainty. HUMAN RESOURCES Solving the technical side, however, is only part of the solution. The most important trust relationships that cyberspace threatens are society's human networks-that is, the bonds and links that people have as individuals, neigh- bors, and citizens so that they can work together to solve problems. Solutions for making these human networks more durable are even more complicated and difficult than any technical fixes. Cyber- enabled information operations target the links that build trust between people and communities. They undermine these broader connections by creating incen- tives to form clustered networks of particularized trust-for example, social media platforms that organize groups of like-minded individuals or disinforma- tion campaigns that promote in-group and out-group divisions. Algorithms and clickbait designed to promote outrage only galvanize these divisions and decrease trust of those outside the group. Governments can try to regulate these forces on social media, but those virtual enclaves reflect actual divisions within society. And there's a feedback loop: the distrust that is building online leaks out into the real world, separating people further into groups of "us" and "them." Combating this requires education and civic engage- ment-the bowling leagues that Put- nam said were necessary to rebuild Americans' social capital (Putnam's book Bowling Alone, coincidentally, came out in 2000, just as the Internet was beginning to take off). After two years of a global pandemic and a further splintering of Americans into virtual enclaves, it is time to reenergize physical communities, time for neigh- borhoods, school districts, and towns to come together to rebuild the links and bonds that were severed to save lives during the pandemic. The fact is that these divisions were festering in American communities even before the pandemic or the Internet accelerated their consolidation and amplified their power. The solution, therefore, the way to do this kind of rebuilding, will not come from social media, the cEos of those platforms, or digital tools. In- stead, it will take courageous local leaders who can rebuild trust from the ground up, finding ways to bring together communities that have been driven apart. It will take more frequent disconnecting from the Internet, and from the synthetic groups of particular- ized trust that were formed there, in order to reconnect in person. Civic 30 FOREIGN AFFAIRS A World Without Trust education could help by reminding communities of their commonalities and shared goals and by creating critical thinkers who can work for change within democratic institutions. BOWLING TOGETHER There's a saying that cyber-operations lead to death by a thousand cuts, but perhaps a better analogy is termites, hidden in the recesses of foundations, that gradually **eat away at the very structures designed to support people's lives.** The previous strategic focus on one-off, large-scale cyber-operations led to bigger and better cyber-capabilities, but it never addressed the fragility within the foundations and networks themselves. Will cyberattacks ever cause the kind of serious physical effects that were feared over the last two decades? Will a strategy focused more on trust and resilience leave states uniquely vulner- able to this? It is of course impossible to say that no cyberattack will ever pro- duce large-scale physical effects similar to those that resulted from the bombing of Pearl Harbor. But it is unlikely-be- cause the nature of cyberspace, its virtual, transient, and ever-changing character, makes it difficult for attacks on it to create lasting physical effects. Strategies that focus on trust and resilience by investing in networks and relationships make these kinds of attacks yet more difficult. Therefore, focusing on building networks that can survive incessant, smaller attacks has a fortuitous byproduct: additional resil- ience against one-off, large-scale at- tacks. But this isn't easy, and there is a significant tradeoff in both efficiency and cost for strategies that focus on resilience, redundancy, and persever- ance over convenience or deterring and defeating cyberthreats. And the initial cost of these measures to foster trust falls disproportionately on democracies, which must cultivate generalized trust, as opposed to the particularized trust that autocracies rely on for power. This can seem like a tough pill to swallow, especially as China and the United States appear to be racing toward an increasingly competitive relationship. Despite the difficulties and the cost, democracies and modern economies (such as the United States) must prioritize building trust in the systems that make societies run-whether that's the electric grid, banks, schools, voting machines, or the media. That means creating backup plans and fail-safes, making strategic decisions about what should be online or digital and what needs to stay analog or physical, and building networks-both online and in society-that can survive even when one node is attacked. If a stolen pass- word can still take out an oil pipeline or a fake social media account can con- tinue to sway the political opinions of thousands of voters, then cyberattacks will remain too lucrative for autocracies and criminal actors to resist. Failing to build in more resilience-both technical and human-will mean that the cycle of cyberattacks and the distrust they give rise to will **continue to threaten the foundations of democratic society.**

## Impact Defense

### 2AC---No ! to Reps

#### Reps don’t shape reality and there’s no impact

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Eric Van Rythoven, “The Securitization Dilemma,” Journal of Global Security Studies, 7-16-2019, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/5/3/478/5532523?redirectedFrom=fulltext#137694797

Tragedy is largely absent from the existing normative debate on securitization. Instead, the debate has become organized around whether securitization is a “negative” or “positive” concept. In the classic formulation, the Copenhagen School points to how “[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power-holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes” (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Williams 2003). Securitization has negative effects when it functions as “a political technology that consistently favors the interests of the powerful and enables violence and exclusion” (McDonald 2015, 154). Correspondingly, Wæver admits a “‘bias’ for desecuritization” or de-escalation, although he quickly notes that this is “not always better than securitization” (Wæver 2011, 469). At the same time, a number of approaches point to cases where securitization is ethically desirable. In her compelling consequentialist argument, for example, Floyd asks “whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitization are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicization” (2007, 338). Relatedly, Roe contends that “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated” and suggests it may even elicit unappreciated forms of cooperation (2012, 250).

The problem with the negative/positive debate is that it appears to impose moral certitude where there often is none. Registering securitizing moves as clearly positive or negative can be difficult because their effects can be mixed and temporally distant. The difficulty in making this determination may also be an indicator of the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves. In the end, because the outcomes of security claims are uncertain, we cannot know in advance whether they will lead to positive or negative consequences. Instead, we should entertain a distinctly tragic vision of securitization that councils an ethic of self-limitation. The core of this tragic vision is a recognition that the powerful allure of using security talk to “gain control” over a situation will always be present (Wæver 1995, 54). However, we should also recognize that this control is always illusory because it presumes all of its effects can be predetermined. The tragedy of securitization is that the failure to recognize how contingency imposes limits on action lures political actors into a false sense of certainty and the conviction that they can determine the future. This leads to a hubristic adoption of “misplaced certainty,” such as when Vice President Dick Cheney declared in August of 2002 that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” (quoted in Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 3). A similar situation emerged when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently claimed in November that the Iraq conflict could be “[f]ive days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that” (Esterbrook 2002). A similarly misplaced certainty is evident in US General Stanley McChrystal’s assurances to the Obama administration in 2009 that a surge in troops and resources were critical to stave off American defeat in Afghanistan (Woodward 2009). More recently, it is visible in President Donald Trump’s 2018 assertion that he was “100 percent right” on the weaknesses of the Iran nuclear deal (CNN 2018).

Yet, tragedy cuts both ways. Blanket opposition to securitizing moves can also have unanticipated effects. Ironically, the desecuritization of an issue may not just result in its repoliticization, but in its disappearance from public view (Floyd 2010, 57–58). Viewing security discourse as negative also underplays how the management of threats can serve as a focal point for democratic cooperation among different political actors (Roe 2012, 250, 257–58). The point is not that every security discourse and the practices it justifies has catastrophically perverse consequences. Instead, the goal is to highlight a sensible restraint over the limits of seeing into the future, how this shapes choice, and the dangers of hubris that follow. When properly adapted to this constructivist context, the tragic vision of securitization can be an important tool in cultivating prudence and restraint (cf. Lebow 2003, 364).

The problem with this tragic vision is that it points to processes that are never entirely in our possession. Whether in the form of background knowledge (Pouliot 2008), habits (Hopf 2010), or routines (Mitzen 2006), much of social life occurs without conscious deliberation and reflection. These forms of unthinking action impair reflexivity and limit actors’ ability to see how the world might be different and thus how outcomes can be uncertain. In some cases, this can be benign, such as the unreflexive amity between Canada and the United States that allows these countries to “escape” from the traditional security dilemma (Collins 2014, 572–73). But just as practices of amity can be habitual, so too can enmity. The hawkish US senator may designate Iran’s nuclear program as threatening because that is what hawkish US senators do, and there is no perceived way to be hawkish otherwise. The result is that the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves becomes concealed under an unthinking veil of common sense. The tragedy of securitization then is not only that political figures often exceed their limitations by ignoring how contingency can derail securitizing moves—it is that these limitations often never even register

This means overcoming the tragedy of securitization require a certain degree self-reflexivity. This is similar to what Booth and Wheeler describe as the “security dilemma sensibility,” or an actor’s ability and willingness to reflect upon their actions, including one’s own role in provoking insecurity in others (2008, 7). By sensitizing leaders to how uncertainty is an endemic feature of political life, and how their actions can be interpreted in unintended ways, security competition can be mitigated, at least in part (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 265). Yet, these moments of self-awareness and reflection are difficult precisely because there are powerful forces that demand simplicity and closure: namely our desire for a stable sense of self or what is widely referred to as ontological security (Mitzen 2006). Reflecting on the uncertainty of international politics can erode one’s sense of identity and agency, ultimately leading to a “deep, incapacitating state of not knowing how to get by in the world” (Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 29). Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma sensibility may have the laudable goal of alerting leaders to the role of uncertainty in political life, but this confronts the problem that many would prefer that it remain hidden.

The consequence is that this tragic aspect of the securitization dilemma takes on an intractable character. Either unwilling or unable to “know one’s limits,” as Herz would say (1950, 179), the role of uncertainty becomes hidden and security claims appear as a reliable strategy for control and influence. Like the classic realist dilemma, the securitization dilemma is pervasive because it is often invisible. The compelling need for a logic of selflimitation—of a careful and reflective use of security language and how it can be derailed by contingency— is obscured because of an aversion to recognizinguncertainty. It is this specter of a need for reflection and restraint that may not be realized, I suggest, which demands that we rethink the role of the analyst in provoking reflexivity among power-holders.

Conclusion: Rethinking the Role of the Analyst

Motivated by the absence of unintended and perverse consequences in constructivist theorizing of security, this article has pursued a reconceptualization of the security dilemma. Viewing the dilemma as a logic of limitation shaped by choice, uncertainty, and tragedy, the argument focuses on transposing this logic to the constructivist context of securitization theory. By showing how the choice to engage in the social construction of threats is complicated by uncertainty and the tragic failure to recognize one’s own limits, the dilemma analytic helps us to understand how securitization can be both a potent instrument for mobilization, as well as a volatile source of unpredictability. Moreover, this conceptual lens lays the foundation for an ethical imperative of self-limitation among securitizing actors—albeit one made difficult given the desire for simplicity and closure. Far from a rebuke of constructivist theorizing, the argument shows that taking the social character of security seriously means appreciating how political claims are always vulnerable to being derailed by different types of contingency.

This reconstructive move has important implications for studying the social construction of security. First, while the initial influence of realism on securitization theory is well-documented (Floyd 2010; Gad and Peterson 2011), few attempts have been made to show how engaging with these realist roots can yield new insights.22 Here, the reconstruction of the security dilemma demonstrates how returning to realist themes can yield a fresh insights. Second, the argument pushes scholars studying securitization to expand their universe of outcomes beyond the reductive binary of success and failure and to consider cases of perverse and unintended consequences. Not only are these outcomes relatively common, they undercut the prevailing image of securitization as a reliable technology of control. Third, the securitization dilemma shows why uncertainty is more of an enduring problem for social action than constructivists typically acknowledge. Contra earlier arguments where learning and socialization effectively mitigate the problem of uncertainty (Wendt 2006, 208–9), this perspective stresses how contingency means that social acts like securitizing moves can have unpredictable effects.

The most important result of this reconstruction, however, may be in how taking the tragic element of the dilemma seriously reorders the political role of the analyst. Rather than assessing the validity of a particular security discourse, or exposing its socially constructed nature, this perspective asks the analyst to provoke reflexivity on behalf of power-holders over the risks associated with securitization. While this entails a bias toward deescalation and desecuritization, unlike other approaches this is not achieved through overt references to any liberal, democratic, or emancipatory ideal. Instead, it is packaged for power-holders as a strategy of self-preservation. Here, the analyst presents the move to securitize as a risk-laden and potentially self-defeating strategy. The analyst points to a series of precedents showing how such a strategy can produce perverse consequences: how today's tough talk can become tomorrow's liability; how audiences can interpret threatening messages in unexpected ways; and how today's framing of security can lead to perverse consequences tomorrow. By foregrounding the problem of uncertainty, the analyst works to accentuate and impress upon actors the dilemmatic quality of securitizing moves.

Yet, the problem with presenting the move to securitize as a risk is that it may become accepted. Ironically, framing an escalation in enmity as possible but dangerous is precisely what may legitimize such a move in the eyes of risk-insensitive actors. This is Huysmans’ (2002) now familiar normative dilemma of writing security. The indeterminacy of language means that political actors may interpret advice in unpredictable ways. Frustratingly, this may include the precise opposite of the analyst's intention. This situation is likely inescapable, but it may be mitigated. What I suggest is that analysts should strive to cultivate a deeper subjectivity of risk sensitivity, comparable to Booth and Wheeler's security-dilemma sensibility, among political actors.

Key to this argument is how visions of the future satisfy the human desire for certainty. As Berenskoetter argues, “visions depicting the self in an imagined future order serve as anxiety controlling mechanisms” (2011, 654). Visions of the future inoculate actors against the anxiety of uncertainty by providing a narrative of where they are going and how to get there. Indeed, normative debates on securitization are already loaded with such visions. The impulse to securitize is underpinned by a utopian future where the security frame can finally mobilize a response to an otherwise intractable problem. Conversely, the impulse to desecuritize is sustained by a dystopian future defined by unrestrained authoritarian politics. A tragic vision of the future does something different: it presents a future where the only thing we can know decisively is that it is indeterminate and attempts to conclusively control it are vulnerable to failure. The very recognition of fundamental limits on human freedom (Steele 2007, 281–82) becomes transformed into a source of ontological security. This tempers the human need for cognitive closure by reconfiguring it into what Herz understood as a “fundamentally humble posture toward the value and precariousness of life” (Sylvest 2008, 442). An actor with a greater sensitivity to indeterminacy may still pursue securitizing moves, but with a cautious awareness that they are volatile acts best pursued sparingly. The analyst does not simply educate political leaders by pointing to the indeterminacy of the world; she seeks to make political subjects more sensitive toward it by crafting visions of a precarious future.

Finally, this tragic vision cannot, and should not, escape its own need for reflexivity. Its scholarly proponents need to engage in their own process of self-reflection, focusing on how their knowledge and interests are themselves historically situated. The ethic of restraint is a value, and not necessarily the value for all historical circumstances. A recognition of the social construction of security “facts” must be sobered by a recognition of the social construction of security “values” (Hamati-Ataya 2012, 685).

### 1AR---No ! to Reps

#### Securitization theory is wrong — other factors outweigh representations.

Baysal 20 – Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Faculty of International, Political, and Urban Studies at the Universidad Del Rosario

Basar Baysal, “20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework,” Uluslararasi Iliskiler, 7-1-2020, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1228409

Despite its strengths and popularity in the last 20 years, Securitization Theory has several limitations, some of which have already been identified by different scholars. The most criticized aspect is its focus on speech acts.16 According to McDonald, the theory over-emphasizes speech acts while neglecting other processes or means for communication, such as images and other visual representations like videos, which also play a significant role in the process.17 As Möller notes, “language is only one of the (albeit the most central) means, through which meaning is communicated”. 18 Moreover, Williams emphasizes the importance of images by stating that: “Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics.” 19 Addressing these criticisms, several studies have examined the impact of other means of communication during the securitization process. 20 In line with this, the dual framework that is introduced in this article also takes different means of communication into account in addition to speech acts.

In addition to images and other visual representations, Paris School scholars also emphasize the role of the practices of security professionals,21 arguing that these play a more crucial role than discursive practices in constructing security issues.22 That is, rather than the magical power of speech acts, it is the institutionalizations and routinizations through repetitions of security practices that produce security issues. 23 Moreover, unlike the Copenhagen School, scholars of the Paris School also focus on the insecuritizing consequences of the process of securitization by asking what security does rather than what security is.24 In this way, they also inquire and focus on the threats that ordinary people face, like the Welsh School does, with its Emancipatory Security approach.25 However, the Paris School is also limited since it overemphasizes micro-level practices and ignores macro-level decisionmaking with its bottom-up framework.26 My dual framework borrows insights from the approach of the Paris School as it takes the practices of security professionals into account without ignoring the discursive impact of speech acts of macro-level decision-makers. Moreover, it also focuses on the insecuritizing consequences of securitization.

Another significant limitation of Securitization Theory is the inadequate analysis of the audience. According to Thierry Balzacq, the role of the audience is underspecified because of Wæver’s reliance on John L. Austin’s language theory.27 I additionally argue that the overemphasis on speech acts and under-analysis of the audience(s) in the framework of Securitization Theory derives from the tendency of the Copenhagen School scholars to see securitization as a universal phenomenon. According to Balzacq, however, “the success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor’s ability to identify the audience’s feelings, needs, and interests…To persuade the audience, the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience’s experience.”28

Securitization Theory also fails to adequately analyze contextual issues. Balzacq, for example, claims that whereas Securitization Theory claims that securitization modifies the external context, the opposite is also true: the contextual issues and audience characteristics also influence the process and success of securitization.29 According to Matt McDonald, “in developing a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through speech acts, the Securitization Theory ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors.”30 Attention to these two related limitations, concerning audience and context, is essential to the dual securitization framework too. However, I do not elaborate on these in this article since they have already been discussed by various scholars, and many empirical studies have already been conducted with a focus on these issues.31

### 2AC/1AR---AT: Endless War

#### No impact to endless war.

Chandler 9 – Professor of IR at the University of Westminster

David Chandler, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics," Review of Dillon and Reid’s The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler\_18-1.pdf

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’（p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’（p.84）. In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity（p.6）. As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’（p.84）.¶ It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic（p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human（against humans）are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them.¶ This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’（p.85）Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control.¶ It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. ¶ The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war（the asserted purpose of the book）. Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…（p.84）¶ Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

### 2AC/1AR---AT: Root Cause

#### No root cause, especially in IR. Realism provides unique insights.

Cruz 20 – Professor at Baylor College

Miguel Cruz, “Between Theory and Practice: The Utility of International Relations Theory to the Military Practitioner,” Air University, 2-3-2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2063140/between-theory-and-practice-the-utility-of-international-relations-theory-to-th/

Constructivism helps to understand and navigate the complex ways in which states as well as influential non-state actors engage with one another, how they define themselves and others, and how these shape the boundaries of the world within which they act.48 It helps explain how norms based on common ideas and values can help promote security and cooperation, and how significantly different ideologies can lead to conflict. Constructivism goes a long way in explaining how individuals and organizations influence policy decisions. However, constructivism alone can’t answer all policy issues. There are obvious gaps that require the application of realist and liberalist perspectives to comprehend modern international relations.49 In today’s complex, ever-changing environment, no theory is comprehensive enough to stand alone.50 Policy makers and senior advisors should consider the insights of each theory when articulating national security policy. Conclusion Theory cannot claim primacy over practice and implementation, but its understanding is a useful precursor for both. This is the central argument of this examination. As senior advisors, how we choose to explain national security issues inform the solutions we propose. Because national security policy is important to the practice of military affairs, it is paramount that senior military leaders develop a good understanding of those aspects affecting policy formulation. Improving this understanding can provide a stronger foundation for senior military leaders to engage more effectively with civilian leaders on defense-related policies. IR theory helps describe how policy makers see the world and how this influences policy making. Theory influences their perspectives and inform their biases and thus, deserve study and analysis. Three predominant schools of thought attempt to explain the way states behave: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. In general terms, realism focuses on state power, typically in relation to other states. For the United States, realist policies can translate into hegemonic actions designed to maintain preeminence in the world. Liberalism stresses the emphasis on democratic institutions and economic interdependence. This can prompt policies designed to maximize international cooperation through international bodies and trade at the expense of defense-related capabilities. Constructivism highlights the influence of shared norms, values, and ideas on state behavior. Normative policies generally focused on establishing international rules and norms of behavior states are expected to follow with heavy emphasis in the diplomatic and legal arenas. Theory, however, is no panacea. While these theories offer useful frameworks with which to observe international relations, they tend to either overemphasize or underestimate attributes in state behavior such as the primacy of power, the importance of interdependence or the necessity of norms. Thus, policy making and subsequent execution relying on one theory at the exclusion of others is risky. Senior military officers and policy advisors cannot be content with simply knowing what policy is. They must understand what policy does and the mechanisms available to recommend appropriate and effective policy. Having an understanding of how perceptions of the world and state behavior affect policy decisions is a way to do so. In this regard, IR theory remains essential for understanding world events, explaining their causes, assessing their impacts, and proposing suitable solutions. As Snyder suggests, “to use the insights of each of the three theoretical traditions as a check on the irrational exuberance of the others.”51 There is utility in theory, but it is the practitioners’ role to determine how they apply. Most importantly, it is the practitioner’s job to make the best use of them in order to advance national goals.

#### Totalizing claims of conflict are intellectually bankrupt.

Chan 20 – Professor of Political Science and Director of the Farrand Residence Academic Program at the University of Colorado, Boulder

Steve Chan, "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations," ISSF, 11-9-2020, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides#_Toc55574357>

Having said all of this, I very much agree with Wang that “States can go to war for a variety of reasons. Attempting to isolate a single cause for all wars is impossible. The proposition that war tends to break out during a power transition is better understood as a probabilistic—not deterministic—statement.” In order to assess the relevant probability of war, it is imperative that researchers develop a valid and comprehensive data base to enable such assessment. Sensible, consistent, and theoretically informed rules for the inclusion and exclusion of cases would be necessary to implement this data project. Otherwise, an analysis can be seen to engage in cherry-picking, ransacking history for evidence supporting its proposition(s).

## Alt

### 2AC---Alt Fails

#### Other social structures overwhelm the alt AND securitization theory is wrong.

Goddard and Krebs 15 – Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College; Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

Stacie Goddard and Ronald Krebs, “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It Should, and How It Can,” Duck of Minerva, 9-18-2015, http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlantic-divide-why-securitization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-it-can.html

Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others [are ignored] ~~fall on deaf ears~~. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security does not crowd out all other spending priorities—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. Nor does simply declaring something a matter of national security guarantee its funding—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

### 1AR---Alt Fails

#### Discourse changes fail — pragmatic approaches are key to solve.

Snetkov 17 – Senior Researcher at the ETH Zurich, Adjunct Lecturer at the Universities of Zurich

Aglaya Snetkov, “Theories, methods and practices – a longitudinal spatial analysis of the (de)securitization of the insurgency threat in Russia,” Security Dialogue, 4-7-2017, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010617701676

According to Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde’s foundational text of the theory of securitization, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), an issue can be non-politicized (it is not subject to public debate or policymaking), politicized (it is publicly debated and subject to policymaking) or securitized (it is presented as an existential threat, authorizing measures outside normal politics to address it), and ‘any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). The Copenhagen School model outlines that for an issue to be repositioned from the status of non-politicized or politicized to that of securitized requires an authorized and responsible actor to name it as an existential security threat to a particular referent object, and for this ‘securitizing move’ to be accepted by the relevant audience of this referent object, the endorsing of extraordinary measures to address it. In turn, desecuritizations are processes ‘in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (Buzan and Wæver, cited in Coskun, 2008: 405).

As such, the key aim of securitization theory is to identify what, when, where and how an issue is moved from being part of the normal environment of politics to becoming a threat to security and beyond the scope of normal politics – and vice versa (desecuritization). The Copenhagen School securitization model gained considerable popularity during the 2000s, and was applied to the empirical study of a diverse range of security issues, including the War on Terror (Buzan, 2006), immigration, trafficking and minority rights (Huysmans, 1998, 2000; Aradau, 2004; Sasse, 2005; Jutila, 2006), societal insecurity, human rights (Morozov, 2002), environmental politics, HIV/AIDS (Elbe, 2006) and EU security (Huysmans, 2000; Balzacq, 2008; Neal, 2009). However, it has also been the subject of a series of critiques and modifications from both its staunch supporters and ardent critics. As Ciută notes, this critique has three main strands: conceptual (structural issues particularly related to speech act theory and other necessary components of the model); epistemological (how securitization views contexts); and normative (related to the shift from securitization speech acts to practices of the political and the liberal) (Ciută, 2009: 302).

In light of these critiques, a ‘second-generation’ research agenda emerged among ‘contextual securitization scholars’ (Stritzel, 2012: 553), which is concerned with combining the formal aspects of the securitization model with a greater emphasis on examining the interrelationship between security politics and the contexts in which it operates. The aim of this agenda is to ‘construct a more comprehensive understanding of underlying processes’ by focusing on the ‘socio-linguistic and/or socio-political micro-dynamics of generating threats’ (Stritzel, 2012: 553; see also Balzacq, 2005, 2011; Guzzini, 2011; Salter, 2008; Stritzel, 2007, 2011; McDonald, 2008, 2011). Mirroring the original debate about the Copenhagen School model, the initial focus of such second-generation scholarship centred on analysing securitizing moves, while the inverse process of desecuritizing moves did not receive much attention (Coskun, 2008: 393). Recently, however, second-generation scholars have begun to delve more deeply into what it means to desecuritize an issue and ask what a desecuritized issue would look like (see Åtland, 2008; Aradau, 2004; Aras and Polat, 2008; Behnke, 2006; Cui and Li, 2011; Hansen, 2012; Knudsen, 2001; Roe, 2004; Wæver, 1995; Oelsner, 2005; Coskun, 2008; Salter, 2008; Klinke and Perombelon 2015).

These efforts have revealed a lack of basic consensus on the nature of desecuritization as a concept, model or process. As Coskun rightly points out, ‘the Copenhagen School does not suggest an explicit framework for its analysis as it has done for securitization’; ‘different scholars have interpreted and implied desecuritization differently’ (Coskun, 2008: 395). The notion that to analyse desecuritization is simply to follow the Copenhagen School securitization model, but in reverse, has proven problematic. Åtland (2008: 292) argues that, as opposed to securitization, ‘desecuritization does not necessarily happen as the result of a “speech act”. Rather, there are many other ways that an issue or issue-area can be moved out of the sphere of security politics and into the sphere of regular politics’. For many scholars, desecuritizing moves have come to be considered as the product of a wider management process, rather than a singular speech act or debate (for more on this debate, see Roe, 2004, 2006; Jutila, 2006).

#### The alt can’t overcome securitization.

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Basar Baysal, “20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework,” Uluslararasi Iliskiler, 7-1-2020, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1228409

In addition, by focusing on the illocutionary act, securitization is presented as happening within a single moment rather than as a process over time. Ole Wæver, for example, argues “the utterance itself is the act … by uttering security, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means to block it.”37 That is, securitization occurs just within the moment when the speech act is performed, and the audience has accepted it.38 Although this Schmittian stance has somewhat changed in the 1998 book39 by focusing on the securitizing move and the inherent processual nature of persuasion of the audience, the processual understanding of securitization is still limited. Still, in this framework of the Copenhagen School (successful) securitization ends with the persuasion of a sufficient number of right people and the start of the extraordinary measures.40 However, I argue that securitization should be considered as a process that includes the definition of security, discursive efforts to convince the audience, security practices that normalize and routinize the security definition, the clashes between rival security definitions and arguments, and the insecurities that result from these security practices. I further argue that securitization lasts until the issue is fully desecuritized. It can further be argued that securitization and desecuritization may occur simultaneously; some groups may be struggling to securitize an issue, while others may be working for its desecuritization.

The main shortcoming of Securitization Theory relevant for the argument of this study is the lack of the analysis of rival voices. Securitization is considered as truth construction. That is, the Securitizing actor proposes a truth claim and convinces audiences of this claim. The securitizing actor proposes a security definition in which s/he describes the threat, legitimate security provider, referent object, and legitimate means to deal with the issue. However, there are always rivals who reject this truth claim or, in most cases, counter truth claims, and definitions emerge. This a constant conflict between these truth claims, while constructing security issues means that a securitization analysis should also examine these rival voices. These rival voices may take the form of non-violent opposition or counter-securitization. To overcome this limitation, a dual approach is required to examine rival voices in the securitization process.

The lack of a dual approach in Securitization Theory means that a securitization analysis can only problematize one side, namely that of the securitizing actors, by revealing how they create security issues and use security discourses to achieve their own aims. In most cases, this actor is the state or other formal institutions like the EU. In most cases, however, particularly when counter-securitization emerges, other securitizing actors are involved that should also be problematized. These may also use extraordinary or violent means like the use of force. For example, in the securitization of a minority group in a country, the state may be the securitizing actor, which uses extraordinary means as a result of a securitization process. However, there may also be a counter-securitization against the state from within this minority group, and this securitizing actor may also be using extraordinary means against the state like the use of force. The sequence of the primary and counter-securitization may also change. Hence, both primary and counter-securitizations should be investigated in a comprehensive securitization analysis. However, it should be stated that there does not have to be a countersecuritization in all securitization cases. There may also be non-violent opposition depending on the contextual factors, but I argue that there are always rival voices in line with the argument of Foucault that “where there is power there is resistance.”41

### 2AC---Alt Fails---Realism

#### The Alt Fails – it can’t change realist structures.

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Marcelo de Araujo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology, 6-xx-2014, https://jetpress.org/v24/araujo.htm

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of **morally enhanced individuals** would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by **climate change**, grand scale **terrorist attacks**, or the risk of **catastrophic wars.** The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ **moral motivation**. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be **fewer wars, less terrorism**, and more **willingness to save our environment**. Although simple and attractive, **this assumption is**, as I intend to show, **false**. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an **old political arrangement** that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the **real possibility** of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, **biotechnology or nuclear capabilities.** The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that **“structural issues,”** rather than **human nature**, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the **survival of humankind**, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or **to reduce evil in the world**, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the **only, relevant actors** in the context of international relations; and second, that states **compete for power** in the international arena. **Moral considerations** in international affairs, according to realists, are **secondary** when set against the state’s primary goal, **namely its own security and survival**. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this **structure** that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor **security over morality**, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, **even if** human beings turn out to become **morally enhanced** in the future, humankind may still have to face the same **scary scenarios** described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that **in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary.** Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, **but the very structure of the political international system of states** within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to **dismantle their nuclear weapons**. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators **in the present as possible enemies in the future.** The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often **fail to cooperate,** and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, **even if,** in the future, political leaders become **less egoistic and power-seeking** through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of **bioengineering** is unlikely to yield the **expected results**, so long as moral enhancement is pursued **within the present framework of the international system of states.**

### 2AC---Securitization Inevitable

#### There’s no alternative to the current world order.

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Dillon Tatum, “Toward a Radical IR,” Duck of Minerva, 11-28-2018, http://duckofminerva.com/2018/11/toward-a-radical-ir.html

David Brook’s latest column in the New York Times, banging on the same themes about “the kids are just not right,” raises some questions about what it means to engage in radical politics in the Trump era. Brooks compares the younger generation’s belief “that the system itself is rotten and needs to be torn down” to accomodationist and gradualisms. He continues on to speculate about how these new attitudes might affect older, more “pragmatic,” liberals who desire to work within the system. Brooks, as usual, uses a conservative argument to position himself in the “middle.” I have been thinking a lot about this issue of “radicalism” contra arguments about working within systems that are unjust in thinking about liberal world order and its futures. It has led me to a question I am currently exploring in a work-in-progress about what the possibilities are of radicalism as a way of approaching international politics. Against arguments like Brooks’, and even more sophisticated arguments about agonistic democracy developed by thinkers like Chantal Mouffe, I think there is a place in IR for radical conceptions of transformation, order, and politics. What is radicalism? Brooks never fully fleshes out this concept. Philosophy and political theory have engaged with the issue of radicalism as a concept, though the results are often divergent. To quote Agnes Heller, in her treatise on radical philosophy, it “can give the world a norm, and it can will people to want to give a world to the norm.” Radicalism as an idea, and as a form of critique, mobilizes many different modes of thinking about the social and the political. The most comprehensive definition of radicalism is that provided by Paul McLaughlin, who defines radicalism “in terms of (i) a fundamental orientation (toward fundamental objects) (ii) in the political domain (iii) of an argumentative nature.” More than that, though, we can add that radicalism intervenes in the political domain with the goal of fundamental transformation. Additionally, though radicalism indeed proceeds in an argumentative nature, this methodology for argument is one that is aimed at critiquing, and seeking the destruction/replacement of existing institutions. A revised working definition of radicalism, therefore, is: a way of thinking about politics that focuses on totalities, praxis and political action, and the deployment of historicist methods with an eye toward “getting to the root of things.” Thus, radicalism is both a broad range of critical thought and practice, but also is specific in the realms of focus, action, and method. If Brooks is right that there is a major clash between a radical younger generation and a more pragmatic and moderate older generation in American politics, these differences are not well expressed in contemporary thinking about IR. Some of the biggest divisions are between what Robert Cox called “problem-solving theories” and theories that critique such approaches, but provide little argumentation aimed at tearing structures of injustice down altogether. In short: IR, even at its critical ends, is not radical (for an excellent exception see here and here). Why is this important? This morning, I taught a seminar on the question “Is Liberal World Order Finished?” I asked my students to think about what makes a liberal order “liberal,” and then asked: “Can we fix the liberal world order, or can we imagine a world without it?—and what would that look like?” The students were quick to point out the violences, inequities, and problems inherent in a liberal world order, but it took a good bit of pushing and prodding to get them to articulate whether/how we should/could take this order apart and rethink it. This was not just a difficult task for the students—it is something IR has not spent enough time meditating on. There is a lot to be critical of these days. And, I disagree with Brooks’s pessimism about a younger radical generation. Politics is deeply intertwined with engagements with radicalism. What I think is missing when we consider global politics, though, is that many of our pressing questions about institutions, order, and state action proceed from the same sort of moderation, accomodationism, or—at the most—an immanently critical vein. If we want to intellectually and politically approach issues like: What do we make of the future(s) of liberal world order? IR needs to engage with radicalism.

## Link Defense/Turns

**2AC---Russia Securitization Good**

**Russia is a geostrategic threat and labelling them as such is essential to maintain NATO cohesion and credibility---failure leads to deterrence collapse and Russian expansion**

**McInnis and Fata 22** – Senior fellow in the International Security Program and the director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense and a nonresident senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Kathleen J. McInnis and Daniel Fata, "Russia Still Threatens NATO Despite Military Failings," Foreign Policy, 5-20-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/20/russia-threat-nato-madrid-summit/?tpcc=recirc\_latestanalysis062921

Recent events in Ukraine have once again proved that reports of NATO’s death are an exaggeration. Many leaders across the alliance have been quick to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with aid to Kyiv, increases in their own country’s defense budgets, or both. But as the war grinds on and the **geopolitical reality** of an **adversarial relationship** with Russia sets in, NATO must once again take the **longer view** on what all this means for trans-Atlantic and global security.

Conveniently, in less than two months, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid to endorse the alliance’s new strategy. The key question, therefore, is whether member states will use the moment to reforge NATO’s raison d’être to meet current and future challenges—in particular, by naming Russia as a threat to the alliance itself. Given the implications of Ukraine for European and global order, **the stakes could hardly be higher.**

Some take the view that Madrid should mark a reprioritization of U.S. efforts away from Europe and back toward Asia. Their logic goes that not only is European defense spending increasing, but Russia has also demonstrated ineptitude in the prosecution of its war in Ukraine. That means the longer-term need for significant U.S. forces in Europe has also therefore declined. And, after all, China is the pacing threat for Department of Defense planning.

In fact, **the opposite is true**. For starters, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it **abundantly clear** that **he views NATO** as a **strategic threat**. Recent events suggest we should **take these statements** **at face value**. In the runup to the current war, some analysts developed **elaborate rationales** for why the buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border didn’t mean an invasion was coming, such as a strengthened negotiating position vis-à-vis Ukraine’s future political directions. Another Russian invasion of Ukraine was **so** **obviously** strategically counterproductive that there must have been another reason for the buildup. **In the event, there wasn’t.**

And while Russian military incompetence has been startling, planners **shouldn’t leap to conclusions**. Russian forces were not able to capture Kyiv, but they have been able to seize tens of thousands of square miles of territory along Ukraine’s eastern border—at least for now. Estonia, a Baltic NATO member that borders Russia, is less than 20,000 square miles in size. Militaries can also reform, especially after disaster, as Ukraine’s own army did after its failures in 2014.

The United States has **good reasons** to want to **keep NATO vibrant**: The **strategic benefits** of U.S. leadership are **manifold**. Not only does American leadership in NATO provide pathways for **organizing military coalitions**, but it also affords the United States privileged status on **trade partnerships** and **access to bases**. If Putin **achieves his aim** of **discrediting NATO**, this could lead to trans-Atlantic **strategic insolvency**: a situation whereby allies, including the United States, are **unable** to meet their **security obligations** and, relatedly, maintain favorable standards of living for their populations.

Which brings us back to Madrid. The last time that NATO agreed on a strategic concept was in 2010. It is a document that specified that, among other things, defense of allied territory remains a critical mission for the alliance, but it is silent on naming nation-state threats to NATO. For a variety of domestic and international political reasons, building formal consensus on threats among 30 allied states is extremely challenging. Indeed, in the 2010 document Russia is **viewed as an aspirational partner** for NATO when it comes to European security—despite the **warning sign** of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the intervening years, Russia has conducted **destabilizing disinformation campaigns** in NATO states and has **attacked Ukraine twice**. And while NATO leaders have condemned Russian aggression, the rhetoric falls short of formally declaring Russia as a long-term strategic threat to the alliance.

**Durable consensus requires clarity**. To **prepare NATO** to contend with this threat over the long term requires a **frank admission** of the **strategic realities that Russia poses** in the alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted in Madrid. As a practical matter, this will commit NATO members to take budgeting, force planning, acquisition, and possible troop repositioning seriously—and put teeth into the declaration. This is needed for NATO planners to determine, for example, whether spending 2 percent of GDP on defense is sufficient to meet the challenges to the alliance.

But the real value of the document is what the collective members reaffirm as to what NATO continues to stand for, what it calls out as the threats to the member territory, and what it intends to do to address, deter, and, if necessary, defend against these threats. By stating up front that **Russia is a** formal **threat**, member states—and the alliance as a whole—will find it **harder to backslide** from their **current cohesion**. It is **difficult to overstate** how important it is for NATO to ensure its **consensus is durable**; as the war grinds on and publics begin feeling the economic effects of the conflict and sanctions on Russia, the temptation to dilute support to Ukraine will undoubtedly mount. Not to mention, **calling it like it is** will **send an important message** to Putin: **NATO will not be deterred**.

**Words matter.** It is time for NATO leaders to formally **accept reality**: **Putin is a threat to the alliance and its members**, and, therefore, they should declare so in the news strategic concept. Indeed, **not declaring Russia a** formal **threat** to NATO territory would **compromise NATO’s credibility** and would **give Putin a pass** for the atrocities and violations he has committed in Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the United States can **afford to allow that** to happen.

### 2AC---Threats Real---Generic

#### Threats real, fear good, and demands key.

Meisel Citing Wittner 17 – Climate Writer; citing Professor of History Emeritus at SUNY

Duncan Meisel citing Lawrence Wittner, "Mass Mobilization Stopped Nuclear War Before and It Can Again," Toward Freedom, 10-31-2017, https://towardfreedom.org/archives/activism/mass-mobilization-stopped-nuclear-war-before-and-it-can-again

A common thread running through the entire post-1945 period is that people don’t want to think about nuclear war. When they’re forced to think of it, when they can’t escape it, they want to stop it. But when it’s not in the headlines any more and governments are growing more reasonable, they’d just as well not think about it. If nuclear war did break out today, you can bet more people would focus on it, but, of course, we don’t want that war to have to take place. The peace movement’s challenge is to maintain its momentum and sense of danger — even though the world might seem safer and there are fewer nuclear weapons in the world. If the nations of the world are maintaining their arsenals, the struggle hasn’t come to an end. Do you think the moment we’re experiencing today with Trump and North Korea is potentially a driving force for another peak of movement energy? What’s different today? It’s possible that there will be some revival of the nuclear disarmament movement, but we haven’t seen the surge of resistance yet. I’m a co-chair of the national board of the group Peace Action, so I’m very well aware of how peace groups are doing. While Peace Action isn’t doing badly, we’re certainly not yet experiencing the surge of action in the streets, such as when its predecessors, SANE and the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, were taking off. One reason it’s not taking place is that the mass media rarely focus on the danger of nuclear war, and when they do focus on it, it’s the danger of some other country waging war on the United States. One day it’s Iran, another day it’s North Korea — but they don’t seem to get to the basic problem that nine countries have 15,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenals. It’s a worldwide phenomenon, as is the persistence of the idea of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of national security. Right now there’s also a sense that only Koreans are vulnerable, that most Americans aren’t at risk of being bombarded by nuclear missiles. At the height of popular protest in the 1980s, millions of people were in the streets — in part because U.S. and Soviet arsenals could reach both sides quite easily. That got people to wake up and realize that nuclear war wasn’t such a hot idea after all. How big a role did fear play in these spikes of organizing? How can people dealing with fear of the Trump administration, or of North Korean nuclear mobilization, help direct that energy into making nuclear conflict less likely? I think fear has probably been the most important factor in mobilizing people. When you look at things psychologically, people should be afraid of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. It seems irrational to go bury your head in the sand and not worry about them. But it’s also true, in two ways, that fear is dangerous. One is that it can be demobilizing, that people get so scared they’re scared silent. They become so frightened they retreat and they don’t feel powerful any more. They might take drugs instead of taking action. A second danger is that, if people are scared of nuclear war, the hawks have an answer for them. They turn fear on its head: Yes, they say, nuclear war could be a bad thing, that’s why we need nuclear weapons to deter the bad Russians, Iranians, North Koreans and so on. This means fear may reinforce the desire for nuclear weapons rather than for getting rid of them. For these reasons, the use of nuclear fear has to be very careful. Peace activists have to make the case that as long as nuclear weapons exist there’s no real security from nuclear war, and therefore we need to get rid of nuclear weapons. That’s the best case that can be made by nuclear disarmament forces: The arms race is a race no one wins. What are some of the forgotten “paths not taken” of weapons not built or decisions not made as a result of anti-nuclear organizing? How might the world be different if those things had been built? The neutron bomb was being proposed during the Carter administration. This enhanced radiation weapon was designed to destroy people rather than property, and was scheduled by the Carter administration to be deployed in Western European nations. But once peace groups learned of it and began to focus on its terrible effects, this caused massive protests in Western European nations and, eventually, an unwillingness to support the neutron bomb deployment by their government officials. As a result, the Carter administration finally concluded that, if Western governments weren’t willing to stand up for it, the U.S. government wasn’t going to be the villain of the piece. So Carter canceled plans for its deployment. The MX missile was the jewel in the crown of the Reagan administration during its first term of office. Peace groups said that it was a first-strike weapon, and there was so much popular protest against it that Reagan couldn’t get funding through Congress. Eventually, a plan that began as 200 missiles barely slipped through with 50 missiles. That failure became the basis of the U.S. government’s push for strategic arms reduction treaties, for it meant the U.S. government couldn’t keep pace with development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. And the next best thing was seeing to it that neither country had those weapons. The best way to do that was to sign a treaty: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which Gorbachev welcomed and showed him, in many ways, to be a peace person, strongly influenced by the movement. Gorbachev had his own peace-oriented ideas, but he also received a large amount of information from the disarmament movement in the United States and around the world. He would take time out of his meetings with heads of state to meet with representatives of groups like the Freeze campaign, SANE, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. So, Gorbachev and Reagan’s detente and the overall drawback from the nuclear brink were heavily influenced by the peace movement — not just through public pressure but also through direct engagement. Are there other potentially winnable campaigns of this kind available to anti-nuclear weapons activists today that might limit the likelihood of the Trump administration using nuclear weapons? It seems to me there are two ways to develop mass pressure on Trump and Congress in connection with the general problem of nuclear weapons. The first has to do with the trillion dollar nuclear “modernization” program — the plan to upgrade the entire nuclear weapons complex, build new bombers and missiles and submarines and so on. That cost is so great that it provides the opportunity to reach people who are already concerned about the arms race or are satisfied with the weapons we already have and don’t want to bankrupt the country. So you can make demands for cutbacks in the “modernization” plan or stopping it entirely and mobilize a sympathetic constituency. A second way is to focus on Trump’s mental instability: The fact that he’s a reckless, dangerous leader, who really shouldn’t have the button to launch nuclear war in his hand. That’s what the currently proposed Markey-Lieu bill seeks to address: Under its provisions, unless there’s a nuclear attack on the United States, the president cannot initiate nuclear war without a Congressional declaration of war. Since Congress hasn’t declared war since 1941, that’s a pretty big restriction.

### 2AC---Experts Good

#### Experts are credible.

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Earl Ravenal, “Designing Defense for a New World Order,” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects--- a.k.a. pork---funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities---at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)---for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups---about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”---not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation---is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points--- empirically---to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### 2AC---Realism Good

#### Realist IR understandings are accurate and key to prevent international conflict.

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Rajesh Basrur and Frederick Kliem, “Covid-19 and international cooperation: IR paradigms at odds,” SN Social Science 11-9-2020, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43545-020-00006-4

The realist approach

In the realist view, the basic principles of international politics never change. International affairs always remain essentially a struggle for power among self-interested states. Since realism is not a unitary theory, different branches of realism rely on different independent variables. Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau see perpetual conflict rooted in an innately selfish human nature, which translates into competitive state behavior (Morgenthau 1985). Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz focus on an inherently competitive international system without a central organizing authority that monopolizes power to manage inter-state relations and protect states from one another (Waltz 1979). Within this anarchic international system, states are the primary actors and employ self-help strategies to survive and, depending on the exact branch of neorealism, to maximize power or security. Because of an inevitably asymmetric distribution of power, the anarchic condition of international affairs may compel weaker states to either balance against or bandwagon with more powerful ones. Neoclassical realists marry neorealism’s systemic assumptions with domestic level factors that either facilitate or circumscribe foreign policy, for instance domestic institutions, government-society relations, and leadership perception (Ripsman et al. 2016).

Realism is generally pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation and mutual support among states. It would immediately predict the national self-help and “us first” mentality that characterizes the global management of Covid-19 and its consequences. Travel and entry bans, international scapegoating, great power competition and pharmaceutical protectionism are ubiquitous.

Even in the world’s most integrated supranational organization, the European Union (EU), member states readily violate otherwise sacrosanct principles of cooperation, and realists would not be surprised by how quickly lofty European ideals and norms made way for national self-help once the Covid-19 crisis hit the continent. The outbreak was followed by immediate violation of many existing EU regulations: competition law, fiscal discipline, and freedom of movement. As countries closed their borders, EU capitals went into full nationalist gear (Guardian 2020a). Without any EU-consultation process, a number of EU countries immediately closed their borders and decreed export bans. When Italy, one of the worst affected countries in the world, asked fellow EU members for emergency relief with critical medical supplies, for several weeks it was met with precisely what realism would expect: its neighbors violated the EU’s single-market spirit by decreeing export bans on pharmaceutical equipment (Braw 2020; Reuters 2020).

Dismayed by the lack of European solidarity, Rome was happy to accept support from China, which, though itself badly affected, sent medical equipment and experts immediately. Far from being altruistic, however, Beijing aims to rewrite the Covid-19 narrative. It does not want to be seen as the point-of-origin of the Covid-19 virus and views the pandemic as an opportunity to come out ahead of the United States in a zero-sum competition for global primacy. In Italy and elsewhere, China’s “mask diplomacy” is a noteworthy public relations coup (Kliem and Chong 2020). Beijing wants to be recognized globally as a responsible provider of public health goods in the absence of US leadership, and thereby, progress towards its ultimate objective of comprehensive power accumulation relative to Washington.

Indeed, the US has not only been absent in terms of leadership, but has also actively engaged in nationalistic self-help at the expense of others. President Donald Trump of the United States, Europe’s closest non-EU ally and partner, tried to lure CureVac, a German firm that was developing a promising Covid-19 vaccine technology, to relocate its Covid-19 research and development division to the US and to guarantee exclusive American access to the firm’s products (Die Welt 2020). Similarly, Trump sought to block the sale of masks to Canada by a US-based firm (MacCharles and Ballingall 2020), though a compromise was arrived at later. The US (like other countries, e.g. Japan) has also sought to restructure global supply chains in order to bypass dependence on China (Pamuk and Shalal 2020), which—if it succeeds—will be a radical and long-term change.

Realists also point out that international institutions do not enable states to concentrate on greater long-term gains for everyone. Instead, international anarchy forces states to treat international organizations and institutions essentially like the international system itself: as an arena for zero-sum competition. Indeed, as realism predicts, the World Health Organization (WHO) has become highly politicized. For example, because of the PRC’s refusal to accept Taiwan as a diplomatically independent, sovereign nation state, the WHO disregards Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19 as well as related research and development results. Allegedly bowing to pressure from Beijing, the WHO does not recognize Taiwan and refuses to include Taipei’s very successful pandemic management strategies in its reports on global research efforts (Financial Times 2020). This also supports the neoclassical realists’ argument about domestic factors. It shows how domestic ideology shapes foreign policy decisions in China and hinders international cooperation.

If a severe transboundary global crisis cannot spur international cooperation, then what can? Realism reminds us that, because of the trust deficit systemically inherent in an international system characterized by anarchy, states hesitate to forgo their first instinct for self-help and zero-sum games, even amidst a common global challenge.

The liberal approach

Liberal theory highlights four imperatives for cooperation: interdependence, transnationalization, the growth of international institutions, and democracy (Doyle and Recchia 2011; Nye 1988).

When the fates of states are bound together, liberals claim, they must cooperate or pay a very high price. The global economy, for instance, is a complex network of trade, finance and manufacturing that places a premium on cooperation. From this perspective, states must cooperate to stem pandemics that flow seamlessly across the world and impose high costs on all societies. They must share knowledge and material resources to counter a scourge that harms them all. They certainly do so, for example, in US-led efforts to ensure the reliable availability of equipment to combat pandemics (Tribune 2020). But they do not cooperate consistently. The United States has sought to corner scarce medical supplies (Bradley 2020), European states have failed to coordinate policy (The Guardian 2020a), and China and the United States are squabbling over responsibility (Shi and Wu 2020). In short, the pattern is much as in another arena of contest between interdependent states: the as yet unfinished “trade war.”

Why? Interdependence does not automatically produce cooperation. It is only when the breakdown of interdependence raises the prospect of serious catastrophe that states cooperate. When nuclear-armed states are on the verge of war, for instance, they engage in tacit cooperation by practicing extreme caution and often seek explicit accommodation through talks, as was the case in Cold War crises. Even so, they continue to compete through arms racing, alliance building and occasional brinkmanship. Comparatively low levels of interdependence amidst the Covid-19 outbreak are unlikely to generate high levels of cooperation as the threat to national survival is limited.

The onset of pandemics has certainly produced unprecedented cooperation among epistemic communities, such as virologists, in a transnationalized world. Scientists from many countries have worked together to manage the threat of a viral outbreak ever since the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002. The appearance of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012 quickly led to the activation of a scientific network that has been dubbed the “SARS club” (Butler 2012). More broadly, the onset of MERS spurred global research, producing as many as 883 scientific papers in 92 countries between 2012 and 2015 (Zyoud 2016). Likewise, as the New York Times has noted, the Covid-19 outbreak has galvanized unparalleled cooperative research in which scientists have bypassed standard protocols and competitive secrecy to engage in shared efforts (Apuzzo and Kirkpatrick 2020). But, not for the first time, politics has trumped cooperation. The possibility of a quantum leap in global scientific collaboration has been stymied by the China-US spat, which has reduced the prospects of shared funding and finance to fight the virus. The US, for instance, stopped funding of a critical coronavirus-related training program for Chinese and other scientists even before the current outbreak. National priorities have overridden collective action, which is entirely in accord with realist expectations (Baumgaertner and Rainey 2020).

The same malaise afflicts international institutions, which liberals see as fostering high levels of cooperation. The Group of 7 major economies (G7) failed to organize a summit meeting in March 2020, while a subsequent meeting of their foreign ministers came up with no more than an anodyne statement seeking to foster research cooperation and do “whatever is necessary” to counter the economic fallout of the crisis even as they disagreed on whether China was to blame for the onset of the crisis (Schult 2020). The G20 did not do much better. It did support debt relief for poor countries, but its announced $5 trillion injection into the global economy was in fact no more than the sum of moneys already committed by its individual members for themselves (Chodor 2020). The institution at the center of the crisis, the WHO, has been acknowledged as critical to the information flow relating to the crisis. But the WHO has also been dogged by controversy for announcing the onset of the pandemic late (on 11 March, by which time it had already spread to 113 countries) and for apparently deferring to China in doing so (Basrur 2020). Such failings have brought much criticism and calls for its reform (South China Morning Post 2020).

Finally, democracy is said to be a binding factor, at least among developed economies. This is largely true with respect to the relationship between democracy and war. But the evidence is not persuasive in the present context. Developed democratic states in Europe and North America have engaged in recurring tugs of war over the sharing of counter-pandemic resources such as protective equipment and ventilators and have done relatively little to take collective action (Cohen and Musmar 2020). Overall, liberal theory does not have much to offer to explain the weak nature of international cooperation in the crisis.

Ideational approaches

The constructivist approach is an essentially ideational theory (or set of theories) that stresses the importance of belief structures, identities and roles, holding that, fundamentally, the ways in which actors behave in international politics are shaped by a consensus about reality and appropriate responses to it (Onuf 1989). From this standpoint, responses to the Covid-19 crisis are determined by deeply embedded beliefs about the priorities that states should adhere to in such a situation. The possibilities of cooperation, from a constructivist perspective, are not circumscribed by the anarchic condition in which states coexist (as realists would have it), but by our beliefs about what is feasible and what is not in such a condition (Pouliot 2011). The central dictum of the constructivist—“anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992)—thus sees the lack of collective action in the face of the pandemic not as an inevitable product of the material reality of the world as it actually is, but as arising from a realist thought structure. To wit, states fail to cooperate despite the urgency of the Covid-19 crisis because they are weighed down by the unquestioned notion that, even under the onslaught of a pandemic, self-help must come first, and the exercise of power must shape action. This worldview, for the constructivist, is an ideational construct that needs to be overridden if cooperation is to be achieved.

It is to the credit of constructivism that it widens the space for potential change by critiquing the realist perception of unalterable reality. However, while the concept of ideational structure is helpful in challenging established modes of thinking (and consequent habits of action) over time, it is not particularly helpful in offering insights into the short-to-medium-term responses of states to crises like the pandemic or to anticipating what, in fashioning states’ responses, might actually be do-able and what probably will not. On the contrary, since constructivist thinking views both cooperation and conflict in terms of thought structures, it explains very little as far as responses to the current crisis go. In short, constructivism is not a predictive theory and tends to be non-falsifiable and, more pragmatically, lacking in much utility other than urging new thinking. How to get from the present ideational structure to a more desirable one when a crisis breaks out remains a knotty problem.

Normative theory, which centers on moral judgment about what should be—as distinct from the materialist view of international politics as what is—is similarly problematic (Ramel 2011). Certainly, it offers useful space for the identification of responsibility when a crisis breaks out. The analyst may adopt two basic approaches that Robert Gregory labels “backward-mapping” and “forward-mapping” (Gregory 1998). The former looks at the origin and history of the policy process and how they might have created or contributed to the problem. In the present case, one would ask: who was responsible for the outbreak of the pandemic? A second question would be: was policymaker X warned about the problem and did he/she take action to avert it or mitigate its potential consequences? The latter approach considers the policy action taken at the time of the crisis. Did the policymaker act appropriately once the crisis had broken out? While both are normative questions, they also have strong practical implications. The attribution of responsibility relates to the consequences of the policymaker’s actions and to whether the individual held responsible was fittingly sanctioned or punished for it, whether legally or politically. This has important implications. If the person or persons responsible is/are not in some way punished, he/she/they may tend to repeat this or similar errors and cause a recurrence of societal harm. Here, China would certainly be one center of analysis, as questions mount as to whether Beijing took the necessary steps to share information once the outbreak of the novel Coronavirus was first confirmed by Chinese medical doctors in late December (The Guardian 2020b). As mentioned above, the WHO too is open to the charge of prioritizing political expediency by not including Taiwan in its assessments and recommendations.

The problem, however, of explaining why states behave as they do remains. The attribution of responsibility for a crisis is normally only a post facto phenomenon and does little to inform the analyst as to why international cooperation as a pattern of behavior does or does not occur. Even more, the scope for anticipating future behavior remains uncertain at best. Like constructivism, normative theory is valuable in understanding critical aspects of international cooperation or the lack of it, but it misses some of the most important facets of international reality: it fails to explain why states tend to let competition override cooperation when individual and collective interests collide.

Conclusion: realism redux

Much post-Cold War academic thinking gave the appearance of a “transition” in the way intellectuals view global politics: a “decline” of realism and the rise of alternative approaches in apex-level scholarly research (Maliniak et al 2011). However, this analysis shows that alternative paradigms in IRT have much less grasp over the current crisis than realism. The continued dominance of the state and of individual national interests over collective interests in the absence of effective international authority is evident in global responses to the pandemic. Realism tells us that, because of the systemic trust deficit in international affairs, especially in times of crises, states will turn to self-help and zero-sum calculations rather than to cooperative collective action. It is evident that precisely such behavior dominates the global management of the Covid-19 crisis. To be sure, cooperation does occur, but only when it does not clash with national interest.

Going forward, a realist would expect further restrictions on international exchange in order to minimize the threat and at least a temporary but nonetheless significant scale-down of globalization, as it were. The economic effects of the crisis are likely to be severe and unpredictable, and likely to include recession, flight of capital, widespread impoverishment, fall in agricultural output, and increased deaths from other diseases such as malaria and HIV (Congressional Research Service 2020; Economist 2020; Shiller 2020). These will be subject to the same dynamics of cooperation and conflict as described here, in particular in the context of Sino-US competition.

Rather worryingly, the Covid-19 crisis also points to what global action on other critical issues such as climate change, severe economic dislocation, or the apocalyptic consequences of nuclear war could look like in the future. They will in all probability not induce intense global cooperation to manage common challenges, but instead spur nationalism, zero-sum competition and the application of power to secure the objectives of individual nations.

On the positive side, realism also tells us that states try to imitate the successful activities of their peers. Governments may look jealously upon one another, but they will also adopt those measures used by others that are seen to be working. In that sense, we can place hope in the ability of Europeans and Americans to emulate successful measures taken by states like New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan to contain the spread of Covid-19.

Clearly, while all branches of IRT have something to offer, realism is best equipped to explain and anticipate the ambit of international cooperation in a crisis of the magnitude of the Covid-19 pandemic. Discounting its value can only subtract from the potential of IR as a discipline to meet its social function.

#### **Realism is accurate AND the only methodology to analyze threats.**

de Araujo 14 – Professor of Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeir

Marcelo de Araujo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology, 6-xx-2014, https://jetpress.org/v24/araujo.htm

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

## AI

### 2AC---Securitization Good

#### Military applications of AI are inevitable, so de-securitizing isn’t an option. The risks are real and pretending they aren’t risks undermining effective governance strategies. National security framing is key for building trust.

Gill 19 – Executive Director of the Secretariat of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation, Project Director and CEO of the International Digital Health & AI Research Collaborative

Amandeep Singh Gill, Artificial Intelligence and International Security: The Long View, 2019, Ethics & International Affairs, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/artificial-intelligence-and-international-security-the-long-view/4AB181EAF648501422257934982A4DD5

An Agenda For Ensuring Security and Stability in the Age of AI

The starting point for dealing with the international security implications of AI must be the acknowledgment that we are in it for the long haul. There will be no quick fixes. The economic, political, and security drivers for mainstreaming this suite of technologies into security functions are simply too powerful to be rolled back. There will be plenty of persuasive national security applications—minimizing casualties and collateral damage through better discrimination of targets, fighting crime, defeating terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases—to provide counterarguments against concerns about runaway robots or accidental war caused by machine error.

This acknowledgment must be accompanied by an intensification of crossdomain literacy. AI cannot be the business of coders and cognitive scientists alone; nor can its security implications be the province only of diplomats, generals, and lawyers. Given the broad impact that AI businesses can have on society, the business of AI has to be everyone’s business. Governance of AI can only be based on a correct understanding of the power and limits of the technology, and such governance can only be effective globally if it is part of a tiered approach that includes actors at the intergovernmental, national, and industry levels.

Currently, though military investments in AI are being acknowledged, no state admits to the existence of lethal autonomous weapon systems in its inventory. Thus, if we want to build mutual confidence and trust, we are left either to add discussions on such systems to existing dialogues on cybersecurity and arms control more broadly or to begin with new dialogues on approaches to repurposable civilian capabilities. The latter might be a more productive venue for engaging the private sector, which is wary of being stigmatized by civil society as the maker or facilitator of “killer robots.” Tagging on discussions of AI to cybersecurity or traditional arms control would also be unhelpful because of the risk of false analogies.

Thus, new innovatively structured dialogues in the track setting (involving both government and nongovernmental parties) or the track setting (involving artificial intelligence and international security only informal nongovernmental parties) are required. The first objective should be to enhance mutual understanding through in-depth discussions on national approaches to AI development, testing and validation, deployment, and use. Another objective should be to allow some sharing of best practices or cautionary experiences. A third potential objective would be to shift thinking from zerosum competitive approaches to collaborative problem-solving using data and algorithmic insights pooled by the participants themselves or put in escrow with a trusted third party.

Agreement on norms to govern the military use of AI could take time, but influencing the direction of such use by other means brooks no delay. One important channel for shaping AI use globally is guiding principles short of binding law. At a time when there are trust deficits among nations and multilateral negotiations are at best seen as opportunities for “lawfare,” it makes sense to rally around shared values and ethical principles. In the context of emerging technologies, such an approach also permits more of an impact early on in the innovation cycle, when national or international regulatory reach is absent or ambiguous. Consistent with this logic, the EU High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence has identified five principles—beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy of humans, justice, and explicability—for the trustworthy and ethical development of AI.

More specifically, in the context of military use, in the Group of Governmental Experts of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), comprised of states and including all countries thought to be pursuing national security applications of AI, identified ten guiding principles on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. These principles cover aspects related to the applicability of international humanitarian law, human responsibility, accountability, risk assessment and mitigation, and the need to take a nonanthropomorphic view of such systems. The guiding principles are accompanied by building blocks of common understandings on definitions and the nature of human intervention required throughout the various stages of technology development and deployment to uphold compliance with international law, in particular international humanitarian law.

Another channel for the soft governance of AI could be engineering standards and codes. At a minimum, a common vocabulary for assessing risks and aligning design with safety and reliability considerations is needed. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems has started building a shared, multidisciplinary, and evolving resource of terms. There is further scope for constructing common standards that can progressively align practices around the globe to responsible principles.

Last Word

There is a growing concern over the repurposing of AI technologies for warfare. As with cyber weapons, LAWS could have indiscriminate effects and be turned around to attack the attackers.They can create challenges for the application of international humanitarian law principles, such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution, all of which presuppose a degree of human reflection and control. Their international security implications are still unfolding but could be as significant as the nuclear revolution in warfare, if not more so. Innovative and agile ways of governing the use of AI are needed urgently to head off risks to international peace and security.

#### Analysis through nation-states and security is good.

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6. The two faces of security – and of peace Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested political authority. Often it is enacted through violent power, rebranded as legitimate force. Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But although security is a deeply disputed idea, it is also a highly necessary one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, as a frame for policy and as a moral narrative. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as essential to the preservation of peace. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency to slide from global, to national, to citizen and to human security and back again, without enough serious reflection on how they interconnect and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong. The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with eachother. On the one hand, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily transforming the conditions giving rise to this violence or attending to the quality of the subsequent peace. In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative nonstate or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most acute. For in practice it protects socially embedded power, established property relations and social privilege – and reinforces global, national and local inequalities. On the other hand, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to social peace and protection from violence, abuses of rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. It connects to the idea of ‘positive peace’, including transformations in the social conditions giving rise to violence and deepening the relationships between states and their citizens. The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people fall back upon their social identities – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to respond to insecurity and violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these identities are written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed to establish hierarchies of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘Security in the vernacular’ paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by those who challenge the deeply rooted legacies of insecurity, exclusion and injustice. Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or a region or locality is considered to be secure. Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they should be. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of social order, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both affairs of governance and vital concerns for everyone who lives under the leaky umbrella of political authority. Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law, and effective and accountable security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects conditions of the security of people. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but also because of the need for constant vigilance to ensure that those charged with delivering security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to protect.

### 2AC---Securitization Good---Nuclear

#### Multilateral AI securitization reduces distrust and alleviates tensions – that prevents nuclear war

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Edward Geist and Andrew J. Lohn, “How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?” RAND Corporation, 2018, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html>.

Overall workshop participants agreed that **AI has significant potential to upset the foundations of nuclear stability and undermine deterrence by the year 2040,** especially in the increasingly multipolar strategic environment. Dismissing the Hollywood nightmare of malevolent AIs trying to destroy humanity with nuclear weapons, experts were instead concerned with more-mundane issues arising from improving capabilities. AI applications discussed included the ability to track and target adversary launchers for counterforce targeting and the incorporation of AI into decision support systems informing choices about the use of nuclear weapons.

Some experts fear that an increased reliance on AI could lead to new types of **catastrophic mistakes.** There may be pressure to use it **before it is technologically mature**; it may be **susceptible** to **adversarial subversion**; or adversaries may believe that the AI is more capable than it is, leading them to make **catastrophic mistakes**.

On the other hand, if the nuclear powers manage to **establish a form of strategic stability** compatible with the emerging capabilities that AI might provide, the machines could **reduce distrust** and **alleviate international tensions**, thereby **decreasing the risk of nuclear war.**

At present, we cannot predict which—if any—of these scenarios will come to pass, but **we need to begin considering the potential impact of AI on nuclear security before these challenges become acute**. Maintaining strategic stability in the coming decades may prove extremely difficult, and all nuclear powers will have to participate in the cultivation of institutions to help limit nuclear risk. This goal will demand a fortuitous combination of technological, military, and diplomatic measures that will require rival states to cooperate. We hope that this Perspective will begin that discussion and open a path toward pragmatism and realism on these controversial and often polarizing topics.

### 2AC---Securitization Inev

#### AI representations by foreign actors mean securitization is inevitable

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Jinghan Zeng, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 14, Issue 3, Pages 417–445, Autumn 2021, <https://doi-org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/10.1093/cjip/poab005>

Geopolitically speaking, China’s national approach towards AI and moves to make it a security matter are fuelled by ever more competitive United States–China relations. Each side’s perception of the other’s AI advancement as a threat accelerates the securitization process. In the domestic arena, where the primary concern is the regime security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the practical use of AI and its relevant discourses are geared to securing authoritarian rule. In this regard, China’s bold AI experiments practice a unique digital technocracy, making its AI approach quite distinct from that in Western societies.

Currently, this securitization is an ongoing process. Although the extent of its impact on targeted audiences, namely, local governments, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public, remains unclear, all nevertheless enthusiastically echo the central government’s AI campaign. In this regard, such securitization appears to convince domestic actors. However, it also generates unintended consequences. They are: (i) creation of a nationalistic environment that makes China less attractive to global AI labor and capital; (ii) impaired industrial efficiency by virtue of focusing on self-reliance; (iii) obstruction of China’s global AI governance leadership; (iv) reinforced technological rivalry due to disregard for potential global AI cooperation; and (v) constraints on the global access of Chinese AI companies. All could undermine China’s key objectives of fostering a booming AI economy and becoming a global AI leader.

Indeed, securitization of AI has progressively become a global movement. In the United States and Europe, for example, the AI advancements of geopolitical competitors, especially Russia and China, are often perceived as a potential threat to national and international security. The relevant speech act frames AI not as a normal technology, but as a national security matter that justifies the enablement of extraordinary actions from the state and society. In effect, it signifies the urgent need to deploy more resources and support, for example, in the US case, not only to the American AI-enabled military sector, but also the AI commercial industry.

This article focuses on how AI is securitized within China. Needless to say, the securitization process works differently in the Chinese context, given its unique state-society relations. Despite a non-liberal democratic setting, however, there is still a need to convince the domestic audience and thus win more support for China’s national AI plan. Table 1 categorizes the arguments into the securitization framework. It argues that the Chinese central government, as the securitizing actor, is performing a securitizing move by labeling China’s AI advancement as a matter of security. In the relevant discourses, the national interests and survival of the Chinese nation constitute the referent object that needs to be protected. As part of the central government’s AI campaign to mobilize domestic actors, this performative act aims to convince the domestic audience including local, subnational, academic actors, market actors, and the mass, as the rest of the article will explore.

The relevant securitizing move belongs to the type of securitization referring to a directive elementary speech whose aim is to raise an item on the agenda.36 It consists of “three sequential, elementary speech acts,” including claim, warn, and request.37 In this case, the State Council of China aims to raise its audience’s awareness of AI’s importance, and requests the relevant actions. As the quote at the beginning of the article claims and warns, other countries (i.e. China’s competitors) are elevating AI as a significant national strategy for the sake of national security.

The document also claims that, as China lacks significant original AI innovations, China’s overall AI development lags behind that of other great powers.38 As such, it requests the nation’s prioritization of AI advancement to protect national security. On the heels of this request comes the setting of the broad goal to make China a leading AI power, along with a three-step plan and a targeted timeline to: (i) catch up with the AI technological progress of world-leading countries such as the United States by 2020; (ii) make major breakthroughs in certain AI technologies by 2025; and (iii) become a global leading AI power by 2030.39 In short, the Chinese central government is labeling AI as a national security matter and highlighting the threat of falling behind in efforts to convince domestic actors to support its action plan.

The serious damage American sanctions have inflicted on Chinese tech companies has heightened China’s awareness of both its technological weakness and feelings of insecurity in regard to global reliance. Understandably, therefore, China wants to master leading AI technology independently. As Xi Jinping elaborates:

accelerating the development of a new generation of AI is an important strategic handhold for China to gain the initiative in global science and technology competition…We need to ensure that the core AI technologies are firmly in our own hands.62

China’s AI aspirations extend to global leadership. Since China’s rise, the US-led global order has left China dissatisfied due to the limits it places on China’s say in global norms and rules.63 Rather than a norm-taker, China now aspires to be a norm-shaper, or even a norm-maker. Many Chinese scholars argue that current established norms are geared primarily to serving interests other than those of China.64 To maximize Chinese interests, therefore, future norms should be defined by/for China, and on Chinese terms.

In addition to history and geopolitics, China’s securitizing move also has a domestic context. Certain scholars see AI as exerting two types of impact on China’s national security—traditional and non-traditional.80 The former refers to the military threat, namely the aforementioned use of AI in warfare; the latter includes such non-military sources as political security, economic security, environmental security, cyber security, and energy security.81 However, most important is the so-called political security (政治安全) or institutional security (制度安全), i.e., regime security.

As far as regime security is concerned, the bold and controversial AI practices China applies to state governance is an inevitable topic. As part of the CCP’s adaptation strategy in the digital age, China has invested heavily in AI technologies in order to advance towards digital governance. Such AI investment expects returns in the form of improved public services (by enhancing efficiency), and maintenance of authoritarian rule.82 AI’s empowerment of digital surveillance is widely discussed among international analysts, having been used to upgrade China’s sophisticated state surveillance program and potentially reshape state-society relations.83 Although similar—though less intensive and extensive—AI surveillance programs have been implemented worldwide, due to privacy concerns they have met with considerable social resistance in Western societies in efforts to balance states’ use of AI.84 In China, however, there is scant legal constraint on the relevant AI practices. For example, China has pioneered AI facial recognition technology, which has been restricted, or even banned in many Western societies. Meanwhile, to reduce social resistance, the Chinese government has proactively guided public opinion on AI by framing it as positive and modern social progress that is of enormous benefit in securing public safety, as will be discussed later.

Certain Chinese scholars also link AI with economic security. Li Zheng from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, for example, holds that sustaining the current socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics is the core of China’s economic security.85 In essence, this economic security extends to regime security, i.e., securing the CCP’s rule. In spite of its quasi-capitalist market reforms, the CCP’s economic policies have always been constrained by its ideological commitment to being a communist entity.86 Thus, in the interests of its political legitimacy, the CCP must uphold certain socialist responsibilities. Li argues that AI will be able not only to improve socioeconomic governance, including market supervision, and fight economic crime, but also strengthen the CCP’s capability to manage the macro and microeconomy.87

### 1AR---Securitization Inev

#### Chinese securitization makes AI competition inevitable

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This article shows that the Chinese central government is performing a securitizing move by labeling AI as a security matter in order to convince local states, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public. But if AI is indeed being securitized, so what? Although it is difficult to quantify the exact impact of this securitizing move, it undoubtedly helps the Chinese central government’s mobilization of domestic actors towards advancing its AI agenda. Nevertheless, this move also generates unintended consequences for the securitizing actor’s goal in the long run. According to the State Council’s AI plans, its three-step AI plan carries the specific goals of fostering a booming AI economy, and a grand goal of becoming a global AI leader.125 Securitization may undermine these key objectives for several reasons.

First, a highly securitized AI sector will affect the flow of foreign AI labor and capital to China’s AI industry. To make it attractive to global talent and capital, a booming AI industry requires an outward-looking, open-minded, and international socio-politico-economic environment. However, the securitization trend is pushing in the opposite direction by producing a rising nationalistic, inward-looking, security AI discourse. This is counterproductive to China’s AI ambitions, because it puts China at a disadvantage in the global market. More specifically, there is a global shortage of AI talent and, as previously mentioned, China is short of 5 million or more qualified AI industry workers. This has led to fierce global competition in the AI industry for qualified workers, to the extent where Chinese tech companies offer extremely—or unreasonably—high salaries.126 Such financial attraction, however, could be offset by an unfavorably nationalistic domestic environment.

Second, the securitization trend could hinder economic efficiency. As previously discussed, it contributes to the rise of a self-reliance discourse on technology whose creation is often at the cost of economic efficiency. Precisely because China is lagging behind in AI development, it needs to make use of the global AI supply chain to catch up. However, the self-reliance discourse considers the risk of relying on foreign technology too high, and thus focuses on “Made in China.” Such self-reliance is difficult (if not impossible) to realize in the short run, and hinders China’s ability to benefit from the global AI market and thus maximize industrial efficiency. Similarly, the securitization of AI in the United States also undermines the appeal that America holds for Chinese national AI talent, capital, and technology. Growing tension between China and the United States has, moreover, undermined Chinese companies’ willingness to invest in the United States. In the long run, therefore, securitization is detrimental to the competitiveness of the American AI industry.

Third, in connection with the above paragraph, the domestic inward-looking nationalistic trend that securitization has created hinders China’s realization of global leadership. To lead AI in the global arena, China must provide public goods and win support from others through successful partnerships. It must play a key role in promoting global governance and, as a global leader, act according to common interests rather than solely national interests. However, a security-focused, inward-looking, nationalistic AI discourse is helpful to neither global governance nor common interests. For example, it can foster the rise of inward-looking national AI policies that prioritize national interests over those of the globalized world. This is in direct contrast to global governance goals, i.e., to build a shared future through global solidarity. Indeed, many of the problems that AI has created, such as those relating to ethics, represent collective challenges to humankind that require a globally concerted response. Inward-looking national AI policies may contribute to a fragmented global governance structure, and thus obstruct concerted global actions to address AI problems.

Fourth, the securitization trend has reinforced technological rivalry at the expense of the potential for global AI cooperation, and will likely exacerbate the United States–China confrontation. This is not to deny the existence of United States–China cooperation in the field of AI. However, by speaking of AI in the language of security and a global race, the relevant security AI discourse emphasizes competition over cooperation and destruction over creation. This may produce a real security threat, and perhaps an actual global AI race, thus undermining the space for cooperation from which both the United States and China can benefit. In other words, the rivalry discourse adopts a zero-sum geopolitical angle for understanding AI innovation that is inevitably to the latter’s detriment in both countries.127

More importantly, securitization may push AI further into the hard security area by virtue of its military applications. The securitizing actor tends to exaggerate the security threat to achieve a successful securitization, so enhancing the strategic risks of AI military practices and increasing the likelihood of war, and of escalating ongoing conflicts. In this regard, a highly securitized AI politics may set China and the United States on a dangerous path towards a catastrophic confrontation that imperils everyone’s interests and security. In the worst case scenario, as in all arms races, blithe assertions about the inevitability of AI-enabled war are a self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecy. In this regard, the aforementioned Fu Ying’s call to regulate AI’s military application merits more attention.

Lastly, by strengthening state involvement in China’s AI industry, securitization may undermine the interests of Chinese AI companies. The boundary between the state and the market is always far less defined in China than in other countries, due to China’s political environment. Making AI a national security matter justifies the necessity for heavier state involvement, if not control. Although a blessing in the Chinese domestic market, close ties with the state are a burden on the global stage. Take the aforementioned civil-military integration as an example. Although helpful in gaining China’s AI companies and research institutes more state funding, it undermines their global access. Close relations with the Chinese government have caused certain Chinese AI companies, including members of the “national AI team of China,” to be subjected to punishment, in the form of the aforementioned American sanctions. In this regard, securitization could hinder the access of China’s AI companies to the global market, and hence their future development. It also remains to be seen whether heavier state involvement in the AI industry hinders market efficiency.

### 2AC---AT: No AI Threat---China

#### AI revolutionizes Chinese military capabilities – gives them the capacity to create asymmetric advantages over the US

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Alex Stephenson and Ryan Fedasiuk, “How AI would – and wouldn’t – factor into a U.S.-China War,” War on the Rocks, 05-03-2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-ai-would-and-wouldnt-factor-into-a-u-s-chinese-war/>

How AI Could Enhance Chinese Capability

The most likely sources of a potential U.S.-Chinese conflict, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or a contest over some South China Sea feature, would likely feature the full spectrum of civil and military information operations aimed at deterring U.S. intervention and degrading U.S. allies’ will to fight. AI could play a dominant role in each of these missions. The Network Systems Department of the People’s Liberation Army, for example, may try using generative language models to synthesize and amplify content on Facebook and Instagram, as it has done using botnets and other non-AI tools around Taiwanese elections. The Chinese military is also likely to wage a similar campaign to discredit U.S. military activities or sow division with partners, including Australia and Japan.

Soon after the start of a conflict, the People’s Liberation Army would likely attack U.S. sensor and communication networks, and several different kinds of machine-learning applications could aid this task. A cadre of scientists at the People’s Liberation Army National University of Defense Technology, for example, specializes in “fuzzing,” using machine learning to identify vulnerabilities in an adversary’s computer networks. Experts also point to AI’s role in attacking or defending critical infrastructure in Taiwan, Japan, Australia, or the United States.

Chinese planners also aim to use AI for electronic countermeasures and operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. For example, analysts from anquan neican (a Chinese journal for cybersecurity research) are optimistic about cognitive electronic warfare — using AI to analyze incoming radar signals, and then automatically adapting one’s own output to optimize jamming. But several other applications of AI also play a role in electronic spectrum operations. In 2020, for example, the People’s Liberation Army awarded equipment contracts for swarms of drones equipped with modular radar-jamming systems, which could be flown near U.S. carrier strike groups, military installations in Japan and South Korea, or shared facilities in the Philippines. Many systems under development by Chinese universities and military research institutions are explicitly designed to counter U.S. drone systems and swarm concepts. Chinese companies have already exported drones to Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, among others. However, while some People’s Liberation Army experts contend that these drones have been “battle tested,” others are less sanguine about their capabilities in a real conflict.

Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army may attempt to use AI to enhance the lethality and reach of its surface ships and anti-access and area denial systems, which could hold U.S. forces at risk during a crisis. China’s current approach to territorial defense relies on hundreds of short- to long-range ballistic missiles that would target U.S. aircraft carriers and strike aircraft based in mainland Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and as far away as Guam. As early as 2016, Wang Changqing, director of the General Design Department of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, claimed that the company’s next generation of cruise missiles would use AI to adapt to specific combat conditions, being capable of adjusting flight profiles and even warhead yield. Chinese defense industry engineers appear inspired by the U.S. Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, which uses AI to improve accuracy and achieve more flexible targeting.

Finally, the People’s Liberation Army is building a wide array of autonomous vehicles and extensive undersea sensor networks that make use of AI and big-data analytics. These systems may be useful in recording and transmitting the locations of U.S. undersea vehicles, and would be crucial to overcoming the Chinese military’s disadvantages in undersea warfare. Large unmanned submarines, such as the HSU-001 and Haishen-6000, could be equipped with sea mines to deny the U.S. Navy access to undersea space between the first and second island chains, or to restrict access to the Taiwan or Luzon Straits.

Of course, AI has the potential to revolutionize Chinese operations in countless other ways, including through predictive maintenance, logistics, and back-office tasks not discussed in depth in this article. In any case, it is clear that the People’s Liberation Army is banking on the technology to create asymmetric advantages vis-a-vis the United States.

**Cyber**

**2AC---FW**

**Research in academic spaces can generate policy-relevant information necessary to navigate cyberspace. A focus on state-policy can be combined with critical approaches BUT abandoning statism makes relevant research impossible.**

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Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855

A second approach focuses on why cyber norms emerge only slowly, building on the existing IR norms literature (Finnemore & Hollis, 2016). Early works in this area focused on the debate among states, especially at the United Nations, followed by a growing number of proposal from the private and the civil sector (Hurwitz, 2014). However, cyber norms remain contested at the international level (Grisby, 2017). More recently, the interest of researchers shifted to the role of the creators (mostly private entities) and exploiters (sub-, semi-, and non-state actors) of digital technologies in shaping the behavioral standards that new regulation needs to take into account (Hurel & Lobato, 2018). **States** need to know how their **intelligence services** work in cyberspace, because through their **tools** and **practices** they set practical norms of acceptable (**cyber) espionage** with far-reaching effects on **state behavior** in **cyberspace** (Georgieva, 2019). The focus on the role of **intelligence** agencies in cyber conflict–as both the biggest threat and the most **capable provider** of **safety**–opens up interesting questions linked to the **larger transformation** of these agencies in the context of the **digitization of society**. Some authors argue that cyber conflict is primarily an **intelligence game**, because setting up cyber exploitation is much more expensive than countering released exploitation, which increases the incentive to keep the target at risk (Lindsay, 2017).

A third approach explores the broader repercussion of cyber conflict dynamics for government and governance. The concept of networked governance seems especially apt at capturing the essence of cyberspace as co-constituted by technical devices and networks and socio-political institutions (Hofmann, 2016). The key governance challenge in cyberspace is fragmentation of authority and accountability. A case in point is the lack in public transparency and trusted knowledge about the perpetrators behind most cyber incidents. Although the number of public attributions of cyber incidents by states and threat intelligence firms has been on the rise, both types of actors have political and economic reasons not to fully disclose their evidence (Egloff, 2019). As a consequence, attribution claims remain contested in the public domain, undermining the legitimacy of state action–from insurance matters and criminal proceedings to mechanism of international cooperation and potentially escalation control.

Cluster 3: Securitization, practice, and assemblages

Looking back at the beginnings of the cyber threat story, the policy debate was riddled with cyber-doom scenarios and constant attempts to mobilize in the political process. As a reaction to what was considered a “hype,” some scholars started to get interested in why and how this issue was presented the way it was and with what consequences. Early work to analyze the issues surrounding the politics of Internet from IR and critical security studies perspectives emerged at the end of the 1990s (Deibert, 2002; Eriksson, 2001; Saco, 1999). A bit later, there was a concentrated effort to apply variations of securitization theory to the issue of cyber security politics (cf. Dunn Cavelty, 2008; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2013). Securitization signifies the representation of a fact, a person, or a development as a danger for the military, political, economic, ecological, and/or social security of a political collective and the acceptance of this representation by the respective political addressee (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998). The successful securitization of a topic justifies the use of all available means to counter it–including those outside the normal political rules of the game.

Following the theory, the prime questions this literature engaged with were related to the object of security, to what or whom was considered the main threat, and to what policy responses flowed from these threat constructions (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Given its theoretical underpinnings, the Copenhagen School focuses mainly on official statements by heads of state, high-ranking officials or heads of international institutions (Hansen, 2006, p. 64). What a focus on elite speech acts ignores, however, is how these discursive practices are facilitated or prepared by practices of actors that are not so easily visible. The social competition for the definition of reality is not only held in the open political arena. There are always state and nonstate actors “under the radar”–that is, specialized bureaucratic units, consultants or other experts–which have the capacity to establish “the truth” about certain threats, thus pre-structuring the discursive field in relevant ways (Huysmans, 2006, p. 72).

Cyber security, so the common assumption, arises from the interaction of technologies, processes, and everyday practices. Thus, the literature pays particular attention to how a variety of actors uses different representations of danger to create or change different political, private, social, and commercial understandings of security in selected public spheres. In addition, it gives more weight to material aspects of the issue in the tradition of STS (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016; Collier, 2018; Shires, 2018; Stevens, 2016), looking at the co-constitution of technology and politics. In particular, it recognizes that the political reading of cyber security cannot be divorced from particular knowledge practices in different communities.

As the most recent research focus to emerge, literature in this cluster covers a variety of topics, united by a focus on understanding how cyber security emerges as an assemblage of people, objects, and enacted ideas. Questions of authority and power are most directly addressed by research in this cluster. C. Stevens (2019) sets out to better understand the role of cyber security companies by looking at Symantec’s analysis of Stuxnet and the publication of their reports in the public. Tanczer (2019) focuses on the increasingly blurred boundaries between field of security professionals and hackers, pointing to changes in the larger context of security and insecurity that are reflected in the practices of these technical experts and in the conception of them. Shires (2019) looks at how the cyber security industry portrays cyberspace as a terrain of persistent threat, systemic vulnerability, and intelligence ambiguity, a classic “noir” narrative that results from systemic economic deficiencies (distorted incentives for protection) and from systemic political deficiencies (black markets for new exploits). By focusing on non-traditional actors and aspects of politics, this type of research is able to make invisible aspects of cyber security visible.

Conclusion: Where is **cyber security** politics research headed?

Over the past decade, **research** in **cyber security** politics has seen the emergence of a **growing** interdisciplinary **body** of work that is at the same time **theoretically informed**, grounded in **empirical observations**, and **policy-relevant** in many of its insights. We have ended our **intellectual history** by outlining three research clusters. In place of a summary of the past and present evolution of cyber security as a security political issue, we want to look into a possible future of research on cyber security politics in this concluding section. We do this based on the same assumption discussed at the beginning of this article: that the trajectory of both cyber security research and cyber security policy will continue to be shaped by the interplay between technology, politics, and science. The direction in which research and policy will move will be co-constituted by technological possibilities, political choices, and scientific practices. We end our intellectual history with a brief outlook on likely developments in all three areas.

Digital technologies have politics, and technological possibilities and developments will require new governance mechanisms, while at the same time being shaped by politics. First, the interconnectedness between ever more complex socio-technical systems is bound to increase. Cyber security will grow in importance as a topic as countries all around the world strive to shape digital transformation processes that affect society, economy, and the state alike. In the context of what has been called fourth industrial revolution, the complexity of socio-technical systems will increase due the ubiquitous digitalization and automation of technical processes that support a great variety of socio-political institutions. As these technical system become tighter coupled and integrate more aspects of society and economy, cyber security concerns will inevitably expand to more policy fields at both the national and international level. These developments will create new demands for technical and organizational research that needs to be better integrated with approaches from the social and political science.

Second, cyberspace will become increasingly dependent on space-based technologies and interlinked with newly emerging technologies in the fields of quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI). This will increase the size of cyberspace. More importantly, as an enabling technology with diverse applications in all areas of life, AI will link cyberspace to more policy fields. AI will become an essential element of cyber security and will have a profound impact on the speed, scale, duration, autonomy, and complexity of cyber operations, for both offense and defense. These new technologies will be primarily developed by global technology firms and the private sector. As a consequence, state actors will likely become more dependent on technology firms and independent technology experts, further transforming the relationship between public and private actors. The fact that there is considerable **uncertainty** regarding the tempo and scope of these technological developments creates new demands for **research** that maps, assesses, models, and **forecasts** new **technological possibilities**. As social scientists, we need to understand the increasingly salient **political** and social **aspects** that will affect the patterns of **cooperation** and **conflict** in politics and society at the national and international level.

**Political choices** at the **national** and international **level** have a **technological dimension**. Politics will **influence** and **govern technology** development while at the same time being **pre-structured** by **technology**. First, we can expect that **political** and military **actors** will attempt to better understand the (limited) **strategic utility** of cyber operations below the level of **armed conflict**, in order to find the right balance between **restraint** and **exploitation**. One key challenge in this context is ho**w best** to **manage** the **transformation** of state intelligence services in the digital age and their **growing dependence** on private intelligence firms. Another key challenge is linked to information operations and propaganda that might be spread more targeted and effectively via AI technologies and social media platforms. These political developments raise important research questions that require interdisciplinary answers.

Second, public actors will uphold their efforts to control the risk of escalation trough international cooperation. States cannot secure cyberspace on their own, without taking into account **market** and **social forces**; yet no **stable cyber governance** framework will emerge without greater **convergence** on **responsible behavior** among **great powers**. As long as great powers **disagree** about what represents responsible use of **cyber operations** in **state interactions**, and for that matter what forms of espionage and interference in the political process of other states through cyberspace are acceptable, **little** top-down **progress** will materialize. **Bottom-up progress**, on the other hand, presupposes that the actors become **more visible** for each other in order to **successfully work together** in a multi-stakeholder framework. **Research** can shed light on **invisible actors** and **analyze** the interaction between market **dynamics** and **political dynamics** in stabilizing cyberspace, it can evaluate if the socio-technical institutions that secure cyberspace reflect the tools and practices of public and private actors.

Third, the key governance challenge at the domestic political level is how to overcome fragmentation of authority and accountability. Tighter coupling of technical systems and their growing interconnectedness with socio-political institutions creates growing demand for governance in networks, which in turn means that governments increasingly share responsibility with actors from business and society. The integration of policy into a coherent overall framework involves difficult trade-offs between security and privacy and creates horizontal and vertical coordination and cooperation problems across government and at the intersections between state, economy, and society. Research can evaluate how states can fine-tune their multidimensional roles. How states decide to regulate their technology base is moreover directly linked to how they anticipate this will influence their relative economic, political, and military power at the international level. Academics in this context can study how different (democratic and authoritarian) political systems balance regulation and market forces differently and what this means for state access to the private technology sector, export control systems of dual-use technologies, and screening mechanisms of foreign investment into the strategically relevant technology base.

Scientific practice, as our third and final sphere of interest, will keep coevolving with the anticipated changes in the spheres of technology and politics. We started the article with the ascertainment that there is no “field” or “subfield” of cyber security politics–and we conclude with a wish that this remains true in the future. Research at the **intersection** of **cybersecurity** and **security politics** in order to remain **relevant** to **policy choices** and cognizant of technological possibilities needs to **speak to** a variety of **other bodies of research**, free to choose interesting and pressing issue without **disciplinary constraints**; it needs to co-opt some of the **new data** analytical tools **offered by AI**, and it needs to flexibly overcome some of the **institutional barriers** that slowed down its **independent contribution** to **cyber security**.

A first key challenge for cyber security politics research is conceptual and linked to the integration of theoretical knowledge from different disciplines and research traditions. Researchers need to better integrate concepts and mechanisms from IR and security studies, IPE, and intelligence studies to analyze the transformation of intelligence services and how this affects their relationship with private cyber security and intelligence firms. They need to better understand the interplay between (black) security markets and (covert) security political dynamics if they want to explain the co-existence of strategic restraint and low-level subversion in cyberspace. Cyber security politics research must pay more attention to economic aspects of the phenomena at hand. Practice theory with its focus on technological possibilities and socio-technical processes allows to integrate these different approaches at the empirical level. STS offers a productive lens for understanding the mutual interplay between the technical and the socio-political sphere and, from an analytical point of view, to deal with the opaqueness of cyber operations. Such an approach is of critical importance in an attempt to shed light on how the cyber security policy and practice of states, both at the national and the international level, are facilitated or thwarted by the interests and practices of actors that are not easily visible, in- and outside of governments.

A second key challenge or indeed an opportunity for cyber security politics research is linked to the fact that more data about cyber operations by many different actors around the world and better tools to monitor and analyze this data are becoming available. While there is room for theory development and theory testing, we will likely enter an era of empirical work. In-depth qualitative studies on the role of invisible actors in state interactions linked to cyber security can be combined with more data-driven approaches that evaluate how new AI tools affect the cyber offense-defense balance. As state actors begin to integrate these tools in their border guards, police corps, armies and disaster response structures, important social and political questions will arise linked to privacy, bias, and control. Conversely, governments and societies will need to discuss how much of this new data should be made publicly available and what this means for data protection and privacy. From a research point of view, these developments call for more interdisciplinary research at the intersection of computer science, mathematics, economics, and political science.

A third key challenge for cyber security politics research is linked to overcoming the institutional barriers that slow down its independent contribution to cyber security and cyber security politics. Universities can help the public actors at the national and international level to catch up in their technology competence, while educating the next generation of experts for society and industry. **Academia** can contribute to the study of **cyber conflict** and through its **independent** and peer-reviewed **knowledge** broaden the knowledge base for some of the **difficult** policy choices discussed above. Science can collaborate with the **private** and **public actors** in the development of **evidentiary standards** and norms that will underpin the **future resilience** of sociotechnical systems, and in the negotiation and establishment of new norms and institutions that should govern the use and misuse of these systems. Yet in order to free its full **potential**, universities must overcome the **institutional barriers** that slow down **interdisciplinary** and more so **transdisciplinary research** intersection of science, technology, while building a network of institutions and programs that together can considerably expand the body of **public knowledge** surrounding these societally and politically relevant questions.

**2AC---Perm do Both**

#### Perm do both---studying both political power and individual contributions to security logics is necessary for generating change

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Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Florian J. Egloff, “Hyper-Securitization, Everyday Security Practice and Technification: Cyber-Security Logics in Switzerland,” Swiss Political Science Review, vol. 21, no. 1, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12433>

On the other hand, Everyday Security Practices are invoked frequently in the Swiss cyber-security discourse. Particularly, the idea of individuals as ‘responsible’ partners is reinforced in the various cyber-security policy documents and debates. This is partially manifest in the credo that everyone is primarily responsible for their own cyber-security. Such thinking echoes with the strong political ideal of subsidiarity that demands the leanest role of the state possible. The responsibility of individuals in the security of the whole collective is highlighted through calls towards more awareness and prevention campaigns, informing the broader public about cyber risks and countermeasures, thereby aiming to improve prevention and resiliency, security concepts of the everyday.6 Through the aim of resiliency, the individual is discursively constructed as being directly attached to larger security outcomes of social collectives.

Of all three, Technification is the most intriguing logic. Cyber-security ‘experts’ with a mostly technical background drive the Swiss discourse – be they ICT entrepreneurs, specialists, or researchers. This reflects the technification of the securitised cyber-security discourse, in that privilege is given to constructing cyber-security as a primarily technical issue. Other, non-technical commentators often preface their statements with “I am no technical expert, but...” demonstrating the need to legitimise one’s own contributions to a political discourse, when one is not considered ‘technical’ This technified discourse is further visible throughout policy solutions, be they the way critical infrastructure risk is measured (i.e. calculated in complex formulas and statistics), or the state of internet security in Switzerland is communicated (e.g. how many percent of Swiss websites implement a particular security technology).

Conclusion

In this contribution, we demonstrated that Swiss cyber-security politics can be fruitfully approached with constructivist research, more specifically, one that draws on practice approaches. Of the three securitization logics as described by Hansen and Nissenbaum, all three are present in the Swiss case, with technification being the dominant one at present. For democratic politics, technification is a particular challenge. Assigning an issue to the technical realm has a depoliticizing influence, which removes it from democratic deliberations. By making cyber-security an issue of the ‘genius few’, technification makes contestation from those with less technical expertise very hard if not impossible or makes it easy for those with the most valued expertise to discredit others without it. In addition, the power of technical expertise comes with a claim of being ‘neutral’ or ‘a-political’, and hence, of being more valid than anything that seems emotional or based on morals.

The Swiss case also highlights interesting aspects for securitization research and beyond. In theory, securitization assumes that there is one powerful actor who can make a convincing case for the exceptional nature of a policy issue. The entire Swiss political system works against this. **There are always multiple voices and multiple audiences to convince** – which makes it much harder to be successful in a simple securitization move based on urgency. In such a political system, **less ‘visible’ bureaucratic actors need to be studied more thoroughly.** Security is not mainly the domain of security elites and politicians. Instead, the research focus needs to shift to everyday security practices, to less traditional security actors, and to actors outside government that have a central role in the creation of danger knowledge and everyday security.

Beyond securitization research, it is evident that looking closely at the **intricacies of political systems, power distribution and political culture,** as studied by scholars in comparative politics and similar fields, becomes necessary to understand security logics in any policy field. **Bringing the two research traditions more closely together** in some form of conversation across sub-disciplinary boundaries **could be beneficial for both.**

**2AC---Securitization Good**

**Cyber securitization is inevitable AND good – recognizing the threat is key to developing necessary protections**

**Hersee 19** – PhD in Cyber Security, which focusses on the dispute between digital rights and national security in cyberspace.

Steven Hersee, “THE CYBER SECURITY DILEMMA AND THE SECURITISATION OF CYBERSPACE,” Royal Holloway University of London, 2019, https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-cyber-security-dilemma-and-the-securitisation-of-cyberspace(dcf65dd5-c75d-40ce-8994-6da979eaa1e7).html

5.2 SHOULD CYBERSPACE BE DESECURITISED?

**Desecuritisation** is the process by which an issue is removed from the security sphere and is **no longer considered to be an urgent threat**, requiring exceptional measures to counter. For the Copenhagen School, ‘it means not to have issues phrased as “threats against which me have countermeasures” but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ (Busan, et al., 1998, p. 29).

But **desecuritisation is difficult to achieve once an issue has been accepted as threatening** and **desecuritisation does not guarantee than an issue will become re- politicised** and re-open to public debate. If securitising moves are rejected forcefully enough, then **issues can become both de-securitised and de-politicised** (See Figure 5.1). This means that **not only are the issues considered non- threatening, but they are also closed for discussion**. Islamic extremism and immigration are issues that are often difficult to discuss in a political environment because they are either securitised as existentially threatening or de-politicised because the responses to them are considered threatening, racist or intolerant.

Cyberspace scholars are in general agreement that cyberspace securitisation has mainly negative consequences. Kingsmith, for example, discusses the negative consequences that emerge from moves by states to securitise internet content.

Considering these securitising moves ... the more that filtering practices are withheld from public scrutiny and accountability, the more tempting it is for framing authorities to employ these tools for illegitimate reasons such as the stifling of both opposition and civil society networks (Kingsmith, 2013, p. 1).

Deibert also highlights the negative consequences of the securitisation of cyberspace, including the resultant threats to basic freedoms.

There has been a **growing recognition of serious risks in cyberspace**. The need to manage these risks has led to a wave of securitization efforts that have potentially serious implications for basic freedoms (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010, p. 49).

Whilst arguing that the securitisation of cyberspace is negative and inevitable, Deibert also contends that the form of this **securitisation can be influenced**. ‘The **securitization of cyberspace may be inevitable**, but what form that security takes is not’ (Deibert, 2012, p. 274). He suggests that it is better to securitise threats to human rights than to securitise threats to national security. Mariya Georgieva takes this further, citing the Snowden disclosures as an example of the securitisation of digital rights, arguing that Snowden had ‘successfully shifted the focus of the securitisation of cyberspace from values such as the survival of the state and effective national security to the survival of privacy and personal choice’ (Georgieva, 2015, p. 44). Whilst she celebrates this shift she does not explain why it is better to securitise privacy rather than national security. Helen Nissenbaum is one author who does take a more consequentialist approach to cyberspace securitisation, arguing that **it might be justified when the threat is as extreme** as its proponents claim.

If those who subscribe to a conception of security as cybersecurity are right, particularly **if the magnitude of threat is as great as those on the extremes claim, then an extraordinary response is warranted despite its chilling effects** (Nissenbaum, 2005, p. 73).

However, this approach is rare and most literature is either critical of state surveillance and the securitisation of cyberspace, or is complimentary of Edward Snowden and supportive of the securitisation of individual privacy. Given that a narrow majority of the British public support greater efforts to protect national security it is surprising that academic literature is weighted so strongly towards criticisms of state surveillance and the securitisation of national security (Pew Research Centre, 2016). Even when cyberspace securitisation by non-state actors is addressed, such as in Georgieva’s work on Snowden as an alternative securitizing actor, these forms of securitisation are **considered positive** because they **support human rights**. In the US and UK, academics have also been politically active in opposing state surveillance. In 2014 over one thousand scholars from a wide range of disciplines formed the ‘academics against surveillance’ campaign, which published an open letter criticising state surveillance (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014).

Whilst there is disagreement over whether desecuritisation is always best and what types of securitisation should be reversed, there are a variety of means through which desecuritisation can be achieved.

### 1AR---Securitization Good

**Even if cyber securitization is bad, it’s inevitable and necessary – their alt ensures infrastructure attacks and cyber crimes**

**Pickin 12** – MA in War Studies and University of London

Matthew Pickin, “What is the securitization of cyberspace? Is it a problem?,” University of London, 2012, https://www.academia.edu/3100313/What\_is\_the\_securitization\_of\_cyberspace\_Is\_it\_a\_problem

In analysing the problems of securitization, major issues have been raised. Threat inflation, surveillance, militarisation and the military-industrial complex are only some of the most prominent issues. There are **benefits of securitization** however, and at the very end of this analysis it will be explained why **securitization is necessary for now**. The main supporting arguments for securitization include, the future of cyber-attacks in conflicts, protecting critical infrastructure and cyber-crime.

The 2010 National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment stated that the United States was under a severe threat of cyber-attacks (Blair, 2010). Due to the amount of infrastructure connected to the internet in the United States targets for cyber-attacks are nearly unlimited, as a superpower the United States presents a valuable target. “As the world’s hegemonic power, the United States is also the **main target** state that dissident groups, terrorists, and rogue states wish to damage (Valeriano & Maness, 2011, p. 145).” Therefore, the **United States must have some defence, or offensive capability in order to protect itself from future conflicts and attacks on critical infrastructure**. In Foreign Affairs William J Lynn the former deputy secretary of defence wrote that the centrality of information technology in the United States makes it a prime target. He argued that extending advanced cyber-defences was crucial for the American economy, and also stated that **failure of critical infrastructure** would **compromise national defence**, “Our assessment is that **cyber-attacks** will be a **significant component** of future conflicts (Lynn, 2011).” Therefore **in order to protect the United States, the government has been forced to securitize the issue**. According to William J Lynn an attack could compromise national defence; therefore the issue is very high in the national security agenda. In the article, he also addresses the critics who argue that cyberspace is at risk of being militarized and states that US cyber strategy has been designed to prevent this from happening, “Far from militarizing cyberspace, U.S. cyber-strategy will make it more difficult for military actors to use cyberspace for hostile purposes (Lynn, 2011).” In **securitizing cyberspace** and creating advanced cyber-defences and cyber-weapons the United States is **preparing for any future conflict or attack.** If such an attack or conflict is a real existing threat then it is **beneficial to prepare through securitization**, otherwise the disadvantages clearly outweigh any advantage.

The other **main benefit** of **securitizing cyberspace** would be **tackling cyber-crime**. According to the security company Sophos, in the first six months of 2010 it received 60,000 new malware samples every day. Apart from malware, cyber-crime covers many different areas such as financial, piracy, hacking and cyber-terrorism. These crimes are growing due to the constantly evolving communications system of social sharing of data, online data storage and social networking, “Although cybercrime has formed a hidden shadow and a kind of evil doppelganger to every step of the Internet’s long history from its very origins, its growth has suddenly become explosive in recent years by virtually any estimate (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 28).” Both Deibert and Rohozinski argue that the rise is cyber-crime has become a big problem for states, in 2011 counterfeiting and copying cost the Asia-Pacific region almost $21 billion. Certainly cyber-space has become a rewarding way to commit crimes with little risk of prosecution, “Cybercrime has elicited so little prosecution from the world’s law enforcement agencies it makes one wonder a de facto decriminalization has occurred (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 29).” Due to the trouble of cyber-crime, **the only way of combating it effectively would be greater state regulation and intervention**. With the whole of cyber-space effectively securitized by the United States due to the threat to national security by technological and social shifts, the government is asserting itself increasingly to counter these threats.

Conclusion

In analysing what was the securitization of cyberspace, the beginnings of the cyber-debate in the United States have been examined; this country was used due to reliance on information technology and the status as a superpower. The securitization model from the Copenhagen school of thought was used to understand how issues are non-politicized, politicized and eventually securitized. A different range of security bills have been examined with this model to understand what was needed for cyberspace to become a securitized issue. With the definition of securitization dependent on the terms of national security, the changing definition of this concept was also examined. Securitization has occurred due to an evolving history whereby the military have understood the potential of information technologies in warfare and where vulnerabilities have been recognised that could damage national security.

In evaluating whether securitization of cyberspace is a problem, it is very clear that securitization is a growing concern with many complications. There are many issues including privacy, regulation, surveillance, internet regulation and the growing tension in the international system. However, because the United States is a superpower contesting with other cyber-heavyweights such as Iran, Russia and China **the issue will not be de-securitized in the short term**. With the discovery and use of cyber-weapons, many states are in the process of making their own for defensive and offensive purposes. The government of the **United States will not de-securitize the issue of cyberspace while there are rival states and groups which prove a threat to the national security agenda**. These problems will continue to exist until there is no defensive agenda and the issue is de-securitized, for now **securitization is a necessary evil**.

**2AC---Cyber-Threats Real**

**Cyber-security research is based in sound research. Cold war threat inflation is a thing of the past.**

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Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855

Cluster 1: The **reality of cyber conflict**: Explaining state restraint and practices

In the **beginning** of this **intellectual history**, political aspects of **cyber security** were discussed almost **exclusively** in publications originating in U.S. **think tanks** and **war colleges** (for example: Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1992). This literature had **little ambition** to contribute to an academic debate. The two main questions it tackled were “who (or what) is the biggest danger for an increasingly networked nation/society/military/business environment” and “how to best counter the new and evolving threat.”

The first cluster is characterized by a **reevaluation** of the threat based on **empirical evidence** and a **gradual application** and adaption of “**old**” **IR** and strategic studies concepts to **cyber security** (Kello, 2013). Two cyber incidents–the discovery of **Stuxnet** in 2010 and later the **Snowden disclosures** in 2013–were **instrumental** in shifting the focus of both **policymakers** and **researchers** from the **threat politics** of “**what if**”-scenarios that had dominated the 1990s and early 2000s to the **reality** of the **strategic use** of **cyberspace** by state actors. In this new context, literature in **IR** and **strategic studies** could be used to examine how **state actors** use cyber instruments for their **political** or **military advantage** and analyze their impact on national and international security (Borghard & Lonergan, 2017; Kello, 2017; Maness & Valeriano, 2016). A strong disciplinary “**pull**” is visible in how early works **zoomed** in on an alleged **offensive advantage** in cyberspace due to the ubiquity of technical vulnerabilities (Peterson, 2013), grappled with the problem of **escalation dynamics** in cyberspace (Liff, 2012), and asked how deterrence might be adapted in order to uphold stability in cyberspace (Wilner, 2019).

As researchers began to build data sets of cyber operations (Kostyuk & Zhukov, 2019; Valeriano & Maness, 2014) to link cyber issues to the larger agenda of conflict studies, an empirical puzzle emerged that **challenged** many of the **theoretical tenets** and standards assumptions of the **older literature**. Most cyber operations did not seem escalatory, nor were they determined by power asymmetries or changed the existing strategic balance. **Overall**, states seemed to exercise a fair amount of **restraint** in cyberspace (Gartzke, 2013; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). **At the same time, however**, a lot of cyber operations linked to **state rivalries occurred**, though as mere add-ons to existing conflict dynamics and not independent of a broad range of other foreign policy instruments (Betz & Stevens, 2011).

Reacting to this puzzle, the literature in this cluster has begun to move in two directions: First, and comparable to the evolution of the strategic studies literature during the nuclear age, some authors have started to integrate additional non-systemic explanatory factors into their analyses of cyber conflict. While some explore the role of beliefs and **cognitive biases** in cyber policy decision making (Gomez, 2019), others zoom in on the destabilizing role of bureaucratic politics and other deficiency of the policy process especially in crisis decision making. Second, and more consequentially, many authors acknowledge that the emerging empirical picture reflects the structural feature of cyberspace as an operating environment, which is marked by a high degree of technical interconnectedness and constant political contestation (Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2018; Smeets, 2018). Taking this into account, operating strategically in cyberspace seems to be more technically and organizationally demanding than the “cheap and easy”-metaphor suggests, while at the same time offering little enduring strategic gains in the sense of changing a rival’s political goals (Lewis, 2018; Slayton, 2017).

**2AC---Realism Good**

**A focus on the state is still necessary and appropriate. Critical approaches fail because they focus on theory and abstraction over empirical data.**

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In 2006, Eriksson and Giacomello stated that the discipline of international relations (**IR**) was struggling to **apply** its varied theoretical toolbox to the topic of **cyber security**, therein detecting “great difficulties for theoretical adaptation and application in analyses of the complexities of the emerging new digital world” (p. 236). **This observation no longer holds true**. Due to interlinked changes occurring in the **fields** of **technology**, politics, and **science**, research that applies **international relations** or **security** studies theory to different facets of the **phenomenon** is no longer as **rare**, inviting us to look at this emergent body of research in depth at this point in time (for a similar undertaking see Deibert, 2017a, 2017b).

This special issue displays the latest wave of cyber security politics research. The articles position themselves mostly in a post-positivist research tradition and use a set of different theories and conceptual frameworks to analyze the current state of cyber security in politics. Some articles examine the contested nature of public attributions of cyber incidents, the norm-setting day-to-day behavior of intelligence agencies, and discuss the consequences for governments and governance. Another group of articles explores the knowledgeshaping practices of IT-security companies, the co-production of risks and vulnerabilities by technology and experts, and aim at better understanding the role of firms and experts in strategic state interactions.

In this introductory article, we provide the intellectual history to situate the literature in its broader evolutionary context. In a first part, inspired by Buzan and Hansen’s framework from their “The Evolution of International Security Studies” (2009), we discuss six drivers that have been influential in the evolution of (Western) cyber security politics and how it is studied. In a second part, we identify three clusters of research. In each of them, we highlight the interplay between technological possibilities and political choices of state actors in combination with scientific factors. The focus on “**the state**” is **appropriate and necessary**, because **security** politics is **inevitably tied** to questions of **authority and power**. That said, the state is not the **only** important actor in this space–rather, it is at the **intersection** between state and nonstate actors, nationally and internationally, that the **specificities** of **cyber security** politics emerge.

In the conclusion, we use these same drivers to look into the possible future of cyber security politics research. We claim that it should not be conceptualized as a sub-field of anything, so that inquiry is not overly restricted by the disciplining power of disciplines. Cyber security transcends levels of analysis, necessitates considerable interdisciplinary knowledge, and will be shaped by the availability of new data and methods. Its relevance for society is likely to become even bigger in the future, with new digital technologies expanding the spatial boundaries of cyberspace and with new complex issues emerging. Scientific knowledge of both the problem-solving and the reflexive kind is crucial to understand what politics these technologies will have and how they will be linked to broader socio-economic changes affecting the society, the economy, and the state in the future.

Factors driving the evolution of cyber security politics research

Mapping a body of research is no trivial and certainly no purely objective undertaking. In order to simplify and abstract, a series of choices have to be made about what to include and what to exclude. As critical cartographers know, “[m]apping is epistemological but also deeply ontological – it is both a way of thinking about the world, offering a framework for knowledge, and a set of assertions about the world itself” (Kitchin, Perkins, & Dodge, 2009, p. 1). First, we hone in on “cyber security politics,” highlighting two areas that help to structure the debate. What we aim for in these pages is an understanding of cyber security politics that is flexible enough to deal with the dynamics of the phenomenon, yet precise enough to demarcate the research focus sufficiently to be of use. Second, and loosely following Buzan and Hansen (2009), we identify six driving forces that explain the dynamic co-evolution of cyber security politics and the academic engagement with it. These factors help us to understand what researchers choose to write about, what subjects and issues they define as the main cyber security problem(s) and which ontologies, epistemologies, and methods carry legitimacy (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 39–40).

Staking out cyber security politics

What is “cyber security” and how is it related to security politics? Far from allowing a straightforward answer, this question lies at the heart of the political and academic debates about the issue. First, cyber security is a relatively new term for a set of older practices around the security of computer networks (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). Second, definitions for the term are contested, exemplified by the refusal of some state actors to agree on a common vocabulary (Giles & Hagestad, 2013). Third, the meaning of the term is changing across time. Not so long ago, a limited circle of experts discussed cyber security primarily as a technical risk management issue in critical information infrastructure protection. Now the highest government circles deal with cyber security as a key challenge of national security (Dewar, 2018). Fourth, parallel to the advancing digitalization of ever more aspects of the economy, society, and politics, cyber security concerns are expanding to additional policy domains (Dunn Cavelty & Egloff, 2019). In sum, cyber security is at the same time moving upwards in the political agenda and expanding sideways as a problem area to a multitude of additional policy domains.

Simple and static definitions are not well suited to deal with constantly changing contexts. However, if we look down on the conceptual space from a sufficient height, we notice that cyber security politics’ common ground is characterized by two main factors: First, by digital technologies, specifically their use and misuse by human actors in economic, social, and political contexts; and second, by enduring and often highly conflictual negotiation processes in formal and informal settings between the state and its bureaucracies, society, and the private sector, geared towards defining roles, responsibilities, legal boundaries and acceptable rules of behavior.1

The first dimension is tied to the use of a set of distinct digital technologies and how these technologies are linked to broader conceptions of socio-economic changes (Papp, Alberts, & Tuyahov, 1997). The marriage of computers and telecommunications, the integration of these technologies into a global multimedia system, and their worldwide inexpensive availability is the bedrock for heralding multiple, rapid and consequential transformations in production, management, societal interaction, and governance (Schwab, 2018) though it remains to be seen just how revolutionary these changes will really be. The most pertinent questions in cyber security politics with regard to digital technologies are what their characteristics are, what actions they make possible and which ones they restrain, but also who develops them in what ways and why and who has the power to shape their use and misuse.

The second dimension is tied to the role of states and their engagement with other actors nationally and internationally. “Security” in cyber security politics can be read in two ways: As cyber security politics (the security political aspects of the issue) or as cyber security politics (the politics engaging with questions of cyber security more broadly). This ambiguity is deliberate because we consider the question of what type of politics emerges under what kind of rules and with what kind of boundaries to be crucial. From a theoretical point of view, the question of how much politics there is or should be in security–and how much security in politics–allows us to link research in cyber security to debates in security studies (Hagmann, Hegemann, & Neal, 2019). Importantly, the state has different roles in cyber security, ranging from security guarantor, legislator and regulator, to threat actor and danger to society and other states (Dunn Cavelty & Egloff, 2019). Hence, cyber security politics are defined by national and international negotiation processes about the boundaries of the responsibilities of state, economic, and societal actors and the agreement or disagreement over the means these actors use. This second dimension includes the projection of power by certain actors, like the control over populations and information flows, and the push-back against it as well.

Six driving factors

In their intellectual history of international security studies, Buzan and Hansen develop a framework of five interrelated factors (2009, pp. 39– 100)–great power politics, technology, key events, academic debates, and institutionalization–that drove the evolution of the field. For cyber security politics, we propose a slightly different framework, purporting that changes in research are linked to changes in the empirical phenomenon, whereby these changes can go both ways: A research phenomenon often influences directions of research, but research also illuminates aspects of the phenomenon that have gone unnoticed before. We focus on the interrelationship between technology and the world of policy and state practice–on what political actors say they are doing and on what they are doing in the field of cyber security as a political issue, both nationally and internationally, often in relation to other actors–and on the different ways to observe this interrelationship (Figure 1). The intellectual history of cyber security politics is thus shaped by the interplay of three broad spheres: Technology, Politics, and Science.2 Technological dynamics interact with social and political dynamics. Technological possibilities and constraints influence socio-economic processes. In turn, political preferences and contexts shape the evolution of digital technologies. This also applies fundamentally to the actors developing these technologies and to the dynamic interplay of cyber security markets and cyber security politics. Within each of the three spheres, we identify two main drivers. In different combinations during different times, these six factors stimulate or dissuade scholars from picking up specific research questions. A summary can be seen in Table 1, with a more detailed description in what follows.

[[Figure Omitted]]

Technology as a driver

It seems like an obvious choice to include “technology” as a category, since the issue of cyber security is linked to the development and use of cyberspace, a technological environment entirely built by humans. Yet scholars have rightly pointed out that the vision of one unique cyberspace is itself based on a social construction (Bingham, 1996; Graham, 1998). Indeed, the conception of what cyberspace is and what can be done with it has changed considerably throughout its history, highlighting the needfor historically contingent understandings of the development and use of technologies. However, a core characteristic of IR scholarship’s dealing with digital technology is “technological determinism” (Herrera, 2003). The majority of IR approaches chooses to deal with technology as an exogenous variable (McCarthy, 2018, p. 4), seeing technologies as a material objects or power resources that drive social change or as neutral tools that acquire meaning only through their use (Leese & Hoijtink, 2019).

In contrast, we understand technologies as embodiments of societal knowledge in the tradition of science and technology studies (STS), as sites where power relations can be seen in operation and where the shaping and coordination of the behavior of social and political actors happens (Behrent, 2013, p. 57). During the design stage of technologies, the intentions, norms, and values of their developers find their way into the artefacts, while existing power structures influence the desirability of specific aspects or forms of technology. Once technologies diffuse, they are often given particular meanings and acquire purposes other than the one initially intended by their developers (Matthewman, 2011), but always within certain inescapable material bounds (see also Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2018). For example: A pen can be used for writing, but it can also be used to stab someone. It can, however, not be used to make phone calls.

[[Table Omitted]]

That digital technologies “have politics” is hardly a contested statement (Deibert, 2003, 2013; DeNardis, 2014; Mueller, 2010; Price, 2018). Design decisions made by engineers in the late 1960s have implications until today, especially for security. From the early prototype phase as ARPANET (1967- 1972) to the gradual development into “the Internet” (1973-1983), technological protocols that define how data is exchanged were written in an egalitarian spirit (Naughton, 2016). The decision to have a system with minimal rules that had no central power and no censor was deliberate and based on philosophical and political beliefs of the technical community (Berners-Lee, 1999). Cyber security as we understand it today became an issue only gradually, when the system architecture changed from large proprietary machines with little connection to “smaller and far more open systems (not built with security in mind) coupled with the rise of networking” (Libicki, 2000), yet still ran on the same basic protocols.

The perception that cyberspace is creating and perpetuating insecurity with potentially catastrophic consequences is shaped by different key events linked to the technological sphere as a second important driving factor. In line with what we noted above, these events are not understood as causal forces that unidirectionally influence politics or science (cf. Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 54ff.) but rather as interrelated catalyzers. The category consists of events outside the cyber realm with influence on cyber security politics (examples include 9/11, the Snowden revelations, or the Arab Spring), and cyber incidents themselves. In its most basic form, a cyber incident is a disruption that challenges the normal operation of digital technologies. Undesired change inside machines create technical effects. Yet these technical effects alone are not sufficient to explain the salience of cyber security in politics. Between the initial effect in the machine and the political effect lies a knowledge production process that creates an incident embedded in a specific social context. A technical effect needs to be discursively linked to something with sufficient social or political value to become security politically relevant–which also explains why only some cyber incidents reach that stage while others do not (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016).

Such moments of disruption highlight previously hidden characteristics of socio-technical artifacts, opening up opportunities for the study of new aspects of the phenomena that were not easily observable before or did not seem important (Best & Walters, 2013, p. 346; Latour, 1999). Incidents are also linked to another fundamental issue in the study of cyber security: the availability of data. Our current knowledge about cyber security relies heavily on data from commercial threat reporting and news reports. Yet this data provides a partial and biased view of cyber threat activity, because it is often politicized and influenced by the demands of powerful buyers and the interests of capable providers (Lindsay, 2017).

Politics as a driver

The discipline of **IR** is mainly interested in patterns of **cooperation** and **conflict** among **states** and how these patterns relate to shifts in the distribution and **character of power** in the international system: international power politics. As the issue of **cyber security** gained in importance in **state interactions**, experts and policy makers pondered whether **digital technologies** gave rise to a “**new**” type of **power** and how this power source would influence the **existing** power **distribution** in the system (Nye, 2011). Given that IR began as an “American discipline, was focused on American security and written by Americans” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 51), the debate about the security implications arising from the spread of information technologies also originated in America, with a series of implications for how the subject was studied. Though definitions vary, cyber power is understood as the use of resources related to cyberspace to achieve specific (political) ends inside and outside of cyberspace (cf. Nye, 2010, p. 3). In the contemporary U.S. setting, a discourse of simultaneous empowerment and disempowerment characterized the conceptual debate from the beginning. While the technological realm carried the promise of wielding a new sort of power, it highlighted new dependencies and vulnerabilities at the same time (Rattray, 2001).

Apart from giving the digital domain a particular weight in the broader questions that IR scholars are interested in, we also need to consider how **international politics** influence the **use** of **these technologies**. Given the **interconnection** between **technology** and politics, we can expect the **overall state** of **world politics** to have a noticeable influence on the forms of **use**/misuse of **these technologies**. Buzan and Hansen call this larger context “**patterns of enmity** and amity between **great powers**” (2009, p. 52). This highlights questions of cooperation and conflict, about the formation of alliances and the maintenance of strategic stability, about the proliferation and control of dual-use technologies, but also about the efforts of states to come to international agreements in the form of norms and institutions.

In our conception of politics, the **international dimension** is just **one aspect** of a broader set of political interactions. Cyber security is **not only** about **enmity** and **amity** and the potential for **war** and peace. In fact, it is not very often about situations of great urgency, but more often about “**normal” domestic politics**. Like many other complex policy issues, **cyber security** is cutting across different areas of **responsibility**, requiring coordination and cooperation between a wide **variety** of **public actors** at different levels of government, but also actors from business and society When government tasks and authority are delegated downwards (localization), upwards (supranationalization), or sideways (privatization) (Krahmann, 2003), governance in networks becomes important. Under such conditions, governments no longer simply issue instructions and monitor their implementation, but seek to shape the framework conditions so that cooperation operates as smoothly as possible even without constant oversight (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Salamon, 2002), coming with a set of challenges for state-society relationships.

Science as a driver

The last two factors are situated in the realm of science that is understood here as a collective term for “academic work,” “intellectual labor,” or “knowledge production.” Like Buzan and Hansen (2009, pp. 57-65), we focus on academic debates and on institutionalization. This introduces an element of internal conflict into our intellectual history, because even if academics would agree on the key events or issues that need to be studied, how they would study it would still differ widely. As a case in point, cyber security politics research is no subfield of anything–it is characterized and united by the engagement with a multifaceted and dynamic phenomena, but the disciplinary approaches used, the ontological and epistemological choices, vary greatly.

Debates about ontology, epistemology, and methodology are at the heart of some of the most fruitful key debates in security studies, but at the same time they divide the discipline. The biggest **cleft** exists between **problem-solving** theories and **critical theories**: the former do not explicitly question the prevailing social and power relationships, while the latter problematize these very relationships by analyzing their origins and their evolution (Cox, 1986). Which of these two approaches is **favored** in certain research settings however **depends** on many different factors (Bourbeau, Balzacq, & Dunn Cavelty, 2015). Building on decades of IR scholarship, **traditional approaches** have seen **incremental** **theoretical innovation** since the end of the Cold War. By contrast, **critical approaches** have gone through a phase of rich **theory** development and are only **slowly** becoming ripe for **empirical work** based on critical methods (Aradau, Huysmans, Neal, & Voelkner, 2014). The key focus of interest has been the analysis of the (social) power relations that underpin security policies in liberal states, highlighting security as a powerful political technology for social (and political) control (Dillon & Reid, 2009); as a collection of discourses that serve to empower and reproduce hierarchies (Shepherd, 2008); or as routinized and patterned practices carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals (Bigo, 2002). These overall research trends have an important impact on cyber security politics research, since the topic has been picked up by all approaches, leading to distinct takes on what cyber security politics is and how it should be studied.

**Emerging cyber-dynamics don’t make realism obsolete.**

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Akin Ünver, 6-11-2017, "Computational Diplomacy: Foreign Policy Communication in the Age of Algorithms and Automation," Edam, https://edam.org.tr/en/computational-diplomacy-foreign-policy-communication-in-the-age-of-algorithms-and-automation/

**Automation** doesn’t change the fact that **diplomats** and embassies still matter. **Foreign policy**, like all politics, is a factor of **human condition**, including sense, gut feeling and cultural cues, along with its **imperfections**. However, there is a **clear trajectory** whereby **states** that can best **adapt** to automation – in war, **foreign policy** and economy – will develop more **efficient ways** of dealing with the challenges of an **interconnected**, **data**-centric **world**. Diplomacy too, can retain its **relevance** and influence over **politics** between **nations**, so long as it can properly designate areas where **automation** can help and where it can’t. Although all **states** will come up with their **own answers** to these questions, based on their **own individual interests and needs**, the common direction in which automation and foreign policy is headed is more or less similar for all countries. In the future, diplomacy has to build data processing and management capabilities, with dedicated departments and scientists supporting diplomats and negotiators on the ground. The structure of this new framework will also heavily depend on regime type, scope of foreign interests and alliance behavior.

The structural shadow of **uncertainty** over diplomacy is stronger than ever. Some communicative rituals and **practices** of diplomacy are growing more **obsolete**, as modern political communication slides increasingly to short and sharp rhetoric, coupled with automation tools that bombard audiences at unprecedented levels. **Diplomacy itself** is **hardly obsolete however**, as the task of mediating and **negotiating power relations** is perhaps as important as it was during the **Cold War**. **New power** centers – in the form of technology companies and big data brokers – are **changing** the **state-centric parameters** of **classical realism perhaps**, but the **inherent dynamics of power realignment** still render **diplomacy** a **crucial endeavor**. To rise to the challenge however, modern diplomacy has to develop a strong computational **capacity**, able to adapt to the changing nature of **digital communication** and advances in automation.